Israeli and Brazilian media view Donald Trump’s policies as an increasingly significant and potentially destabilizing factor. The focus is on Washington’s reliability in its relationship with Netanyahu, the risk of escalation involving Iran, and a possible shift in the U.S. strategy on Ukraine—toward a peace agreement or a new phase of confrontation. Meanwhile, the Brazilian press is discussing the prospect of deploying U.S. troops in Latin America, reflecting the region’s concerns about intervention and sovereignty. This material is based on reports by O Povo (Brazil) and News Israel (Israel).
Brazil Concerned by Expanded U.S. Military Presence
Plans by Donald Trump’s administration to expand the U.S. military presence in Latin America under the pretext of combating drug trafficking have caused concern across the region. As noted by the Brazilian outlet O Povo, this is not merely a new security operation, but could also alter the political and military balance in Central and South America.
According to available information, the United States intends to send about 600 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division to a jungle training center in Panama. After training, the units are expected to take part in exercises and operations alongside the forces of Colombia and Honduras. At the same time, Washington plans to deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to Colombia and Ecuador, establish a new command structure in Miami, and expand counter-narcotics operations. In addition to maritime routes, operations are expected to be conducted more actively on land.
For Brazil and other countries in the region, the key question is not so much the size of the U.S. contingent as whether the temporary deployment will become the basis for permanent U.S. military infrastructure. The mission is formally described as temporary, but American officials acknowledge that rotating units could become a lasting element of the region’s security architecture.
This scenario is particularly sensitive because of Latin America’s historical memory. During the 20th and 21st centuries, many governments and societies in the region viewed U.S. intervention in their affairs as a violation of national sovereignty. The issue has additional significance for Brazil, whose foreign-policy tradition is based on non-intervention, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and strengthening regional autonomy.
Although the publication does not include direct comments from Brazilian politicians or experts, its assessment reflects widespread Latin American distrust of the militarization of counter-narcotics policy. Human-rights organizations fear an increase in civilian casualties, while specialists point out that eliminating individual members of criminal groups rarely destroys the networks themselves: new figures quickly replace leaders who have been killed or arrested.
O Povo pays particular attention to the effectiveness of U.S. operations already under way. Washington says it has carried out 71 strikes against suspected vessels in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, resulting, according to U.S. data, in 239 deaths. However, the American side has not provided evidence that all those killed were actually involved in drug trafficking. Experts have also not observed any significant reduction in the availability of cocaine on the U.S. market.
For Brazil, which is simultaneously fighting transnational crime and remains an important transit territory for cocaine, this raises a broader question about the effectiveness of external military force. Drug trafficking is linked not only to supply routes and armed groups, but also to sustained consumer demand, financial schemes, corruption, poverty, and weak state institutions. Military strikes may hit individual links in the chain, but they do not eliminate its structural causes.
An expanded U.S. presence could also affect the domestic politics of neighboring countries and increase pressure on governments pursuing a more independent foreign policy. This, in turn, could complicate regional cooperation, in which Brazil seeks to maintain a prominent diplomatic role.
Thus, the O Povo report views the American campaign against cartels not as a neutral technical operation. The focus is on the risk of normalizing a permanent U.S. military presence, doubts about the effectiveness of a force-based approach, and concern that the fight against drug trafficking could become a new mechanism for expanding American influence in Latin America.
Israel Questions the Effectiveness of MOAB Against Iran
The possible use by the United States of the super-powerful MOAB bomb against Iran would not guarantee the destruction of its nuclear and missile infrastructure, according to authors at the Israeli outlet Inyan Merkazi. The publication examines Donald Trump’s threats primarily from the perspective of Israel’s security and urges readers not to confuse an impressive explosion with a genuine military result.
MOAB, known as the “mother of all bombs,” weighs about 9.8 metric tons and can cause extensive destruction on the surface. However, the outlet emphasizes that the weapon is not designed to penetrate mountain formations or deep underground complexes. The main problem is that Iran has spent many years building defensive infrastructure designed to withstand possible U.S. and Israeli air superiority.
Tehran’s nuclear facilities, missile arsenals, command centers, production plants, and storage sites are dispersed, camouflaged, and in many cases located deep underground. Therefore, the authors note, “the force of an explosion is not equal to its ability to penetrate.” After a powerful strike, the key question will not be the scale of the destruction on the surface, but what remains operational “under the mountain.”
The American GBU-57 MOP, weighing about 13.6 metric tons, is mentioned as a more suitable weapon for such tasks. It was designed to destroy hardened underground facilities. Even its use, however, would not guarantee success: the outcome would depend on the depth of the structures, geological conditions, the design of the fortifications, the accuracy of the strike, and the quality of intelligence.
From the Israeli perspective, a massive airstrike could destroy entrances to facilities, communications, and external infrastructure, but would not necessarily eliminate equipment, material stockpiles, and production capacity hidden in protected underground rooms. This distinction between a spectacular attack and the irreversible elimination of a threat is central to the publication’s assessment.
The possibility of retaliatory escalation is also a major concern. A U.S. operation against Iran could lead to strikes on American bases, energy facilities, maritime routes, and Washington’s allies in the Middle East, including Israel. The possible destabilization or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could indirectly affect Israel’s economy and security through a surge in global energy prices, disruptions to maritime and air logistics, financial instability, and an expansion of the regional conflict.
Although the publication does not cite separate statements from Israeli politicians or military officials, it reflects the caution characteristic of Israel’s strategic discourse. It expresses distrust of symbolic “superstrikes” and calls for assessing an operation by its verifiable results: whether Iran retains the ability to produce weapons, develop its nuclear program, threaten its neighbors, and launch retaliatory attacks.
As Inyan Merkazi emphasizes, “spectacular destruction is not necessarily a strategic victory.” For Israel, what matters is not the loudness of the explosion or the political effect of demonstrating force, but whether Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure is actually put out of operation.
