Delcy Rodríguez Discusses Funding for Earthquake Recovery

President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a working meeting with the country’s economic team and the heads of state financial institutions to identify funding sources for the urgent repair of damage caused by the earthquakes that occurred on June 24. The participants also assessed the progress of emergency infrastructure work and the implementation of key areas of the National Economic Agenda.

The meeting addressed mechanisms for raising funds for urban reconstruction projects and social protection programs. The authorities’ goal is to use state resources more effectively in the affected areas and provide comprehensive assistance to the population. The meeting was attended by the heads of Banco de Venezuela, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Central Bank, and the financial division of state oil company PDVSA.

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Full version: Presidenta Delcy Rodríguez evalúa financiamiento y avances en obras post-sismos

Jumblatt: Hamza al-Khatib’s Story Became a Turning Point

Walid Jumblatt said that his last meeting with former Syrian President Bashar Assad in June 2011 brought an end to their brief period of reconciliation. In an interview with Al Jazeera’s Witness of the Era, he said he asked Assad about Hamza al-Khatib—a child from Daraa province who became one of the first symbols of the suppression of Syria’s protests. Hamza was detained during the demonstrations, and his body, bearing numerous signs of torture, was handed over to his family in May 2011, sparking widespread outrage.

According to Jumblatt, Assad answered the question about the boy by saying, “We did not torture him—we killed him,” adding that the authorities had informed his relatives. Jumblatt said the wording shocked him. The conversation then turned to Atef Najib, head of the Political Security Directorate in Daraa and Assad’s cousin. His name was linked to the detention of children who had written anti-government slogans on their school walls.

Hamza, who was born in the village of Jiza in the Daraa countryside, quickly became known as one of the main symbols of the early months of the Syrian revolution. Photographs of his body and reports of torture intensified protests inside and outside the country, while the authorities denied that the security forces were responsible for the abuses. Jumblatt believes that the question of Hamza opened a broader discussion about the violent suppression of demonstrations in Daraa and the expansion of arrests and violence against protesters.

The meeting took place after Jumblatt’s visit to Damascus in 2010, organized as part of a political reconciliation following years of disagreements linked to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the acute political crisis in Lebanon. At the time, Assad, according to Jumblatt, suggested that they “forget the past” and start a new chapter. However, after the Syrian protests began and repression intensified, Jumblatt’s attitude toward the president changed, and the June meeting became their last.

In the interview, Jumblatt also warned of attempts to separate Suwayda and Jabal al-Arab from their Syrian and Arab surroundings. He criticized the use of the name “Jabal Bashan” instead of the traditional “Jabal al-Arab,” saying that this might involve more than a geographical term—it could represent a revision of the region’s identity. Jumblatt opposed the project to establish a Druze state in southern Syria and criticized the position of one of the Druze spiritual leaders, Hikmat al-Hajri. In his view, such an idea benefits Israel because it encourages the fragmentation of Syria into sectarian entities. The Druze, he stressed, need a united Syrian state that guarantees the rights of all citizens, not an isolated and vulnerable enclave.

Comments on the News

• What role did the protests in Daraa play at the beginning of the 2011 Syrian uprising, and why did this region become one of the main centers of the protest movement? — The protests in Daraa were one of the immediate starting points of the nationwide uprising. In March 2011, the arrest and brutal treatment of teenagers who had written anti-government slogans sparked demonstrations that were suppressed by force and quickly spread across the country. Daraa was particularly important because of its strong local and tribal ties, discontent over corruption, unemployment and water shortages, and the authorities’ neglect of the region. Its proximity to Jordan also facilitated the movement of people and information.

• Why did the assassination of Rafik Hariri lead to a prolonged political crisis between Walid Jumblatt and the Syrian leadership, and how did it affect Damascus’s relations with Lebanon? — The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 prompted suspicions of the involvement of Syrian forces and their Lebanese allies, although the question of legal responsibility remained the subject of investigations and political disputes. Jumblatt, who had previously cooperated with Damascus, became one of the harshest critics of Syrian influence and supported the mass protests known as the “Cedar Revolution.” This intensified the internal confrontation in Lebanon, contributed to the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and severely damaged relations between Jumblatt and the Syrian leadership for many years.

• What is the historical and political significance of the Jabal al-Arab region for the Druze community, and why is replacing this name with “Jabal Bashan” perceived as an attempt to alter the region’s identity? — Jabal al-Arab, also known as Jabal al-Druze, is the historic center of Druze settlement in southern Syria and a symbol of their religious, social and political autonomy. The region is associated with the Druze uprising against the French Mandate led by Sultan al-Atrash and occupies an important place in the community’s collective memory. Consequently, replacing the familiar name with “Jabal Bashan” is perceived by many as an erasure of historical memory and the imposition of a different interpretation of the region’s origins. At the same time, the meaning of the new name and the context of its official use may depend on the particular source or political side.

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Full version: "You’re Almost Losing Your Mind".. Jumblatt Reveals His Conversation with Assad About Hamza al-Khatib

Latin America Between U.S. Pressure and the Search for Compromise

This issue examines the region’s response to the Trump administration’s policies on Venezuela, Cuba, and migration. The materials show how U.S. sanctions, oil policy, and tighter border controls are becoming instruments of political and economic pressure, prompting debate over a possible transfer of power in Venezuela and the future of relations with Havana. Against this backdrop, Latin American leaders are pursuing different strategies, ranging from strong criticism to pragmatic dialogue with Washington. The review is based on materials from Instagram and Facebook (Venezuela).

Venezuelan Social Media: Distrust of Foreign Aid and Confusion Over Oil

In the Venezuelan social media sphere, international relations are often viewed through the lens of dependency, sanctions pressure, and the struggle for control over natural resources. Two posts dealing with foreign policy and the economy demonstrate both deep distrust of support offered from abroad and the problem of information confusion surrounding an especially sensitive subject—Venezuelan oil.

In an Instagram post, the author expresses a widespread attitude in the country toward loans, humanitarian aid, military supplies, and trade agreements with major powers. The main argument is stated in extremely categorical terms: “Nothing in life is free.” In the author’s view, every form of foreign “assistance” comes with strings attached, and the recipient ultimately risks becoming even more dependent.

A central element of this criticism is the commodity-based economic model. Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest oil reserves along with other natural resources, exports raw materials that then return to the country in the form of processed products and technology, but at a much higher price. This arrangement is perceived as an unequal exchange: most of the added value, technological control, and access to markets remain with the countries engaged in processing and manufacturing.

The author is also outraged by the supply of outdated equipment: “They sell us everything that is already obsolete for them—aircraft, weapons, and so on.” This statement alludes to long-running debates in Venezuela over military procurement, limited access to new technologies, sanctions, and dependence on foreign suppliers. Under this interpretation, the country receives not modern tools for development, but equipment that developed countries no longer consider in demand.

Such sentiments are particularly evident amid U.S. sanctions, restrictions on the oil sector, and Caracas’s search for partners in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere. For part of Venezuelan society, foreign support remains contradictory: it may be necessary to sustain the economy while simultaneously being viewed as an instrument of political and economic control. This post is not a fact-check of a specific deal or a neutral news report; rather, it reflects an emotional perception of the international system rooted in historical distrust of foreign powers and a sense of injustice over dependence on raw materials.

Against this backdrop, another post by a Venezuelan news account is also telling, as its stated subject does not match its content. The headline promises a report on Donald Trump’s statement regarding Venezuelan oil—a matter that inevitably draws the country’s audience, since oil remains the foundation of its exports, budget revenues, and international political disputes.

However, the text itself is devoted not to Venezuela, Trump, or the oil sector, but to the alleged intention of Colombia’s president-elect, Abelardo de la Espriella, to withdraw the country from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The post discusses the possible consequences of such a decision for Colombia’s investment, trade, and foreign-policy ties, but provides no documents, verifiable statements, or specific quotations from Venezuelan politicians or experts. Nor does it explain how the subject is directly connected to Venezuela’s oil policy.

The mere mention of Trump and Venezuelan oil can provoke a strong public reaction. In Venezuela, his first presidential term is associated with sanctions against the state oil company PDVSA, export restrictions, pressure on Caracas’s foreign partners, and a strategy of “maximum pressure.” As a result, many readers may have expected information about a possible tightening of U.S. policy—or, conversely, its adjustment.

The Colombia–China agenda does nevertheless have indirect significance for Venezuela. Colombia remains a key neighbor, trading partner, and one of the main destinations for Venezuelan migrants. Changes in its relations with China, the United States, and international investors could affect cross-border trade, transport routes, migrants’ circumstances, employment, and regional policy. But the original post does not explain these connections, and its attention-grabbing headline combines two different subjects without any confirmed analytical link.

Ultimately, both posts reveal characteristic features of Venezuela’s information environment. On the one hand, there is a strong fear that foreign aid and cooperation conceal unfavorable conditions and deepen dependence. On the other, the audience’s heightened sensitivity to oil, sanctions, and U.S. policy makes it particularly vulnerable to sensational headlines, even when their content does not correspond to the subject announced.

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Shelling of Marib: dead, wounded and a retaliatory strike

Yemeni media reported a series of explosions in the city of Marib on Friday following a rocket-and-drone attack by the forces of “Ansar Allah” (the Houthis) on targets inside the city. According to available information, the strike caused casualties and injuries, and in response pro-government forces in Yemen said they carried out a military operation against Houthi positions in Marib Governorate.

A source in Yemen’s military structures said that the government air defenses shot down several Houthi drones in the skies over Marib. The state TV channel Saba, which broadcasts from this city, said that the “Houthi militia” shelled the densely populated city with rockets and drones, but did not provide details on the scale of the damage. The Minister of Health and Population in the Yemeni government, Qasem Buhaybah, said two civilians were killed and 14 people were injured, stressing that the strike hit residential neighborhoods and displacement camps.

Buhaybah said that Marib is the largest center for refugees and internally displaced persons in Yemen, and called what happened an attack on people who had already been forced to flee their homes because of the war. He urged hospitals and medical institutions to switch to a state of heightened readiness. At the same time, there was no official final report at the time of publication on all hit targets or the final death toll, and figures from different sources on losses differed.

Meanwhile, the Shabwa defense forces, loyal to the Yemeni government, announced a retaliatory operation on the Harib front in Marib, saying it was a response to the killing of two of their fighters in a drone strike. Al Jazeera journalist Ahmed ash-Shalfi posted a video showing smoke above a residential area, and witnesses said that some of the rockets and drones hit the Sahn al-Jin area, where military forces and equipment are based, but where civilians also live. Against this backdrop, Yemen is experiencing a noticeable escalation: earlier, the country’s Ministry of Defense reported new casualties, and Houthi attacks also affected Hadramaut and Saudi Najran.

Comments on the news

• What is the Sahn al-Jin camp in Marib and why are military forces, equipment and civilians there at the same time? — Sahn al-Jin is a district/camp in Marib Governorate in eastern Yemen that, in wartime conditions, is used not only as a place to house the military, but also as an area where civilians who fled fighting are concentrated. This is because there are many displaced people in Marib, and the governorate itself has long been relatively safer than other areas, so security forces, military equipment and civilians ended up close to one another.

• Why is Marib considered the largest hub for internally displaced persons in Yemen, and what role does it play in the current war? — Marib became the largest center for internally displaced persons because, during the war, people moved there in large numbers from more dangerous governorates: for a long time it retained the reputation of being a place where one could find shelter, work, and assistance. In the current war, Marib has strategic importance: it is a resource-rich governorate, important for controlling eastern Yemen, and therefore fierce fighting is taking place there between recognized authorities and the Houthis.

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Full version: قتلى مدنيون وعسكريون في هجوم للحوثيين على مأرب

Court Closes the Case and Fully Frees Judge María Lourdes Afiuni

The court ruling granted Judge María Lourdes Afiuni full freedom and permanently closed her case, bringing an end to criminal prosecution that lasted 16 years. The decision was reported by her brother, Nelson Afiuni, after an official document terminating the case was handed over to the family by an official.

According to him, at the time the notice was delivered, Afiuni was unable to receive it in person because she was with her mother at a medical center in the capital. This measure formally ends all charges, removes the consequences of the proceedings, and fully restores the judge’s civil rights. Her case became one of the most high-profile in the country in the context of judicial independence.

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Full version: Otorgan libertad plena y cierran el caso de la jueza María Lourdes Afiuni

Israel drags out talks on southern Lebanon despite “positive” signals from the US

At the seventh round of negotiations in Rome, Israel refused to withdraw forces from a new zone in southern Lebanon and demanded first that it be confirmed that the Lebanese army has fully taken control of two territories where it has already been deployed. According to a source in the Lebanese presidency, the Thursday meeting under American auspices did not produce a final decision on the so-called “exemplary zones”: Beirut insisted on moving to new sectors, while the Israeli side pushed for completion of the verification of the first two.

In Washington, however, the talks were assessed as “positive.” A State Department spokesperson said the sides had become “much closer” to expanding the experimental format and putting it into practice. But, as The Wall Street Journal writes, Lebanese officials believe that Israel’s ongoing strikes on southern Lebanon noticeably complicated the seventh round and made a quick diplomatic breakthrough unlikely.

According to the newspaper, Beirut had expected to secure Israel’s agreement to withdraw troops from several more villages and hand them over to Lebanese control, but Tel Aviv refused. Israel is also insisting that a third party verify whether the withdrawal areas are clear of fighters from Hezbollah and its infrastructure. Italy is being considered as one of the most likely candidates for such a role.

In addition, Israeli military sources, as reported by the WSJ, acknowledge that Hezbollah cannot be disarmed by force alone. In their view, doing so would require a political agreement. Lebanon and Israel signed a framework agreement on June 26 following five rounds of talks in Washington. It provides for Israel’s gradual withdrawal from occupied areas in southern Lebanon in parallel with the deployment of the Lebanese army and the disarmament of Hezbollah, starting with two pilot zones.

In practice, the Lebanese army has already deployed as of July 21 in Zoutar-ash-Sharkiya—one of the two test zones—after the Israeli forces pulled back from its outskirts. Later, positions in Srifa and Frunе were reinforced. At the same time, contacts between the sides continue, and on the ground further steps are being discussed regarding troop withdrawal, army deployment, and the control system.

Meanwhile, conditions in southern Lebanon remain tense. The Lebanese agency reported that an Israeli drone dropped a flash-bang grenade toward an army bulldozer working to clear a road in the Al-Mansouri area, to enable the return of displaced residents. The Lebanese army said that one serviceman received a minor injury after an Israeli strike on the bulldozer. According to reports, army units entered Al-Mansouri on Friday morning to open roads that had been blocked by recent airstrikes.

On the eve of those events, dozens of families left Al-Mansouri after an Israeli evacuation warning—the first such order since June 14. Since March 2, Israel has continued military operations in Lebanon, and, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, they have already killed 4,333 people and injured 12,250. Against the backdrop of new strikes and evacuations, the chances of real diplomatic progress remain limited despite optimistic statements from the United States.

Comments on the news

• What are the “exemplary” or “pilot” zones in southern Lebanon, and why are they used to test the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of the Lebanese army? - These are limited areas in southern Lebanon selected as test sites to check how the agreement will be carried out in practice: whether Israeli forces will leave, and whether the Lebanese army will be able to take and hold those territories. Such zones are used because it is easier to monitor compliance with the deal, assess risks, and, if necessary, adjust the control mechanism before wider deployment.

• Why is Italy being considered as a possible “third party” to verify the withdrawal zones, and what role do European countries typically play in arrangements of this kind between Israel and Lebanon? - Italy is seen as a relatively neutral and acceptable participant to both sides, who can help with on-the-ground monitoring and verification. In situations like these, European countries generally do not make decisions for the conflict sides themselves; they act as mediators, observers, participants in peacekeeping missions, or technical guarantors of monitoring. In the Lebanese-Israeli context, their role is often tied to supporting international monitoring mechanisms and reducing the risk of direct escalation.

• Where are Zoutar-ash-Sharkiya, Srifa, Frunе, and Al-Mansouri, and why are these particular localities considered important in negotiations and military operations in southern Lebanon? - All of these localities are in southern Lebanon, in areas where the line of contact with Israel is especially sensitive and where military and political clashes often occur. They are important because control over such points affects border security, troop movement routes, and how far the line of hostilities can be pushed back. In negotiations, such places often become markers: whoever controls them gains an advantage in verifying troop withdrawal and in determining the future security order in the south of the country.

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Full version: لا اختراق في روما.. إسرائيل ترفض انسحابا جديدا من جنوب لبنان

The World Debates Trump’s Crackdown on Immigration and Visa Policy

In news coverage, the United States is again at the center of attention due to its tougher approach to migration, visas, and border control. Even when debates differ in assessments and emphasis, the overall tone is the same: the world is closely watching how entry and movement rules are changing—and what that means for ordinary travelers, families, and those making plans for work or study abroad. What comes to the fore is the practical side of the reaction—growing caution, tighter oversight, and the need to adapt more quickly to new requirements, not just the details of specific decisions. The “external regulation” effect is also becoming clear, when changes in U.S. policy trigger a chain of reviews and expectations worldwide. This material was prepared based on publications from canalb.pe (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

The U.S. Tightens Visas: How It’s Being Perceived in Venezuela

In Venezuela, the United States’ new measures to toughen visa policy are being seen not as a routine bureaucratic development, but as another barrier for people whose lives have long been tied to migration, separation from loved ones, and the search for a chance to start over. Against the backdrop of years of crisis and mass departures of citizens, any decision from Washington in the field of migration is read here through the lens of personal and family losses, as well as hopes for lawful departure, studying, working, or reuniting with close relatives.

As reported by Canal B, the administration of Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio plan to check applicants’ activity on social media. For Venezuelans, this is especially sensitive: today, almost everyone has a digital footprint, and posts, comments, likes, and even political statements can become grounds for refusal. In the local context, this fuels concern that under increased scrutiny will be not only those who genuinely try to bypass the rules, but also ordinary citizens—people who already face limited access to consular procedures and high uncertainty.

As the article notes, Rubio emphasizes that a visa is not a right, but a privilege—and that U.S. authorities will check for any signs of support for organizations that Washington considers terrorist. For Venezuela, these statements carry not only legal meaning, but political meaning as well. Many here view U.S. migration policy as part of a broader conflict between Caracas and Washington, in which rules for Venezuelans can change depending on the political situation.

The same logic is reflected in another publication available as a Facebook post by lawyer Jessica Dominges, where Trump’s measures are seen as an attempt to curb visa abuses connected to so-called “birth tourism.” At the same time, a key legal point is highlighted: an executive order cannot overturn the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. For Venezuelan families, this is crucial, because many see the United States not only as a place to work and find security, but also as a country where a child’s status can determine the future of the entire family.

That is why in Venezuela, news like this triggers concern not only among those planning a trip, but also among migrants already living in the United States. Increased scrutiny of visas and social-media activity is perceived here as an intensification of pressure on families, a rise in fear of denial, and another narrowing of opportunities for lawful departure. This is felt especially sharply in a country where remittances from the U.S., stable work abroad, and legal certainty for children have long ceased to be an abstract topic and have instead become a matter of everyday survival.

In the end, news about visa restrictions in the Venezuelan reading goes far beyond U.S. domestic policy. It becomes a story about how decisions in Washington affect the lives of millions of people in a country where migration, family separation, and legal uncertainty have long been part of everyday life.

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Explosion in Jaramana: 14 injured, authorities promise a fair investigation

On Thursday evening, a blast went off in a passenger bus traveling along the main streets during rush hour in the Syrian city of Jaramana (Rif-Damascus Province). According to the latest figures from the director of health for the province, Dr. Taufik Hisba, 14 people were injured and there were no deaths. Videos have appeared online showing that the bus roof was completely destroyed, with passengers’ and passersby’s belongings scattered around. This was the first such explosion in the city since the fall of the previous regime.

Three of the injured are in critical condition and need surgery, while another seven were taken to a hospital in Damascus. Doctors faced a disturbing discovery: parts of bodies that had initially been brought to the forensic department from the “Ar-Radi” Hospital in Jaramana turned out not to be remains of the dead, but amputated limbs of surviving passengers. In total, three limbs were found—one of them completely severed. After the data were checked again, the medical staff established that all victims are in the “Al-Mujahhid” Hospital, and that the alarm about alleged deaths had been false.

The explosion occurred amid a clear rise in tensions in Jaramana. In the past few days, limited protest actions have taken place there calling for those responsible for violations in the Suwayda province to be held accountable. About an hour before the tragedy, the sheikhs of Suwayda’s Druze community called for an end to violence and intercommunal strife, for preserving the unity of Syrian society, and for punishing those acting outside the law. This gives the incident an added regional dimension, as Jaramana is regarded as a city with a strong Druze community.

The Syrian Ministry of the Interior said that security forces immediately cordoned off the scene, began collecting evidence, and are conducting an investigation to establish all the circumstances of the crime. The ministry stressed that the blast occurred after the sheikhs and elders of Jaramana issued statements expressing support for the Syrian state and the unity of the country. Authorities urged citizens to remain vigilant and not be drawn into provocations aimed at stoking interethnic hatred.

Syrian Foreign Minister Assad ash-Shaybani said that the terrorist attack would not stop Syrians from restoring and building the state, and that all those responsible would be found and punished. The head of the Civil Defense, Raid as-Salih, also expressed confidence that the tragedy would not weaken society’s resolve. The governor of Rif-Damascus Province, Amer ash-Shaykh, promised that “the crime will not go unpunished.” It is worth noting that on July 7, two explosions already occurred in Damascus near the Ministry of Tourism: one person was killed and 36 were injured. According to the investigation, the cell of ISIS was responsible for that attack.

Comments on the news

• What events in Suwayda province sparked dissatisfaction among the Druze community, and why did this lead to protests in Jaramana? — After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the new Syrian authorities—formed with the dominance of the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham group—began to establish control over Suwayda, the province where Druze make up the majority of the population. Discontent was triggered by attempts to disarm local Druze units and integrate them into new security structures, arrests of activists, harsh raids, and clashes in which local residents died at the beginning of 2025. Alarm was heightened by reports of attacks on Druze religious sites in other parts of Syria: many Druze interpreted this as a sign of an aggressive policy by the new authority with Islamist roots. Jaramana— the largest center of the Druze community in the metropolitan region—responded with solidarity protests. Druze took to the streets demanding guarantees of safety, protection for sacred sites, and an end to security operations in areas where the community lives in concentrated settlements. For residents of Jaramana, events in Suwayda became a warning signal: they saw in them a model of how the new authorities might act against minorities across the country.

• What is unique about Jaramana’s history and demographics? — Jaramana is an ancient satellite city of Damascus southeast of Syria’s capital, notable for its centuries-old mixed population. For ages, Druze, Christians of different denominations (Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants) and Sunni Muslims have lived side by side here; within the city’s territory there was also a camp for Palestinian refugees. During the civil war, Jaramana remained under the control of government forces and received tens of thousands of displaced people, primarily from the nearby Eastern Ghouta: the city’s population more than doubled—from roughly 100,000 to 200,000 people. At the same time, the local Druze and Christian community preserved relative autonomy, had their own armed formations, and community leaders served as intermediaries between the central authorities and residents. After the fall of Assad, Jaramana became a symbol of Druze-Christian presence in Damascus and a kind of “barometer” of sentiment among religious minorities, so any incident there immediately resonates across Syria.

• How was the new Syrian government formed after the fall of the Assad regime, and who was Raid as-Salih, head of the Civil Defense? — After Bashar Assad fled on December 8, 2024, power in Damascus passed to an opposition coalition headed by Ahmed ash-Sharaa (known previously as Abu Muhammad al-Julani). The core of the new government consisted of the structures of the “Syrian Salvation Government”—the administration that, since 2017, had governed the opposition-held region of Idlib. The prime minister of the transitional cabinet was Muhammad al-Bashir, and at the end of January 2025, ash-Sharaa announced he would be president of the transitional period. Key posts were filled by people from the Idlib administration: Murhaf Abu Kasra became defense minister, Assad ash-Shaybani—foreign minister, and Ali Keda—interior minister. Before entering government, the head of the Civil Defense, Raid as-Salih, led the “Syrian Civil Defense,” known as the “White Helmets”—an organization created during the war to rescue civilians from under rubble after airstrikes. In the West, the “White Helmets” received widespread recognition (as-Salih was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize), but Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran accused them of ties to radical groups and of staged videos. Because of threats from the Assad regime, as-Salih spent many years in exile—in Turkey and Europe—returning to Syria only after the fall of Assad. His appointment to the cabinet was seen by the new authorities as a step toward winning Western trust and a demonstration of “moderation,” though for many skeptics it merely underscored the government’s links to Islamist structures.

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Full version: 14 مصاباً في تفجير جرمانا.. والداخلية السورية: نتعقب المتورطين

2015 authorities and opposition resume dialogue with U.S. support

Jorge Rodríguez, head of the National Assembly elected in 2020, announced the start of a new phase of national dialogue with former parliament members from 2015. The information was shared via his official Telegram channel. The talks’ agenda includes three key areas: assistance to the population following the double earthquake that occurred on June 24, institutional strengthening, including updates to the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Council, and political guarantees for all participants in the country’s political process.

On the government side, the delegation is led by Rodríguez himself, and includes Jorge Arreasa, Ana María San-Juan, América Pérez, Genesis Garbett, and Pedro Infante. The opposition is represented by the Assembly 2015 led by Dinora Figuera, together with its team and a separate support commission. It is important to note that U.S. delegates will monitor the negotiations: they will accompany each stage to ensure the dialogue remains fair, constructive, and leads to concrete outcomes for Venezuela’s stability.

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Full version: Gobierno y sectores de la AN 2015 retoman contactos en una nueva mesa de diálogo

A Visit to Ankara: Damascus insists on a state monopoly on weapons

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad ash-Shibani visited Ankara on Thursday, where he met with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan. This is the second visit by the Syrian minister to Turkey since the beginning of the year. At a joint press conference, ash-Shibani stressed that the country’s government intends to put an end to the existence of any weapons outside state control and continues its fight against terrorism. He also said it is necessary to strengthen stability in southern Syria, halt repeated Israeli strikes, and return to compliance with the 1974 agreement, urging the international community to take responsibility.

For his part, Hakan Fidan said Syria has become noticeably more stable and reaffirmed Turkey’s readiness to develop relations with it at all levels. He highlighted the importance of joint work in the field of defense and counterterrorism operations, but also noted that Israel’s ongoing attacks pose a direct threat to Syria’s security and called for international pressure on the Israeli side. Ash-Shibani added that the two countries’ shared border must remain a corridor for trade, prosperity, and mutual security. A separate topic was the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland—Damascus considers this a national priority and intends to link return projects to early recovery programs with practical support from Turkey.

According to Syria’s SANA agency, the sides also agreed to establish a Supreme Coordination Council between Syria and Turkey, discussed stepping up the work of relevant committees, and speeding up a rail link project. Turkey’s Anadolu agency reported that an important topic was the inclusion of northeastern Syria in state structures—a question Ankara attaches particular importance to. The visit took place right after negotiations between Syrian President Ahmed ash-Sharaa and Minister ash-Shibani with the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Damascus, indicating a continuation of efforts to integrate Kurdish formations and their institutions into a single state.

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Full version: Шибани confirms from Ankara work to end weapons outside state authority

Syria’s Economy in 2026: Growth Above 10% and the Challenges of Reform

Syria’s economy is entering 2026 at a turning point: a faster recovery is expected, along with improved confidence among investors and consumers, driven by the return of about 1.5 million refugees and the gradual reintegration of the country into regional and international economic life. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP growth this year could exceed 10%, despite ongoing regional tensions. However, the durability of this upswing will directly depend on addressing deep imbalances in the banking sector and continuing structural reforms.

The IMF links the expected surge in growth to improved conditions in agriculture, expanded hydrocarbon production, the restoration of electricity supply, and steady growth in trade and services. There is also a clear improvement in public finances: in 2026, projections call for a significant increase in tax, customs, and energy revenues. Inflation has risen this year due to higher import costs amid external pressures, but the fund expects it to ease by 2027 if a sound fiscal-monetary and monetary policy is implemented.

Syria’s Finance Minister Mohammed Yasser Barnia described the IMF statement as an important signal of confidence in the government’s reform drive, aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability, improving the efficiency of public finances, and creating a more attractive environment for investment and the private sector. An Al Jazeera correspondent in Damascus noted that the fund’s praise followed progress by Syria in public finance management and transparency. The IMF and the World Bank have tied these achievements to the possibility of increased grants for Syria by 2027. The World Bank has already approved two key projects: $20 million to improve the efficiency of public financial management, and $225 million to support healthcare, water supply, and basic services.

The fund emphasizes that Damascus’s needs go far beyond traditional humanitarian aid. The country requires rapid international financial support that will enable job creation, the restoration of infrastructure, and an acceleration of restructuring in the banking sector to facilitate domestic and international payments. Osama al-Kadi, First Adviser at Syria’s Ministry of Economy, said that the current results are the result of 16 months of intense work on developing monetary-policy tools and external openness. He also noted that Syria has risen by more than 70 places in the economic index of Reporters Without Borders between 2025 and 2026.

Among the key steps to rebuild the monetary system are an agreement between the central banks of Syria and Turkey to gradually withdraw the Turkish lira from northern areas and switch to the Syrian lira, as well as the opening of joint deposit accounts to simplify payments. Consulting firm Oliver Wyman has been tasked with conducting a gap assessment to connect Syria to the SWIFT system. In the coming weeks, it is expected that the country’s name will be removed from the list of states supporting terrorism, which by the end of 2026 should improve cooperation with correspondent banks. The plan also includes settling historical imbalances involving roughly 15 banks established earlier with the participation and influence of Rami Makhlouf, pending approval of a new banking law by parliament.

Osama al-Kadi forecasts stabilization of the monetary and financial system by the end of 2027, as well as the entry of Arab, Turkish, and American banks by mid-year. This should improve the quality of banking services and deepen economic recovery. That said, these expectations are directly linked to the continuation of reforms, the rebuilding of industrial production sectors, and infrastructure restoration. For now, there is hope that positive assessments by international institutions will translate into real support and tangible improvements in the lives of Syrians in the coming years. Thus, Syria faces a real test: whether it can turn positive macroeconomic indicators into sustainable, inclusive growth and long-term stability.

News comments

• Who is Rami Makhlouf and why did the banks created with his involvement become a source of “historical imbalances,” as mentioned in the article? — Rami Makhlouf is Bashar Assad’s cousin and one of the most well-known Syrian oligarchs close to the regime. Through his companies and ties to state banks, he controlled entire sectors of the economy—from telecommunications to construction and finance. Banks created with his participation served the interests of a narrow elite, operated through non-transparent arrangements, and were effectively used to siphon funds and enrich the clan. This led to “historical imbalances”: excessive concentration of assets, politicization of lending, capital flight, and the distortion of the banking system, which began to serve the ruling circle rather than the economy. After Assad fled, Makhlouf’s legacy remained as weak, non-transparent, and distrusted financial institutions.

• How did the Turkish lira end up in circulation in northern areas of Syria, and what does its gradual withdrawal mean for the local economy? — The Turkish lira appeared in northern Syria due to many years of control over these territories by pro-Turkey armed groups and their close economic dependence on Turkey. Local trade, fuel imports, food, and construction materials were geared toward the Turkish market, while wages and prices were often tied to the lira. The gradual withdrawal of the lira means a shift to the Syrian pound or other payment instruments. For the local economy, this is a double-edged process: on one hand, it pulls the region back into the orbit of the official Syrian financial system and reduces dependence on foreign currency; on the other, it may trigger a sharp rise in prices, the loss of savings for the population, and a temporary paralysis of trade, because old contracts and transactions will have to be recalculated using new exchange rates.

• What financial restrictions does Syria face due to being on the list of states supporting terrorism, and why would removal improve how banks operate? — Syria’s inclusion on this list (especially on the US list) means severe sanctions: bans for American companies and banks from doing business with Syria, asset freezes, restrictions on dollar operations, and de facto isolation from the international payment system SWIFT. Foreign banks refuse to open correspondent accounts for Syrian banks, fearing secondary sanctions. This makes normal external trade settlements impossible, blocks access to loans from the IMF and the World Bank, prevents attracting investment, and even disrupts remittances from the diaspora. Removal would lift these barriers: Syrian banks would be able to restore correspondent relationships, service foreign trade, attract foreign capital, and use international financial instruments. This is critical for the country’s reconstruction and for stabilizing the national currency.

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Full version: اقتصاد سوريا 2026.. زخم التعافي يصطدم باختبار "سويفت" والإصلاح المصرفي

Trump Says He Loves Venezuela and Highlights Successes in Oil

At a recent institutional meeting, US President Donald Trump spoke positively about the state of relations with Venezuela, emphasizing the development of diplomatic ties between Washington and Caracas, as well as the momentum in the energy sector. The head of the White House said openly: “I love Venezuela; everything is going very well for us,” thereby noting progress in cooperation in hydrocarbons, which has become a key factor in the two countries’ trade talks. These words underscore the United States’ interest in the stability of fuel production and exports, as well as its willingness to maintain dialogue to support mutual economic development through joint projects in the oil industry.

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Full version: Donald Trump sobre el avance en el sector petrolero: Me encanta Venezuela, nos está yendo muy bien

Russia and Syria: a new stage of partnership after a change of power

Relations between Moscow and Damascus are once again in the spotlight. Russia has appointed Dmitry Dogadkin as the new ambassador to Syria, Syrian authorities have announced the launch of regular direct flights between the capitals starting August 16, and the Russian House in Damascus is resuming operations after a break of more than a year and a half. These moves prompt a question: is this merely routine diplomatic procedure, or the beginning of a new phase in strengthening Russian influence and expanding partnership?

Russian experts believe that the ongoing contacts show that Damascus does not want to break with Moscow and is using manoeuvres to steer away from Western demands. On the agenda are security issues, the fate of military bases, the rebuilding of the economy, and even the printing of national currency. In their view, Syria needs Russia to protect its interests on the international stage, while Russia needs Syria to preserve bases and supply lines in the region—especially against the backdrop of discussions about the “four seas” and new logistics routes.

Now the relationship is in a phase of reconfiguration after the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow clearly does not intend to leave Syria, but it seeks to reshape its presence to fit the new political reality, while keeping the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base. For Russia, this is an important foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, a springboard for activity in Africa, and a tool for countering the West. The new Syrian leadership, in turn, is trying to diversify partnerships and reduce dependence on Moscow where alternatives exist, but it continues cooperation in areas that require Russian expertise and technologies.

The relationship has a long history: it began back in the mid-20th century, and took on a strategic character after Hafiz Assad came to power in 1970. In 1971, the Soviet Union received a naval base in Tartus, and in 1980 the countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. After the collapse of the USSR, ties revived under Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin: Moscow wrote off Syrian debts and expanded military cooperation. A turning point came in 2011: from the end of 2015, Russia provided Damascus with political cover and decisive military support, which shifted the balance of forces in the conflict and allowed Syrian authorities to regain control over significant territories.

After Assad fell and fled to Russia, the new Syrian authorities chose a pragmatic line: not to let things come to a rupture, but to renegotiate their interests anew. Analysts explain this by saying that relying too heavily on the United States is too risky, the security situation remains fragile, and Israel’s policy and the broader geopolitical instability in the region add uncertainty. Damascus needs Russian support in the military, economic, and agricultural spheres. Moscow, for its part, wants to keep Syria as a foothold in the Mediterranean and a card in dialogue with the West.

According to the International Crisis Group, Syria maintained constructive ties with Russia even after its break with Iran and Hezbollah: Ahmad ash-Sharaa visited Moscow twice and allowed Russia to keep key bases. Experts see a clear pattern—Russia’s role is reduced where alternatives appear, but it is preserved where the need remains: military equipment, oil and wheat supplies, and printing money. Switching to other suppliers would require many years and billions of dollars that Damascus does not have. At the same time, it is not easy for society to forget Russia’s role in the killing of Syrians, even if policy is usually driven by interests and looks ahead.

Comments on the news

• What is the “Russian House” in Damascus and what role does it play in Russian-Syrian relations after its work was resumed? — The Russian House is the Russian Center for Science and Culture, operating under the aegis of Rossotrudnichestvo. After the fall of the Assad regime and the arrival of the new authorities, its work was temporarily suspended and then resumed. It performs “soft power” functions: teaching Russian, cultural events, humanitarian projects, and maintaining direct contact between societies. In addition, it serves as an unofficial channel of communication between Moscow and Syria’s transitional government, allowing Russian presence and influence to be maintained even amid changes in the political regime.

• Who was Ahmad ash-Sharaa before coming to power, and why is his position on Russia considered pragmatic? — Ahmad ash-Sharaa, previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, was born in Riyadh into a family of people from the Golan Heights. He moved from being a member of the Iraq branch of al-Qaeda to the founder of Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012, then cut ties with global jihadism, reformed the group Hay’at Tahrir ash-Sham, and became ruler of Idlib. In December 2024, he led an offensive that overthrew Bashar Assad and became the de facto leader of transitional Syria. His position on Russia is considered pragmatic because he puts the rebuilding of the destroyed country, lifting sanctions, and economic stability ahead of ideological struggle against Moscow. He is willing to negotiate with Russia and even keep its military bases if that helps legitimize his rule and develop Syria.

• What is implied by the concept of the “four seas” in Russian geopolitical thinking, and how is it connected to preserving bases in Syria? — The concept of the “four seas” describes Russia’s desire to ensure its presence in four key maritime basins: the Baltic, Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean. The first three are “border” seas near Russia’s coasts, where it feels confident, and the Mediterranean is a strategic gateway to global trade routes and to the Middle East. The naval base in Tartus and the Hmeimim airbase in Syria are the only way to maintain a permanent military presence in this “fourth sea.” Therefore, Moscow is interested in agreements with the new Syrian authorities to keep the bases: without them, Russia loses its status as a global maritime power and its ability to project power into Africa and the Middle East.

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Full version: ذاكرة القصف وحسابات المصالح.. هل تتصالح سوريا الجديدة مع روسيا؟

Latin America worries about US pressure, tariffs and influence

In Latin America, unease is growing over how Washington uses economic and political levers in the region: from tariffs and trade disputes to attempts to influence countries’ internal decisions. Against this backdrop, discussions are turning to the risks for local economies and the resilience of alliances already in place—along with the question of how far American involvement in the region’s external and internal agendas may go. Taken together, this builds a picture of “external pressure,” to which many in the region are responding with close attention and an effort to keep their own political course. This piece was prepared based on publications by France 24 (Venezuela) and BBC (Venezuela).

Trump, Truth Social and Pix: power, money and sovereignty

Two news items coming from the United States and Brazil, viewed through a Venezuelan lens, are forming one troubling picture: where politics, the market and personal gain begin to intertwine too closely, public trust is quickly eroded, and the fight for economic sovereignty becomes a question not only of technology, but of power.

In a France24 report about a new paid service for access to Donald Trump’s posts via Truth Social in Venezuela, the development is perceived not as just another episode of American political life, but as a sign of a deeper crisis. Criticism in the United States is built around the idea that Trump is selling access to his messages, which can move markets—creating unequal conditions for investors. American senators and politicians—Mark Warner, Elizabeth Warren and Adam Schiff—call it an abuse of office and demand an SEC investigation. For a Venezuelan reader, this sounds especially familiar: it echoes debates about corruption, lack of transparency, and the merging of power with private interests.

Particular concern stems from the fact that through Truth Social, Trump publishes messages about wars, tariffs or Iran—and the markets react instantly. This makes political communication part of a financial game. Analyst Art Hogan notes that the new service gives investors and algorithms “an advantage in a fraction of a second,” while law professor Ann Lipton believes Trump has an incentive to post messages that can move markets. From a Venezuelan perspective, this looks like a dangerous normalization of the idea that information from a leader turns into a commodity, and that access to it can be bought for large sums. Even the subscription price—estimated at tens of thousands of dollars—reinforces the sense of exclusivity and the notion that power serves not everyone, but only the chosen few.

Against this backdrop, the story about Brazil’s instant payments system Pix—covered by BBC Mundo in https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c98vj2g5npjo—reads in Venezuela as an opposite, but no less important, narrative. Here, Pix is seen not merely as a convenient payments service, but as a symbol of digital sovereignty and the state’s ability to build its own infrastructure without dependence on Visa, Mastercard or US platforms. This is especially important in a region where the question of economic independence has always been closely tied to politics.

The article emphasizes that Pix is a state tool, created and run by the Central Bank of Brazil. The conflict between Brazil and the United States over this system shows how quickly a successful Latin American initiative becomes a target of external pressure. Lula responds to the criticism with the slogan: “Pix es de Brasil,” and for a regional audience it sounds like a statement of the country’s right to set the rules for its own financial infrastructure. Even Flavio Bolsonaro, according to BBC Mundo, tries to claim this symbol for political purposes—confirming that Pix has become not only an economic, but also an election-related tool.

The Venezuelan viewpoint makes especially visible the words of those who assess Pix not as a private innovation, but as a public system. Polina Kempinski notes that Brazil has become known for its digital banks and domestic financial innovation. Paul Krugman praises Pix for its low costs and almost instantaneous transfers, contrasting it with the weaknesses of cryptocurrencies. Joseph Stiglitz says that Washington does not like the idea of Brazil’s independent payments system, not controlled by Visa and Mastercard. And the Federation of Brazilian Banks (Febraban) explicitly underscores that Pix is a payments infrastructure, not a commercial product—and that it strengthens competition. For Venezuela, this line is particularly important because here the dispute is read not only as a trade conflict, but as a struggle over control of the financial architecture.

Both stories converge on one point: power is increasingly trying to monetize access—whether access to political messages or access to payments infrastructure. In Trump’s case, it raises suspicions of using presidential influence for private gain. In Pix’s case, the issue is the attempt to preserve public control over the most important digital system despite outside pressure. That is why the Venezuelan perspective brings these storylines together into a broader conclusion: where politics turns into business, and financial decisions become tools of influence, society risks losing equality, trust and sovereignty.

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Iraqi oil will once again head to the Mediterranean via Syria

Syria is planning to put back into service the Haditha–Baniyas oil pipeline, through which Iraqi oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean coast. According to Yusuf Kablawi, head of the Syrian Oil Company, the rehabilitation will take between 30 months and three years. Talks with Baghdad on the final contract are already under way and are expected to be concluded within the next two to three months. Only after the deal is signed will engineering surveys begin, followed by procurement of materials and construction work. For now, the parties have not disclosed either the investment amount or the level of transit fees for Damascus.

In July 2025, two memorandums of understanding were signed in the United States. The first was between the Syrian Oil Company and Iraq’s Basra oil company, and the second was with an international consortium led by the American company Chevron. The consortium also included UCC Holding and TI Capital. The ceremony took place in the presence of Iraq’s prime minister and the U.S. energy minister. The consortium will handle preparation of technical, economic and financial studies, as well as development of the project’s implementation structure.

The capacity of the upgraded pipeline is expected to be 1.5–2 million barrels per day. For Syria, it is a direct source of revenue: transit fees, storage charges, and port services. For Iraq, it is an additional Western export route via the port of Baniyas, reducing dependence on existing corridors. In addition, if the final contract allows for it, part of Iraq’s oil could be sent for processing at a plant in Baniyas.

The project effectively revives the historical Kirkuk–Baniyas route, which operated from 1952 and was halted after damage during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The old pipeline was about 895 kilometers long and had an oil throughput capacity of 13.5 million tons per year. Along it there were 23 oil storage facilities with a total capacity of 575,000 tons. The new targeted capacity is significantly higher than the previous one, so the project will require large-scale upgrades to pumping stations, storage facilities, and the Baniyas port infrastructure.

The pipeline talks are taking place amid Damascus’s efforts to rebuild the oil sector after the war and sanctions. Syria currently produces about 100–110,000 barrels per day. Kablawi expects output to rise to 250,000 barrels by the end of 2027 and to reach one million barrels per day by 2030. By comparison, before the war began in 2011, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the country produced about 383,000 barrels per day. The new target looks highly ambitious.

The return of foreign companies is already beginning. The U.S. company HKN Energy has taken over the management and operation of the Rumeylan oil field in the Hasakeh province, repairing wells, drilling new ones, and upgrading infrastructure. Company chief Mark Rollins said his team has been working at the site for two months and called Rumeylan one of Syria’s most important fields. This process was accelerated by the U.S. lifting comprehensive sanctions in July 2025 and repealing the “Caesar Act” in December of the same year; British Gulf Sands has already resumed investment in the Diyala field in Hasakeh province.

Comments on the news

• What is the “Caesar Act” (Caesar Act) imposed by the United States on Syria, and why did its repeal in December 2025 become a decisive condition for the return of foreign oil companies? — The “Caesar Act” is a broad U.S. sanctions regime targeting the government of Bashar Assad, based on reports of torture and violence in prisons. The law prohibits foreign companies from doing business with Syrian authorities, freezes assets, and effectively blocks investment in the Syrian economy, including the oil sector. Due to the threat of secondary sanctions, even major international oil majors avoided any contact with Damascus. Repealing this law in December 2025 removes the main legal and financial barrier: oil companies no longer risk losing access to the U.S. financial system, meaning they can legally participate in rebuilding Syria’s oil infrastructure.

• Who effectively controls oil fields in the northeast of Syria, including Rumeylan in Hasakeh province, and does this create obstacles to Damascus’s plans to restore the pipeline? — These fields are controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose core consists of YPG units supported by the United States. Rumeylan is one of the country’s largest fields, and Damascus does not have operational control over it. Production revenues go to the autonomous administration of the northeast rather than to the central government. This creates a serious obstacle: restoring the pipeline from the northeastern fields to the coast requires either an agreement between Damascus and the SDF or the return of territories under Syrian army control. As long as this has not happened, Damascus’s plans to resume full-scale oil pumping remain in question.

• Why is the port of Baniyas important for Syria’s oil infrastructure, and what historical role did it play even since the days of the Kirkuk–Baniyas route? — The port of Baniyas is a key energy hub on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. It hosts an oil refinery, tanker terminals, and oil storage facilities. Historically, the port was the endpoint of the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which since the 1950s delivered Iraqi oil to the coast for export to Europe. This made Baniyas strategically important not only for Syria but for the entire Middle East oil market. Today, its significance remains: through Baniyas, Syrian oil can be shipped and, potentially, Iraqi oil as well if the pipeline is restored. The port’s return to full operation is a central condition for integrating Syria’s oil sector into the global market.

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Full version: سوريا تتوقع إعادة تأهيل خط أنابيب النفط مع العراق خلال 3 أعوام

Delcy Rodríguez: We haven’t left—we continue helping those affected

After the earthquakes that struck on July 24, Venezuela’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, said that the government has not halted its work and remains with the people. She stressed that the authorities are providing comprehensive support to affected families—especially those who have lost loved ones and their homes. Rodríguez noted that many international journalists turned off their cameras and left, but unlike them, the country’s leadership continues to help the most vulnerable citizens. The statement was a response to those who believe attention to the disaster has already faded, and a confirmation that the work will be carried through to the end.

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Full version: Delcy Rodríguez: Algunos apagaron sus cámaras y se fueron, nosotros seguimos aquí trabajando junto al pueblo tras el 24J

IMF: Syria’s economic growth will accelerate to double digits in 2026

The International Monetary Fund expects that growth in Syria’s economy will accelerate to double-digit figures as early as 2026 and remain high in 2027. The IMF links this to the recovery of agriculture, increased oil and gas production, improved electricity supply, as well as the expansion of trade and services. At the same time, the fund warns that the recovery remains uneven across regions, inflation is accelerating this year, and the banking sector is still “highly imbalanced” and cannot fully finance the economy.

The assessments were released following a mission by an IMF team led by Ron van Rooden to Damascus from July 19 to 23. Fund representatives discussed economic developments and reform priorities; however, as stated in the announcement, the visit does not mean that a loan agreement or a new financing program has been reached.

Syria’s economic recovery began in 2025: after the change of regime, consumer and investor confidence rose, about 1.5 million refugees returned, and Syria is gradually restoring economic ties with neighboring countries and the rest of the world. This partially offset the effects of a severe drought that hit agriculture. In 2026, according to forecasts, the momentum will strengthen thanks to better rains and harvests, increased fuel extraction and electricity generation, as well as a rise in the number of visitors, government spending, and the return of refugees. The IMF’s new estimates are noticeably more optimistic than the April forecast of the World Bank, which expected Syria’s economic growth in 2025 to be only 2–4%. Support also came from the European Union lifting most sanctions and a U.S. license allowing investments, financial services, and transactions related to Syrian oil.

Despite the pickup in economic activity, inflation— which slowed in 2025 to low double-digit figures—has risen significantly since the start of 2026. The IMF explains this by higher import costs, above all for fuel and food, due to the regional conflict, as well as strong domestic demand boosted by higher wages for public-sector employees and by increases in utility and housing tariffs. Price hikes for electricity and services, as noted, are intended to cover operating costs and reduce the indirect financial burden on the state, but they also intensify pressure on household budgets. The fund expects inflation to slow in 2027, provided that import price pressures ease and the authorities adhere to disciplined fiscal and monetary policy. By way of comparison: the World Bank projected inflation to fall from 72.1% in 2024 to 11.5% in 2025, while noting that around 90% of households still struggle to meet basic needs.

Syria’s central government budget closed 2025 with a small surplus: the government kept spending within available resources, focusing on urgent needs, and stopped financing the budget through the central bank. In 2026, a significant increase in revenues is expected: first-half proceeds from taxes and customs rose noticeably, oil and gas revenues are expected to grow, and there are expected one-off receipts from telecommunications licenses and transit fees for fuel. At the same time, Syria’s Ministry of Finance reports that the 2026 budget provides for expenditures of around $10.5 billion, with expected revenues of 8.716 billion and a deficit of approximately $1.8 billion. The IMF advises preparing the 2027 budget based on conservative revenue estimates, restraining current spending, reducing off-budget operations, and improving the collection of taxes and customs duties.

The IMF gave a positive assessment of the issuance of a new national currency, but notes that monetary policy remains severely constrained due to the lack of effective tools and disruptions in the banking sector’s operations. The fund calls for the prompt preparation of a new central bank law and banking legislation that would give the central bank a clear mandate to ensure price stability, strong supervisory powers, and mechanisms to resolve problems at troubled banks.

Other priorities include a comprehensive assessment of banks’ financial stability in line with international standards, restoring payment systems, rebuilding depositor confidence, and expanding credit to businesses and citizens, including domestic and international transfers. In addition, Syria needs to strengthen its system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing so that it can exit the FATF “gray list,” where it remains under enhanced monitoring.

The IMF emphasizes that Syria needs strong and fast international financial support—not only for humanitarian needs, but also for restoring housing, infrastructure, public services, and creating jobs for returning and internally displaced people. At the same time, the government’s ability to attract external financing will depend on a comprehensive resolution of the country’s old debts and the development of a local capital markets. As AFP notes, the Syrian government has not yet sought help from the IMF, and any such request would likely be linked to a restructuring of the country’s external debt.

The IMF and Syrian authorities have agreed an expanded program of technical assistance. It covers budget management and government liquidity, tax and customs reforms, debt management, capital market development, restoring and overseeing banks, updating financial legislation, and improving statistics on GDP, prices, and the balance of payments. This, it is expected, will lay the groundwork for resuming Article IV consultations, which the Syrian authorities requested; the most recent completed consultations of this kind were held as far back as 2009.

News comments

• What happened in Syria during the mentioned “change of regime,” and when exactly did it take place? — In late November 2024, a coalition of armed groups led by Hay’at Tahrir ash-Sham launched a rapid offensive from the north of the country. By December 8, 2024, the forces of the previous government had lost control of Damascus, the Assad regime had effectively fallen, and Bashar al-Assad himself fled to Russia. Power then passed to a transitional government led by Muhammad al-Bashir.

• What is known about the new Syrian national currency, and why did its issuance become an important step for monetary policy? — After the change of authority, the Central Bank of Syria announced that it would move toward issuing new banknotes without portraits and symbols of the overthrown regime. The main goal is to restore confidence in the Syrian pound, reduce dollarization in the economy, stop the depreciation of the national currency, and create a foundation for a more predictable monetary policy. Issuing the new currency is also seen as a signal to the international community that the transitional authorities are ready for financial reform.

• Why is Syria on the FATF “gray list,” and what are the consequences for the banking sector and international settlements? — FATF placed Syria on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring due to systemic problems in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Being on the “gray list” forces foreign banks to apply enhanced screening measures to Syrian counterparties, often rejecting or delaying payments and cutting correspondent banking relationships. This effectively blocks Syrian banks’ access to international markets and makes any cross-border transactions difficult.

• What is the real scale of Syria’s external debt, and who are the main creditors? — The exact size of Syria’s external debt remains hard to verify because official statistics have not been published for many years. Estimates suggest that Syria’s total external debt may range from $20 billion to $40 billion, and according to some data, it is significantly higher. The main creditors are believed to be Russia, Iran, China, as well as some Arab countries and international financial institutions. A large portion of the debt was accumulated even before the conflict began, and after 2011 it grew further due to military loans and supplies made via routes circumventing sanctions.

• What exactly does the U.S. license allow regarding Syrian oil, and which European sanctions did the EU lift? — The OFAC U.S. license regarding Syrian oil generally allows limited transactions involving energy commodities—for example, temporary purchase and transportation of crude oil or ensuring fuel supplies to Syria for humanitarian needs. The EU, in turn, announced a partial suspension of sanctions in sectors such as financial services, transport, and energy to support the transitional process. At the same time, the arms embargo and sanctions targeting individuals linked to the former regime remain largely in place. The exact parameters depend on the specific text of the license and the EU decision.

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Full version: IMF expects Syria’s economy to grow by more than 10%

Villegas: Venezuela’s fate in the hands of Delcy Rodríguez and dialogue

Journalist and political analyst Vladimir Villegas said on Monday that the near future of Venezuela’s political stability largely depends on decisions by the national executive leadership and personally on Delcy Rodríguez, noting that the country’s next course depends on these actions. In an interview with the Globovisión channel, he called the dialogue that began on August 1 the starting point on the path toward elections and stressed that its success is possible only with the participation of all political forces and with due consideration of each side’s views.

Among the first issues to be discussed, Villegas highlighted the elimination of the consequences of the double earthquake on June 24, unresolved matters within the Peace Commission, the holding of open competitions for appointing new judges, and the need to decisively respond to the weakness of the minimum wage. He urged the parties to resolve political disagreements strictly within the framework of the Constitution and dialogue, reminding them of the importance of democratic debates on these pressing problems.

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Full version: Vladimir Villegas:

Syrian Helicopter in Iraq Turned Out to Be a Fake: Video From 2016

A video has been circulating on social media showing a helicopter flying low over the ground under heavy fire. The authors claimed that a Syrian military aircraft had entered Iraq’s airspace, attacked the “Hashd ash-Shaabi” bases, and was forced to retreat. However, the video itself only shows shots fired toward a distant aircraft—there is no evidence of an air battle or of the helicopter’s state affiliation.

The clip sparked a heated reaction among Iraqis: some mocked the weak response by the military, while others wondered why drones are being purchased if even a helicopter cannot get out of the barrage. Many said the incident demonstrates a loss of sovereignty and called on authorities to take decisive action. Users urged that Iraq not be turned into a stage for other people’s disputes and called attention to corruption and external threats.

Media outlets also joined in, including a channel with a million-strong audience, which gave the video an almost official status. At the same time, neither Baghdad nor Damascus issued any statements. The lack of response from the authorities intensified suspicions that the footage was either old or taken out of an entirely different context.

Verification showed that an earlier version of the video appeared as far back as July 20, 2023, and during further searching a full version was found on YouTube from January 2016. In it, people speaking with an Iraqi accent record the same flight and mention that the helicopter belongs to the Iraqi army. Thus, the aircraft was not Syrian—it was an Iraqi helicopter that took part in battles with terrorists nearly ten years ago.

Additional shots and features of the landscape made it possible to identify the filming location: the Makхul Mountains, northeast of Baiji, in Salah ad-Din Province. In that area in the mid-2010s, the Iraqi army and the Hashd ash-Shaabi militia forces fought fierce battles against ISIS. In other words, the original story is simply a typical combat episode from that war—not a border violation.

The appearance of the old video comes amid growing tension in the region. The Iraqi government has officially stated that it will not allow attacks from its territory against neighbors, and that the army is ready to counter any provocations. This followed strikes on Saudi oil facilities, which were blamed on Iran-backed Iraqi groups, and subsequent airstrikes by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The timing coincidence raises questions about why someone needed to resurface an old clip right now—creating an image of Iraq as an open target for foreign incursions.

Comments on the news

• What is “Hashd ash-Shaabi” and how is this Iraqi coalition connected to Iranian military networks operating in Syria? — Hashd ash-Shaabi (“Popular Mobilization Forces”) is an Iraqi coalition created in 2014, consisting mainly of Shiite militias that originally mobilized to fight ISIS. Formally, Hashd was later integrated into the structure of Iraq’s security forces, but its most influential factions (“Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq,” and the “Badr” organization) are closely tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), above all to the “Quds” Force. The link to the Syrian theater runs through the shared “Axis of Resistance” network: Iranian commanders coordinate the actions of the Syrian army, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite groups. It was fighters of Hashd ash-Shaabi (along with Afghan and Pakistani IRGC formations) who fought in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s government, receiving weapons, training, and orders via Iranian channels. Therefore, Hashd is not purely an Iraqi phenomenon—it is part of a cross-border military network controlled by Tehran.

• Why did neither Baghdad nor Damascus issue an official denial of the video, and what real security-interaction channels exist between Syria and Iraq? — Official silence is a typical tactic in cases like this: if the incident is real, it involves intelligence-sensitive operations that are not disclosed; if the video is fake, a denial would only give it extra publicity. As for real channels: coordination mechanisms between Baghdad and Damascus have long existed to fight ISIS—liaison officers along the border, joint operational points (including with Russian and Iranian military participation), and agreements to patrol desert areas. Iraqi aviation has repeatedly carried out strikes on ISIS hideouts on Syrian territory—such raids are usually coordinated in advance with Damascus or Moscow, but they are not publicized. At the same time, there are no full-fledged official intergovernmental defense treaties between Syria and Iraq—much is handled through informal military contacts and coordination via third parties.

• Have there been precedents of Syrian aviation crossing into Iraq to strike ISIS, or are similar clips used in an information war to delegitimize Damascus? — No publicly confirmed precedents of strikes by specifically Syrian fighters on Iraqi territory have been recorded. In practice in recent years, the picture is rather the opposite: Iraqi Air Force has bombed ISIS positions in Syria’s desert areas with Damascus’s tacit approval, and Iranian drones have operated on both sides of the border. A video showing alleged Syrian aviation invading Iraqi airspace fits well into the logic of information warfare: it portrays Damascus as a violator of a neighboring state’s sovereignty and works to delegitimize the Syrian government in the eyes of Arab public opinion. Since neither Iraqi nor Syrian command has confirmed what happened, such a clip should be viewed as a likely propaganda insertion—though it cannot be entirely ruled out that rare episodes of pursuing militants across the border occur without official declaration.

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Full version: مشاهد لمروحية عسكرية سورية في أجواء العراق تثير جدلا.. ما القصة؟

Trump, Iran and the dispute over diplomacy—or escalation

While Washington tries to shape its line on Iran, international attention is focused not so much on individual events as on the very design of the policy itself: how pressure and negotiation rhetoric fit together, and why each new phrasing becomes a pretext for diametrically opposed interpretations. In headlines, the theme of “inconsistencies” is appearing more and more often—either Trump and Tehran are getting closer to an agreement, or the sides are merely laying the groundwork for the next round of confrontation. Some observers see signs of de-escalation and a diplomatic breakthrough, while others are sure this is just another iteration of pressure, where every concession or signal is taken as part of the bargaining. Against the backdrop of external commentary, one overall conclusion emerges: for many, the U.S. position on Iran remains risky and internally inconsistent, and its success or failure is assessed not by facts, but by how the tone and logic of actions are changing.

The material was prepared based on publications from www.instagram.com (Venezuela) and www.france24.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela and Latin America read signals from Washington

Today, Venezuelan and regional agendas are watching two storylines at once—seemingly different at first glance, but in fact linked by a shared logic of pressure, markets, and geopolitics. On the one hand, Bloomberg Línea, through a Venezuelan lens, describes the dispute between Donald Trump and Tehran over U.S.-Iran negotiations as a story with direct consequences for oil, currency, business expectations, and the risk of escalation. On the other hand, France24 reports on Marco Rubio’s reaction to the strengthening U.S. influence in Latin America, where his words about an “extraordinary achievement” are being received not as neutral commentary, but as a demonstration of America’s leverage over the region.

In the Bloomberg Línea piece, it is emphasized that Trump and Tehran are “telling different stories” about whether negotiations are taking place at all. Washington talks about the “last chance” for Iran and insists that contacts continue, while the Iranian side denies it and claims it communicates only with Oman regarding maritime transit in the Strait of Hormuz. For Venezuela, this storyline matters not only as a Middle East news item, but also as a reminder that any tension around Hormuz can immediately affect the global oil market—meaning it can also hit a country whose economy is still sensitive to oil prices, sanctions, and external pressure. The text directly asks what lies behind these opposing versions and how the market responded; this, more than the diplomatic sparring itself, is what Venezuelan readers are most interested in. Original

The regional context reinforces this interpretation. For Venezuela, the conflict over Iran is easy to read through its own experience: limited access to global markets, sanctions pressure, dependence on intermediaries, and the familiarity with how foreign-policy crises are reflected immediately in prices, the exchange rate, and business expectations. The mention of Oman as an intermediary evokes how, in crises, direct dialogue is often replaced by indirect contacts—a scenario well known to Venezuelan foreign-policy practice. That is why the risk of escalation involving the U.S. and Iran is viewed in Caracas not as abstract diplomacy, but as a factor of global instability capable of striking imports, markets, and domestic sentiment.

At the same time, in a piece that is drawing attention in Latin America, France24 says that Marco Rubio believes the strengthening of U.S. influence in the region is an “extraordinary achievement,” linking it to Donald Trump’s policies and the increase in the number of pro-American leaders. For Washington, this is presented as a success, but for the Venezuelan audience such wording sounds different: like a reminder of an old pattern in which regional politics is measured by the degree of loyalty to the United States. The mention of Venezuela, in particular, comes across as especially sensitive. The report claims that after the January events, Caracas is allegedly “cooperating” with the U.S. energy and economic agenda, and that Nicolás Maduro no longer appears as an independent center of power. For Venezuela, this is directly tied to the themes of sanctions, pressure, and forced compromises—as well as the question of who actually sets the limits of its foreign policy. France24 material

For Caracas, such rhetoric is especially painful because it brings historical associations with U.S. policy in Latin America during the Cold War—supporting leaders convenient to Washington and putting pressure on governments that tried to chart their own course. That is why Rubio’s words are understood not only as an assessment of American diplomacy, but also as a signal that the U.S. is again seeking to reshape the region to fit its interests. In this reading, Venezuela turns out not merely to be part of the news background, but a symbol of a broader struggle for sovereignty, influence, and the right to determine its own political course.

Taken together, both storylines produce a single overall picture: both the dispute between Trump and Tehran and Rubio’s statements about the region are being read in Venezuela through the same lens—external signals capable of affecting oil, markets, the sanctions environment, and the balance of power in Latin America. That is why such messages here are not seen as a set of separate diplomatic episodes, but as parts of one big conversation about pressure, intermediaries, levers of influence, and the fragility of regional stability.

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A craftsman from Aleppo passes his ancient art of wood carving to his son

In the labyrinths of Aleppo’s old markets, the Syrian artisan Ayman Said leans over wooden panels, creating Eastern patterns and Arabic calligraphy. In this way, he is trying to preserve an art form that is around 1,400 years old and protect it from disappearing. The 42-year-old master has been practicing the craft for three decades—not only keeping the tradition alive, but also passing it on to his son. He believes the art can survive only if it moves into the hands of the new generation, which will keep the memory of this artistic heritage. Said works in painting and wood carving, creating three-dimensional panels and ornaments in the spirit of Arab and Islamic heritage, even though the number of masters in this profession has dropped significantly and it has been added to a list of crafts at risk of extinction.

For centuries, the art of raised Arab ornamental painting—also known as “al-rasm al-ajami”—has been one of the key elements of architecture and decoration in the region. It adorned the ceilings and walls of mosques, churches, and palaces. Examples of this style can still be seen in famous monuments, including the Throne Hall of the Citadel of Aleppo and the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. With changes in building traditions and tastes in home interiors, the use of this art in large buildings has declined; however, it has found a new niche in the production of souvenir boxes, artistic panels, and small wooden items that are in demand among lovers of handcrafted goods.

A father of three children, Ayman Said began learning the craft at the age of twelve and today tries to teach it to his son so that the cultural heritage can continue to live on in future generations. He works in the traditional atmosphere of Aleppo’s old markets and believes that preserving this craft means preserving part of the city’s cultural memory. According to him, raised ornamentation was one of the brightest features of the Eastern style that distinguished the ceilings and walls of traditional Arab houses.

The work process begins with a drawing on paper, which is then transferred onto the wood. After that, the masters use a special paste made from plant materials to form raised patterns. Next, the base is covered with paint and a protective layer, and the ornaments are painted by hand with a brush. In the final stage, thin black lines are applied to give the work its finishing look.

Said admits that he approaches the craft with the same enthusiasm as many years ago and says, “This profession doesn’t let you get bored.” Each new piece reveals previously unknown details, sustaining his interest and desire to improve his skills. He notes that the colors and materials of wooden decoration change how space is perceived: some shades create a sense of coolness in sunny rooms, while others add warmth to spaces with insufficient light. “Customers who come to my workshop spend a long time looking at the walls and ceilings, noticing the smallest details of the work,” the master adds.

Ayman Said calls for creating a traditional market where craftsmen could work under one roof—something he says would help protect old trades from extinction. Such a venue could bring together different types of crafts: raised painting, copper production, weaving, and carpet weaving. In his view, having workshops side by side would strengthen healthy competition and raise the quality of the products. While traditional crafts are giving way to a modern way of life, Ayman Said continues to create patterns in wood and puts the craft he inherited from his family into his son’s hands, hoping that his works will not become the last trace of an art form that has lived for 1,400 years.

News comments

• What is “al-rasm al-ajami,” and why is this technique considered a distinctive hallmark of Aleppo’s Arab and Islamic heritage? — “Al-rasm al-ajami” is a traditional technique of decorative finishing for wooden panels featuring a volumetric raised ornament, gilding, and painting. The word “ajami” in Arabic means “Persian” or “non-Arab,” indicating the influence of an Iranian artistic tradition that Aleppo’s masters reinterpreted and perfected. Paste is applied to a wooden base to create protruding patterns, which are then covered with paint and gold. During the Ottoman Empire era, this technique flourished specifically in Aleppo, decorating the interiors of palaces, mosques, public buildings, and wealthy residential homes. It is considered a symbol of the city’s Arab-Islamic heritage and is protected by UNESCO as an element of intangible cultural heritage.

• What stages of destruction and restoration did Aleppo’s old markets go through after the start of the war in Syria, and how did that affect traditional crafts? — The covered markets of old Aleppo (Souq Al-Madina), with more than 1,200 shops, were severely damaged during the fighting from 2012 to 2016, when the city was divided into areas of control. The markets burned repeatedly, and were subjected to shelling, looting, and vandalism: hundreds of workshops, storage facilities, and historic caravanserais were destroyed. After the eastern part of Aleppo returned under the control of government forces in December 2016, phased restoration efforts began with the participation of UNESCO, international foundations, and local communities. Many shops and workshops were restored and reopened. However, traditional crafts suffered a major loss: a significant number of artisans were killed, emigrated, or lost their equipment, and many unique skills were lost due to the lack of passing experience to the younger generation. Today, the slow revival of craft schools and workshops is underway, but full restoration of both the markets and the craft tradition will take years.

• What plant components are traditionally used to prepare the paste that masters use to form raised patterns in the “al-rasm al-ajami” technique? — The paste base is a mixture of chalk powder with glue, but plant components traditionally include wheat starch or wheat flour, which are cooked with water until they reach a thick paste-like consistency. The recipe often also includes linseed oil for elasticity and gum arabic—natural acacia resin—which strengthens the mixture and gives it plasticity. Sometimes small wood shavings were mixed into the paste for additional strength of the relief. It is the plant component that gives the paste the required consistency, allowing the master to shape delicate raised designs before they harden, after which the surface is gilded and painted.

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Full version: See.. A Syrian craftsman protects a 1,400-year-old heritage from extinction

Analysis

Key points: - On July 29, SUNAVAL met with investment funds at the Bolívarian Stock Exchange of Caracas to discuss the rebuilding of La Guaira after an earthquake. - SUNAVAL head Carlos Herrera said that traditional financing is not enough; innovative capital-raising mechanisms are needed. - Tibisay Marcano highlighted the problems faced by small businesses: premises, warehouses, and equipment were lost; a bank loan does not solve the issue. - The exchange president is seeking support from multilateral organizations, but the resources of the banking system and the capital market are insufficient. - Participants called for new financial instruments, tax incentives, and long-term investments. - It was proposed to separate strategies: on the one hand, housing and infrastructure; on the other, restoration of production. - The author raises the question of La Guaira’s long-term economic identity over the next 50 years, citing examples of successful regions. - La Guaira has advantages: a port, an airport, proximity to Caracas, tourism, and access to the Caribbean. - Multilateral organizations are limited; what’s needed is international private capital.

Plan for the final text: 1. The meeting’s context and the regulator’s statements about the scale of the task. 2. The problem of small business and the limitations of the banking system, along with the need for new instruments and two strategies. 3. The author’s vision: the question of La Guaira’s future economic role, its competitive advantages, and examples of successful regions. 4. The role of multilateral organizations, mobilizing private capital, and the conclusion that a long-term development project is necessary.

La Guaira: from clearing up the aftermath to a development strategy

On July 29, in Caracas, at the venue of the stock exchange, a meeting was held convened by the National Securities Superintendency (SUNAVAL). Representatives of investment funds and regulators discussed how the capital market could help restore the La Guaira state after a devastating earthquake. SUNAVAL head Carlos Herrera emphasized that the scope of the challenges—from housing to reviving production—far exceeds the capacity of ordinary financing, so unconventional mechanisms for attracting capital are needed.

Particular attention was paid to the fate of small entrepreneurs. As Tibisay Marcano, director of the public offerings department, noted, many shops and small companies lost premises, warehouses, and equipment and, in practice, cannot resume operations. Bank credit is not enough for this, and without functioning businesses there will be neither jobs nor sustainable recovery. At the same time, the president of the Caracas Exchange acknowledged a structural problem: neither the national banking system nor the local capital market today has resources sufficient for a project of this scale. That is why the discussion is about creating new financial instruments, tax incentives, and mechanisms for long-term investment.

The article’s author suggests going further and dividing recovery into two different strategies. The first is financing housing and infrastructure for thousands of families affected. The second is targeted support for the productive sector: hotels, restaurants, logistics, transport, and tourism, where even small investments can quickly kick-start the economy. Mixing these tasks, the author argues, leads to inefficient use of funds. The central question, however, should be phrased even more ambitiously: what economic vocation does La Guaira want to pursue over the next fifty years? Examples such as Las Vegas, Napa Valley, Silicon Valley, and Orlando show that transforming a region is possible only with a clear long-term strategy.

La Guaira has unique advantages: the country’s main port, an international airport, proximity to Caracas, tourism potential, and access to the Caribbean Sea. However, these factors alone do not create development—what is needed is a project attractive to large investors. Multilateral organizations can help only partially due to long procedures and constraints, so the key opportunity is attracting international private capital. The meeting convened by SUNAVAL showed that Venezuela’s securities market is willing to participate in solving the problem, but the rebuilding of La Guaira should be not just the elimination of the consequences of a natural disaster, but the beginning of a long-term economic revival of the entire region.

Comments on the news

• Which earthquake is specifically meant in the article, and why were its consequences for La Guaira so catastrophic? — If the article does not name the date and scale, it likely refers to the San Narciso earthquake of 1900. It was one of the strongest earthquakes in Venezuelan history: its epicenter was in the Caribbean Sea, near the coast of La Guaira; the magnitude is estimated at roughly 7.7–8.0; and it triggered a tsunami with waves up to ten meters high. La Guaira is a narrow port city located at the foot of mountains on the seashore, so it was nearly at the epicenter and took the full force of the wave. By comparison, the destructive events in La Guaira in 1999 were not an earthquake, but flooding and mudslides known as the Vargas tragedy. These two disasters can be easily confused, but an article that specifically mentions an earthquake almost certainly refers to the 1900 catastrophe.

• How do international sanctions and Venezuela’s political isolation affect the ability of regions such as La Guaira—whose author calls private capital essential for long-term recovery—to attract private capital? — Sanctions—primarily American—do not create a direct ban for investors; rather, they create impassable legal and financial barriers. The port and airport of La Guaira are publicly owned, and working with any Venezuelan state-owned companies linked to the Maduro government is risky due to “secondary sanctions”: any dollar payments, use of the international banking system, and even partnering with local firms may result in asset freezes and cut the investor off from the U.S. market. At the same time, Venezuela does not receive loans from the IMF, the World Bank, or the Inter-American Development Bank, so it essentially does not repair infrastructure. Private investors also do not come because the country has weak property guarantees, a lack of independent courts, strict currency controls, and the possibility that any property may be expropriated. The port, airport, and tourism potential are attractive, but without the removal of sanctions, a stable legal system, and the ability to insure political risks, large capital considers an investment in La Guaira too risky—regardless of how promising the region may look.

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Full version: Sunaval y la reconstrucción de La Guaira

From the Underground to the Presidential Palace: Ahmad ash-Sharaa’s Confession

The second episode of the program “Interview” on Al Jazeera, in which the host Ali ad-Dafiri spoke with Syria’s President Ahmad ash-Sharaa, sparked a strong response on social media. The discussion touched on key turning points in his biography—from childhood and his trip to Iraq to the fight against “Islamic State” and a rethinking of his earlier ideological positions. Viewers and analysts were split in their opinions, but almost everyone noted the unusual nature of the life of a man who made the journey from an underground fighter to the head of state.

During the conversation, ash-Sharaa for the first time gave a detailed account of how in 2003, at the age of twenty, he entered Iraq to protect the Iraqi people before the American occupation. In his words, it was a normal and natural step—without any pre-planned scheme. Soon, however, he was arrested, and over the next five years he spent in prison under someone else’s name—“Amjad Muzaffar.” When asked about official documents, he recalled only this name and identified himself as “Amjad Muzaffar Hussein.”

This detail revealed a family secret: it turned out that the name belonged to his father, who signed letters sent through the ordinary postal system in order to evade surveillance by Syrian security services. Thus, ash-Sharaa bore his father’s alias in Iraqi captivity, adding a personal and family dimension to his story. Activists on social media actively discussed the account, seeing in it evidence of the pressure and persecution his entire family had faced.

Ash-Sharaa also directly addressed those who tried to remind him of his former name, “Abu Muhammad al-Julani.” He said he was not ashamed of his history: “I belong to the Golan, and that does not disgrace me. More than 23 years of intense work, and in this story there is a burden, blood, martyrs, people’s cries and suffering. I’m proud of it. It has become part of Syrian heritage.” Such a response won broad support—many saw in him honesty, courage, and a refusal to renounce his own path.

Observers also highlighted two main lessons from the interview. Some see in ash-Sharaa an example of an astonishing rise: not long ago, he moved across Syrian provinces with a handful of people and without even minimal weaponry, and today he receives world leaders in the presidential palace. Others stress his ideological evolution—from a narrow factional logic and the old discourse to building a state and national institutions. This move is viewed as a well-deserved and necessary adjustment, especially important for the restoration of a new Syria, where the president presents himself not as a break with the past, but as a continuation of the story in a new, broader political dimension.

News Comments

• Why did Ahmad ash-Sharaa take the alias “al-Julani,” and what does belonging to the Golan Heights mean to him—territory that has remained a symbol of Syrian identity since 1967? — “Al-Julani” means “a man from the Golan” and refers to the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel in 1967. Ash-Sharaa’s family is from there, and the alias for him was not just a piece of cover—it was a statement of Syrian identity and resistance to occupation. For many Syrians, the Golan is a wound that will not heal in national memory, so for him that name symbolized the struggle to return the land. Coming out of the underground and becoming president, he returned to his real name in order to appear as a leader of all Syria, not only an armed group.

• What is Hay’at Tahrir ash-Sham (HTS), and how did its former leader Ahmad ash-Sharaa make the transition from “an underground figure” to President of Syria? — HTS is a former jihadist group that grew out of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda (“Jabhat al-Nusra”). Later, it severed formal ties with Al-Qaeda, changed its name, and became the dominant force in the Idlib province, where it created its own administration. Ash-Sharaa managed a double transformation: externally—from a radical field commander to a pragmatic politician who softens the rhetoric in every possible way and promises rights for minorities; and tactically—by using alliances, amnesties, and military force, he led an offensive that toppled the Assad regime. After capturing the capital, he consolidated power and presented himself as a transitional leader, not only the leader of a rebel group.

• How did the Syrian “mukhabarat” (state security) operate, and why did Syrian families linked to the opposition have to use false names and secret communication channels to survive? — “Mukhabarat” was a sprawling network of security services that permeated all of Syrian society: they had informants in schools, hospitals, mosques, and markets. They could arrest people without trial, torture them, extort confessions, and punish entire families for the “guilt” of one relative. Therefore, any connection to the opposition—even just a phone call or a letter—could cost someone’s life. Families had to use invented names, code words, pass messages through trusted intermediaries, or, conversely, completely sever contacts so the regime couldn’t find them and punish everyone. Such conspiracy was not paranoia, but the only survival strategy under a total surveillance system.

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Full version: From “Amjad Muzaffar” to “Abu Muhammad al-Julani”… How did Syrians react to al-Sharaa’s interview?

Damascus Reassembles Arab Poets: the International Festival Opens

The Syrian capital has kicked off the first International Festival of Arabic Poetry in Damascus. The ceremonial opening took place at the Damascus Opera House and brought together 55 poets, writers, and lecturers from 16 Arab countries. Organizers describe the forum not merely as a literary event, but as a comprehensive cultural project intended to redraw and document the region’s literary map. Here, words become a bridge for human and aesthetic exchange between participants and the public.

In remarks, Syrian Minister of Culture Muhammad Yasin Saleh announced a set of new initiatives. Among them is the completion of work on the “Sham Burda” poetry prize in honor of the Prophet, as well as the establishment of the “Damascus Sword” award in the field of Arabic poetry. In addition, a committee has been created for Nabataean poetic heritage, aimed at honoring Bedouin and urban traditions, and a platform called “Divan of Syrian Poets” has been launched—a living archive of national poetry. In cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, the organizers also decided to restore cultural symbols to purebred Syrian horses.

The festival program, which will run for six days—from August 2 to 7—goes far beyond traditional poetry readings. At the Opera and the Dramatic Theatre, evenings of classical and Nabataean poetry will be held with authors from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, and Syria. Discussions are planned on supporting creative youth, along with talks about the experience of poets such as Suad as-Sabah, live podcasts, art and book exhibitions, and presentations of new publications. The musical portion will be closed by a concert by singer Bashar Zarkan.

The festival also links literature with historical sites: for guests, excursions have been arranged—they will visit Old Damascus, Bosra, Saydnaya, and Maaloula. The opening ceremony included a video presentation titled “Damascus and Poetry,” the song “Syrian Qasida,” a children’s program, and a segment dedicated to departed intellectuals. According to the organizers, the festival goes beyond beautiful words and turns to the human and moral core of poetry, and that the discipline of words and ethical values should become the foundation of a society that lives by the law and rejects injustice. Damascus is once again asserting itself as the cradle of Arab poetry.

Comments on the news

• What is Nabataean poetry, and why is a separate committee created to preserve it under the Syrian Ministry of Culture?
  Nabataean poetry is folk poetry in colloquial Arabic (as opposed to classical literary Arabic poetry). It is widespread among Bedouin and rural communities in Syria, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. It is distinguished by a particular rhythm, an oral tradition of transmission, and themes tied to life, honor, love, and tribal customs. A separate committee has been set up because this form of poetry is passed down orally and is at risk of disappearing due to urbanization, wars, and generational change. The Ministry of Culture aims to document, preserve, and popularize it as part of Syria’s intangible cultural heritage.

• What are Saydnaya and Maaloula known for, and why are they included in the festival’s excursion program?
  Saydnaya is a town in the mountains north of Damascus, known primarily for the ancient Orthodox monastery of the Virgin Mary (Deir-Saydnaya), which is considered one of the oldest functioning monasteries in the world and an important Christian pilgrimage site. Maaloula is a unique settlement where Western Aramaic is still spoken—an Aramaic language closely related to the one that, it is believed, Jesus Christ spoke. It is home to ancient monasteries of Saint Thecla and Saint Sergius (Mar Sarkis), carved into the rocks. Both places attract pilgrims and tourists thanks to their religious history, ancient architecture, and picturesque mountain landscapes.

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Full version: With the participation of 16 countries... Opening of the first edition of the Damascus International Festival of Arabic Poetry

A New Era of Dialogue: Expert Assesses a Shift in Venezuela’s Political Map

On Saturday, a new phase of negotiations began between the Venezuelan government and the radical opposition. Working groups were led by Jorge Rodríguez, the head of the parliament, and Dinora Figuera, a former member of the National Assembly elected in 2015. The well-known sociologist and head of Hinterlaces, Óscar Schemel, called it a “new era” and a strategic reshaping of the country’s political landscape. In his view, the absence of María Corina Machado from the talks clearly shows a split between those who favor confrontation and those who choose institutional dialogue. The main technical task at present is reforming the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Court (TSJ) to provide guarantees for future elections.

According to polls, public demand has clearly shifted toward the center: 65% of citizens support pragmatic forces, while opposition parties have backing from only 5% of the population. This points to fatigue with ideological polarization and a priority placed on economic stability, working services, and everyday certainty. Schemel also noted that official power is undergoing a transformation toward a more pragmatic and adaptive model while preserving its ideological roots. The expert emphasized that the dialogue underway symbolizes the decline of an era of extremes and opens a new chapter in Venezuela’s political life.

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Full version: Oscar Schémel: nueva etapa de negociación redefine el mapa político venezolano

Return of the grandson of the “Arab Gandhi” to the destroyed Golan Heights after 13 years in...

After more than 13 years in Turkey, where he fled the war, the grandson of the late Syrian thinker Jaudat Said, known as the “Arab Gandhi,” returned to his village in the Golan Heights. Ibn Rushd Hajji Bayram left it as a ninth-grade student, and now, after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, he found his homeland in ruins. He spoke about how his family was forced to flee and shared memories of his grandfather, who devoted his life to the ideas of nonviolence and intellectual reform.

Hajji Bayram recalls that the war first forced the family to relocate to Damascus, and in 2012 they made the final decision to leave. “There were 30 of us. We gathered the whole family and understood that we could no longer stay here. At the time, the intelligence services were looking for my grandfather,” he says. In December 2012, they went to Turkey by a long land route—together with their grandfather, their mother, brothers, and uncle, fleeing persecution by the regime.

In Turkey, the family began rebuilding their lives. “We spent 13 years there. When I left Syria, I was in ninth grade, and there I continued my education, entered university, and graduated from the Faculty of Dentistry,” he shares. The first scenes of killings still remain in his memory, and he admits it is a very heavy feeling. Jaudat Said, for decades, had been a beekeeper and livestock breeder, but the war destroyed everything he had created.

Hajji Bayram also spoke about his grandfather’s creative path: for many years, Said worked as a teacher. His ideas drew the regime’s anger, and when the state realized their influence, Said was removed from teaching. At the same time, he continued writing books, but throughout his life he refused to take any money for his work, believing that knowledge belongs to everyone. The thinker’s philosophy was built on the principle of nonviolence, which he called the essence of the Islamic message. He was inspired by the Meccan period of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and loved to repeat: “You cannot change a person without persuading him,” as well as “If we want to change society, we must start with ourselves.” Jaudat Said was born in 1931 in the village of Bir Ajim into a Circassian family and died in Istanbul in 2022 at the age of 91.

Hajji Bayram speaks of his return as one of the strongest impressions of his life. He found the place where he grew up turned into ruins: “When I returned, the village had no life, but there were memories. I felt as if I had never left it.” He walked again along the familiar lanes and past the schools, and despite the devastation, the past came alive in his mind. In conclusion, he called the events in Syria a “liberation war” and expressed hope that the country will overcome the consequences of the war and begin a new stage of reconstruction.

Comments on the news

• How did the Circassian community end up in Syria, and why are there Circassian villages in the Golan Heights, such as Bir Ajim? — The Circassians were resettled to the Middle East after the Caucasus War in the 1860s, when the Russian Empire conquered the Caucasus. The Ottoman Empire dispersed hundreds of thousands of Circassians across its provinces, including Syria and the Golan Heights. The settlers were expected to serve the empire: protect trade routes, guard the borders, and develop sparsely populated lands. That is how Circassian villages came into being, including Bir Ajim, whose residents still preserve their Circassian identity and language.

• Why did the village of Bir Ajim, located in the Golan Heights, remain under Syrian control despite the fact that most of the Golan Heights has been under Israeli occupation since 1967? — In 1967, Israel seized almost all of the Golan, but after the 1973 war, a Disengagement of Forces Agreement (1974) was signed. Under it, the Israeli army withdrew from some territories, and along the ceasefire line a UN buffer zone was established. Syria regained a narrow strip with the city of Quneitra, and Bir Ajim was precisely on the Syrian side of that line—east of the Israeli positions. Therefore, the village remained under Damascus’s control, and its residents remained Syrian citizens.

• Why did the Assad regime consider Jaudat Said’s ideas so dangerous that the intelligence services hunted him, and how did his preaching on nonviolence threaten the authorities? — Jaudat Said was a Circassian Syrian thinker and Islamic scholar, known as the “voice of nonviolence.” He argued that change should not happen through armed struggle, but through education, moral upbringing, and peaceful resistance. For an authoritarian regime, this idea was more dangerous than armed opposition: it undermined the very logic of rule based on fear and violence. If people stop fearing and choose nonviolent disobedience, the authorities are left with neither a moral nor political justification for repression. That is why the intelligence services monitored Said, restricted his movements, and tried to silence him— the regime saw his preaching as a hidden threat to its very existence.

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Full version: بعد 13 عاما من اللجوء.. حفيد "غاندي العرب" يعود إلى الجولان السوري (فيديو)

Practicing Engagement with the United States: Diplomacy, Institutions, and Everyday Connections

Talk of the United States in today’s roundup sounds pragmatic: the U.S. is seen not so much as a source of yet another dispute, but as a convenient reference point and a practical partner in regional diplomacy. The focus is on official visits, the work of embassies, public information, and how American decisions and institutional mechanisms are reflected in the everyday needs of Latin American countries. The article emphasizes the theme of access and the effort to observe how Washington’s priorities are shifting—and what effects that brings to the region, especially for Venezuela, as well as for neighboring countries, where direct contacts and clear rules of interaction matter.

This material is based on content from www.visittheusa.com (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

The United States as a boundary, not just a travel destination

Two different publications—one about the practical requirements for entry into the United States, the other about how Mexico is shaping relations with Washington—together show the same Latin American reality: the United States remains central, but far from a simple benchmark for the region. In one case, it concerns information on visittheusa.com/es, where travel to the U.S. is described as a process dependent on visas, authorizations, and formal requirements. In the other, it is about a statement from Mexico’s SRE, which highlights a pragmatic alliance with Washington based on trade, history, and shared interests.

For a Venezuelan reader, the first text sounds especially familiar. It is not political analysis, but it very accurately captures everyday reality: getting to the United States is not a matter of desire—it is a matter of meeting strict rules. The piece reminds readers that for many foreigners a visa is required, while ESTA is available only to countries participating in the visa waiver program. Against the backdrop of Venezuela—where there are already plenty of economic, social, and administrative constraints—this fact is not perceived as a dry consular detail, but as yet another practical barrier. For those who view the U.S. as a place for tourism, studying, family reunification, or temporary migration, this arrangement means having to think ahead about interviews, proof of financial means, immigration history, and waiting times.

The text contains no quotes from politicians or experts, and that is precisely what makes it telling: it does not argue, assess, or explain—it simply lays out the rules. But for a Venezuelan audience, that is enough to see a familiar storyline: the need to prepare carefully for any international trip, turning it into an administrative-and-economic project. In conditions where the stability of documents and resources is not always guaranteed, even a brief list of requirements is felt as a reminder that mobility today is distributed extremely unevenly.

Quite differently, yet still around the United States, a Mexican publication presents relations with Washington as a long-term and beneficial alliance that must be managed pragmatically. In the SRE message, published on behalf of the Government of Mexico, Roberto Velasco Álvarez said that Mexico and the United States are linked by “more than two centuries of continuous diplomatic relations,” and also drew attention to a symbolic parallel between Benito Juárez and Abraham Lincoln. For a Mexican audience, such historical references are important: they help portray relations with the northern neighbor not as dependence, but as an equal and long-standing connection—one in which national dignity and diplomatic autonomy have a place.

At the same time, the main point of the text is not ideology, but advantage. Velasco emphasized that bilateral trade brings in $872 billion per year. The material also states that cooperation covers security issues and even agriculture, including efforts to fight the gusano barrenador. In the Mexican context, these are not abstract diplomatic formulas: the focus is on jobs, logistics, border economics, migration, and protecting the agro-industrial sector. This kind of tone is usually aimed not only at the general public, but also at markets, business, and political elites: the channel to the United States must remain open because too much depends on how it works.

Particular significance is attached to the mention that cooperation is built on “four principles,” clearly defined by President Sheinbaum. This emphasis matters for understanding the Mexican line: engagement with the U.S. should be pragmatic, but not subordinate—while preserving the country’s own agenda and maintaining control over national interests. Within Mexico, this is presented as a continuation of a course toward a managed partnership rather than confrontation. In other words, the aim is not to distance Mexico from Washington, but to make relations with it predictable and useful.

If we look at both texts together, a difference becomes clear between two types of ties with the United States that are especially visible in Latin America. For one reader, the U.S. is primarily a country that is difficult to reach due to visa barriers and administrative restrictions. For the other, it is a key economic partner that must be approached through carefully planned, beneficial, and institutionally formalized diplomacy. In Venezuelan perceptions, the Mexican example is especially illustrative: it shows that even with a complicated history, it is possible to look for workable compromises rather than conflicts—where trade, security, and political symbolism reinforce one another.

The overall conclusion from these publications is simple: for the region, the United States remains not only a desired destination, but also a system of filters, rules, and interests. For some, it is primarily a matter of access and documents; for others, it is a matter of diplomatic calculation and economic feasibility. That is why both the practical warning about visas and the Mexican statement about cooperation read not as isolated messages, but as parts of a single larger Latin American story of relations with Washington.

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CNN: Washington prepares a new wave of strikes on Iran

The U.S. television channel CNN, citing two informed American officials, reported that the United States is planning new strikes on Iran as early as the coming weekend. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has prepared several military options and put its forces on heightened readiness. Among the scenarios under discussion is a large-scale campaign lasting up to two weeks, aimed at Iranian missile sites.

The plans also include strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the “Mount Fase” facility south of Tehran, although the preparation is not limited to this location. At the same time, the Donald Trump administration is taking a cautious approach to strikes on Iranian energy assets: Washington fears that Tehran could retaliate by targeting facilities in countries of the Persian Gulf, which would trigger a new round of instability in global energy markets.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz previously said his country would like to strike Iran’s energy infrastructure to increase economic pressure on Tehran, but the United States currently does not support such a move. There are no signs that Israel would join a possible new U.S. operation. On Friday, Trump, during a meeting of the cabinet, again threatened to resume intensive strikes, expressing dissatisfaction with diplomatic efforts. In the White House, they said the president would not “sit back and allow this terrorist behavior to continue,” but the exact timing and targets of the strikes remain unclear— the operation could also be canceled.

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Full version: CNN: Washington is preparing sweeping strikes on Iran at the end of the week

Formal talks between Venezuela’s government and opposition resume

On Saturday, August 1, the government and the opposition of Venezuela will officially return to the negotiating table. From the incumbent authorities, the chief negotiator will be Jorge Rodríguez, the chair of the National Assembly, while the opposition will be represented by Dinorah Figuera, who led the 2015 parliament. She returned to the country on June 18 after eight years in exile, at the invitation of the U.S. State Department. At that time, the sides also agreed to create a “political parity table” to strengthen democracy, consolidate peace, and find a common future. The initiative emerged three weeks after the opposition coalition PUD proposed talks involving the United States to “restore democracy.”

The composition of the delegations has not yet been disclosed, but according to the movement Unión y Cambio, along with Figuera, the negotiations will also include former 2015 parliament members—Jorge Millán, Marco Aurelio Quiñones, and Juan Miguel Mateus. On the agenda being discussed with U.S. mediation are the restoration of democratic institutions, strengthening of the National Electoral Council, guarantees for participation in political life, and protection of civil liberties for open political debate. The opposition is calling for specific, verifiable outcomes: the release of all political prisoners, real guarantees for all participants, and respect for popular sovereignty. For its part, the government, according to Diosdado Cabello, general secretary of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, intends to raise the issue of lifting international sanctions.

Some opposition forces—Justicia Primero, Popular Will, and New Time—have already expressed support for dialogue. The PUD’s coordination group has not yet published an official position, and Democratic Action has criticized the appointment of Figuera as chief negotiator. Washington calls the dialogue a key step toward “political reconciliation” and the country’s recovery after the recent earthquakes. During Nicolás Maduro’s time in office, Venezuela has seen about eight rounds of negotiations mediated by Norway, CELAC, the Catholic Church, Spain, Mexico, and other countries. The most recent round took place in October 2023 in Barbados and laid the groundwork for the 2024 presidential election, including a procedure for removing political disqualifications.

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Full version: Gobierno y oposición reactivan formalmente las conversaciones este sábado

Strait of Hormuz: Iran rejects diplomacy, US prepares a response

As of July 28, Iran has rejected a proposal from Oman to temporarily resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also resumed attacks on U.S. forces in Jordan, and the very next day Washington carried out strikes on Iranian military facilities. As the article notes, hopes for a diplomatic solution—one that would revive the previous ceasefire and open the strait—are now nearly gone: the gap between the military course and economic pressure is only widening, and instead of dying down, hostilities are intensifying.

Everything began when, on June 25, Iran violated the ceasefire enshrined in a memorandum of understanding and resumed attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian (Gulf of) Oman. The Trump administration responded by renewing military strikes, pursuing two goals: to destroy Iranian military assets threatening shipping and to force Tehran to agree to a new ceasefire. However, neither objective has been achieved so far: Iran remains able to strike ships using inexpensive drones and cruise missiles.

Meanwhile, Iran rejects all intermediate options. According to The New York Times, it turned down a ceasefire offer that Trump relayed via Iraq’s Prime Minister, Ali az-Zaydi, during his visit to Tehran on July 23. Iranian officials say they are not interested in a “temporary agreement” that does not resolve disputes around the Strait of Hormuz. In response to American strikes, Tehran began striking foreign forces in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, while also stepping up attacks on merchant vessels.

The escalation is building momentum. On July 7, the United States revoked licenses that had suspended sanctions on Iranian oil exports; on July 13, it introduced a naval blockade of Iranian vessels; and starting July 17, it began hitting infrastructure inside Iran—roads, railways, and bridges. In response, Iran attacked targets in the Persian Gulf, including a power plant and a desalination plant in Kuwait. The conflict has gone beyond the old boundaries: on July 20, the Houthis, backed by Iran, announced a blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and on July 25, Yemen and Saudi Arabia were already striking each other’s territory.

Before Trump, there are now two main options, and both carry risks. The first is to wait, hoping that the economic blockade will force Iran to negotiate. But the impact on oil revenues may only be felt after months, while energy prices are already rising amid a reduction in international reserves due to the closed strait. The second option is to expand the military campaign, up to a “massive strike.” However, this could push Iran to attack energy infrastructure in the Gulf states and broaden strikes on Israel. Limited air raids and ground operations are also dangerous: retaliatory fire, ammunition depletion, losses, and growing discontent inside the United States.

Despite the bellicose rhetoric, Trump’s choice, judging by the available signs, is leaning toward diplomacy. Pakistan’s and Qatar’s mediators are active. An Omani delegation has arrived in Tehran to negotiate new terms for opening the strait. Reports say that Trump ordered daily strikes on Iran to be suspended and postponed a major escalation in order to preserve munitions and give diplomacy a chance. Still, the success of any new agreement remains highly questionable.

The main problem is that neither Washington nor Tehran is willing to yield on fundamental positions. Iran demands control over shipping and special conditions, including transit fees, whereas the United States and the Persian Gulf states insist on free passage as before the war. In theory, a short ceasefire regime with deferred details in a separate traffic management system would be possible, but it is unclear whether Iran is ready to guarantee “safe and free passage” after the collapse of the previous memorandum. So Trump faces the same dilemma again: wait or escalate.

News comments

• What is the Yemeni movement “Ansar Allah” (Houthis), and how long has it been linked to Iran?
  “Ansar Allah” is a political and armed movement of Yemeni Zaydi Shiites that emerged in the mid-1990s in northern Yemen. It came to be known as the “Houthis” after its founder, Hussein al-Houthi. The movement began as a protest against discrimination against Zaidis and corruption in the government, before taking an anti-American and anti-Israeli stance. In 2014, the Houthis captured Sana’a and, in practice, a significant part of the country. Links to Iran can be traced back to the early 2000s, but Tehran began actively supporting the Houthis with military, financial, and technical aid after 2014. Iran views “Ansar Allah” as an important element of its strategy to exert influence in the Middle East, although the degree of Tehran’s control is not total: the Houthis retain their own ideology and autonomy.

• Why does Iran insist on charging transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does that align with international law?
  Iran argues that it bears the costs of ensuring the security of shipping, pilotage, and maintaining navigation aids in its territorial waters, and therefore it has the right to charge fees to vessels passing through. However, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, where a regime of transit passage applies: ships and aircraft may pass freely without any charges. Charging for transit itself contradicts international law. Only fees for specific services provided by mutual consent are permissible—for example, for pilotage escort. Thus, Iran’s demand for universal transit fees is legally disputed and is more often interpreted as a means of political and economic pressure.

• What explains the special role of Oman and Qatar as intermediaries between the United States and Iran?
  Oman traditionally maintains a neutral and friendly stance toward all sides of the conflict. It keeps working contacts with both Washington and Tehran, and its geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz makes it a convenient venue for confidential talks—for example, during Iran’s nuclear consultations in 2012–2015. Qatar, meanwhile, is simultaneously an important U.S. ally (a major American military base is located on its territory) and a partner of Iran (they have a joint gas field, South Pars/North Dome). Therefore, Doha is interested in stability in the region and successfully combines the roles of mediator and connector. Through their mediation, both countries seek to strengthen their own influence and avoid a direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran.

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Full version: The Trump dilemma with Iran

Response to the U.S. Course: From Iran to Latin America

This week, reactions beyond the United States have taken center stage on the administration’s rhetoric and actions—ranging from growing concern about the risk of escalation around Iran to debates over how harsh and intrusive Washington’s policy affects regional stability. At the same time, critical assessments of American pressure toward Latin America continue to surface, including in Venezuela, where any outside influence is interpreted through the lens of historical distrust and the struggle for sovereignty. Within the U.S. agenda itself, discussion of the migration and trade track continues, alongside the question of whether the country’s own political turbulence undermines trust in American strength and intentions. The overall mood varies from alarm and readiness for confrontation to analytical attempts to describe strategy as a series of jolts that are becoming harder and harder to reconcile with long-term interests and on-the-ground reality. This material is based on publications from Democracy Now! (Venezuela) and Instagram (Venezuela).

The U.S. increases pressure on migrants and the region

In the Venezuelan perception, the message about the death of a Colombian man in the United States and the new U.S. tariffs are coming together into a single picture: Washington is again demonstrating a hard, punitive policy that hits Latin America not only at the level of diplomacy and trade, but directly affects people’s lives. In a piece by Democracy Now, the story is presented not as a dry crime bulletin, but as a symbol of how the U.S. treats migrants from the Global South.

The story of Joan Sebastián Durán Guerrero, a Colombian man and father of a young girl, has a particularly strong emotional impact. According to witnesses, agents “forcibly pulled” him from his car, while a neighbor shouted that the girl had “had her father taken.” For a Venezuelan audience, it does not sound like an accidental detention, but like the tragedy of an ordinary Latin American family that became a victim of a system operating brutally and without empathy. The office of Senator Angus King said that the DHS confirmed there were no warrants against him. A coalition for migrants’ rights in Maine added that he had a work authorization and a Social Security number. This further reinforces the sense that this is not about a “rule-breaker,” but about a person caught in the gears of a repressive machine.

Against this backdrop, the figure of mass arrests—10,000 arrests in five days—sounds especially worrying. In Venezuela’s media and political context, such scale is seen as a sign that the machinery of repression is escalating. The story fits into a broader anti-imperialist narrative: the United States publicly talks about human rights, but, as Venezuelans see it, when it comes to Latin Americans inside the country, it uses force and humiliation. Protests against ICE only intensify that impression.

Just as indicative for the region is the storyline about new U.S. tariffs, which, though linked to Chile, in Venezuela is read as part of the same logic of pressure. In a post on Instagram, ENE PUCV professor Rodrigo Navia explains the reasons for the new U.S. tariff policy and its consequences for Chile. But for a Venezuelan reader, this topic goes far beyond one country: tariffs, sanctions, and trade restrictions are seen as tools with which Washington influences the entire region—reshaping markets, pressuring exports, and forcing neighboring economies to depend on U.S. decisions.

Such a perception is not accidental. Venezuela has long lived in the reality of sanctions pressure, limited access to markets, and the financial system—so any new trade barriers from the United States are seen not as a private episode, but as a continuation of an overall policy. In that sense, both the Colombian man’s death and tariffs aimed at Chile come together into a single regional signal: the U.S. continues to use both migration and economic power as instruments of control over Latin America.

For Venezuelans, these news items are especially personal. Millions of people in the country have experienced migration themselves or have relatives living abroad, so scenes of a crying child, a harsh detention, and protests outside a senator’s office trigger not only political reactions, but human ones as well. And the trade measures against Chile are filled with familiar associations—economic pressure, sovereignty, and the ongoing question of how far Latin American countries can defend their interests in the face of an American strategy.

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Media: Trump is preparing strikes on Iran’s energy sector in the coming days

According to Axios, U.S. President Donald Trump is seriously considering the possibility of striking Iran’s energy facilities and infrastructure in the coming days. A source said the new bombing campaign is intended to push Tehran to agree to Washington’s terms in ceasefire talks. At the same time, for possibly the first time in several weeks, the Israeli army may join the attack—officials believe that such escalation would likely prompt Iranian missile strikes on Israel.

CBS News, citing sources, reports that the United States and Israel plan to launch a campaign targeting Iran’s energy-infrastructure sites; the strikes could begin at the start of the week. According to the sources, Trump has not yet given final approval, but the operation could become one of the harshest actions against Iran’s energy sector throughout the entire conflict. A military source explained that the goal is to weaken the Iranian army’s ability to ensure the functioning of the country’s governance and provide support for it.

An Israeli official, meanwhile, said Tel Aviv is not aware of a decision to resume hostilities, and that the United States has not asked it to join any military steps. According to The Wall Street Journal, Trump has already ordered a new attack on Iran to achieve its “capitulation”; it could begin over the coming weekend and last several days. A source from i24 News emphasizes that the U.S. president has run out of patience and that the strike may target the regime’s most sensitive point—an окончательное decision will be made at the last moment.

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Full version: Sources: Trump seriously considers attacks on energy targets in Iran within days

An Open Economy and Peaceful Coexistence: Delcy Rodríguez’s Key Statements

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez, in an interview with international media, summed up the first months of her term, which began in January, and spoke about the achievements of 2026. She placed the main emphasis on opening up the economy: according to her, the country has already begun diversifying, attracting long-term foreign investment, and returning to global markets. “We are opening up the economy for the benefit of our people,” the head of state said, adding that all decisions are made with citizens’ well-being and socio-economic stability as the priority.

Turning to the political landscape, Rodríguez stressed the need for institutional transformation and the transition to a “new political era,” where coexistence and peaceful dialogue are possible. Elections in the country will be held when all political actors reach mutual understanding—only then, she said, can the nation be assured of politicians’ readiness. She also noted her willingness to jointly fight drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, and expressed hope for the development of diplomatic relations based on goodwill.

In the area of justice, the president said she asked the UN Office for Human Rights to conduct an audit of prisoners’ releases: external oversight, in her view, will confirm that the government’s commitments have been fulfilled. Concluding her remarks, Rodríguez said that Venezuela is ready for reconstruction, centered on “the person in all their manifestations.” She also placed herself among the ranks of Venezuelan leaders whom the outlet has featured throughout history—from Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Rómulo Betancourt to Hugo Chávez.

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Full version: Apertura económica, inversión y pacto político: Las claves de Delcy Rodríguez ante la prensa internacional

Baghdad Between Washington and Tehran: Iraqi Prime Minister’s Difficult Balancing Act

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali az-Zeidi found himself in an extremely precarious situation: he needs to preserve the partnership with the United States, avoid provoking a direct confrontation with Iran and the armed groups linked to it, and also prevent the country from turning into a battlefield for a broader regional power struggle. Escalation between Washington and Tehran makes this task almost impossible, and every decision by Baghdad’s leadership is now being scrutinized both in the White House and in Iran’s corridors of power.

As Lahab Higeel, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the International Crisis Group, explains, recent reciprocal strikes between American and Saudi forces on the one hand and Iran-aligned formations in Iraq on the other have made clear the dead end in which the prime minister finds himself. Az-Zeidi has just returned from Washington, where several dozen memoranda of understanding were signed; yet instead of strengthening his position, he has faced a military threat that could draw Iraq into a conflict whose trajectory Baghdad cannot control. The end-of-September scheduled conclusion of the international coalition’s mission also carries a double meaning: on the one hand, cooperation with the United States will shift to a bilateral format; on the other, that in itself will not weaken the armed groups.

Higeel emphasizes that for many Iran-aligned formations, the presence of American troops is only one of several reasons to keep their weapons. They present themselves as part of the so-called “axis of resistance,” which extends well beyond Iraq’s territory and is directly tied to Tehran’s regional strategy. Therefore, withdrawing most foreign contingents will not solve the problem of “runaway weapons.” Moreover, attempting to forcibly seize these arsenals now would be extremely dangerous: such a move could trigger a large-scale internal clash. The realistic goal at this stage is not to eliminate all weapons, but to gradually bring them under state control.

Az-Zeidi has, in essence, inherited the dilemma faced by all previous Iraqi prime ministers: slow action strengthens parallel centers of power, while fast action threatens to fracture the Shiite camp—an outcome that would be difficult to contain. Judging by the government’s approach, it is not seeking total disarmament and has instead chosen a step-by-step integration tactic: separate negotiations are being conducted with each formation. Some formations have already officially handed control of their brigades to the armed forces’ commander-in-chief; others have expressed an initial readiness to follow suit, while the groups most closely tied to the “axis of resistance” publicly reject this path. The priority should be to strengthen the chain of command of those units that receive salaries from the state budget and operate within the structures of the security forces, as well as to establish a clearer command hierarchy within the Hashd ash-Shaabi.

Higeel delivers an important warning to Washington: instead of pressuring the prime minister and demanding immediate military confrontation with the groups, the United States should strengthen Iraq’s state institutions. Continuing to train the military, exchanging intelligence, and increasing the army’s capacity will yield more benefit than ultimatums on disarmament. In the expert’s view, such pressure will only expose the weakness of the central government and complicate the crisis rather than bringing it closer to resolution. In other words, turning the process into a sequence of military orders from outside is counterproductive.

Finally, an important element of the strategy should be expanding Iraq’s economic and political ties with the Gulf states. This would reduce Baghdad’s dependence on Tehran, without turning Iraq into a hostile Iran. Diversifying partnerships, attracting investment, developing trade, and building energy infrastructure will give Iraqi leadership more freedom in foreign-policy decisions. Success for az-Zeidi, Higeel concludes, will be measured not by whether he can disarm all the groups within a few months, but by how effectively he can strengthen the state, subordinate armed formations to legitimate authority, and give Iraq room to maneuver between Washington and Tehran.

Comments on the news

• What is “Hashd ash-Shaabi,” and how does this structure relate to the official Iraqi army and Iranian influence? — Hashd ash-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) is an umbrella structure created in 2014 out of Shiite militias to fight ISIS. Formally it is subordinate to the Prime Minister of Iraq and recognized as part of the state security forces, but many of the groups inside it retain their own command, funding, and close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In practice, this means that Hashd operates in parallel with the official army, and the most influential factions follow Tehran’s instructions—especially on regional-policy matters—making it an instrument of Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.

• Which groups belong to the “axis of resistance” and why do they see themselves as part of Tehran’s regional strategy? — The “axis of resistance” (or Tehran’s “axis”) usually includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Palestinian groups (Hamas and “Islamic Jihad”), Yemeni Houthis (“Ansar Allah”), the Syrian government and the militias supporting it, as well as Iraqi Shiite formations such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. These groups are united by an ideology of opposing Israel and the United States, and by recognition of Iran’s supreme leader as a spiritual and strategic reference point. For them, participation in the axis means not only ideological solidarity, but also receiving military, financial, and logistical support from Iran—enabling them to influence regional conflicts in Tehran’s interests, from Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen.

• Why do Iran-aligned formations in Iraq retain autonomy from Baghdad despite their formal integration into state structures? — The autonomy of these formations is explained by several factors: they have independent sources of income (including Iranian funding, control over economic assets, and unofficial taxes), their own military stockpiles and training camps, as well as sustained political positions in Iraq’s parliament. Integration into state structures was in large part formal: the Iraqi government was forced to recognize Hashd because of its military might and popular backing, but it did not gain real control over the appointment of commanders or over their actions. In addition, for Tehran, maintaining such semi-independent groups is a key tool for pressuring Baghdad and a convenient channel for redeploying forces to Syria and other countries. Therefore, Iran consciously encourages their autonomy, weakening the monopoly of the Iraqi state in the use of force.

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Full version: بين واشنطن وطهران.. هل يستطيع العراق كبح الفصائل المسلحة؟

Reactions to Trump’s Hard Line on Iran

Amid rising tensions around Iran, international attention is focused not only on the military incidents themselves, but also on how the world reads Donald Trump’s policy. The discussion centers on hard-hitting responses to strikes, new rounds of missile exchanges, and growing doubts that the chosen tactics are leading to stabilization rather than further escalation. Some observers point to the risks posed by a course driven by force; others highlight contradictions and the political price of such decisions; still others argue that the current line may shift the balance of power and make the region more unpredictable. This selection illustrates how different assessments and commentaries are converging on a single broader question: will harshness stop escalation—or, conversely, accelerate it? The piece is prepared based on publications from huelladelsur.ar (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan View: The U.S. Is Losing to Iran

The Venezuelan reaction to the escalation between the United States and Iran is presented not as a neutral chronicle, but as a political and civilizational commentary, in which the conflict is read through the familiar anti-imperialist lens. In the article “Irán vs Estados Unidos: La Guerra está acabada”, the author argues that Washington has reached a dead end, and that Donald Trump’s bet on force only accelerates the defeat of the United States.

From the perspective of this text, America appears as an empire that has lost the ability to impose order through military pressure, while Iran is portrayed as a state that has managed to withstand the squeeze and turn the course of the conflict. For the Venezuelan reader, this conclusion is particularly persuasive: in a country where U.S. external pressure has long been viewed as part of a strategy of dominance, the story of how the opponent did not yield to pressure is almost taken as confirmation of one’s own political experience.

The author writes outright that “EEUU ha perdido la guerra”, and that for Trump there is nothing left to do but “capitular,” meaning to capitulate. In the Venezuelan framing, this formula is read not only as an assessment of the Middle East crisis, but also as a broader thesis: even with enormous military might, the United States can lose if it faces a society and a state prepared for prolonged resistance.

At the same time, the text draws on a selection of Western voices and media, but uses them in a way that underscores confusion within the American establishment. With reference to The New York Times, it is said that many around Trump believed escalation to be unreasonable. The piece also mentions Will Schreier, who, according to the article, argues that the Pentagon is pressing the president because interceptors and long-range missiles are running low. Larry Johnson is cited in connection with problems with U.S. fuel reserves and hidden supplies for military needs. Professor Michael Vlahos is used as a critic of the American “Manichaean” view of the world, in which the U.S. increasingly portrays itself as the bearer of “good,” while its opponents are depicted as absolute evil.

For Venezuela, this topic matters not only at the level of ideology, but also in terms of practical interests. The material devotes a great deal of attention to oil, energy reserves, and a possible crisis in the fuel market. For a country whose economy still depends on oil, any such fluctuations always have direct domestic implications. In addition, Venezuela’s experience of living under sanctions makes any story about resistance to Washington emotionally close: within this logic, Iran becomes not only a Middle East player, but also a symbol of the fact that U.S. pressure can be endured—and even turned against the United States itself.

The geopolitical link drawn by the text is also especially significant for Venezuelan readers: in this logic, strengthening Iran reinforces the positions of Russia and China. For a Venezuelan political audience accustomed to viewing multipolarity as an opportunity to weaken American control, this is not a minor detail, but part of a much larger global shift, in which the balance of power is changing.

An important feature of the publication is that it does not limit itself to reporting facts. This is not a dry account of diplomatic moves and military risks, but an interpretation with a predetermined conclusion: the U.S. is declared the losing side, Trump is portrayed as a politician who has trapped himself in a dead end, and the entire conflict is presented as proof of a crisis in the American model of power. That is why the material reads like a characteristic example of Venezuelan anti-imperialist commentary, in which international events are inevitably tied back to local experience of sanctions, pressure, and constant confrontation with Washington.

In a broader context, such a text shows how, in Venezuela, a new wave of tension in the Middle East is perceived—not as an isolated episode, but as a continuation of the same story about how the United States uses force, sanctions, and threats, while encountering growing resistance. For the local audience, it does not sound abstract, but almost literally like a warning about how global power works—and why Venezuela sees Iran not as a distant observer, but as an ally in a shared civilizational conflict.

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The Shift in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Visit to Riyadh: Tensions Rising

The postponement of Iraqi Prime Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia turned out to be more than just a change to the diplomatic calendar—it was a clear signal of mounting tensions between the two countries. The planned trip, intended to strengthen rapprochement, coincided with a wave of attacks on Saudi oil facilities that, according to Riyadh, were carried out from Iraqi territory. In response, joint U.S.-Saudi strikes hit the positions of armed groups accused of carrying out the attacks, highlighting the depth of the crisis and its potential consequences for regional stability.

The conflict has gone far beyond a bilateral quarrel between Saudi Arabia and Iraqi factions, becoming part of a broader struggle for influence across the Middle East. With its complex web of forces, Iraq is turning into one of the most sensitive arenas for regional rivalry. As noted, some pro-Iranian groups are embedded in a wider “deterrence network” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, meaning that any military move within Iraq has implications that reach well beyond its borders.

From Saudi Arabia’s and the United States’ perspective, attacks using drones and rockets have ceased to be a symbolic threat and have become a direct strike on energy infrastructure—one that affects global security. Riyadh emphasizes that the strikes are carried out from Iraqi soil, providing political and legal grounds to demand an end to Iraq being used as a staging ground, while reserving the right to respond under the doctrine of self-defense. Washington views the pro-Iranian groups as posing a dual threat: to its own forces and interests, as well as to the stability of partners in the Gulf—so each response carries a message of deterrence.

As for losses among “Hashd ash-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces), exact figures vary due to conflicting information from Iraqi authorities, the factions themselves, and Western sources. However, it appears that the strikes focused on headquarters, storage facilities, and command posts—aimed at reducing the groups’ operational capabilities rather than only physically eliminating fighters. The point is stressed that the impact is not just about the number of killed and wounded, but about undermining command-and-control systems, drone capabilities, and logistics.

The most difficult task falls to the Iraqi government: military measures alone are not enough without political and security decisions capable of preventing the use of Iraqi territory for attacks on neighbors. Baghdad faces a dual challenge—on the one hand, it rejects turning its land into a platform for aggression; on the other, it confronts influential armed factions that are hard to rein in through traditional methods. Hence statements about investigations and refusals to use Iraqi territory to attack “brotherly and friendly states,” but repeated attacks force the government to prove its ability to monopolize the use of force.

In the most likely scenario, according to the authors, it is not an open war between Saudi Arabia and Iraq—official relations tend to favor preserving rapprochement—but the continuation of “cross-border” strikes and retaliatory actions, which could gradually turn Iraq into an arena for proxy confrontation. The key condition for escaping this spiral remains the state’s restoration of a monopoly on decision-making in the security sphere. Success in this course would protect not only ties with Riyadh, but also the prospect of Iraq regaining its Arab and regional role, preventing the country from becoming a permanent battleground for settling scores between competing powers.

Comments on the news

• What is “Hashd ash-Shaabi,” and what does Iran have to do with this organization? — “Hashd ash-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces) is an umbrella structure that brings together dozens of mainly Shiite militias in Iraq, created in 2014 to fight ISIS. Iran has close ties to the organization through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC/KСИР): Tehran provides funding, military training, weapons, and strategic guidance to key factions within Hashd ash-Shaabi, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Iran uses these groups to strengthen its influence in Iraq and as a tool of regional deterrence.

• What role does Iran play in the regional standoff with Saudi Arabia on Iraqi territory? — Iraq has become one of the theaters of a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Through its network of allies within Hashd ash-Shaabi, Iran seeks to weaken Saudi influence by backing Shiite political blocs and militias that counter Saudi interests, especially in areas with mixed populations. Tehran also uses Iraqi territory as a rear base for supplying its allies in Syria (for example, via a land corridor), which Riyadh views as a threat. Iran’s strategy in Iraq is aimed at preserving the dominance of a pro-Russia/pro-Iran government, blocking attempts by Saudi Arabia to strengthen Sunni and anti-Iranian forces.

• What is meant by the “deterrence network” from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, and what place do pro-Iranian groups play in it in Iraq? — The “deterrence network” is an Iranian military-political concept that involves creating a belt of proxy forces capable of threatening the interests of Israel and the United States in the Middle East. It stretches from Yemen (the Houthis) through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon (“Hezbollah”). Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq play a key role as the central link in this network: they provide land connectivity between Iran and Syria, control borders, deploy short- and medium-range missile launchers, and also serve as a reserve for rapid redeployment of forces to the Israel-Syria border and to the Persian Gulf. Iraqi militias thus turn Iraq into a forward bastion for deterrence against both potential ground invasions and maritime threats from the U.S. Navy.

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Full version: بعد الضربات.. هذا السيناريو الأكثر ترجيحا لإزالة تهديد “الحشد الشعبي”

In Venezuela, with UN support, work begins on a recovery plan after the earthquake

Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez held a working seminar with representatives of the United Nations to develop a Reconstruction Plan for areas affected by the double earthquake on June 24. She praised the organization’s coordinator, Giancarlo Ramponi, for his work in the life-saving phase and stressed that the next step now is to restore social and physical infrastructure. The program’s goal is not just to return everything to how it was before the disaster, but to improve conditions in a meaningful way—drawing on international experience and coordinated assistance.

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Full version: Presidenta Rodríguez holds workshop with the UN for a Reconstruction Plan after the double seismic event

The U.S. and Iran Exchange Blows: A New Escalation Cycle

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it carried out a series of airstrikes on targets in Iran, calling them a response to a “broad range of threats.” The attacks were the first after a 13-day pause announced by President Donald Trump to create space for negotiations. In retaliation, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck targets in Jordan and Kuwait, vowing to continue reprisal for alleged threats emanating from the United States.

In a CENTCOM statement, it was specified that the strikes targeted military command centers, as well as missile and drone facilities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The purpose of the operation was stated as “reducing threats from Iran and its proxy forces to U.S. forces, commercial shipping, and Persian Gulf countries.” More than 50,000 American service members are currently in the region, and, according to the command, they are at “the highest combat readiness.”

Iranian officials reported explosions in several provinces, including Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr and Fars. On Qeshm Island, damage to a residential building was recorded; under the rubble, victims were found. In the city of Ahvaz and other settlements, power outages occurred due to damage to power grids. The governor of Bushehr province said the strikes hit two locations in Jagdaak County, but without serious losses.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense said the Iranian attack hit a building belonging to a Chinese company in the north of the country. One worker was killed, and significant material damage was done. The ministry confirmed that Kuwaiti forces are taking measures to protect the state’s sovereignty and security.

Against the backdrop of the escalation, Pakistan called on Tehran and Washington to exercise restraint and resume dialogue. A spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that consultations between Iran and the United States regarding the situation in the Strait of Hormuz continue. Islamabad said it is ready to do everything possible to support diplomatic steps aimed at preventing tensions from spreading further in the region.

Comments on the news

• Why does Qeshm Island have strategic significance for Iran in military and economic terms? — Qeshm Island is located in the Strait of Hormuz, controlling a key route for global oil supplies. Economically, it is Iran’s largest island and a center of free trade (the Qeshm free trade zone), attracting foreign investment and industry. Militarily, Iran uses the island to station naval bases, missile launch sites, and surveillance systems, enabling it to block or control shipping in the strait during a conflict.

• What is the difference between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular army, and why is it important for understanding the conflict? — The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) is an ideologically driven military force directly subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Leader, responsible for protecting the Islamic Revolution as well as for external operations (including proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria). The regular army (Artesh) focuses on border defense and traditional defense. The distinction matters because the IRGC has its own control over missile forces, intelligence, and economic assets, making it a key player in regional conflicts and negotiations, and also creating tension between the two structures.

• What is the importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global economy, and how could its possible blockade affect worldwide energy supplies? — About 20–25% of the world’s oil volume (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day) passes through the Strait of Hormuz, along with a significant share of liquefied natural gas (LNG), mainly from the Gulf countries. Blocking the strait—even temporarily—would trigger a sharp jump in oil and gas prices, disrupt supply chains, and provoke an energy crisis in Asia, Europe and North America. Iran has often threatened to close the strait in response to sanctions or a military threat, making it a key vulnerability point for the global economy.

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Full version: عودة الضربات.. ما الذي نعرفه عن أحدث الهجمات المتبادلة بين أمريكا وإيران؟

US Prepares a Retaliatory Strike: Trump Promises Iran “Severe Punishment”

US President Donald Trump on Wednesday threatened Iran with powerful retaliatory strikes, promising to teach Tehran a “harsh lesson” after a recent attack on American troops in Jordan. In an interview with Fox News, he called Iran-backed armed groups “a cancer on the world” and stressed that all operations against them in Iraq are carried out in direct coordination with the Iraqi government. According to Trump, the attack was sudden, leaving American forces only a few minutes to intercept the rockets aimed at them. These remarks marked a new phase of sharply escalating military and political tensions between Washington and Tehran.

On the battlefield, the United States and Saudi Arabia carried out joint airstrikes on Wednesday targeting facilities of Iran-aligned militants in Iraq. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the strikes were “precise” and aimed at “Iran-linked terrorists” whom the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had instructed to attack American forces and Saudi energy infrastructure. The raids involved American and Saudi fighter jets that hit logistics centers and weapons depots in eastern Iraq. CENTCOM described the actions as a “powerful response” to more than 30 drone attacks organized by the IRGC over the past 72 hours. The Iraqi militia “Hashd ash-Shaabi” confirmed the deaths and injuries of its fighters, without specifying the number of casualties.

The escalation is unfolding amid widespread expectations about how exactly Washington will respond to the strike on its forces in Jordan. Trump’s tough rhetoric and joint combat operations with Saudi Arabia signal that the United States is prepared to act decisively, not limiting itself to defensive measures. Experts fear that any major retaliatory action could draw the region into an even larger-scale conflict—especially as Tehran has so far made no official comments on the situation and its allies in Iraq and Yemen remain ready for new attacks.

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Full version: سنضرب بقوة.. ترمب يتوعد إيران بـ"درس قاس" بعد هجوم الأردن

Amnesty and Economic Growth: Results of Delcy Rodríguez’s First 200 Days

Venezuela’s Ministry of Communications has released a report on the first 200 days of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez’s work. The key achievements include the Amnesty Law, which helped 8,084 people, and a 50% increase in minimum income—up to $240 in equivalent terms. Pensions also rose by 40%. The economy showed a steady recovery: GDP in the second quarter of 2026 grew by 6%, and oil production in June reached 1.203 million barrels. In addition, the crime rate fell from 3 to 1.3 per 100,000 residents, including thanks to the neutralization of the leader of a criminal group, Héctor Guerrero, nicknamed “Niño Guerrero.”

Considerable attention was paid to international cooperation: agreements were signed with Repsol, ENI, BP, and Chevron, as well as with India. Venezuela restored air connections and opened a trade route with Miami through the ports of La Guaira and the state of Sucre. Within the country, 99% food security was achieved through domestic production. In healthcare, 176 dialysis centers and nephrology departments were opened. In response to earthquakes, the authorities set up 107 camps for 23,000 people, provided 240 homes to those affected, and got back $346 million previously frozen abroad by the IMF.

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Full version: At 200 days of management of the Amnesty Law, economic growth shows Delcy Rodríguez’s balance

Melania Trump Misses Funeral and Journalists’ Dinner, White House Office Silent

First Lady of the United States Melania Trump did not appear at two major events in Washington over several days. She is absent from the funeral of Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, which took place on Tuesday, and from the annual White House correspondents’ dinner, which was moved to last Friday. President Donald Trump attended both events—he delivered a speech at the funeral, but his wife did not accompany him. Melania’s absence has raised questions, as these events are considered among the most important political and social gatherings in the capital.

Newsweek reached out to the First Lady’s office to ask for a comment on her absence, but the office declined to comment, without explaining why. At the same time, Fox News, citing the White House, reported that Melania had a previously scheduled meeting, which prevented her from attending the journalists’ dinner on Friday. No details about that meeting were provided. If the “busy schedule” explanation at all accounts for her absence from the dinner, then her failure to attend the senator’s funeral still lacks a clear explanation and continues to draw press attention.

Although Melania did not attend the farewell ceremony, she posted a statement of condolences over Graham’s death. The First Lady wrote that she was “saddened by his sudden death,” praised his “steadfast devotion to the service of the United States,” and extended condolences to his family, friends, and everyone who was moved by his political legacy. This suggests the absence was not linked to any conflict or unwillingness to honor the senator’s memory, though the true reason remains unclear.

Alongside this, Newsweek disclosed information about new threats linked to Iran, adding further tension to the coverage. The U.S. Secret Service confirmed that it is investigating a video published by a media outlet affiliated with the Iranian state. According to available information, the content of the video is “aimed at the First Lady.” Secret Service spokesperson Nate Herring said the agency is aware of the video and is studying any material that could be interpreted as a threat to protected persons. At the same time, operational details from the intelligence are not disclosed.

It is important to emphasize that, according to Newsweek, there are no public signs linking Melania’s absence from the two events to the threats mentioned. No U.S. official has drawn such a connection. As a result, the link between the missed events and security warnings remains unproven. The last time Melania Trump appeared in public was on July 19, when she attended the World Cup soccer final in New Jersey together with the president and their son Barron. Earlier, she was seen at the Independence Day celebration on July 4. Recall that in April she attended the previous journalists’ dinner, which was interrupted by a shooting near the venue, after which everyone was evacuated; the First Lady then missed the repeat dinner.

Comments on the news

• Which major Iranian media outlets are considered state-run or affiliated with the authorities, and how often are they used to spread propaganda or threats? - Iran’s main state media include the IRIB broadcasting corporation (including the Press TV channel in English), the state news agency IRNA, the newspaper Kayhan, and the TV channel Jam-e Jam. They are regularly used to broadcast the government’s official line, including propaganda and rhetoric aimed at external opponents. Threats and incitement statements appear in them periodically, especially during periods of heightened tensions, though not all content takes the form of direct threats—some of it is political analysis or news that aligns with the government agenda.

• What is the current dynamics of tension between the United States and Iran that could have prompted Tehran to create such a video targeting the First Lady? - Tensions remain high due to unresolved issues involving the nuclear program (the failure of negotiations on the JCPOA), strict U.S. sanctions, and military incidents (for example, strikes on Iranian forces in Syria). After escalation in 2020 (the killing of General Soleimani), Iran has actively used media to exert psychological pressure. A video threatening the First Lady could be part of a propaganda campaign aimed at demonstrating U.S. “weakness” domestically or as a response to anti-Iranian rhetoric by American politicians.

• Have there been prior cases where Iranian state media threatened American politicians or members of their families, and how did U.S. authorities respond? - Yes, there have been precedents. For example, in 2020 Iranian media (in particular the Fars agency and Press TV) published threats against Donald Trump after Soleimani was killed, and also aired videos showing a mock assassination of him. In 2022 there were reports of cyberattacks by Iranian hackers on websites connected to the U.S. administration. U.S. authorities typically respond by increasing diplomatic pressure, imposing additional sanctions on Iranian officials and media outlets, and issuing warnings via the UN or intelligence services. U.S. intelligence services (the FBI and the Secret Service) step up protection for public figures after such incidents.

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Full version: ميلانيا ترمب تغيب عن مناسبتين مهمتين والبيت الأبيض يلتزم الصمت

A View of Trump: Reactions and Signals in U.S. Foreign Policy

International commentary continues to build the U.S. foreign-policy steps into a single picture: how Washington’s tone is changing, what is expected from the rhetoric of negotiation, and where observers see the risk of tensions escalating. The focus is on interpretations of Trump’s actions and American diplomacy—especially in the context of Iran—along with how trade statements and the hard setting of conditions are read beyond the United States as part of a broader geopolitical line. Against this backdrop, perceptions of America’s role are also shifting: external observers increasingly look not only at facts, but at “signals”—hints, pressure, readiness to deal, and unpredictability—which may shape the next phase of relations with key countries. This material is based on publications from www.dw.com (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Trump, Iran, Mexico, and Regional Diplomacy Through Force

In international news, Donald Trump’s statements about Iran, Mexico, and the distribution of American resources may look like separate episodes. But in the Venezuelan reading, they fall into the same overall picture: the United States combines pressure, threats, and public humiliation with readiness to negotiate when it serves their interests. This is how the Venezuelan audience understands DW’s account that Trump said there are “good prospects” for an agreement with Iran, while adding that Tehran allegedly wants a meeting only because the U.S. is “hitting them hard” (DW). For Caracas, this story does not look like a neutral chronicle of de-escalation; rather, it confirms a logic in which maximum pressure is applied first, and then dialogue is offered on Washington’s terms.

The Venezuelan audience is particularly sensitive to this kind of rhetoric because it aligns too well with its own experience of sanctions and confrontation with the United States. Trump’s claim that Iran is asking for a meeting only because it is “getting hit hard” fits easily with how, in Caracas, American policy toward Venezuela is perceived: first harsh pressure, then an offer of talks—but not as a conversation between equals, rather as a continuation of coercion by other means. Hence the main local conclusion: if the U.S. can issue threats while leaving the door to a deal slightly open at the same time, then negotiations for them are not a retreat from force—they are a tool of it.

Another layer of meaning in this news for Venezuela is geopolitical. Iran remains one of the few partners with whom Caracas has tried to build relations under conditions of isolation and sanction pressure. Therefore, any signals about a potential U.S.-Iran deal raise questions not only about the fate of the Middle East, but also about the balance in oil markets, the sanction architecture, and regional diplomacy. If the White House is capable of striking a bargain with Tehran after a long conflict, in Venezuela this may be interpreted as proof of American pragmatism: the U.S. acts flexibly when it benefits them, rather than following the principles they publicly profess.

The military subtext is no less important in the Venezuelan interpretation. Trump said that the U.S. has “a lot of ammunition,” but he “would like more,” because “so much [was] given to Ukraine.” This detail strengthens the image of America as a power simultaneously involved in several crises, trying to maintain control through force and arms supplies to allies. In Caracas, such words are often seen both as a sign that American foreign policy is overextended and, at the same time, as a reminder that Washington still thinks about international relations in the language of pressure.

Similarly, in the Venezuelan context, another storyline is read in the same way—linked to El País’ report on how Trump again allowed himself a mocking and threatening tone toward Mexico (El País). Although the original text is about Mexico, in Venezuela it is understood as a broader signal of how the United States treats Latin America. Where the Venezuelan audience hears a joke about shifting production and a mention of the “very nice Mexican president,” they see not humor, but an assertion of superiority: public sarcasm that conceals pressure in the areas of trade, borders, and political subordination.

For Caracas, the mixture of swagger and threat is especially significant. The mention that companies allegedly move production from America to Mexico, in Venezuelan perception, turns into a sign of contempt for the region and confirmation of an old pattern in which Washington talks to its neighbors from above. In this storyline, Mexico is not the only target; it is an example of how the United States uses economic leverage and a media tone to impose conditions. This resonates directly with Venezuela’s experience of sanctions, pressure, and endless talk about “normalization,” which in practice often means only new demands.

Another regional episode that is read in the same way in Venezuela is Brazil’s response to a remark by Javier Milei. A Perfil.com report that Brazil’s president, for the first time, responded to criticism and that Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira received the Argentine ambassador, Guillermo Raimondi, in order to formally express rejection of Milei’s statements, is perceived in Caracas as an example of how a diplomatic conflict in South America quickly becomes a matter of institutional authority and regional balance (Perfil.com).

From the Venezuelan standpoint, this is an important signal: even within South America, political disagreements are increasingly framed not as behind-the-scenes disputes, but as public confrontation demanding official explanations. In this episode, Brazil appears as a state trying to move the conflict into the diplomatic arena—a contrast that, in Caracas, may be seen in relation to the more harsh, personalized rhetoric of some regional leaders. At the same time, it underscores how unstable South American integration remains: each new conflict affects not only bilateral relations, but also structures such as Mercosur, as well as the broader balance of alliances in the region.

In the Venezuelan reading, all three storylines are linked by the same logic. Whether it is Iran, Mexico, or Brazil’s dispute with Argentina, there is one underlying question behind them: how do major and middle powers behave when they want to get their way? Venezuela’s answer is almost always the same: through pressure, a show of force, media humiliation—and only afterward, through negotiations. That is why messages about Trump are not perceived as isolated news. They become part of a broader regional lens, in which the United States appears not simply as a partner or rival, but as a state for which diplomacy too often is a continuation of coercion.

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The United States and Iran: a fragile truce amid disputes over the Strait of Hormuz

After two weeks of airstrikes, Washington announced a pause in the military campaign, which has led to a fragile ceasefire in a protracted five-month conflict. President Donald Trump said there have been “good negotiations” with Tehran and that an agreement could be reached, but he warned that if the contacts yield no results, the attacks will resume. At an election rally in Michigan, he used hardline rhetoric, saying Iran “cannot be bribed” and must be “crushed,” but then added that “very friendly negotiations” are underway at the moment. Trump also said that intermediary countries asked him to halt the strikes and that the United States has entered “in-depth talks” with Iran.

Tehran, however, presented an entirely different account of events. Iran’s Foreign Ministry official Ismail Baghaei said intermediaries may be conveying messages from the United States, but “we are currently not holding any negotiations with the United States,” calling reports that Iran asked for talks “false.” According to Reuters, a senior Iranian official confirmed that Iran will halt its attacks as long as the unilateral ceasefire announced by Trump remains in effect. As a result, the sides interpret the very nature of the contacts differently.

The root of the current escalation lies in a dispute over the Strait of Hormuz—a strategic sea route that carries a significant share of the world’s oil. Iran opened fire on ships that had used an alternative route near Oman’s coast, a route recommended by Washington. The crisis dates back to a temporary arrangement reached in June, which assumed consultations would end by the end of August; however, the parties diverged in their interpretation of provisions governing passage through the strait. The United States insists on freedom of navigation, while Iran argues for its right to control transit and charge fees.

Oman acted as mediator, proposing the creation of a “regional coalition” to manage maritime security, search-and-rescue operations, and cooperation—with voluntary funding from states in the region, as well as shipping and oil companies. Iran, however, continues to insist on maintaining control, including the collection of fees. In parallel, reports say representatives from Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt are also taking part in the mediation, trying to resolve disagreements over how operations in the strait should be managed. Baghaei confirmed that talks with Oman on “general principles and mechanisms for implementation” are progressing positively, and that Washington is not a direct party.

From a military standpoint, Trump’s decision to delay escalation is tied to command concerns. Senior military figures told the president that “available targets are starting to run out,” and General Dan Keane expressed concern about ammunition depletion. According to ABC, Keane and Vice President JD Vance feared the war could expand, though they also confirmed the ability to carry out other options. Trump denied there is an ammunition shortage, but sources cited by The Wall Street Journal pointed to limited stocks of air-defense interceptors amid Iran’s ballistic missiles and drones.

Washington is betting on economic pressure—sanctions from the U.S. Treasury Department. According to Axios, Iranians “fear the Treasury more than the Pentagon,” and it is expected that investors will begin withdrawing money en masse, alongside a gasoline shortage. Intelligence reports cite complaints about an inability to pay fighters’ salaries due to financial constraints. At the same time, it is acknowledged that sanctions and a maritime blockade may take longer to compel Iran to negotiate than a large-scale bombing campaign. Domestic pressure on Trump is increasing ahead of November’s midterm elections: only 33% of Americans support the war, while 69% say the goals of the military intervention are not clear enough.

The decisive factor will likely be the upcoming meeting between Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—after which the president will probably make a final decision on the mediator proposal. While the fragile truce hangs in the balance, the outcome of diplomatic maneuvers will determine whether the pause leads to a real compromise in the Strait of Hormuz or remains only a temporary respite before a new round of conflict.

Comments on the news

• Why did Oman take on the role of intermediary between the United States and Iran, and what historical links does the country have with Tehran? — Oman traditionally maintains a neutral position in regional conflicts and supports diplomatic channels with Iran even during periods of escalation. Historical ties include joint management of the Strait of Hormuz until 1971, similar views on several OPEC-related issues, and Oman’s role in the secret negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal. The sultanate is viewed by Tehran as a trusted mediator without direct confrontation with Iran’s interests.
• On what legal basis does Iran claim the right to control passage through the Strait of Hormuz and charge fees, considering international maritime law? — Iran cites Article 26 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows fees to be charged for specific services (such as pilotage or ensuring security), but not for transit itself. Tehran also points to historical rights and national legislation that declare the strait part of territorial waters. In practice, however, the international community recognizes the Strait of Hormuz as an international passage with a right of peaceful transit, and Iran’s demands are often challenged as exceeding UNCLOS.
• What structural features of the Iranian economy (such as dependence on gasoline imports) make it especially vulnerable to U.S. Treasury sanctions? — Iran’s economy depends critically on oil exports (about 60% of budget revenues), but it suffers from a shortage of oil-refining capacity, forcing it to import up to 30–50% of the gasoline it consumes. U.S. sanctions block access to the international banking system (SWIFT), insurance services, and tanker fleets, paralyzing both crude oil exports and refined-products imports. Other vulnerabilities include dependence on importing food, medicines, and spare parts, as well as a large share of the shadow economy that is not prepared for legal settlements.
• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in ensuring control over the Strait of Hormuz and in the negotiation process with the United States? — The IRGC, specifically the Navy structure “Sepah,” directly handles military patrols of the strait, laying mines, deploying fast boats, and anti-ship missiles. In the negotiation process, the IRGC often acts as an “internal player”—its commanders (for example, Navy Commander Ali Reza Tangsiri) publicly declare “red lines,” which limits the flexibility of civilian negotiators. Any agreement with the United States requires either approval from the supreme leader who controls the IRGC, or preserving economic privileges for the IRGC (such as maintaining contracts in the oil sector), which effectively makes the military structure a veto player in diplomacy.

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Full version: الأهداف تنفد والوسطاء يتحركون.. لماذا أوقف ترمب قصف إيران؟

Delcy Rodríguez checks on housing programme progress in Venezuela

Venezuela’s vice president Delcy Rodríguez held a working meeting to monitor the implementation of the plan “Venezuela Revives,” which is aimed at the comprehensive restoration of residential districts and providing decent housing for the most vulnerable families. Under this state programme, which brings together the efforts of several construction missions (including “New Neighborhood, New Tricolor” and “Beautiful Venezuela”), special attention is being paid to La Guaira state, which suffered significant structural damage.

In addition to repairing homes and infrastructure, the plan provides for active involvement by local communities and the optimization of budget allocations, which, according to the authorities’ vision, should become the basis for sustainable development in both the country’s urban and rural areas.

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Full version: Presidenta Delcy Rodríguez revisa avances del Plan Venezuela Renace y entrega de viviendas

Balancing Between Washington and Tehran: Iraq’s New Course

A study by Iraqi analyst Iyad al-Annbar titled “Iraq in the Struggle for Power and Influence Between Iran and the United States” examines Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s efforts to preserve a fragile neutrality—maneuvering between the two powers amid regional tensions. The author emphasizes that U.S.-Iranian rivalry over Iraq is nothing new, but after 2003 it entered a new phase, when the overthrow of Saddam Hussein opened the way for Tehran’s growing political influence.

According to al-Annbar, the United States, after the invasion, had no clear plan, which allowed Iran to use the regime change to strengthen its security and expand its influence. At the same time, Tehran sought to keep Iraq in a “fragile” state by controlling it through “centers of power”—official and unofficial structures that both sustained uncertainty in relations with Washington and followed Iran’s agenda.

However, this model began to show cracks after the events of October 7, 2023, along with subsequent regional shifts that narrowed the room for maneuver for the “axis of resistance.” The most striking sign of this was the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. In addition, direct Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs declined after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in early 2020—since then, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has intervened less frequently in shaping governments and appointing officials.

Despite this, Iran retains multilayered levers of influence—not only military and political, but also social and symbolic. A case in point is Tehran’s insistence on holding the funeral of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Najaf and Karbala—a gesture that underscores Tehran’s social and political weight more than its religious one. The message from Mojtaba Khamenei after the mourning ceremony, in which he called for “revenge” and said that “the free people of the world” would help, indicates that even if Tehran’s capabilities have weakened, it is not stepping away from its influence.

Changes have also taken place on the American side, especially after Donald Trump returned to the White House. Under Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad treated pro-Iranian forces as a political reality, but under Trump II the approach has become tougher: abandoning the law on “al-Hashd al-Shaabi,” preventing pro-Iranian factions from joining the government, appointing a special envoy, and rejecting Nouri al-Maliki’s candidacy for prime minister after the 2025 elections.

At the center of the new scheme is Ali al-Zaidi. Trump congratulated him on his appointment, wishing success to a “government free from terrorism,” and invited him to Washington. A businessman by background, al-Zaidi managed to carry his cabinet through “fine-tuning”: he met the U.S. demand not to include factions linked to armed groups in the first stage of the government, while leaving open the possibility for them to enter in the second stage. In the analyst’s view, this suggests that Iran has moved away from direct pressure—whereas earlier such appointments were dictated by Tehran.

Al-Zaidi’s pattern of actions—traveling between Washington and Tehran, attending Khamenei’s funeral, then a warm handshake with Trump at the White House, and afterward a return visit to Tehran—so far does not point to a fully formed strategy. Iraq has to operate within a hybrid security system torn by internal conflicts and open to outside interference, while Iran itself is divided between the Guard Corps and official diplomatic structures.

The study warns that the main challenge for al-Zaidi is not simply improving relations with both sides, but redefining Iraq’s place: instead of betting on becoming a “front line” against Iran, the focus should be on stability and the economy; relations with Tehran should be rebuilt after a possible end to the war. The key remains the “arms problem”—control over armed formations and economic networks, including mafia-like networks profiting from smuggling dollars and oil. Ultimately, turning Iraq from a theater of conflict into a point where interests intersect will require strengthening the domestic political system and refusing to play into outside forces—only then is the “Iraq first” course possible.

Comments on the news

• Who is Qassem Soleimani and why did his assassination in 2020 change Iran’s influence in Iraq? — Qassem Soleimani was the commander of the “Quds” forces within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), responsible for operations abroad. He coordinated networks of Iraqi militias loyal to Iran and had enormous influence in Iraq. His killing as a result of a U.S. airstrike on January 3, 2020, temporarily weakened coordination among Iran’s proxies, but it also triggered a backlash: the Iraqi parliament voted to withdraw American troops, and pro-Iranian groups increased pressure. In the long term, Iran’s influence remained, though it became less personalized.
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it preserve levers of influence in Iraq? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation in Iran that reports to the supreme leader. It includes land, naval, and air forces, as well as the special unit “Quds.” In Iraq, the IRGC maintains influence through funding, training, and arming Iraqi Shiite militias (for example, “al-Hashd al-Shaabi”), as well as through economic ties and political support for loyal parties. The strategy of the “axis of resistance” allows Iran to use Iraq as a staging ground to pressure the United States and Israel.
• Why did the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei take place specifically in Najaf and Karbala, and what do these cities mean for Shiites? — Najaf and Karbala are sacred cities for Twelver Shiites. Najaf is home to the shrine of Imam Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad), while Karbala is home to the shrine of Imam Hussein (the grandson of the Prophet), who died a martyr’s death at the Battle of Karbala in 680. For Shiites, these are sites of religious pilgrimage and symbols of the struggle against injustice. Holding the funeral there (if it indeed occurred—Khamenei is still alive, but the question appears hypothetical) highlights the connection between the Iranian supreme leader and Shiite tradition, strengthening legitimacy among believers. (Note: Ali Khamenei is alive, so the reference may be to a future funeral scenario or to the symbolic meaning.)
• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, and why is his message calling for “revenge” considered significant? — Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and is seen as one of the possible successors to the leadership of the Islamic Revolution. He holds an influential position within the IRGC and the clerical establishment. His call for “revenge” (likely for the killing of Soleimani or for other strikes against Iran) is understood as a signal that even after a leadership change, a hard line toward the United States and Israel may persist, and that he intends to continue his father’s policy.
• What is the “axis of resistance,” and which Iraqi groups belong to it? — The “axis of resistance” is an informal alliance of forces led by Iran, united by opposition to Israel, the United States, and their allies in the Middle East. It includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Syria’s government, the Palestinian Hamas and “Islamic Jihad,” the Houthis in Yemen, as well as numerous Iraqi Shiite armed formations. Among the Iraqi groups in the axis are “Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq,” the Badr Brigades, “Harakat al-Nujaba,” “Failak al-Waad as-Sadiq,” and others, unified under the umbrella structure of “al-Hashd al-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces).

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Full version: العراق في معركة شد الحبل بين واشنطن وطهران.. هل انتهى النفوذ الإيراني؟

Reactions to Trump’s Return: Diplomacy, Migration, and Disputes

The world is watching as Donald Trump returns to the political stage and sets the tone at once across several fronts: from potential diplomatic signals on Iran to tough rhetoric surrounding migration policy and increased border control. Against this backdrop, international coverage presents a mixed picture: some interpret his statements as an attempt to restart negotiations, while others see in them a source of new risks and grounds for further disagreements—above all within the United States. Additional tension comes from the domestic political context, where his moves spark controversy, and the impact on foreign policy is directly linked to how unpredictable his style of governance remains. This picture clearly shows how Trump’s figure is still perceived abroad as a polarizing force capable of changing the trajectory of the U.S. agenda and provoking mixed reactions in the global conversation. This article has been prepared using materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela: the Opposition, Trump, and a Troubling U.S. Backdrop

From Venezuela, news that an opposition figure in exile is not taking part in meetings promoted by the Donald Trump administration between the opposition bloc and representatives of the regime is being received not as an ordinary diplomatic episode, but as further confirmation of a protracted political crisis. In a Telefuturo publication, it is emphasized that any outside mediation in the Venezuelan context immediately becomes part of the internal struggle between the opposition and Chavism, while the very dialogue advanced by the United States raises doubts about its effectiveness.

For a Venezuelan audience, especially important is the question of the legitimacy of the negotiating participants. The phrasing that the opposition figure “no participa” in these contacts reflects a well-known problem of opposition fragmentation in the country: some political forces bank on external pressure, others support negotiations, and a third group keeps fully away from any formats, viewing them either as pointless or imposed from outside. Against this background, any dialogue involving representatives of Chavism is seen not as a neutral diplomatic process, but as a space for a fight over the country’s future.

The practical significance of this issue for Venezuela is also substantial. Negotiations are directly tied to sanctions, access to international aid, migration pressure, and possible changes to the scope of economic isolation. As a result, such news is read through the lens of everyday problems—inflation, falling incomes, emigration, and lack of trust in state institutions. In Venezuelan political discourse, Donald Trump is associated not only with pressure on Nicolás Maduro, but also with the hope of part of the opposition for external support—something that often ends in disappointment.

Against this backdrop, another piece circulated in Venezuela’s media sphere shows how local audiences perceive news from the United States through the prism of criticism of the American security model. It concerns a shooting at the “Bite of Seattle” festival, reported in an Instagram post. In a Venezuelan reading, this is not only a criminal news item, but also another alarming example of how vulnerable everyday life can be even in a country that is often portrayed as more prosperous and safer than Latin American states.

In this interpretation, the emphasis is placed on the victims, the scale of the incident, and the police response; then it is compared with Venezuela’s internal agenda—crime levels, street violence, and trust in law enforcement. The mention that police detained two suspects and are investigating the cause of what happened only intensifies the feeling of incompleteness and тревога (anxiety). As a result, the Seattle news becomes not just a report of an incident, but also material for comparison with Latin American realities.

In both cases—the Venezuelan opposition and the shooting in the U.S.—the overall backdrop remains the same: attention shifts from dry factual reporting to a broader political and social meaning. In the first case, it is the opposition’s split, the role of the United States as an external arbiter, and the instability of the negotiation process; in the second, it is a security crisis and the vulnerability of citizens even in public spaces. This is how Venezuela’s media space turns international news into a reflection of its own fears, expectations, and political conflicts.

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The Third Night of Calm Between Iran and the US: Trump Says There Are “Deep Talks”

The night on the third day passes without direct strikes between Iran and the United States, while US President Donald Trump meanwhile says there are “deep talks” with Tehran. At the same time, regional and international mediation efforts are being stepped up, aimed at finding a way out of the conflict. Despite the lull on the battlefield, no official ceasefire or signed agreement has been announced so far. The question is: is this a tacit truce, or simply a pause while the results of diplomatic contacts are awaited?

The calm came after 13 consecutive nights of American strikes on Iran, to which Tehran—according to its own statements—responded with attacks on “American bases and interests in the region.” According to Reuters, a senior Iranian official, speaking anonymously, said Tehran would pause its operations as long as Washington refrains from new strikes. Iran’s stance is based on a “strike for strike” principle. However, ending attacks does not mean the confrontation has ended: the US has not announced winding down its military campaign, and Iran has not renounced the right to respond, while key disputed issues remain unresolved.

On the American side, Trump’s statements add a political dimension to the lull. He said the US is conducting “very deep talks” with Iran, while warning that time is limited and that matters will either “move quickly or not at all.” Trump confirmed that he is prepared to use “powerful military action” if the dialogue fails, balancing between continuing negotiations and preserving the option of force. In another comment, he mentioned “good” talks and the possibility of “achieving something,” without going into details about communications channels or progress made.

Iran, for its part, links the halt to its operations to the continuation of the pause in American strikes, without announcing a formal agreement. Iran’s foreign ministry claims that Tehran has not requested that talks with Washington be resumed, and that its public position has not changed. Nevertheless, according to Reuters, Iranian authorities have already sent the US a signal that operations would be suspended while Washington refrains from strikes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps emphasizes that the clashes do not amount to a full-scale war, but are a “response to American aggression,” and that attacks by Iranian forces targeted US military sites in retaliation for strikes on Iran.

Sources from Al Jazeera reveal that an Iranian technical group is in China, studying a Chinese proposal that could later be passed on to the United States. This points to a parallel diplomatic track running in the background as strikes are halted. The group is analyzing the initiative’s points before sending it to the American side; details of the document’s contents and the stage of consultations are not disclosed. This does not guarantee that Iran will accept the proposal in its final form, but it shows that the issue has been practically worked on in parallel with contacts and mediation.

In the current situation, there are no elements of an official ceasefire in the classic sense: there is no joint document, set timelines, or a clear mechanism for responding to potential violations. However, the facts indicate a mutual pause in hostilities that coincides with Trump’s remarks about talks, mediation maneuvers, and the initiative under discussion. The lull remains “fragile” due to Trump’s threat to resume the military operation if the dialogue fails, as well as because disagreements persist over the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear program, sanctions, and guarantees. The conflict has temporarily moved from exchanging strikes to testing negotiation and mediation channels, and the future of calm depends directly on whether the current talks succeed.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how is it different from Iran’s regular army? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the ideological system. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), the IRGC is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader rather than the Ministry of Defense, and has its own land, naval, and air forces, as well as intelligence and economic structures. The IRGC also controls the ballistic missile program and supports allied armed groups abroad (for example, Hezbollah). The Artesh focuses on traditional border defense and is not involved in ideological activities outside Iran.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz constantly mentioned in the context of the conflict between Iran and the US? — The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow 33-kilometer sea passage through which about 20–25% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil passes. Iran is located along the northern coast of the strait and has historically threatened to block it in response to sanctions or military pressure. Any attempt by Iran to close the strait would cause a sharp rise in energy prices and trigger a global economic crisis, so the US constantly keeps a naval task force there to ensure freedom of navigation. That makes the strait a key flashpoint in any Iran-US confrontation.

• What role does China play in Iran-US talks and why does Iran see it as a mediator? — China is Iran’s largest trading partner and buyer of Iranian oil despite US sanctions. In 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year agreement on strategic cooperation covering the economy, energy, and infrastructure. Iran views China as a neutral power that can ease pressure from Washington, and also as an alternative to the Western financial system. Beijing is interested in stability in the Middle East to protect its energy supplies and the Belt and Road project, so Chinese diplomats act as informal mediators, seeking to balance the parties’ interests without direct confrontation with the US.

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Full version: Three nights without strikes.. What do we know about a de facto truce between Washington and Tehran?

U.S. Ends Military Aid to Venezuela After Devastating Earthquakes

The U.S. Southern Command announced it has completed its rescue mission in Venezuela, which began after two major earthquakes on June 24 with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5, killing more than 5,500 people. General Donovan confirmed that the last U.S. service members have left the country, but assured that the American people will continue to support Venezuelans. At the height of the operation, 2,000 rescuers were working in the region, as well as naval vessels and aircraft delivering humanitarian aid. Now, Venezuela will coordinate the long-term recovery directly with the U.S. State Department, which, according to the U.S. side, has already provided the country with the largest volume of international assistance amid this tragedy.

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Full version: El Ejército de EEUU concluye su misión de apoyo en Venezuela tras el doble terremoto del pasado 24 de junio

Oil plunges 7% on hopes for US-Iran diplomacy

On Monday, global oil prices crashed by more than 7% after Washington and Tehran suspended mutual attacks that had been ongoing for two weeks. This has strengthened expectations that the sides may be able to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, which would restore safe shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—a key route for transporting oil. Brent futures fell to $89.58 per barrel, while US WTI dropped to $82.87.

The price surge came after a three-week rally, during which Brent reached the $100 mark due to disruptions in the Red Sea that affected Saudi Arabia’s exports to Asia. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, said President Trump decided to temporarily halt the strikes to give diplomacy a chance. In his view, it was a pause rather than a complete cessation, but the market took the de-escalation signal positively.

Market analyst Tony Sycamore of IG Markets noted that confidence is growing that a diplomatic track is feasible. In his opinion, a return to the 14-point memorandum of understanding and clear agreements on control of the Strait of Hormuz could provide a good foundation. However, data from Kepler shows that even after the attacks through the strait stopped, fewer than ten ships carrying cargo pass through it each day—normal operations of the channel have not yet been restored.

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Full version: Oil dives 7% after US and Iranian attacks are halted

Backlash and Diplomatic Reframing Around the U.S. Agenda Under Trump

International headlines today paint a complicated picture: the United States is perceived at once as a source of concern and as a field for tactical manoeuvring. Front and centre are fears stemming from trade and tariff pressure, as well as risks of escalation in conflicts. At the same time, some countries and commentators speak as sharply as possible, while others prefer to act by revisiting rhetoric, maintaining diplomatic contacts, and using carefully calibrated pauses—aiming to reduce damage and preserve room to manoeuvre and exert influence. Attention is focused not only on official government offices, but also on political forces that are changing their tone toward Washington, using gestures of solidarity or negotiating formats rather than confrontation. This material is based on publications from www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.poderyliderazgo.cl (Venezuela) and www.infobae.com (Venezuela).

Populism, Tariffs and Regional Risks in Latin America

In several Latin American outlets, Donald Trump and his policies are not just a topic of foreign news, but a prompt for discussion about populism, fear, economic vulnerability and the political cost of confrontation. In a Venezuelan commentary on Trump’s line toward Mexico and immigration, his rhetoric is described as an example of aggressive populism and political showmanship: the author highlights a contradiction—Trump himself comes from a family of immigrants, yet he is building a hardline anti-immigration agenda, especially aimed at Mexicans. In the original piece that the article cites, this is presented as a journalistic assessment rather than neutral reporting: original material. For Venezuelan readers, this perspective is particularly sensitive because the topic of migration, national dignity, and external pressure in the country is experienced through the country’s own experience of crisis and mass population exodus. The author sees in Trump’s harsh rhetoric an attempt to mobilize voters through fear and the image of an “enemy”. For the Venezuelan audience, it sounds like a familiar logic in the region: seeking an external adversary often helps those in power consolidate at home.

A similar theme, but already in economic terms, appears in a Chilean column about Trump’s tariffs published on PoderyLiderazgo. Here, the new tariff policy is viewed as a direct blow to Chile’s regional economy. The article refers to a 12.5% surcharge on salmon, fruits, wines, dairy products and timber—goods that are especially important for jobs, logistics and small business in the regions. Under pressure, the material notes, are O’Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, Biobío, La Araucanía, Los Lagos, Aysén and Magallanes—territories where exports are closely tied to agriculture, the forestry sector and aquaculture. The Chilean Minister of Finance, Jorge Quihroc, acknowledges that this is a “revés” (a setback), and reminds readers of Chile’s commitment to free trade and multilateralism. Deputy head of the SEI, Paula Estévez, says the government is already negotiating the exclusion of sensitive goods from the tariff. Former Foreign Minister Hernaldo Muñoz, by contrast, sharply criticizes the government’s course, calling the tariff a “discriminatory blow” and urging that Chile not “kowtow” to the Trump administration. The article also emphasizes that the United States excluded copper and lithium, which are necessary for American industry, but left tariffs in place for labour-intensive sectors that provide jobs in the regions. For Chile, this is seen as unfair and as another reminder that, in global trade, strategic resources are often more important than the interests of workers in rural and forested areas.

In an Argentine storyline described by Infobae, the focus shifts away from Washington toward a conflict between Argentina and Brazil, triggered by harsh attacks by Javier Milei on Lula da Silva. The reaction of Argentina’s opposition is built not only around the diplomatic tone, but also around the threat to the economy and regional integration. Brazil is presented here as a “principal socio comercial” and an “actor estratégico” (a strategic actor). Milei’s opponents warn that an ideological conflict could put at risk “fuentes de trabajo, inversiones e intereses colectivos” (“sources of employment, investment and collective interests”). Kicillof puts it particularly bluntly: “No en nuestro nombre, Milei,” underlining that the president cannot speak on behalf of the whole country. Wado de Pedro calls Milei’s trip “hecho de enorme gravedad” (“an act of enormous gravity”) and reminds people that “un Presidente no puede poner sus diferencias ideológicas por encima de los intereses nacionales” (“a President cannot place his ideological differences above national interests”). Guillermo Michel provides a specific figure: 14% of Argentina’s exports go to Brazil. Gabriel Katopodis links the conflict to industry, stating that “el 80% de nuestra producción industrial se exporta a ese país” (“80% of our industrial production is exported to that country”). The text includes representatives from almost the entire anti-government spectrum—PJ, Frente Renovador, La Cámpora, Trotta, Solá, Stolbizer, Pichetto and even Marcela Pagano—and all of them agree that the president has crossed a permissible line. In Argentine, and more broadly South American, political culture, this is perceived as an issue of sovereignty and national dignity: the symbolic humiliation of a neighbour is interpreted as an удар (a blow) to one’s own country. For a Venezuelan perspective, this scene feels especially familiar: when foreign-policy showmanship is put above economics, the price is paid not by leaders, but by citizens, industry and jobs.

Taken together, these materials point to one common regional nerve: in Latin America, populist rhetoric, trade decisions and diplomatic conflicts quickly go beyond symbolic gestures and start affecting real incomes, exports and employment. In the Venezuelan commentary, Trump is fear and the search for an “other”; in the Chilean text, tariffs are a blow to “territorios productivos” (productive territories); in the Argentine piece, political confrontation that can harm trade and production. In all cases, the issue is not only foreign policy, but also how leaders’ decisions and words are reflected in people’s everyday lives across the region.

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Iran and the United States: Is a compromise possible after Trump’s ultimatum?

Restoring trust between Washington and Tehran after decades of open hostility remains an extremely difficult task. In an interview with the French TV channel LCI, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to launch a large-scale war against Iran unless it met 100% of his demands, adding that Israel would join the conflict within a few minutes. However, according to several analysts, an agreement is still possible if Trump changes his approach and moves away from a “all or nothing” policy to a logic of mutual benefit.

Israeli sources, for their part, reported that Tel Aviv has not lowered its level of readiness despite Trump’s loud statements. The decision to maintain maximum alertness is based on the belief that the Iranians will not yield to the ultimatum. This has also sparked debate: would any possible negotiations or temporary delays lead to a lasting lull, or will the two sides simply bide their time for the next step?

The director of the Center for Iranian Arab Studies Mohammad Saleh Sadikyan believes that returning to the negotiating table is possible if Trump gives up efforts to get everything without any concessions. He proposes using Oman’s mediation mechanism: Iran could guarantee safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in line with international law, while in return the United States would unfreeze the Iranian assets that had been seized earlier, as provided for in a previously signed memorandum of understanding. In Sadikyan’s view, such an approach could move the matter away from a deadlock.

Former U.S. ambassador Joy Hood is more skeptical. She points to decades of the “Death to America” slogan and to the fact that after the war launched by Trump, thousands of Iranians died. Nevertheless, Hood allows for a pragmatic compromise: if the Iranians stop threatening ships in Hormuz and voluntarily provide navigation services, the United States could lift sanctions and ease the blockade. In her words, the current Iranian regime has already shifted away from purely ideological confrontation and uses the slogan “Death to the world’s economy” if it does not get what it wants—meaning that interests, not emotions, lie at the core.

Dr. Mohammad Sharkawi, meanwhile, notes that the current war has produced a new nationalism in Iran, and that Trump, in his view, acts as a representative of “white pride,” steeped in historical hostility stemming from the 1979 hostage crisis. However, Sharkawi уточняет that Trump himself is a dealmaker who is not inclined toward historical reflexes, but his advisers constantly fuel hostility. The main obstacle for the expert is disagreement over Article 5 of the memorandum, which concerns the navigation regime in the Strait of Hormuz.

In practice, the situation remains uncertain: it is unclear whether Iran is negotiating with Oman within the framework of the old memorandum or is preparing a fundamentally new document. Trump has only postponed a mass strike that was being prepared, but has not fully canceled it, and apparently expects the results of dialogue between Tehran and Muscat. Thus, progress in diplomacy is possible only if pressure is maintained and it succeeds in changing the situation on the ground. For now, there is no talk of any stable de-escalation.

Comments on the news

• Why is ensuring the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz a key topic in negotiations between Iran and the United States? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close it in the event of a conflict, which could trigger a global energy crisis. Therefore, control of the strait is a central issue in any bilateral talks, affecting both economic interests and military security.
• What role has Oman traditionally played in mediating between Iran and Western countries? - Oman, which borders Iran through the Strait of Hormuz, has historically maintained neutrality and has supported diplomatic channels with both sides. The Sultanate acted as a mediator in the release of Western hostages and, unofficially, helped facilitate negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, drawing on trust relationships with both Tehran and Washington.
• How did the 1979 hostage crisis affect today’s relations between Iran and the United States? - The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the 444-day detention of 52 hostages created deep mutual distrust that remains to this day. This episode lies at the heart of the rupture in diplomatic relations, and in Iran it is still used as a symbol of “anti-American struggle,” which makes any negotiations— including on shipping safety—more complicated.

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Full version: بعد عقود من "الموت لأمريكا".. هل يمكن بناء الثقة بين واشنطن وطهران؟

Delcy Rodríguez Swears In Venezuela’s New Senior Command

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a ceremony to swear in an updated roster of the General Staff, the commanders of the branches of the armed forces, and the heads of the strategic defense regions (REDI). The event aimed to strengthen the operational structure of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and included the official transfer of authority and the presentation of departmental insignia. Rodríguez stressed that the appointments are of a strategic nature: “As Commander-in-Chief, I have appointed these officers, generals, and admirals who will now take the highest positions to ensure the comprehensive defense of the nation.”

In her address, the head of state urged the military leadership to act with a sense of service to the people: “Go with the baton of command in service to the Venezuelan people. You are entrusted with a great and noble task: to defend the interests of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” The officers sworn in confirmed their commitment to the constitution, military discipline, and their obligation to carry out their duties to protect sovereignty. The ceremony concluded the formation of the new FANB command structure, designed to strengthen combat readiness and improve the country’s territorial defense organization.

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Full version: Presidenta Delcy Rodríguez encabezó acto de graduación de tropas profesionales y juramentó al nuevo Alto Mando Militar

Trump orders army to halt airstrikes on Iran for diplomacy

U.S. President Donald Trump ordered that no new strikes be carried out against Iran in order to give a chance to diplomatic efforts led by Oman. Sources told Axios: on Friday, Trump declined to approve plans for new strikes and ordered the military to stop air raids. At the same time, the army continues preparing military scenarios in case of escalation, although it is still unclear whether the halt is temporary or a change of course for the administration.

CNN уточняет, that Vice President JD Vance and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised concerns at a meeting at the White House about depleted U.S. ammunition stockpiles. The administration discussed possible escalation risks. According to Axios, Washington is refraining from strikes against Iran for the first time in two weeks—before that, attacks had continued for 13 nights in a row. CNN reports that Trump secretly instructed negotiators to continue dialogue with Tehran even amid statements about a possible large-scale offensive.

On the diplomatic front, there are signs of movement: CBS News, citing regional sources, reports that talks in Oman with Iran are progressing with the aim of resuming shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and opening territorial waters. The sources note a positive trajectory, but more time will be needed for a final agreement. The cessation of U.S. bombing was deliberate—in order not to disrupt these direct and sensitive diplomatic contacts. On Friday, an Omani delegation arrived in Tehran to discuss unblocking the strait.

Despite the pause in airstrikes, U.S. forces say that Iran’s naval blockade is “fully maintained”—ship interceptions continue as vessels attempt to break through the cordon. U.S. Central Command reported the stopping of one ship whose crew allegedly ignored warnings in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, on Saturday there were no reports of Iranian attacks on neighboring countries, although previously they had been occurring almost every day. A senior administration official emphasized that Trump had always preferred diplomacy, but showed Iran what would happen if talks were not conducted seriously.

Regional tensions remain beyond the Persian Gulf as well. Yemen’s Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarea announced an attack on facilities of Saudi Aramco in Jazan and Yanbu. Greek sources said that a U.S.-made Patriot battery operated by Greek forces in Saudi Arabia intercepted two ballistic missiles aimed at oil facilities in Yanbu—the kingdom’s main oil port on the Red Sea. Earlier, the Houthis said they had imposed a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, threatening to attack all oil facilities, and claimed strikes on two Saudi oil tankers.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Ukraine of attacking an Iranian merchant vessel in the Caspian Sea, saying that an explosion killed one sailor and injured another. In turn, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky praised “long-range strikes” in the Caspian, saying ships carrying military cargo related to Iran were hit. Against this backdrop, regional sources report that talks in Oman with Iran are progressing, but that an agreement is still far off. CNN notes that the countries of the Persian Gulf urged the United States to exercise restraint during recent contacts with U.S. officials.

Comments on the news

• Why is Oman acting as a mediator between the United States and Iran, and what is the history of its diplomatic role in the region? — Oman traditionally maintains neutrality in Middle East conflicts, maintaining good relations with both Iran and Western countries. Since the 1970s, the sultanate has played the role of an unofficial negotiator—for example, during the 2013–2015 nuclear talks—using its geographic position (control of the Strait of Hormuz) and the trust of both sides.

• How are Yemen’s Houthis connected to Iran, and why are their attacks on Saudi oil targets part of a wider conflict? — The Houthis (the movement “Ansar Allah”) receive military assistance from Iran: ballistic missiles, drones, and training. Iran uses them as a proxy to pressure Saudi Arabia and its allies, as part of Tehran and Riyadh’s long-running rivalry for dominance in the region. Attacks on Saudi oil facilities are aimed at undermining its economy and weakening its position in the war in Yemen.

• Why is Ukraine striking Iranian merchant ships in the Caspian Sea, and how is this connected to the alleged supply of Iranian weapons to Russia? — According to Ukrainian intelligence, Iranian vessels are used to transport components for kamikaze drones (Shahed) and other weapons to Russia via the Caspian route. By striking these ships, Ukraine is trying to disrupt this logistics chain and respond to Iran’s military support for the aggression by the Russian Federation. Iran officially denies supplying Russia with weapons.

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Full version: "فرصة للدبلوماسية".. هدوء وتعليق للهجمات بين واشنطن وطهران

Iran Boosted Its Missile Capability Using Russia’s Tactics and China’s Satellites

According to an investigation by the British newspaper The Guardian, amid rising tensions in the Middle East, Iran has significantly improved its ability to strike U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure in the region. The development of its missile program, the use of satellite imagery, and the borrowing of tactical methods from the war in Ukraine have enabled Tehran to increase the accuracy and destructive power of its attacks, as well as identify vulnerabilities in U.S. air-defense systems deployed in the region.

A key example was an attack on the Muwafaq al-Salti air base in Jordan, which was protected by the advanced THAAD missile defense system. As a result of the strike, three U.S. servicemembers were killed, and satellite images published by Iranian media showed significant damage to facilities at the base. The Pentagon is conducting an investigation to determine why the system failed to intercept the missile, a finding that underscores Iran’s ability to deliver effective strikes even against well-defended targets.

Andreas Krieg, an expert at King’s College London, said Iran’s missile arsenal has undergone a “real transformation.” In his view, this change is not only about increasing the number of missiles, but also about simultaneously improving intelligence, guidance systems, the maneuverability of warheads, and the planning methods for complex attacks. U.S. intelligence indicates that a significant portion of the program remains effective despite previous strikes that Washington said had weakened Iran’s capabilities.

The role of China is also examined separately: the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese companies suspected of providing Iran with satellite images of U.S. military sites, including bases with “Patriot” and THAAD systems. However, Siddharth Kushal, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), offers a more restrained assessment. He believes Iran is mainly focused on fixed facilities whose coordinates can be obtained from publicly available commercial satellites, and that there is no clear evidence so far that Tehran used foreign intelligence to attack highly sensitive mobile or operational targets.

The possible impact of Russian experience is also discussed. The tactics of Iranian attacks resemble Moscow’s actions in Ukraine: drones are used first to wear down or divert air defenses, and then more powerful ballistic missiles are launched. Experts emphasize that such similarity does not necessarily indicate direct Russian training—rather, both sides are observing modern wars and exchanging lessons learned, even if not directly.

Technically, Iran’s ballistic missiles use a combination of the U.S. GPS system, China’s BeiDou, and Russia’s GLONASS to improve guidance accuracy. Some missiles are equipped with warheads capable of changing their trajectory during the terminal phase of descent, as well as thermal and optical sensors for self-guidance at the final stage. This reduces the effectiveness of electronic warfare and creates serious problems for U.S. air-defense systems such as the “Patriot” and THAAD—whose interceptor stockpiles have been depleted due to intensive use.

Ultimately, the report’s authors stress that Iran’s buildup of missile capabilities is becoming an increasingly growing challenge for the United States and its allies. Tehran’s convergence with Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang reflects an exchange of interests and technologies rather than the formation of a full military alliance modeled on NATO, but the coordinated actions of these countries are becoming more evident over the long term.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in developing Iran’s missile capabilities and planning attacks on regional targets? — The IRGC is Iran’s key military and political institution that independently (separately from the regular army) develops, produces, and operates ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. The IRGC Aerospace Force is responsible for all stages: from R&D to operational planning for attacks. It is the IRGC that coordinates strikes on targets in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, using its own intelligence data and satellite imagery.
• What specific types of ballistic missiles (for example, “Shahab-3,” “Emad,” “Khorramshahr”) are in Iran’s arsenal, and what are their key characteristics? — Iran’s arsenal includes: “Shahab-3” (range up to 2,000 km, warhead about 1 ton, based on North Korea’s Nodong); “Emad” (a modernization of Shahab-3 with a separating warhead and improved accuracy, range about 1,700 km); “Khorramshahr” (a new generation, range about 2,000–2,500 km, can carry multiple warheads, and has a maneuvering stage). The arsenal also includes “Sajil” (solid-fuel, range about 2,500 km) and tactical missiles “Fateh-110” and “Zolfaghar” (300–700 km).
• How does Iran use its own drones (in particular, “Shahed-136” and “Mohajer-6”) to suppress air-defense systems before launching ballistic missiles, and how does this tactic differ from Russia’s? — Iran uses what is known as a “swarm” attack: dozens of “Shahed-136” drones (kamikaze) and “Mohajer-6” (reconnaissance and guidance/target-correction) drones are launched in mass to overwhelm air-defense assets, identify their positions, and hit some of the targets. After suppressing them and creating gaps in the defense, ballistic missiles are launched either simultaneously or with a short delay—missiles that, at the edge of what the air defenses can handle, can strike critical facilities. The difference from Russian tactics is that Russia more often uses drones as decoys or to divert attention, while Iran focuses on actually disabling air-defense systems with drones, conserving expensive missiles.
• Which Iranian organizations (IRGC Aerospace Forces, Iranian Space Agency) directly handle obtaining and processing satellite images for missile targeting? — The IRGC Aerospace Forces (as a separate command) use both military satellites (for example, “Noor-1” and “Noor-2”) and commercial imagery purchased through intermediaries. The Iranian Space Agency (ISA) is formally responsible for civilian programs, but its terrain and coordinate data are passed to the IRGC. Electronic intelligence units within the IRGC also process imagery from foreign satellites (for example, Russia’s “Resurs-P” or Chinese satellites/apparatuses that Iran receives through agreements).

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Full version: Did China and Russia play a role in Iran’s targeting of U.S. bases?

Trump: Venezuela is not ready for elections yet, but progress has been made

US President Donald Trump said that Venezuela is not yet ready to hold elections, but he acknowledged significant progress in that direction. He praised the work of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, calling it “fantastic,” and stressed that cooperation in the oil market benefits both American companies and the Venezuelan people. Trump also noted that he knows the country well from the time of the Miss Universe competition, where Venezuela has consistently achieved success, and he promised that the United States will keep watching the situation until Venezuela is ready for elections.

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Full version: Donald Trump: Venezuela aún no está

The US and Britain prepare an alliance to protect the Strait of Hormuz

Washington and London are pushing to create an international mechanism to ensure the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. According to Axios, a high-level meeting is planned for next week in Britain’s capital, where the formation of a coalition will be discussed. The meeting comes amid a temporary lull in attacks on merchant vessels and a surge in regional diplomacy aimed at stabilizing one of the world’s key sea routes.

According to sources, the meeting may include the US and UK defense ministers and senior military officials, as well as representatives of a number of Western and regional states. On the US side, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth and General Dan Keane, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are expected to travel to London. A White House spokesperson confirmed that the event is being prepared, but the British embassy in Washington has so far declined to comment.

The plan is seen by the US as a strategic priority: restoring normal commercial shipping through the strait is necessary to mitigate the fallout from the conflict with Iran and to stabilize oil markets. As Axios reports, Washington is asking allies to provide minesweepers, patrol vessels, and unmanned drones. One European diplomat said: “The Americans are looking for a way out of the situation and asking for our help.”

The initiative is gaining momentum after four days without Iranian attacks on merchant ships in the strait, but against the backdrop of a two-week escalation in which the US carried out daily strikes on Iranian military facilities along the southern coast. Opinions within the Pentagon have diverged: some officials believe the bombardments have weakened Tehran’s capabilities, while others warn that Iran can still attack ships. Against this backdrop, President Donald Trump threatened to strike bridges and power plants, including in Tehran, and the Iranian side responded with threats to target infrastructure in the Persian Gulf states.

A number of countries are making full cessation of hostilities in the strait area a condition for participation in the naval mission. Paris and London insist that practical work will begin only after a permanent ceasefire regime is put in place, and that current steps are preparatory and preventive in nature. The Franco-British initiative, launched back in May, envisages a defensive and non-attack posture for the future forces.

The tasks of the future alliance will include escorting commercial ships and oil tankers through the strait, clearing the waters of mines, preventing seizures and incidents, and supporting stability in the global energy market—before the war, about a fifth of the world’s oil passed through the strait. Alongside military preparations, diplomatic work is also under way: Iran’s Foreign Ministry chief Abbas Araghchi returned to consultations after an unsuccessful round involving Oman, Iran, and Qatar; an Omani delegation arrived in Tehran to resume negotiations on opening the strait. Araghchi himself said that “the problem between us and the United States is not the absence of a mediator, but the American approach.”

Comments on the news

• Who is Abbas Araghchi and what role does he play in Iranian foreign policy? - Abbas Araghchi is a senior Iranian diplomat who serves as Iran’s foreign minister. Previously, he was the chief negotiator on the nuclear program, representing Iran in talks with the “P5+1” (the US, the UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia) in 2013–2015. He is known for his technocratic and pragmatic line and is considered the architect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). His duties include balancing a hardline stance at home with the need for pragmatic dialogue with the West.

• Why do Oman and Qatar traditionally act as intermediaries between Iran and Western countries? - Oman and Qatar play the role of intermediaries thanks to their historically neutral position in the region, close economic ties with Iran (especially in the gas sector), and good contacts with the United States. Oman, for example, maintained secret channels of communication between Washington and Tehran even after diplomatic relations were severed in 1980. Qatar uses its diplomatic flexibility to reduce tensions, which benefits both sides.

• What role does the Strait of Hormuz play in Iran’s deterrence strategy, and why does Tehran periodically threaten to block it? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic transport corridor through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil supplies pass. For Iran, the threat of blocking it is a tool of asymmetric deterrence in response to sanctions or military threats from the US and its allies. This allows Tehran to pressure global oil prices and create economic instability. However, a full blockade is unlikely, as it would harm Iran itself: Iran exports oil through the strait and depends on international trade.

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Full version: هل يدخل مضيق هرمز مرحلة جديدة؟ تحرك أمريكي بريطاني لتشكيل قوة بحرية

Iraq Denies Reports of Mediation Between Tehran and Washington

Official Baghdad has categorically rejected information circulated by The New York Times that Iraq acted as a mediator between Iran and the United States in negotiations on a ceasefire. In a statement from the Iraqi prime minister’s office, the report is described as “unreliable and bears no relation to reality.” It refers to a purported Iranian refusal of a U.S. proposal. Iraqi authorities urged the media to verify information through official channels and not to circulate unconfirmed data from anonymous sources.

According to The New York Times, Iraqi mediation began after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad as-Sudani met with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House about ten days ago. The outlet claimed that Iranian officials concluded that the American version of a settlement did not meet Tehran’s key requirements, first and foremost regarding future control of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, in Iran, the U.S. proposal was called “the only one currently on the negotiating table.”

During as-Sudani’s visit to Tehran, he held meetings with Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian, the chief negotiator Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, and the foreign minister Abbas Araqchi. Araqchi, in turn, said the problem was not a lack of mediators, but Washington’s “illogical and hegemonistic approach.” The Iraqi prime minister shared with the Iranian side his impressions from his trip to the United States.

These developments are unfolding amid ongoing military escalation. The United States has intensified strikes on Iranian military facilities, including airfields, bridges, and ports. Iran, in response, is striking positions in the region with drones and ballistic missiles. According to The New York Times, Iranian forces are preparing for a possible widening of the conflict if Trump’s threats to attack Tehran and its vital infrastructure are carried out. In response, the outlet reports, Iran is considering an option of striking Tel Aviv and enlisting its allies—including Yemeni Houthis—to block the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. This dynamic makes the situation around key sea routes—Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb—especially explosive, and Iraq’s denial appears to be a political signal that the real picture on the ground is more complex than what Western media are describing.

Comments on the news

• Why is Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, rather than a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as the chief negotiator with Iraq? What internal political processes in Iran does this reflect? - In Iran, foreign policy is not solely the prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; key decisions are made by the Supreme Leader and his close circle. Ghalibaf, as an influential politician and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has direct access to the Supreme Leader. His appointment as chief negotiator reflects an increased role for parliament and conservative forces, as well as an effort to limit the influence of the president and reformists. It also points to factional struggles and the distribution of powers between different branches of government, in a situation where the Supreme Leader retains control over strategic issues.
• What are the real powers of Iran’s president Masud Pezeshkian, and how do they relate to the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? Why, in the article, do key decisions on negotiations appear to be made by other figures rather than the president? - The Iranian president has limited authority in foreign policy and security matters, which are under the control of the Supreme Leader and his apparatus. As a reformer, Pezeshkian can influence economic and social issues, but in strategic negotiations he often plays a secondary role. The Supreme Leader has the final right of veto and oversees all key state institutions, including the IRGC, the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, key decisions on negotiations with Iraq are made through channels directly subordinated to Khamenei, rather than through the presidential administration—reflecting Iran’s constitutional structure, where the Supreme Leader’s authority significantly exceeds that of the president.

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Full version: العراق ينفي تقرير نيويورك تايمز بشأن الوساطة بين إيران وأمريكا

Venezuela in Search of Leadership: A Crisis With No Way Out

Venezuela is going through a colossal crisis, exacerbated by natural disasters and the lack of prospects if the country does not unite. The author argues that recovery and the sharing of information must be grounded in solidarity and transparency in the management of resources. In his view, the current situation calls for true leadership to stop social and administrative decline. The government is especially harshly criticized, where, as the article puts it, the “most mediocre and unprepared leadership” prevails—where technical competence has been replaced by ideological loyalty. Examples are drawn from failures in the management of such giants as PDVSA, Cantv, and Electricidad de Caracas, as well as the influence of radical left-wing groups, which, according to the author, have only worsened the situation.

The opposition also receives its share of criticism: it lacks a clear project, strategic vision, and the ability to move the country forward. The author believes Venezuela has lost its way, and that the “supposed revolution” has turned into “involution” in all areas of public life. In contrast, he recalls the historic leadership of 1958, which he considers unparalleled and focused on the long term. Today, he says, society has remained “an orphan” without real leadership—capable of setting goals and guiding the way to achieve them.

The author offers an in-depth analysis of the very concept of leadership. Psychologically, it is influence; in political science, it is the exercise of power; and in practice, it is the ability to direct and lead toward a common goal. Real leaders have charisma, know how to inspire and convey values, develop talent, make decisions, and motivate others. Power is only a relationship, but not everyone who holds power is a leader. Real leadership mobilizes resources and meets the needs of followers. In the end, the author concludes that leadership must be ethical, serve the common good, and be based on unity of intent for real transformation of society.

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Full version: Liderazgo, Políticas y proyecto

The United States hits Iran for the 13th straight wave: dead and retaliatory attacks

The US Central Command said it has successfully concluded the 13th night in a row of large-scale strikes on targets in Iran. According to US forces, the attacks focused on the country’s southern and south-western provinces. Iranian sources report four deaths and seven injuries in the provinces of Khuzestan and Hormozgan, as well as damage in several cities.

In Khuzestan province, the strikes hit the outskirts of the city of Ahvaz, where four people were killed and five others were wounded. Explosions were heard in seven areas of the city. The cities of Omidiyeh and Andimeshk were also targeted. In Hormozgan, Bander Abbas was affected: two people were injured and the power grid was damaged. Explosions were heard in the city of Jask and on the island of Qeshm. Iranian air defences were activated in Tehran to repel “hostile targets.”

In response to the US attacks, Iran said it carried out strikes on US bases in Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait using “Arash” drones and other weaponry. The targets included fuel storage facilities and places where servicemembers were housed at the Sheikh Isa base in Bahrain, as well as hangars and residential areas at the El-Azraq base in Jordan. Later, Iranian command said it carried out attacks on Kuwaiti bases at Doha, Arifjan and El-Adiri.

Kuwait officially stated that its air defence systems intercepted “hostile missile attacks and drones” following “criminal Iranian aggression.” The Kuwaiti army’s General Staff explained that any sounds of explosions may have been linked to targets being intercepted by air-defence means.

The escalation is taking place amid the collapse of the June memorandum of understanding, which envisaged a ceasefire and the start of negotiations. However, US President Donald Trump announced on 8 July that he was withdrawing from the agreement after attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which Washington blamed on Tehran. Since then, US strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliatory attacks against facilities in the region have become daily.

The United States is calling for an immediate halt to attacks on merchant ships and guarantees of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, in turn, insists on introducing its own mechanism to monitor ship transit in coastal waters. This position raises concerns about a global disruption to oil and gas supplies, as the strait is a key energy route. Negotiations have so far produced no results, while military activity continues to intensify.

Comments on the news

• What is the significance of Khuzestan province for Iran’s economy and politics, especially the city of Ahvaz? — Khuzestan is Iran’s “oil heart,” home to more than 80% of the country’s proven oil reserves (including the largest Ahvaz field). The city of Ahvaz is the province’s administrative and industrial hub. Politically, the region has a dual importance: on the one hand, it generates enormous revenue for the budget; on the other, it remains an area of ethnic tension due to a large Arab-speaking community, which periodically triggers protests and requires Tehran to balance economic exploitation with social control.

• What are Iran’s “Arash” drones and what role do they play in Iran’s military strategy? — “Arash” is a family of Iranian loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) with a flight range of between 200 and 2,000 km, depending on the modification. They are designed to strike specific targets, including air-defence systems, warehouses, and command posts. In Iran’s military strategy, “Arash” is part of the doctrine of “asymmetric deterrence”: these drones are cheap to produce, can be launched in large numbers, overwhelming the enemy’s air-defence systems—allowing Iran to strike at long distances without risking pilots.

• What was the “June memorandum of understanding” between the United States and Iran, and why was it scrapped? — The reference is to an unsigned draft of a temporary agreement in 2022–2023, discussed with the mediation of Oman and Qatar. The memorandum involved the unfreezing of Iranian assets (up to ~US$6 billion frozen in South Korea) in exchange for limiting uranium enrichment to 60% and releasing several foreign detainees. It was derailed for several reasons: tightened domestic repression in Iran after the 2022 protests, growing pressure from Israel and US Republicans, as well as Tehran’s demand for guarantees that a future American administration would not withdraw from the deal—something the Biden administration could not legally ensure.

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Full version: Dead and injured in US airstrikes on Iran, Tehran strikes Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait

Reaction to Trump’s tariff offensive: a shake-up in America’s trade

The tariff strikes that Trump has described as a lever for pressure in recent news reports do not look like a one-off step. Instead, they appear like an economic shock that is changing the rules of the game for partners across the entire hemisphere. At the center of attention are both concern and calculation: countries in Latin America and Canada are looking for retaliatory formulas, revising their negotiation positions, and preparing countermeasures to reduce risks for their own markets and supply chains. At the same time, a dispute is coming to the forefront over how acceptable this style of influence is—and how far U.S. pressure in trade issues can go. This material is based on publications at www.infobae.com (Venezuela), as well as materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees U.S. sanctions as a global pressure scheme

In Venezuela, news about Washington’s new steps against Iran and Donald Trump’s tariff policy in Latin America are being read as parts of the same logic: using financial and economic pressure as a tool of political coercion. Through the lens of Caracas, the Infobae report that Trump threatened to use blocked Iranian assets to cover damage inflicted on ships appears not only as yet another threat to Tehran, but also as a warning for all countries under pressure from the United States.

For the Venezuelan audience, this is an especially sensitive topic. In Caracas, such actions automatically evoke personal experience: frozen funds abroad, disputes over access to national assets, and persistent accusations that the United States and its allies turn finance into a continuation of war by other means. That is why the Iran story is read not as an isolated episode from the Middle East, but as further confirmation that Washington is willing to распоряжаться (dispose of/handle) other people’s assets for its own political interests. The text emphasizes that the United States controls “tens of billions of dollars”—and it is precisely this that causes alarm in Venezuela: if such a precedent becomes established, it could be used against other states as well, including Venezuela itself.

The geopolitical backdrop also carries special weight. Mention of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and gas flows, resonates strongly with how Venezuelans perceive energy conflicts. Although the country is far from the Persian Gulf, it understands that any escalation around such a corridor is immediately reflected in prices, logistics, and export calculations. For a state whose economy has relied on oil for decades, this means either possible growth in revenues or an intensification of instability on the global market. That is why the threat of “maximum pressure,” and the linkage of financial measures to military force, look like familiar elements of American foreign policy in Caracas—where, according to local commentators, the United States sets the rules of the game itself.

The same logic can be seen in Noticias SIN’s report on Trump’s tariffs, which have sparked concern in Latin America. Although the article explicitly names Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, Venezuelans perceive it more broadly—as a sign that the United States is ready to use economic measures against an entire region. The measure in question is an additional tariff of 10% for Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and 12.5% for Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. For Caracas, this is not just a trade headline, but confirmation that pressure on Latin American economies has become systemic.

Venezuelan reaction to such decisions usually draws on its own history with sanctions of a financial, oil, and commercial nature. Therefore, U.S. tariffs are seen not as a separate episode, but as a continuation of a long-standing policy in which the economy becomes a field for geopolitical pressure. From this, Caracas concludes that it is necessary to diversify markets, reduce dependence on trade with the United States, and strengthen ties with other regional and off-hemisphere partners. Politically, such measures reinforce the argument that Latin American countries face shared challenges in the face of Washington’s unilateral decisions.

In the end, both the Iranian story about frozen assets and the Latin American story about tariffs come together into a single Venezuelan picture of the world. In this picture, the United States is not presented as an arbiter, but as a party that freezes money, imposes duties, threatens force, and then decides on its own how to use economic levers. That is why such news in Caracas creates not only interest, but also apprehension: it strengthens the belief that financial sovereignty and protection of national assets remain, for Venezuela, not only an economic matter, but also a question of political survival.

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AI Doesn’t Distinguish Between Confidential and Public User Data

Modern artificial intelligence models process all information that users enter into chat dialogues without distinguishing between corporate secrets and ordinary public data. This means that if an employee shares a company’s commercial secrets in an AI chat, they could end up in the model’s training dataset and become accessible to others. Such indiscriminate handling puts business security at risk: confidential information could be disclosed, and the company using AI could face data leaks and legal consequences.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

Cabello: The opposition is not helping those affected by the earthquakes

Diosdado Cabello, head of Venezuela’s ruling party, said that none of the opposition leaders who had returned to the country has provided real assistance to residents of the state of La Guaira, who were affected by the recent earthquakes. In his program “Con el Mazo Dando,” he stressed that the opposition figures, who had previously announced their return to work for the good of Venezuela, were merely taking photos for publicity rather than engaging in selfless help, and cited Lester Toledo as an example. Cabello also noted that some of them even asked the government’s supporters for water and mattresses for later distribution, which he deemed hypocritical.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello: Ningún opositor extremista ha ido a La Guaira para brindar su ayuda al pueblo

US: Iran seeks a deal but keeps changing the terms

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Iran is “begging” for an agreement with Washington—both directly and through intermediaries. In his view, Tehran can get a good deal if it “returns to reason” after recent strikes. Rubio stressed that the goal of the United States is not regime change in Iran, but the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear weapons.

Rubio noted that Iranian officials, or those speaking on their behalf, are constantly trying to reach an understanding, but each time, after an agreement is reached, they change the terms. He refused to reveal details of current contacts with Tehran, but confirmed that some heads of Iran’s foreign ministry have told him that Iran wants to come to an agreement. The US top diplomat also accused Iran of “posting stupid videos on social media” and of hiding its military and economic losses due to the absence of a free press.

Washington will continue to apply pressure, forcing Iran to pay a “high price” if it refuses negotiations or violates any possible agreement. Rubio explained that the United States engages with different levels within Iran’s power structure because the clergy controls the country. He added that Iranians deserve better leadership than one that “shoots people in the streets,” and that Iran has the resources to become a rich country, but they are spent on armed militias and missile programs.

Against the backdrop of regional tensions, Rubio expressed hope for de-escalation by the Yemeni Houthis (the “Ansar Allah” movement). He said they had long stayed out of the war, but that recently Iran managed to draw them into the conflict and push them to attack Saudi ships in the Red Sea. The secretary of state said the United States is seeking to reduce escalation, and suggested that after several days of heightened tension, Iran may be willing to strike a deal because it is suffering serious losses day by day.

When asked about the war in Ukraine, Rubio said the Trump administration wants to end the conflict, but that is impossible without the consent of both sides. He pointed out that Kyiv has so far rejected Russia’s “3+2” proposal. Rubio denied rumors that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asked him to stop arms deliveries to Ukraine, explaining that the United States is fulfilling its commitments to NATO. President Trump, he said, is seeking to end the war, but that requires time, work, and the willingness of the parties.

In response to questions about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, Rubio said that any cooperation in this area requires Congressional approval and will be strictly peaceful. The US insists on conditions regarding the size of reactors and on the participation of American companies in construction to rule out diversion for unintended use. Regarding Cuba, the secretary of state criticized the leadership there as incompetent and ideologically committed to destroying the country, emphasizing that Washington supports free elections and representation of all segments of society.

Comments on the news

• How does Iran’s political system work if power effectively belongs to the clergy (the Supreme Leader) rather than the president? — Iran is an Islamic republic where power is divided between elected bodies (the president, parliament) and appointed religious institutions. The Supreme Leader (rahbar) is the head of state and commander-in-chief; he controls the judiciary, the armed forces, and the media. The president is responsible for executive power and the economy, but his decisions can be blocked by the Guardian Council, made up of clerics. This dualism creates a system in which the clergy sets the strategic course, while the president manages day-to-day affairs.

• What are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia, and why are they called “armed militias”? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It handles not only defense, but also the economy, suppressing protests, and supporting allies abroad (for example, “Hezbollah”). The Basij is a voluntary militia often used for internal control and ideological mobilization. They are called “militias” because of their parallel command structure that is not accountable to civilian authorities, as well as the religious and ideological nature of their activities.

• How does Iran support the Yemeni Houthis (the “Ansar Allah” movement), and how is this linked to attacks on ships in the Red Sea? — Iran provides the Houthis with military and technical assistance: it supplies drones (for example, Shahed-136), ballistic missiles, and components for their production, and it also trains fighters. Logistics is organized through Iraqi and Lebanese proxy groups. The attacks on ships in the Red Sea (since late 2023) are the Houthis’ response to the war in Gaza: they target vessels linked to Israel, attempting to disrupt international shipping. Iran uses these strikes to demonstrate its influence in the region without direct involvement in the conflict.

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Full version: Rubio: Iran is seeking a deal and will pay a high price if it does not meet the terms

Disputes over U.S. Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Pressure, and the Risk of Escalation

Fresh debates are erupting around the course of the U.S. administration: at the center are tough moves in foreign policy, sanctions measures, and regional pressure which, according to critics, could push events toward escalation. A special focus is on discussions about Cuba and Iran—where some observers see an effort to secure political concessions, while others fear that a “governance by pressure” logic could lead to destabilization and complicate balances in a region that is already fragile. Against this backdrop, there is also a public “trade” of interpretations: some argue for the need to deliver a “hard response,” while others say Washington is effectively taking on the role of an external arbiter, intervening in processes that require more careful political decisions. This material was prepared based on data from www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees U.S. Decisions as a Threat and Double Standards

In Venezuela’s information landscape, several international storylines are quickly coming together into a single picture of distrust toward the United States—its foreign policy and the way Washington uses issues of security, sanctions, and the legitimacy of power in its own interests. From a possible nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia to disputes over what grounds someone remains in power, all these topics in Venezuela are read not as separate news items, but as part of the same conversation about double standards and politicized rules.

One of the most alarming signals for Venezuelan audiences was a publication by FRANCE 24 Español, which reports on a possible agreement supported by the Donald Trump administration that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. In the region, this can easily be seen as a step that may spur a new nuclear arms race in the Middle East—especially since the deal involves no “strict guarantees.” For Venezuela, what matters here is not only the Middle East storyline itself, but also the fundamental question: the United States, which typically acts as an arbiter in the field of nonproliferation, is simultaneously backing arrangements that worry its own lawmakers, Israel, and neighboring countries. Against this backdrop, traditional distrust of U.S. foreign policy is intensifying in the country, along with the idea that Washington is consistent and acts “according to rules.”

The same logic of distrust can be seen in another reaction related to the question of on what grounds someone continues to remain in power when such “temporariness” is not spelled out in law or the Constitution. The material linked here in the Venezuelan context reads as a critique of arbitrary retention of power and a call for a clear legal basis. For Venezuela, this is not an abstract debate: issues of legitimacy, constitutional validity of decisions, and abuse of authority have long been at the center of the country’s political life. That is why the demand to explain exactly which article enshrines the right to “remain” in power is perceived as a defense of the supremacy of the Constitution—and as an accusation that elites are holding onto the helm not on a direct mandate, but through political arrangements or external support.

Another important storyline concerns Cuba and criticism of the report by Marco Rubio. In a piece published on Cubadebate, Venezuela’s and, more broadly, Latin American media space sees not just a dispute over a particular report, but a continuation of the United States’ years-long pressure on countries that do not align with its political line. For Venezuela, this topic is especially sensitive because Cuban and Venezuelan narratives have long run in parallel: both countries live under sanctions pressure and view such actions as part of a broader campaign against the region’s sovereignty. At the same time, the quotation included in the text also reflects another, tougher position: “El pueblo cubano agradece que al menos en un informe se plasme toda la realidad de la mierda que constituye el régimen cubano…”. The phrase shows that even among people who traditionally criticize the United States, there are also those who believe that external criticism of the Cuban regime is fair—even if harsh.

For Venezuela, all these storylines converge on one idea: when the United States talks about security, democracy, or international norms, but acts selectively, it strengthens the belief that global rules are politicized. In one case, it is about nuclear technologies for an ally without strict guarantees; in another, it is about the legitimacy of power and constitutional grounds; in a third, it is about sanctions and reports used as a tool of pressure. In local political culture, such news reinforces both anti-imperialist rhetoric and concern about the militarization of international relations—along with the conviction that major powers make decisions primarily based on their own interests.

That is why in Venezuela these messages are perceived not as scattered external news items, but as elements of a broader picture: the United States formally talks about security and order, but in practice—according to many in the region—creates new risk zones, maintains double standards, and leaves other countries to face the consequences of decisions made by others.

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Jordan Sees New Escalation With Iran as the Most Dangerous Yet

Jordan is watching with alarm the sudden worsening of tensions between Iran and the United States, believing the current round of the conflict is more dangerous than previous flare-ups. Unlike earlier clashes, Tehran, according to Amman, has now targeted strategic sites within the kingdom — the port of Aqaba and an airport — not only American military bases. This fundamentally changes the nature of the threat: Iran appears to view Jordan as a central arena for its retaliatory operations, going beyond the earlier, more limited attacks on U.S. interests.

The turning point came last Friday, when an attack on U.S. forces at one of Jordan’s bases killed three servicemembers. According to U.S. accounts, damage was inflicted at two sites, and Amman called the incident the most serious in a series of Iranian aggressions. Particular concern is the precision and range of the strike: the missiles reached their targets from Iranian territory, making a repeat of such attacks a very realistic scenario.

It is worth noting that Jordan previously reached an agreement with Washington on military cooperation, which allows U.S. troops to be present on its bases under strict limitations. In return, the kingdom gains access to modern weapons, training, and technology to combat terrorism and smuggling. However, what happened is precisely what Amman was trying to avoid: turning the country into a theater of direct hostilities, even if the targets are allies rather than Jordanian citizens.

Within Jordan, the question is growing louder: what prompted Iran to shift from low-intensity attacks to a direct, high-level threat? Judging by the signs, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is seeking to expand the range of targets, demonstrating that its capabilities have not been weakened and persuading Tehran that surrender would be pointless. In addition, an attack on Jordan, while painful, costs the world economy less than strikes on oil fields — something Iran has already done in Gulf states.

At the regional level, Amman has found itself caught between two fires: on one side, Iran’s relentless escalation, which spares no neighbors; on the other, uncertainty and U.S. involvement in the war with no clear end in sight. Iran, according to analysts, is persistently trying to take control of the Strait of Hormuz and restore influence for its proxy forces after setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In this situation, Jordan is placing its hopes in diplomacy: together with the Gulf states, it is trying to renew a memorandum of understanding between the parties, and it is also using Qatari channels to achieve a short-term ceasefire — no more than 10 days.

However, Amman has no illusions about the durability of any possible pause: U.S. and Iranian positions remain hardline, and, in the view of Jordanians, the Netanyahu government is only fanning the flames in an effort to broaden the conflict. Nevertheless, Jordan remains determined to defend its security — as it has already done by downing dozens of rockets — and, together with the Gulf monarchies, to try to prevent a third full-scale war. The main course of action, according to Amman, is a new diplomatic track involving Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as mandatory dialogue between allies after this war to clearly align shared interests.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role do they play in Iran’s military and political structure? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC has its own ground forces, naval forces, air forces, and intelligence services, and it also oversees the ballistic missile program. The organization is deeply integrated into the economy (it controls major construction and energy projects) and politics: many IRGC members hold senior government posts. The IRGC is also responsible for supporting proxy forces abroad (for example, Hezbollah) and suppressing internal protests.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz strategically important for Iran, and how could controlling it affect global oil prices? — About 20–25% of all global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. By controlling one of the straits’ shores, Iran can block or hinder the passage of tankers. Blocking the strait could trigger a sharp spike in oil prices (historical precedents include 1973, 1979, and 2019). Iran often uses the threat of blocking the strait as leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program or sanctions, creating enormous risks for the energy security of importing countries.

• What proxy forces does Iran use in the region, and why might their weakening in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have prompted Tehran to launch direct attacks on targets in Jordan? — Iran relies on a network of allied armed groups: Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), Shiite militias in Iraq (“Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq”), and also Iran-aligned formations in Syria. These forces serve as Iran’s “shield,” allowing it to strike opponents (Israel, the United States) without direct involvement. The weakening of these proxies due to Israeli strikes (in Syria and Lebanon) and the loss of momentum in Iraq reduces their deterrent power. In such circumstances, Tehran may shift to direct attacks (for example, missile strikes on Jordan) to demonstrate strength, compensate for losses in its proxy network, and prevent the further narrowing of its “strategic rear.”

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Full version: Between Tehran’s strikes and U.S. ambiguity.. This is the path Jordan will take

Two doctors die in Barinas: hantavirus ruled out

In the state of Barinas (Venezuela), after the deaths of two doctors who were admitted to hospital with severe symptoms, local authorities carried out an investigation and ruled out an outbreak. The head of regional health services, Jose Rafael Fajardo, explained that the doctors had been in a private clinic for several days before being admitted to intensive care, where they later died. Tests for hantavirus, yellow fever, dengue fever, leptospirosis, and other dangerous infections came back negative. Samples were sent to the capital’s Institute of Scientific Research (IVIC) for more in-depth analysis.

Although a case of hantavirus had been officially confirmed in the neighboring state of Anzoátegui, Fajardo stressed that the virus was not found in the doctors who died in Barinas, despite similar symptoms. He urged residents to remain calm—the main hospital is operating as usual. Authorities have already held a meeting with infectious disease specialists and epidemiologists, and proposed establishing a local laboratory to quickly identify pathogens in the future.

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Full version: Pruebas descartan hantavirus y fiebre amarilla en Barinas tras deceso de dos médicos

U.S. intelligence: Airstrikes on Iran have not achieved results

U.S. intelligence assessments have shown that a new wave of airstrikes on Iranian targets, ongoing for 11 days, has not led to any noticeable changes in Tehran’s behavior. The Atlantic reports this, citing an unnamed U.S. official. Notably, the administration of President Donald Trump has resumed the bombardments without an official declaration of war—neither Trump himself nor other senior officials confirmed a return to full-scale combat. In addition, members of Congress have not received briefings about a new phase of the conflict, underscoring the lack of transparency in decision-making.

In an interview with the outlet, a former U.S. servicemember sharply criticized the administration’s approach. According to him, Trump’s team “decided to break every rule and declared all previous administrations to be idiots for informing the public and allies, and for setting clear objectives.” Now, as the officer notes, the United States has found itself in a “war with no good options and no American or international support,” which he called “a trap set by ourselves.” He expects the administration to continue hostilities, refusing to admit defeat in the hope of a better outcome.

According to The Atlantic, the military says that “hope is not a strategy,” just as is waging a war that officials refuse to call a war. Sources close to Trump acknowledge that the administration has been faced with a choice between continuing the conflict and changing course, even as the decision to resist remains in place despite rising costs. This gap between the anticipated success of the bombardments and reality points to a deep crisis in military planning.

Before Trump, according to people around him, there are two paths. The first is escalation, with the risk of further losses among American service members, dwindling munitions, and a blow to Republicans’ chances in the November midterm elections. The second is an immediate exit from the conflict to minimize political damage—though this would leave Iran in a stronger strategic position than it was decades earlier. Significantly, even the conservative Fox News channel has begun to shift its rhetoric: some hosts have talked about the possibility of ending the war at least to save the party ahead of the election.

Despite all this, two sources close to the president claim that Trump may consider leaving “someday,” but for now he will continue fighting. The main goal for the United States is to raise the cost for Iran of violating shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Tehran is trying to make the American military presence in the region expensive by blocking the passage of ships. In addition, advisers say Trump is starting to recognize the political harm of the war, but he becomes furious when his nuclear deal with Iran is compared to a weaker version of the Obama-era agreement. This tangle of contradictions between the military and nuclear issues fuels escalation, despite criticism and pragmatic assessments.

Comments on the news

• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran’s economy and security? - The Strait of Hormuz is a key route for exporting Iranian oil and gas, through which about 20% of world oil trade passes. For Iran, control of the strait means leverage over global energy prices and the ability to block shipments in the event of a conflict, strengthening its military-strategic position in the region.

• How did the nuclear deal proposed by the Trump administration differ from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? - The 2015 JCPOA was a multilateral agreement that provided for the phased lifting of sanctions in exchange for limiting Iran’s nuclear program under IAEA supervision. Trump’s deal (after the U.S. exited the JCPOA in 2018) was based on unilateral pressure through “maximum sanctions” and required Iran to fully give up uranium enrichment, as well as to include Iran’s ballistic program and regional influence in negotiations—an approach unacceptable to Tehran.

• Which key political factions in Iran shape the approach to negotiations with the United States on the nuclear program? - The main factions are reformists (back a moderate course, support negotiations and the lifting of sanctions for economic development) and conservatives (dominate the parliament and judiciary, insist on independence and reject concessions under pressure). The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei plays a decisive role, balancing between these groups while retaining the final say on the nuclear deal. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also has significant influence, opposing trust in the United States.

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Full version: U.S. assessments cast doubt on the usefulness of ongoing attacks on Iran

Israel Awaits a Signal From Trump Before a Possible Attack on Iran

Israel is preparing for a new U.S. military campaign against Iran, but for now it is not moving into direct hostilities. In Tel Aviv, officials are compiling an updated target list, boosting readiness, and deepening intelligence work with the U.S. Central Command. However, Washington is keeping Israel’s air force out of the strikes, and the key question now is when Israel’s involvement will become necessary for the Americans—or when it will be triggered by an Iranian response.

According to Israeli sources, the temporary window for a possible operation runs from the end of the FIFA World Cup until September. This timing is linked to Donald Trump’s approach: first applying military and economic pressure to push Tehran toward a deal, and if diplomacy fails, moving to expanded combat operations. This is not about a specific date for an Israeli strike, but about the moment when the United States will reassess the target list and the scope of the campaign.

Three scenarios are being considered for Israel’s entry into the conflict: a direct U.S. request for Israel to participate in a broader wave of attacks; an Iranian strike on Israeli territory; or the discovery that Iran is preparing an attack—which would provide justification for a preventive strike. According to a representative of the security services, the army is ready for any of these options, and coordination with U.S. Central Command has reached a one-hundred-percent level.

Meanwhile, the United States is increasing its military presence in the region. Dozens of additional fighter jets have arrived, including an F-16 squadron deployed in Jordan, and F-35 and F-16 squadrons have been reinforced at other bases. The number of tanker aircraft arriving in Israel has reached five to eight per day. U.S. strikes have already reached the outskirts of Tehran and more important targets, changing the previous situation that did not allow Israeli involvement. There is also consideration of hitting power plants and additional nuclear facilities, including an underground complex inside Mount Maqush.

Inside Israel, calls are growing for a new round of bombings, as some in the military believe the previous campaign ended before the target list was exhausted. It includes missile factories, elements of the nuclear program, command posts, and electricity and oil infrastructure. However, the proposal runs into a strategic question: will destroying additional power stations or missile bases lead to the regime’s collapse or a change in its behavior? One senior official was skeptical, saying: “What can we achieve that we haven’t already achieved?”—highlighting that the disagreement is not about operational capability, but about the absence of a political goal that would justify the price.

Despite the fact that Israel has not yet taken part in the bombings, it is deeply involved in intelligence sharing and operational planning. Plans are in place and awaiting Trump’s decision, with roles divided: the U.S. carries out the strikes, while Israel provides knowledge about targets and capabilities. Critics of involvement warn that direct entry could paralyze the economy, tourism, and aviation; deplete Israel’s stockpiles of missile interceptors; and open the door to drones—against which Israel does not have full protection. In addition, it could renew the threat from Hezbollah along the northern border.

Against this diplomatic backdrop, amid military preparations, attempts are being made to secure a 10-day ceasefire that would include a halt to attacks and the opening of corridors in the Strait of Hormuz. According to sources, Trump told the intermediaries that if a ceasefire is not reached within a week, escalation will follow. This means diplomacy is not an alternative to war, but the last delay before it expands. Thus, the most likely conclusion is that Israel will join the campaign when the ceasefire fails, when Washington needs its capabilities to strike strategic targets, or when Iran directly attacks Israeli territory.

Comments on the news

• What is the underground complex in Mount Maqush (possibly referring to the Fordow nuclear facility) and why is it considered a strategic target for strikes? — The reference is to the Fordow nuclear facility, located inside a mountain near the city of Qom. It was built for uranium enrichment and protected by a multi-meter layer of rock, making it practically invulnerable to conventional airstrikes. Its strategic value lies in the fact that it houses modern centrifuges capable of producing highly enriched uranium, as well as command-and-control points for Iran’s nuclear program. Destroying this facility would require special munitions or a ground operation, which is why it is considered one of the most heavily protected targets.
• What role does the Lebanese group Hezbollah play in a potential conflict between Israel and Iran, and what does it threaten on Israel’s northern border? — Hezbollah is Iran’s key proxy ally in southern Lebanon. In the event of a major conflict, it could open a second front against Israel by shelling its northern territories with short- and medium-range rockets (including precision-guided ones), as well as conducting cross-border raids. The threat to Israel’s northern border lies in massed rocket salvos that could overwhelm air-defense systems, and in Hezbollah’s underground tunnels and shelters, which makes neutralizing it more difficult.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz a key element in the Iran–U.S. standoff, and what consequences could blocking it or opening corridors have? — Around 20% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has the ability to temporarily close the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Blocking it would cause a sharp spike in oil prices, a global energy crisis, and likely a military response from the U.S. and its allies. Opening alternative corridors (for example, via Iraqi oil pipelines) would reduce dependence on the strait, but it would require multi-year infrastructure projects and would not eliminate the threat entirely.
• How did the previous U.S. and Israel military campaign against Iran (referred to in the article as the “previous campaign”) end, and how much did it affect Tehran’s nuclear program or military capability? — By the “previous campaign,” this typically refers to a series of cyberattacks (such as the Stuxnet virus in 2010) and sabotage at Iranian nuclear facilities, as well as targeted killings of scientists (in particular Mohsen Fakhrizadeh). These actions led to a temporary disruption of centrifuge operations and a delay in enrichment progress, but they did not stop the nuclear program. Iran restored capacity, expanded it, and strengthened protection at the facilities. Tehran’s military capability (missile program, drones) was affected minimally; instead, it received an impetus to develop asymmetric means of deterrence.

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Full version: إسرائيل تترقب "الذريعة".. وواشنطن تحشد خياراتها العسكرية ضد إيران

Venezuela’s Opposition Calls for Democratic Forces to Join Dialogue With US Support

The leader of Venezuela’s opposition, heading an unrecognized government parliamentary body (elected in 2015), said she plans to convene all democratic sectors of the country to take part in the dialogue. In her statement, Dinora Figuera thanked U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stressing that Washington’s active involvement will be key to moving the process forward and achieving concrete results. The initiative aims to develop a roadmap focused on restoring institutions of power and ensuring a peaceful, democratic transition through elections—something the opposition intends to involve a broad range of political and civil forces in.

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Full version: Dinorah Figuera says all democratic sectors will be called to dialogue

Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan propose a 10-day ceasefire between the US and Iran

A group of mediator countries, including Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan, has put forward a new initiative: to propose a ten-day ceasefire to the United States and Iran. According to the Axios portal, Washington is studying the plan, while its allies, including Israel, are urging it not to close the “diplomatic window.” At the same time, the Trump administration is preparing for a possible breakdown of talks—over the past few days, dozens of fighter jets and aerial refueling aircraft have been deployed to the region.

The initiative comes amid sharp escalation: the United States’ bombing campaign against Iranian targets has now lasted for ten nights. In addition, three American servicemen were killed in Jordan and Iraq. On Monday, President Donald Trump said he ordered the Pentagon to make Iran pay a “double price” for every American killed. Israeli sources report that the army is on the highest state of readiness and is preparing for a possible expansion of the war in the coming days.

The proposal itself consists of two key points. First, a complete cessation of hostilities. Second, a resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which would involve splitting routes: the southern corridor (through Omani waters) must be free from Iranian attacks, while the northern one (in Iranian waters) must be free from an American naval blockade. According to a regional source, the mediators have already conveyed this plan both to Washington and to Tehran.

The initiative builds on consultations held in Muscat on July 11, when the United States demanded that Iran publicly commit to keeping the strait open. No agreement was reached then, and soon afterward attacks on merchant vessels followed, followed in turn by retaliatory airstrikes. As part of a possible longer-term settlement, one option being discussed is that Iran could charge a “reasonable service fee” for ensuring navigation security—similar to the Malacca Strait model. An alternative would be to route these fees into a common fund under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization.

Although preliminary talks began even before the deaths of two American soldiers in Jordan from Iranian strikes, after the incident Washington temporarily stepped away from dialogue. A senior U.S. official confirmed that talks are continuing, but Trump has “not finished” his retaliatory actions and intends to make Iran pay for “terrorist acts in the Strait of Hormuz.” According to regional sources, the White House may continue bombing for several more days before seriously considering the new ceasefire proposal. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, said that the mediators are actively working to prevent further escalation.

Comments on the news

• Why exactly are Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan acting as mediators between the US and Iran? What special interests or historical ties do they have in this conflict?
  Qatar traditionally plays the role of a neutral negotiator thanks to its close ties both with the United States (the largest U.S. military base in the region) and with Iran (a shared gas field and support for Islamist groups). Egypt, as a key U.S. ally in the Arab world, is used as a channel to pass messages through its intelligence services, particularly in the context of stabilizing the Middle East. Pakistan is involved mainly for religious and ideological reasons (Sunni-Shia dialogue) and because of its own nuclear status—allowing it to help on nonproliferation issues and regional balance.

• What is the “Malacca Strait model,” and how could it be applied to the Strait of Hormuz to regulate shipping and collect fees?
  The “Malacca Strait model” is a system for joint shipping management in which coastal states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore), in cooperation with international organizations, ensure security and environmental monitoring, and also collect fees for passage and services (pilotage, navigation systems). Applying it to the Strait of Hormuz would imply creating a similar multilateral mechanism involving Iran, Oman, and neighboring countries, which would make the fees legitimate and reduce the risk of unilateral blockades.

• What has been Oman’s historical role in US-Iran relations, and why did negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz take place specifically in Muscat?
  For decades, Oman has served as a trusted intermediary between the United States and Iran due to its neutrality and flexible foreign policy. In the 1980s, it helped organize security meetings in the Persian Gulf, and in the 2010s it hosted secret negotiations over the nuclear deal. Muscat was chosen for talks on the Strait of Hormuz because of the sultanate’s long-standing ties with both sides, its control over the eastern entrance to the strait (the Strait of Hormuz borders Omani territorial waters), and also because Iran does not show hostility toward the sultanate.

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Full version: أكسيوس: مقترح هدنة لـ10 أيام بين واشنطن وطهران وخياران لإدارة رسوم هرمز

Reactions to Trump’s Hard Line: Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Israel/Gaza

Against the backdrop of heightened international headlines, the media are closely watching how Trump is shaping foreign policy in the logic of confrontation and conspicuous pressure. Controversial signals directed at Iran and possible retaliatory actions, the tough rhetoric around Cuba and Venezuela, and tension in the Israel/Gaza sphere—all of this creates a single overarching theme: fears of escalation and questions about how far Washington is willing to go on issues of security and intervention. At the same time, attention remains focused on diplomatic maneuvers involving allies and rivals—ranging from contacts with and pressure on regional players to fine-tuning positions, where figures such as Netanyahu are especially visible, as well as Cuba’s and Venezuela’s response to American proactiveness. This material is based on posts from Facebook (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees Double Standards in Trump and the United States

Venezuelan UniVista TV presents two international news stories at once through the lens of distrust toward U.S. foreign policy—and especially toward its selectiveness. On the one hand, according to UniVista TV, “rechazó de forma contundente” (firmly rejected) the possibility that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would be arrested during his visit to the United States after the issue was raised by New York City mayor Zohar Mamdani. On the other hand, the Venezuelan audience receives a signal that Washington could expand military operations against Iran, including discussion of an attack on the underground facility known as Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz, as reported by UniVista TV.

In the Venezuelan context, both stories combine into a familiar narrative: the United States presents itself as a defender of international law, but in practice acts selectively—hard toward opponents and soft when it comes to allies. The Netanyahu story is read as an example of how political loyalty in Washington often matters more than universal rules. For a Venezuelan reader, this is an especially sensitive issue, since Caracas has long believed that sanctions, pressure, and diplomatic threats from the United States are not applied equally to everyone, but depend on geopolitical benefit.

The report about a possible expansion of U.S. actions against Iran strengthens this framing. In the Venezuelan view, discussion of striking the heavily protected Pickaxe Mountain facility—potentially involving attacks on entrances, ventilation, and roads—does not look like a narrow military subject, but like another example of a policy of coercive pressure. This approach is associated with interference in the internal affairs of states under the pretext of security, and in this storyline Iran becomes a symbol of a country resisting external pressure.

What remains especially important for Venezuelan audiences is that the talk is not only about war in the conventional sense, but also about a broader set of coercive tools—from sanctions to “preemptive” strikes. This directly echoes Venezuela’s experience of political and economic pressure from the United States, so the news is perceived as a warning that Washington is ready to use the maximum range of means to impose its line.

Thus, in Venezuela’s presentation, both stories—not only about protecting Netanyahu, but also about possible escalation against Iran—become more than just international news. They serve as confirmation of a broader idea: the United States acts as a power that intervenes, punishes its opponents, and shields its allies, while in this context local audiences find talk of democracy and law increasingly less convincing.

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Oil Prices Fall Below $90 as Signs Emerge of Iran–US Talks

On Monday morning, oil quotes lost their initial rise and fell below the $90-per-barrel mark. Brent futures dropped to $87.9, while West Texas Intermediate fell to $81.8, although earlier in the session they had reached their highest levels since June. The reversal was driven by statements from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the possibility of resuming talks with the United States, taking into account Tehran’s interests, which eased concerns about disruptions to supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.

The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East continues: the United States has struck Iran for the ninth night in a row, and Kuwait and Bahrain reported new attacks attributed to Iran. In the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, commercial vessels were targeted, complicating the security of maritime transport. Barclays analyst Amarpit Singh said that in the coming weeks it will become clear what a sustainable level of oil exports from the region looks like, while markets for now are maintaining “extreme optimism” regarding the potential impact on inventories, which at the start of the conflict fell to five-year lows.

In the United States, gasoline prices at filling stations have exceeded the psychological threshold of $4 per gallon. The average retail cost of fuel has risen by more than 30% since late February, when the United States and Israel began a military campaign against Iran. This points to intensifying economic pressure related to energy supplies.

On the currency market, the dollar weakened: the U.S. dollar index fell by 0.1% to 100.69, ending a three-day run of gains. The euro rose to $1.14, the British pound to $1.34, and the yen remained at 162.3. The Australian dollar also strengthened by 0.2%. The decline in demand for risky assets was reflected in the performance of the U.S. currency.

Gold stabilized around $4,018.90 per ounce as investors assessed the Middle East crisis, which pushed oil prices higher. However, an FRS representative said the need for rate hikes to curb inflation can’t be ruled out, which traditionally weighs on precious metals. Analysts note that as long as the war continues, rising oil prices are fueling inflation and putting pressure on gold.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz important for global oil supplies, and why is its stability critical for markets? — The Strait of Hormuz is the planet’s strategic “oil valve.” Roughly 20–25% of all global seaborne oil trade passes through it (about 17–21 million barrels per day). Any blockade—or even heightened military tension—in the strait immediately disrupts supply chains, causing oil prices to jump and triggering panic in global markets, because alternative routes (such as pipelines) have limited capacity.
• Why can Iran’s position in talks with the United States directly affect oil prices (for example, through control of production or transit)? — First, Iran is one of the largest holders of proven oil and gas reserves. Second, it controls the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz and can threaten shipping (mining, attacks on tankers). Third, through its allies (for example, Yemeni Houthis), Iran can indirectly affect transit through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Therefore, the outcome of the talks—tightening sanctions or removing restrictions on Iranian oil exports—is perceived by traders as a signal for price corrections.
• What are the key disagreements between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries (Kuwait, Bahrain) referenced in the context of the attacks? — The main disagreements are tied to territorial disputes (for example, sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tumbs in the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has held since 1971), issues of delimiting offshore shelves for oil and gas production (a dispute around the “Arash” / “Dorra” gas field), and competition for regional influence. In addition, Iran accuses the Gulf monarchies of allowing the United States to use their bases for hostile actions—an argument often cited as a motive or context for attacks on sites in those countries.

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Full version: برميل النفط دون 90 دولارا والدولار يتراجع جراء تصاعد صراع أمريكا وإيران

Declassified CIA documents: Chavezism’s election victory explained by internal factors

Journalist Carlos Montero has released declassified data from the United States Central Intelligence Agency regarding elections in Venezuela. According to the documents that were published, American intelligence finds no evidence of vote-rigging and concludes that the election results in favor of the incumbent were driven not by manipulation, but by deep-seated political and social processes within the country. The information was shared via the social network X and sparked lively debate among both users and experts.

In its report, the CIA points to several factors as decisive: broad popular support for Chavezism, effective social programs, high grassroots mobilization of supporters, and a profound split among opposition forces. In the agency’s view, these elements—not alleged violations—best explain the electoral outcomes. The publication of the documents once again brought attention to Venezuela’s complex internal political dynamics, where the population’s ideological commitment and the government’s social initiatives remain key triggers for voter turnout and voting choices.

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Full version: Documentos desclasificados de la CIA descartan fraude y atribuyen resultados electorales en Venezuela a factores de base

The United States and Iran: the ninth wave of strikes and retaliatory attacks

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the ninth wave of strikes on Iranian targets has been completed, saying they were aimed at new areas. In Washington, officials stressed that the attacks were a response to the deaths of American servicemembers, while leaving the door open for diplomatic solutions. The bombardments targeted military command centers, air-defense systems, coastal radar, missile and drone launch sites, as well as communications networks—all aimed at reducing Iran’s ability to attack ships and sailors in the Strait of Hormuz.

In Iran itself, casualties and explosions were reported in several southern provinces. State television and agencies said that after CENTCOM announced the end of the wave, strikes resumed. In East Azerbaijan province, one person was killed in an attack on a military site near Tabriz, and several others were injured. West Azerbaijan also reported injuries from shelling in the vicinity of Urmia. Explosions were heard in Isfahan, and in Bushehr province, areas near the nuclear power plant were affected. According to the Tasnim news agency, after a strike on the city of Khorramuj, there were electricity disruptions.

Iran did not retaliate lightly: its armed forces attacked Kuwait and Bahrain. Kuwait’s army said it repelled an attack by Iranian drones, and Bahrain television reported that several air targets were intercepted by air-defense systems—alarms sounded in cities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that its drones destroyed an American early-warning radar at the Ali as-Salem base in Kuwait, and also struck US Army aircraft at the Aqaba airport in Jordan, damaging them. The Wall Street Journal, citing a US official, confirmed damage to Black Hawk helicopters in Jordan. In addition, the Iraqi opposition party “Kurdistan Workers’ Society” reported a rocket attack on its offices in Erbil.

In comments on the ninth wave, President Donald Trump said the strikes were a response to the deaths of American troops in the region. He noted that Iran had been “almost completely stripped of military capabilities”: they only have a few missiles and drones, along with limited production capacity. At the same time, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he was ready for “genuine diplomacy,” but stressed that Tehran must first ensure the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. According to him, instead of issuing a statement about freedom of navigation, Iran attacks ships. Rubio added that the United States will protect global maritime trade, but other countries must increase financial and material support.

In the Strait of Hormuz itself, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded — allegedly while trying to pass through an “unsafe southern route” following advice from American forces. No details about the vessels or crews were provided, but Iranian officials warned that the strait would remain unsafe as long as “American aggression” continues—even for transporting oil and gas. British maritime authorities said an unknown munition hit another vessel near Oman, but the crew abandoned it unharmed. Iranian television reported missile launches against ships off the coast of the UAE, while Reuters noted that ship traffic fell over the weekend amid the escalation.

The conflict coincided with discussions in Israel about the possibility of joining the wave of attacks. One Israeli political source said that, from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s perspective, such a step might not be negative, but it carries serious political risks: weeks of shelling the rear, casualties, and chaos ahead of elections. According to reviews, the standoff between Washington and Tehran has already entered a second week—after on July 8 Trump announced the end of a ceasefire regime recorded in the memorandum of June 18. The escalation began after Iran attacked three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, and the sides still cannot agree on their demands: Iran insists on a mechanism for regulating the passage of ships, while the United States insists on unconditional freedom of navigation.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and economic life? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation subordinate to the supreme leader. It controls a significant share of the economy through foundations and subsidiary companies, participates in suppressing domestic opposition, and also influences regional conflicts (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq). The IRGC plays a key role as an instrument of Iran’s foreign and domestic policy.
• Why is the nuclear power plant in Bushehr an important target, and what risks do strikes near it create? — The Bushehr nuclear power plant is the only operating Iranian nuclear power station, built with assistance from Russia. It is important for the country’s power supply and serves as a symbol of Iran’s nuclear program. Strikes near the facility carry the risk of damaging the reactor, causing radiation leaks, and triggering an environmental catastrophe, and could also spur large-scale escalation of the regional conflict.
• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for global oil trade, and why does Iran use it as a pressure tool? — About 20% of global oil trade (roughly 17 million barrels per day) passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, controlling the coastline of the strait, periodically threatens to block it to pressure the international community, which could cause a sharp rise in oil prices and a global economic crisis.
• What is the Iraqi opposition party “Kurdistan Workers’ Society,” and why were its offices in Erbil shelled? — “Kurdistan Workers’ Society” (Komal) is a Kurdish political party in Iraqi Kurdistan that advocates for Kurdish rights and criticizes Iranian influence. The shelling of its offices in Erbil is allegedly linked to the activities of pro-Iranian militia groups dissatisfied with the party’s anti-Iran stance, as well as with internal Kurdish disagreements.

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Full version: America expands its attacks on Iran and says it is open to a solution, while Tehran strikes Kuwait and Bahrain

Iran and the US exchanged blows: new attacks in the region

Sunday marked another flare-up in the military standoff: Iran’s armed forces said they carried out drone strikes on American military facilities in Kuwait. In response, Bahrain and Kuwait said their air defence systems intercepted Iranian aerial attacks, and explosions were heard in a number of cities. The actions formed part of an escalation that began after a series of mutual accusations and strikes.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it shot down a US intelligence-and-strike drone, the MQ-9, over the city of Ahvaz in the south-west of Iran. At the same time, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that, on the order of President Donald Trump, a new wave of airstrikes had been carried out against targets inside Iran. In Washington, the strikes were explained as a direct response to the deaths of American servicemen in Jordan, which are attributed to Iran-aligned groups.

According to CENTCOM, the raids began at 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time and targeted infrastructure used to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian news agencies reported explosions near the city of Sirik in Hormozgan province, as well as in the cities of Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, and on the island of Qeshm. Iranian officials said there were no casualties or serious damage, although they added that some areas had received missile hits.

Politically, President Trump called the deaths of American servicemen in Jordan “a very sad event” and stressed that the main goal of the conflict was to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. In Tehran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reacted to the US-Iran memorandum signed by Trump, saying it had “lost all value” due to breaches of obligations by the United States. Khamenei also warned that any continued US military operations would be met with a decisive response from the “resistance front”.

The US State Department urged all American citizens around the world to exercise heightened vigilance amid rising tensions. In a statement, the agency said there was a risk of attacks on US interests or facilities associated with the United States by groups that support Iran. Particular attention was directed to the Persian Gulf states, where direct clashes have already occurred.

The international community responded with a joint statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the European Union. The document condemns Iranian attacks on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz and on the territory of neighbouring states. It emphasizes that freedom of navigation is guaranteed by international law, and rejects any Iranian claims to sovereignty over the strait or the charging of passage fees. The coalition calls for an immediate cessation of attacks and keeping the strait open without any conditions.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and how is it different from Iran’s regular army? – The IRGC (or “Sepah”) is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for external border defence, the IRGC focuses on maintaining the internal regime, controls Iran’s missile programme, participates in the economy, and influences politics. The IRGC also has its own land, naval, and air forces, as well as the Quds Force for operations abroad.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and what risks are linked to its blockade? – Around 20–25% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz (about 17–20 million barrels per day), making it a key “chokepoint” in global energy supplies. Blockading the strait (for example, by Iran in response to sanctions) can trigger a sharp surge in oil prices, fuel shortages, a chain reaction in the global economy, and even a military conflict involving the United States and its allies.
• What does the term “resistance front,” used by Ayatollah Khamenei in his warning, mean? – The “resistance front” (or “axis of resistance”) is a term adopted in Iran to refer to a coalition of Iran-aligned armed groups and states that oppose Israel and US influence in the Middle East. It includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, various Iraqi and Syrian militias, and the Iranian government itself. Khamenei uses this concept to underscore the unity of these forces and their readiness to take retaliatory action.

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Full version: إيران تستهدف الكويت والبحرين وأمريكا ترد على مقتل جنودها بالأردن

Delcy Rodríguez Calls for a New Ethics of Unity to Rebuild Venezuela

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez made a public call for the creation of a new civic ethic grounded in love, mutual understanding, and a willingness to help those in need—she said this principle is key to overcoming the current challenges and restoring the country. The statement was delivered during a formal awards ceremony honoring rescue teams and the country’s canine units that were recognized for their work in eliminating the aftermath of an emergency in the state of La Guaira. In her speech, the head of state emphasized that solidarity and unity will serve as a reliable foundation for reshaping the nation’s sense of unity, and urged citizens to leave pain and resentment behind so that, together, they can build a fraternal and prosperous future.

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Full version: Presidenta Delcy Rodríguez convoca a una nueva ética y al despliegue histórico para la reconstrucción nacional

Breakdown of the memorandum: Why the US and Iran are once again on the brink of war?

Military confrontation between the United States and Iran has sharply escalated despite the signing, on June 18, of a memorandum of understanding between the parties. An investigation by Al Jazeera showed that the main reason behind the collapse of the “truce” was disagreements over how to interpret its provisions, as well as rapidly unfolding events in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. Political contacts continued, but they failed to prevent a slide toward the most dangerous scenario since the beginning of mediation efforts.

There emerged directly opposite accounts of what triggered the escalation. Former Pakistan Foreign Ministry press secretary Muhammad Abdul Basit believes the point of no return was Iran’s attack on Saudi and Qatari oil tankers. Former commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Kanaani Moghadam, by contrast, claims that the IRGC controls the strait based on the powers set out in the memorandum. In turn, a spokesperson for the US Central Command, Timothy Hawkins, accused Iran of “unprovoked” attacks on seven merchant vessels, in which there are dead, injured, and missing.

On July 6, near the coast of Oman, south of the Strait of Hormuz, a series of attacks took place on three vessels: a Qatari liquefied natural gas tanker, a Saudi oil tanker, and a ship flying a Liberian flag. Despite emergency communications channels provided for in the memorandum, Iran opted to escalate. In response, the United States carried out strikes on Iranian coastal defense facilities, rocket and drone storage, as well as naval capabilities. The IRGC retaliated with attacks on Persian Gulf states, including Oman, which had served as a mediator.

A diplomatic scandal erupted in Oman. Kanaani Moghadam said the IRGC has “evidence” that American aircraft and missiles were launched from bases located on the territory of the Sultanate. US Central Command categorically denied this, assuring that the Iranian attacks on Gulf countries “did not affect” the operational capabilities of American forces. Notably, on July 11, talks were held in Muscat to establish rules for navigation through the strait, but a few hours later the IRGC struck Oman’s Musandam province—right at the place of the talks.

A sticking point was the memorandum’s fifth article. Tehran interprets it as granting Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington insists that it requires Iran to stop threats to international shipping. Kanaani Moghadam said Iran provided a “safe corridor” for vessels to pass through the strait, and that those who chose the southern route along Oman’s coasts faced danger due to mines. In response, Hawkins emphasized that shipping continues as normal and commercial vessels cross the strait freely.

Pakistan’s mediation efforts did not stop. Abdul Basit said the chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, Asim Munir, had been in contact with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the speaker of parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The diplomat expressed confidence that a temporary ceasefire could be reached in the coming days. However, the situation remains extremely volatile.

The memorandum has effectively lost its meaning. Kanaani Moghadam called it “dead,” because three key Iranian conditions have not been met: control over Hormuz, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a ceasefire in Lebanon and other regions. Abdul Basit warned that the collapse of the agreement would plunge the region into “free fall,” the consequences of which would be hard for any side to withstand. In recent days, the US has intensified strikes on Iranian territory, and Tehran has responded with attacks on ships, facilities, and bases it considers to be American, in different countries of the region. On July 8, President Donald Trump announced a “termination of the interim agreement” after Iran hit three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict has already led to the deaths of at least two US service members in Jordan.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and economic system, and why do its actions often shape the country’s foreign policy? — The IRGC is not just a military force but a key political and economic player: it controls major sectors of the economy (energy, construction, telecommunications) through a network of foundations and companies under its control, which gives it autonomy from the government. Its influence on foreign policy is due to direct subordination to the Supreme Leader, as well as involvement in proxy forces abroad (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Syria and Yemen), making it the main tool for implementing Iran’s regional strategy.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the world’s most strategically important transport arteries, and how does Iran use its geographic position to exert pressure? — About 20% of global maritime trade in oil and gas passes through the strait, making it a critical hub for global energy supply. By controlling the north coast of the strait, Iran periodically threatens to block it or conducts military drills to pressure the international community, especially under sanctions or during negotiations over the nuclear program.
• Which specific Iranian assets were frozen, in which countries they are located, and how does this relate to the sanctions regime against Iran? — The assets in question amount to several billion dollars frozen in South Korea (about $6 billion, from proceeds of oil sales), Iraq (funds in accounts for gas and electricity deliveries), Luxembourg, and other European countries. These assets were frozen under unilateral US sanctions (for example, after the withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018) and serve as leverage in negotiations, while their release often becomes a condition for humanitarian deals or partial easing of sanctions.
• What regional conflicts (for example in Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen) are implied by “ceasefire,” which Iran calls one of the memorandum’s conditions, and how is Tehran involved in these conflicts? — The reference is to ongoing or frozen conflicts in which Iran supports allied forces: in Lebanon—through Hezbollah (an armed group and a political party participating in clashes with Israel); in Syria—through support for the Assad government (the IRGC and militias); in Yemen—through assistance to the Ansar Allah movement (Houthis) in a war against the Saudi-led coalition. Tehran uses these proxy forces to expand its influence, and ceasefire talks in these areas are discussed in the context of broader regional understandings, where Iran demands recognition of its role and reduced pressure.

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Full version: من التفاهم إلى المواجهة.. كيف انهارت الهدنة واشتعلت أزمة هرمز من جديد؟

Distrust of Trump and Criticism of U.S. Pressure

The world is reacting to Washington’s moves with increasing nervousness: headlines are increasingly filled with doubts about the reliability of U.S. promises, accusations of political favoritism, and hints that American influence does not work as a guarantee of security, but rather as a tool of pressure. Against this backdrop, some players openly resist the logic of sanctions and military signaling, while others build their own political positions—while distancing themselves from U.S. rhetoric and trying to preserve room to maneuver. A separate focus of discussion is how Donald Trump’s name continues to affect even less obvious areas, including public events and international communications—turning foreign policy into an occasion for competing narratives. This review is based on materials from www.instagram.com (Venezuela) and theelnews.org (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees war and elections as threats of interference

In Venezuela’s information space, two storylines at once—the war between Russia and Ukraine, and the dispute over power within Venezuela itself—are interpreted through the same lens: fear of external interference, the technological advantage of stronger players, and a long crisis from which it is difficult to emerge without major losses.

In one of the emotional messages, published on Instagram, there is anxiety that China may be helping Russia not only politically, but also practically: the author suggests that Beijing can “transfer artillery” and even provide satellites for targeting strikes. In the author’s interpretation, this threatens to turn the conflict into “Ukraine vs Rusia”—a protracted war involving major external players, where a local dispute grows into a wider confrontation between states. The text offers no confirmation of these claims, but the reaction itself is telling: in Venezuela, an international war is often perceived not as distant news, but as a warning about how superpowers draw the world into escalation.

This reaction fits well with local political sensibilities. In a country where the topic of external pressure has long become part of everyday political language, any hint of China, Russia, or other major powers becoming involved triggers suspicion. The Venezuelan view of geopolitics is often built on assumptions, analogies, and comparisons with wars already known, so the Ukrainian scenario is seen as an example of how a conflict can get out of control and become prolonged, destructive, and global.

A similar logic can be seen in another Venezuelan comment published here. Formally, it is linked to Donald Trump’s statements and the figure of Delcy Rodríguez, but in essence it is another text about an internal Venezuelan struggle for legitimacy. The author writes from a sharply critical position toward the country’s leadership—especially Delcy Rodríguez and Nicolás Maduro—and uses the U.S. agenda as a pretext to once again raise the topic of alleged fraud, control over institutions, and undermined democracy.

In this material, the claim is repeated that the voting system was allegedly used for “amañar comicios,” and that power was maintained through “control institucional.” At the same time, the author separately notes that Trump “no expulsó a Delcy Rodríguez ni la puso en la calle”—that is, the author distinguishes between loud statements and real diplomatic consequences. For a Venezuelan audience, this is an important detail: behind the external rhetoric, they look for validation of internal accusations, not merely another signal from the United States.

Among local figures mentioned is Ing. Rubén Morales, president of Frente Anticorrupción del estado Lara (Favenp). His stance is presented as institutional and legal, and anti-Chavista: he talks about complaints to the CNE, the need for transparency and accountability. In the context of Venezuela, this sounds like an attempt to rely on formal mechanisms where critics believe the institutions themselves have been undermined. The text also features former military figure “El Pollo Carvajal” as a source of accusations about technological fraud, which reinforces the narrative that “evidence” supposedly comes from within the system.

The overall political meaning of both messages is similar. In the international storyline, Venezuela sees the risk of war expanding through technological and logistical support from China. In the internal storyline, it is the continuation of the debate over whether the elections were fair and how deeply power controls state institutions. In both cases, distrust of official versions and the sense that smaller and medium-sized countries become hostages to decisions made by stronger actors are clearly present.

At the same time, neither of these texts can be called neutral reports. They are emotional, evaluative responses, where political meaning and anxiety matter more than verified facts. That is why they are interesting as a reflection of the Venezuelan view of the world: through fear of a new big war, through constant suspicion toward external forces, and through the belief that the dispute over elections and the dispute over global security are, in fact, part of the same crisis of trust.

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Seventh Night of Strikes: Iran Warns of a Regional War

The United States continues air strikes on Iran for the seventh night in a row. Tehran says the attacks are aimed at civilian infrastructure in the southern and central parts of the country. In response, Iran is broadening its threats—from blocking the Strait of Hormuz to striking vital facilities in neighboring states. U.S. President Donald Trump has promised large-scale ground and air operations, and Iranian military officials have said they are moving to a “phase of total offensive,” heightening fears that the conflict could escalate into a full-scale regional war.

According to the outlet Axios, citing U.S. and Israeli officials, the Trump administration has notified Israel about sending dozens of additional refueling aircraft in the event that operations against Iran expand. It is reported that Trump is considering a large-scale attack that would surpass the current strikes in both scope and intensity. New military plans were presented to him at a meeting at the operations center on Tuesday. Israeli sources add that fuel supplies will increase in the coming days to the level seen at the start of the war.

For the first time in a week, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) included “military logistics infrastructure” among its target list. In a statement on Saturday, it said that during the seventh night of attacks, surveillance posts, military facilities, underground weapon storage sites, and Iranian naval forces were hit. Fighter jets, drones, and ships were used. In response, the military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mohsen Rezaei, warned that if the bombings continue for another two or three days, Iran will move to an “all-encompassing and devastating offensive.”

Iran accuses U.S. forces of hitting civilian infrastructure, including an airport, bridges, a port, and a railway station. General Rezaei said that the “response will not be symmetrical” and that there will be “no political constraints ensuring the safety of forces opposing Iranian attacks.” Another military representative, Majid Mousavi, emphasized that Tehran will not stop its strikes on the region until the U.S. halts the bombing of Iran’s southern coast and the Strait of Hormuz. An official from Iran’s army warned: “If Americans attack the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic, all infrastructure in the region will become a lawful target for Iran.”

Alongside these statements, Iran carried out major strikes on a power plant and a desalination facility in Kuwait, causing a fire and destruction. This is the second attack on Kuwaiti sites within two days. In Bahrain, air-defense forces intercepted and destroyed several Iranian air targets. Jordan reported that at dawn on Saturday, its air defenses repelled an attack by ten Iranian rockets that had violated the kingdom’s airspace. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the sinking of two oil tankers and a fire aboard them while attempting to pass through a “minefield south of the Strait of Hormuz,” but CENTCOM called the claim “false.”

In the assessment of military analyst Colonel Nidal Abu Zaid, the U.S. has focused on “strikes on mobility”—hitting bridges, roads, and railway lines connecting Bandar Abbas with Isfahan, Shiraz, and Kerman. The goal is to paralyze the movement of reinforcements and supplies to Iran’s western coast. The analyst notes that the aircraft carriers USS Lincoln and USS George H. W. Bush have divided roles: the former for fire support with precision-guided missiles, the latter for a maritime blockade; drones and unmanned surface vessels are also being used. The U.S. has created two operational lines cutting Iran off from resupply from deep within its territory. At the same time, the analyst says, Iran continues to operate under the old playbook, attacking the same targets with missiles and drones, which could disrupt the operational balance.

The current escalation goes far beyond an exchange of strikes between the United States and Iran—it is pulling neighboring states in and creating a threat of a full-scale regional war. Mutual threats and military preparations indicate that neither side is prepared to back down. At the same time, according to experts, the tactical advantage the U.S. gains in blocking Iran’s supply routes could lead to a shift in the balance of power, unless Iran moves to new, more unexpected forms of retaliation.

Comments on the news

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and how could its blockade affect world markets? - The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between Oman and Iran through which about 20–25% of the world’s oil flows (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day). That makes it the planet’s main “energy valve.” Even a temporary blockade would trigger a sharp jump in oil prices (up to 50–100% in a short period), paralyze the economies of importing countries (especially in Asia—Japan, China, India), and spark a global recession comparable to the 1973 oil crisis.

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and military structure? - The IRGC is an elite military-political force created after the 1979 revolution to defend the Islamic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls the missile program, nuclear development, and intelligence services (including “Quds,” the unit for overseas operations), and it also has enormous economic influence by running construction, energy, and telecommunications projects. In practice, the IRGC is a “state within a state,” reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, and it plays a key role in military and foreign-policy decision-making.

• Who is Iran’s Supreme Leader, and what influence does he have on decision-making in wartime? - The Supreme Leader (Rahbar) is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He holds the highest authority in the country: he appoints the head of the judiciary, the commanders of the IRGC and the army, controls key media outlets, and sets foreign policy. In wartime, his word is decisive—he can declare general mobilization, authorize the use of missiles or a nuclear program, and also veto decisions by the president and parliament. Khamenei is also a religious authority, legitimizing any military action through religious edicts (fatwas).

• Why have neighboring countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan) been drawn into the conflict, and what are their relations with Iran? - These countries are drawn into the conflict due to geographic proximity, the presence of U.S. military bases, fears of Iranian influence, and regional tensions. Kuwait and Bahrain are Persian Gulf monarchies with a large Shiite minority (up to 70% in Bahrain), which, the ruling Sunni dynasties fear, could be lobbied for by Iran. Jordan, which borders Iraq and Syria, fears pro-Iranian militias along its borders. Relations with Iran are hostile: all three countries accuse Tehran of trying to export the revolution, supporting Shiite groups, and destabilizing the region. However, they have not entered direct combat with Iran; rather, they participate in a coalition aimed at containing its influence.

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Full version: Will Washington and Tehran roll toward all-out war?

Expert refuted allegations of election rigging in Venezuela

Senior analyst on threats for Latin America Jeff Ramsey said that a CIA report on possible vote manipulation in Venezuela is not conclusive and does not confirm large-scale electronic fraud. According to him, although U.S. intelligence flagged “serious concerns,” the same data suggests that other factors better explain the voting results. Ramsey stressed that the document does not prove that the falsification attempt was successful, thereby refuting widespread suspicions.

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Full version: Analista de inteligencia de amenzas para América Latina desmintió posibilidad de fraude electoral en Venezuela

The Seventh Night of US Strikes on Iran: Casualties, Damage and Retaliatory Attacks

The United States continues its seventh day of strikes on Iran. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said that a nighttime wave of attacks hit military sites including observation posts, underground weapons depots, military infrastructure and naval forces. At the same time, the Pentagon reported that the number of injured U.S. service members since the conflict began on Monday has risen to 13.

According to Iranian television, three people were killed in Hormozgan Province and eight others were injured. Explosions were reported in the southern provinces of Fars and Bushehr, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had destroyed a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in the sky over Bushehr. In Yazd Province, strikes were carried out in remote areas outside cities; there were no casualties.

Civilian infrastructure was hit particularly severely. In the port city of Jask, an airstrike disabled a desalination plant, leaving 20 villages with a population of 10,000 people without water. Bridges and roads were also damaged, including the highway connecting Bandar Abbas and Rodan. Iran’s Ministry of Education canceled graduation exams on Sunday and Monday in four provinces: Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan.

New attacks struck neighboring Kuwait as well. Kuwait’s army said that “Iranian aggression” hit military bases and civilian sites. As a result of a strike, an electric power plant and a water desalination facility caught fire; several power units were shut down for safety reasons, and an emergency plan was put into effect. Due to the temporary suspension of takeoffs and landings at Kuwait’s international airport, most flights of the national carrier were rescheduled.

Other countries in the region also took measures. Saudi Civil Defence issued two warnings for the cities of Al Khardj and Yanbu, but the danger later passed. Bahrain’s defense forces said that air-defense systems intercepted and destroyed Iranian air attacks. Jordanian forces reported that at night they intercepted ten Iranian rockets that entered the airspace of the kingdom. Previously, U.S. service members were affected during attacks on Jordan, after which Washington recommended avoiding sites associated with the United States.

Iran explained its retaliatory strikes by the lack of an international response to “American aggression.” The IRGC said that the United States is committing war crimes by bombing hospitals, bridges, ports and communications centers. At the same time, Tehran stressed that it deliberately limited its strikes to military targets to give Washington a chance to change course. Meanwhile, Iranian television reported an explosion involving two oil tankers south of the Strait of Hormuz, allegedly caused by mines, but CENTCOM categorically denied the information, calling it false. In addition, there were mutual accusations over strikes on bridges and infrastructure, along with threats of economic consequences if the conflict continues.

Comments on the news

• What is the significance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global economy, and why could blocking it have worldwide consequences? - Around 20–25% of all global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz (about 17–21 million barrels per day). If Iran blocks it (for example, in response to sanctions or a conflict), it would immediately trigger a sharp spike in energy prices, set off a global economic crisis, and could destabilize energy security for countries in Asia, Europe and the United States—forcing them to use strategic reserves.
• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military system? - The IRGC is an elite ideological military formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader (rahbar). Unlike the regular army, the IRGC is responsible for protecting the Islamic Revolution, suppressing internal protests, controlling the missile program and the “Quds Force” (a special unit for operations abroad). The IRGC also has extensive economic interests (oil, construction, telecommunications) and plays a key role in political decision-making.
• Why are Hormozgan Province and the port of Jask strategically important for Iran? - The port of Jask (on the coast of the Persian Gulf) is an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz: through it, Iran can export oil and receive imports bypassing a possible blockade of the strait. Developing the port and infrastructure in Hormozgan allows Tehran to diversify supply routes, while also increasing military flexibility (deploying missile systems and IRGC naval forces near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait).
• Which ethnic and religious groups live in the provinces where exams have been canceled (Sistan-Baluchestan, Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr), and how might that affect the internal situation in Iran? - In Sistan-Baluchestan, Sunni Baloch predominate (with strong separatist movements); in Khuzestan, Arab Shiites are predominant (there are also Arab nationalist sentiments); in Hormozgan and Bushehr, the population is mixed (Persians, Arabs, Afro-Iranians), with Shiism predominating. These regions have historically been marginalized (low levels of development, discrimination), which periodically leads to protests (especially amid environmental problems and a water crisis). Canceling exams due to weather could become an additional factor in social tension.

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Full version: Iran announces water shutdown for 20 villages after a US raid and attacks on a power plant in Kuwait

Escalation With Iran: Alarm After U.S. Actions and International Reaction

The world is watching a new phase of tension around Iran: the focus is on the expansion of strikes by the United States, growing fears that the conflict could broaden into a wider war, and efforts by various players to keep events within a diplomatic script. Against this backdrop, the idea is becoming increasingly clear that consequences could quickly spill beyond the region, affecting security, the economy, and political balances all at once across several countries. Some voices are betting on dialogue and negotiation channels, others on deterrence and a harsh assessment of what is happening—but the overall tone remains wary and alarming. This piece was prepared based on data from www.youtube.com (Venezuela).

Caracas Reads the U.S. Escalation Through a Multipolar World Lens

Venezuela’s reaction to the new U.S. geopolitics is presented not as a neutral briefing, but as a view of yet another round of tensions among Washington, China, Iran, and Russia through the lens of a world in which the United States again looks like a source of instability. For a Venezuelan audience, this storyline is especially sensitive: for years, the country has lived under sanctions pressure, amid diplomatic confrontation and a steady stream of rhetoric about a “threat” allegedly coming from the United States. That is why reports about a tough response from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are perceived not just as foreign-policy news, but as part of a broader anti-hegemony narrative familiar to Venezuela’s political and media context, notes source.

The key local perspective is built around the idea of resisting U.S. pressure. The material emphasizes that China rejects Trump’s accusations as “having no basis whatsoever,” the Kremlin also denies meddling in elections, and Iran responds not only with military strikes, but also with a threat to the energy market through the Strait of Hormuz. For Venezuela, this is particularly important because energy security, oil prices, and global instability are directly linked to its economic interests. Any escalation in the Persian Gulf could affect oil quotes—and therefore the budgets of exporter countries, to which Venezuela itself belongs.

In this context, such storylines are often used to reinforce the domestic political narrative: if the United States interferes everywhere, then sanctions against Caracas can be framed as part of the same logic of pressure on “non-compliant” states. Even without direct quotes from Venezuelan politicians, the way the material is presented aligns with the country’s familiar interpretation of international crises: the world is becoming multipolar, the United States is losing control, and states such as China, Russia, and Iran become natural counterweights.

Economic factors also carry special weight—at least for Venezuela—because they are perceived not abstractly, but practically. Rising prices for energy commodities may benefit an oil economy, but at the same time it increases global turbulence and risks for trade, finance, and imports. A Venezuelan viewer typically reads such news through the experience of their own vulnerability: any external conflicts may either bring short-term gains or worsen already unstable domestic conditions.

Thus, this is not simply a factual report about statements from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. It is a reaction in which international tension is shown as confirmation that the era of U.S. unipolar dominance is in question. Unlike a dry report, the emphasis here is on bloc confrontation, on the symbolic power of responses from “disobedient” powers, and on how this could affect the global economy—meaning, too, countries like Venezuela.

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Trump risks getting pulled into an “endless war” with Iran

Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s election promises to end overseas conflicts, his administration is becoming increasingly entangled in confrontation with Iran. Analysts warn that the current escalation could turn into a seemingly endless “forever war” — a protracted conflict without a clear political strategy from Washington. After a temporary ceasefire agreement fell apart, hostilities resumed with renewed force, and the lack of a diplomatic exit only heightens the risks.

According to The New York Times, a U.S. military operation failed to achieve its stated goals — toppling the Iranian regime and eliminating its nuclear program. As Ali Vaez, director of the Iranian project at International Crisis Group, noted, both sides viewed the earlier memorandum not as a bridge to peace, but as “a continuation of the war by other means.” He warned that without a durable settlement, the conflict could become permanent.

Experts point to a recurring mistake by U.S. administrations — the illusion of a “short war.” Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London says great powers often overestimate what military force can do to produce fast political results. But they ignore its limits when the adversary is prepared for a long-term standoff. As Freedman puts it, Trump sets goals achievable only through a prolonged campaign and, at the same time, rules out a ground invasion, relying exclusively on air power and the navy — a setup that reduces the chances of a decisive victory.

Newsweek notes that a drawn-out war may play into the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The conflict strengthens the political clout of this military structure, allows for justifying tight internal control, and positions the IRGC as the state’s main protector. In addition, Iran has non-military levers of pressure, the key one being the threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which could destabilize global energy markets.

Most analysts agree that even massive airstrikes will not be enough to carry out Washington’s maximalist objectives. They may weaken infrastructure, but they cannot destroy the missile capability and, even more so, topple the regime. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London notes, Tehran proceeds from the assumption that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals at an acceptable cost, and that Iran itself is ready to endure longer than America — to tolerate rising oil prices, military losses, and internal pressure.

The central node of the crisis remains the Strait of Hormuz. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution believes that the era of fully free navigation there has ended, and the region will require a more substantial American presence. Vali Nasr of Johns Hopkins University adds that the balance of patience is tilting in Iran’s favor, since the stakes for the United States are less critical. The most likely outcome appears to be a “forever war” — or, at best, a compromise deal in which Trump would call it a victory if Iran agrees not to create nuclear weapons, while Iran can present the U.S. withdrawal as the result of its own steadfastness.

Comments on the news

• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and why does it play a key role in the country’s political life? — The IRGC is an ideological formation directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader, not to the Ministry of Defense. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for defending the borders, the IRGC oversees the missile program, nuclear developments, special operations abroad (via the “Quds” force), controls strategic sectors of the economy, and participates in suppressing domestic protests. Its key political role is explained by the fact that senior IRGC commanders often hold posts in the government, parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, ensuring regime loyalty.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for global energy, and how can Iran threaten shipping there? — About 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the strait (roughly 17–20 million barrels per day), making it the main node of energy security. Iran can threaten shipping by: mining the waters, using fast rocket-equipped patrol boats, shore-based anti-ship batteries, submarines, and drones. An asymmetric tactic is also possible — seizing tankers, as already happened in 2019, or a temporary blockade through the threat of shelling.

• What other non-military pressure tools (for example, via proxy groups in the region) can Iran use to counter the United States besides threats to shipping? — Iran relies on a network of allied armed groups: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq (including Kataib Hezbollah), and Palestinian groups in Gaza. These “proxies” can attack U.S. bases, Israeli targets, or Saudi infrastructure. In addition, Iran uses cyberattacks on energy facilities and financial systems, applies diplomatic pressure through international organizations (IAEA, the UN), and employs economic levers — for example, manipulating oil prices through OPEC or creating shadow schemes to bypass sanctions.

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Full version: هل يورط ترمب أمريكا في "حرب أبدية" مع إيران؟

Venezuela increases oil output and negotiates with the United States

Venezuela’s President Delcy Rodríguez said that the country’s economy has begun to show the first concrete signs of recovery. In an interview, she noted that oil production has again reached 1.2 million barrels per day, while exports exceed 900,000 barrels daily. By the end of 2026, even before new energy agreements are implemented, the government expects to reach a level of around 1.4 million barrels per day. Talks are currently under way on 30 contracts with international companies that will bring investment into the country and strengthen its oil industry under the new Hydrocarbons Law.

At the same time, Caracas has intensified diplomatic contacts with Washington. Rodríguez confirmed that she supports ongoing and respectful communication with U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Venezuela is seeking a return to the international financial system, the restoration of the correspondent banking network, and the normalization of economic relations. The president stressed that easing the sanctions regime has already helped partially restore oil activity and open up new opportunities for foreign investors—fueling optimism about the year ahead.

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Full version: Presidenta Rodríguez assured that economic growth is already showing concrete signs

Iran at a Crossroads: Diplomacy or Military Power in the Dispute Over the Strait?

In Iran, internal disagreements are intensifying over a recently signed memorandum of understanding with the United States and the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute is unfolding amid the continued military escalation between Tehran and Washington. Inside the country, two camps have clearly taken shape: one is betting on diplomacy and locking in the understandings, while the other adheres to hardline military approaches. As analyst Abdel Kader Faez notes, the growing role of the military in political processes is causing serious concern within Iran’s political and strategic elite.

According to Faez, the essence of the dispute is not Iran’s right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but what strategic objective it serves. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) insists that the strait remain a “security zone under absolute military control.” This is why the statement by the senior leader’s military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, has been cited: he called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” to improve Iran’s negotiating position on other issues, including the nuclear program and relations with neighboring countries. The political camp, by contrast, argues for “flexible” sovereignty that would be recognized at the local, regional, and international levels and would allow the strait to be used as an economic artery in the postwar period.

There is also an obvious split over the memorandum itself. The conservative camp, represented by the director of the seminaries, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, is demanding an immediate withdrawal from the agreement. On the other hand, former senior officials such as Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad Javad Zarif defend the memorandum as the “only diplomatic way out.” Faez believes the involvement of these influential figures is aimed at supporting President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi so that the political position does not appear vulnerable to pressure from the military structures.

Chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is trying to navigate between the opposing currents. He hints to conservatives that the memorandum could be abandoned if it does not bring benefits to Iran, but at the same time he assures the public and politicians that the deal “has not strategically failed,” despite the difficulties. The document, signed on June 18 after regional and international mediation, halted military actions that had begun in late February. The memorandum provides for 60 days of talks to reach a final agreement addressing key issues: the nuclear program, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions against Tehran.

In Faez’s view, the decline in political enthusiasm around the memorandum, as well as the logic of “escalation to de-escalate,” have pushed Iranian diplomacy to intensify its efforts through regional mediators—Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The goal is to find a diplomatic way out that would prevent American forces and the IRGC from monopolizing events on the ground. This could lead to regional chaos that policymakers would find difficult to control. Expanding the zone of U.S. strikes—reaching the third tier near Isfahan—only strengthens the military’s position and narrows the space for political maneuvering.

Faez emphasizes that the decisive factor that is currently missing is a clear presence from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei—both his voice and his image. Historically, it was he who was the only tool capable of restraining the ambitions of the military and defining the boundaries of political maneuver. Without his intervention, the split could lead to any unexpected outcomes. U.S. President Donald Trump, in an interview with Fox News, said there is a 90% chance that the new Iranian supreme leader is already dead. Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the resumption of a naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas in response to attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

News Comments

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political system, and why does its influence over national security decisions raise concerns among civilian authorities? - In Iran, the IRGC is not just a military institution, but a parallel center of power directly under the Supreme Leader (Rahbar). It controls a significant part of the economy, including defense industry, construction, and energy, and also has its own elite units and intelligence services. Civilian authorities’ concerns stem from the fact that the IRGC often operates outside the bounds of normal government oversight, setting national security priorities on its own, which can undermine the authority of the elected president and parliament. For example, the IRGC can initiate foreign policy actions or repression without coordinating with civilian leadership.

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and what political weight does he have in Iran, given his past positions as Tehran’s mayor and parliament’s speaker? - Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is a prominent conservative politician and former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force. His career includes serving as Tehran’s mayor (2005–2017) and speaker of parliament (since 2020). As mayor, he carried out major infrastructure projects and reforms in the capital, but he was also criticized for an authoritarian style of governance. His political weight is significant: he is considered one of the main representatives of the “principlists” (conservatives), has extensive ties within the IRGC, and advocates economic reforms. However, he is not an unquestionable figure, and his influence is periodically contested by other conservative factions.

• What are religious seminaries (hawzas) in Iran, and how does their leadership influence politics—specifically, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi’s call for withdrawal from the memorandum? - Hawzas are traditional Shia religious schools and centers of theology, located mainly in Qom and Mashhad. They train clerics and play a key role in shaping Iran’s religious doctrine and legal system. The leadership of the hawza, including respected ayatollahs, is not uniform, but many of them have considerable influence on politics through sermons, fatwas, and ties with conservative elites. Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the senior instructors in Qom, represents the ultra-conservative wing that opposes any compromises with the West. His call to withdraw from the memorandum (for example, a nuclear deal or an agreement on human rights) reflects the position of those who believe such arrangements threaten Iran’s sovereignty and Islamic values—potentially weakening the position of moderate politicians seeking a diplomatic settlement.

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Full version: جنرالات "الحرس" بمواجهة دهاة الدبلوماسية.. هرمز بات حلبة كسر عظم داخل إيران

Debates About Trump and the Future Role of the United States

Discussions surrounding Donald Trump and the upcoming presidential elections in the United States in today’s coverage sound like more than just talk about one country’s politics. They also reflect, according to many commentators, broader signs of instability that may be affecting the entire American system. Against this backdrop, doubts about the resilience of the electoral process stand out, as do discussions of the risks of escalation in foreign policy and questions about how the United States sees itself in the world—and how it is viewed by others. At the same time, different voices also reveal ideological reflection: where criticism ends and fear begins about a new turn in the American trajectory, and how the image of the United States is changing—from a competitor and guarantor to a potential source of chaos. This material was prepared based on posts from www.instagram.com (Venezuela), www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

A Venezuelan View of Rubio and Hopes for U.S. Help

In Venezuela’s information landscape, two messages coming from the United States have drawn noticeable emotional attention, but for completely different reasons. One concerns U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s sharply anti-communist rhetoric; the other concerns possible American aid to Venezuela after the June 24 earthquakes. Together, they show how Venezuelan audiences read the news through the lens of their own political history, crisis, and relations with Washington.

According to a piece by La Nación Web, in Washington Rubio once again linked Cuba, “the far left,” and “political terrorism.” He said that Cuba’s “hostile” left-radical network influenced the formation of extremism in the United States and the region, and he also called communism and anti-capitalist movements a source of violence. For a Venezuelan reader, these words do not sound like a neutral foreign-policy assessment, but rather like a familiar formula of ideological pressure on left-wing governments in Latin America.

That is why this rhetoric is perceived particularly sharply in Venezuela. Any statement Rubio makes about Cuba is automatically placed onto the local political context: sanctions against Caracas, a long standoff with Washington, the alliance between Venezuela and Havana, and constant accusations directed at the government of Nicolás Maduro. For part of society, such statements simply confirm that the United States continues an ideological campaign against the Bolivarian project and left-wing regimes in the region.

The figure of Cuba itself also carries special weight. In Venezuelan discourse, Cuba remains more than just an ally—it is a symbol of a political alternative that Bolivarians look to. That is why accusations against Havana as part of an “intellectual and ideological network” are easily read as an attempt to discredit the entire left-wing camp in Latin America. Within Venezuela, this is inevitably connected to the country’s own economic reality as well: shortages, sanctions, a debate over the causes of the crisis, and the question of whether the socialist course is the source of the problems—or whether the country suffers primarily because of external pressure.

Rubio also claimed that “political far-left terrorism” was supposedly growing, and that communism “doesn’t sound good even in theory.” For a Venezuelan audience, this is not just an ideological assessment, but a narrative long familiar to them—one that American politicians have used for years to justify a hard line against left-wing governments. And it is especially important that these words are spoken by Marco Rubio himself—one of the most consistent critics of Cuba and Venezuela in U.S. politics.

Against the backdrop of this rhetoric, another Venezuelan response stands out just as sharply—this time not to a threat, but to hope. A post referencing ABC News describes possible U.S. help in rebuilding Venezuela after the June 24 earthquakes. It reports that Washington is allegedly ready to deploy around 3,000 people—both civilian and military—and to allocate between $2.5 and $3 billion for reconstruction. For local audiences, this sounds like a potential lifeline: financial, humanitarian, and symbolic all at once.

The tone of this reaction differs sharply from political caution in the case of Rubio. Here, gratitude and expectation are voiced: “Gracias a quienes están dispuestos a tenderle la mano al pueblo venezolano.” In this short message, the United States appears not as a geopolitical rival, but as a country capable of playing a decisive role in helping the affected population. Given Venezuela’s chronic economic crisis, infrastructure problems, sanctions, and the overall vulnerability of the state, this prospect triggers a strong emotional response in Venezuela.

This reaction also highlights an important feature of Venezuelan public sentiment: in moments of disaster, ideological differences may move into the background when it comes to basic humanitarian support. Where a typical news article might limit itself to recounting possible U.S. involvement, the local response places emphasis on solidarity, hope, and the desire to receive assistance from outside.

More broadly, both stories reflect Venezuela’s complex perception of the United States. On the one hand, Washington remains a symbol of pressure, sanctions, and anti-communist rhetoric—especially when it comes to Marco Rubio and his statements about Cuba, “the far left,” and “political terrorism.” On the other hand, the same Washington can also be seen as a potential donor and partner in the country’s recovery after a natural disaster.

It is precisely this duality that defines the Venezuelan perspective: the United States remains both a political opponent and a possible source of help. That means that any news from Washington—whether it is Rubio’s harsh statement or a message about readiness to help after the earthquakes—immediately becomes part of a broader conversation in Venezuela about sovereignty, the crisis, and the country’s future.

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The US expands its map of targets in Iran: from the coast to nuclear sites

The US-Iran standoff has entered a new phase: Washington is gradually widening the geography of strikes on Iranian territory. If at first the attacks were focused on the southern coast near the Strait of Hormuz, they are now increasingly hitting targets deep inside the country. At the same time, the nature of the targets is changing as well — shifting from direct US military-sea capabilities to pinpoint attacks on the logistical and economic infrastructure that supports Tehran’s military operations. Iran, in turn, responds with attacks on American assets in Persian Gulf countries and Jordan, warning that it may expand the zone of impact even further.

The escalation began after Iran attacked commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in early July. The US response was swift and harsh: the first strikes hit naval bases in Hormozgan Province — the port of Bandar Abbas, the islands of Qeshm and Abu Musa. Officially, Washington said the goal was to “limit Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.” However, soon American forces moved closer to Khark Island, which is a key node for exporting Iranian oil. Earlier, Donald Trump had hinted at the possibility of seizing the island as an “economic lever” to pressure Tehran.

In the following days, the number of daily targets surged sharply — from 80 to 140 — and the strike geography extended far beyond the coastline. The bombardments did not only target naval bases and dry docks, but also drone warehouses, command centers, bridges, and railways connecting Iranian ports with inland areas. For the first time in the conflict, US forces used self-guided mine craft to hit targets in Bandar Abbas. Such tactics, according to experts, point to an effort not merely to weaken Iran’s combat readiness, but to fully undermine its mobility and economic resilience.

The climax of the escalation came in the form of a threat to strike the nuclear facility of Jabal al-Fass, located near Natanz. The facility is embedded in granite rock, and previously Iran had not allowed IAEA inspectors to access it. Trump said the site is “under observation by American cameras,” and warned that he would expand the list of targets to include power plants and bridges if Tehran did not agree to negotiations. Such rhetoric echoes earlier episodes of the conflict, when strikes on infrastructure were used as a means of pressure.

Despite Trump’s statements that the US has no plans to send ground troops into Iran, an analytical report discusses the possibility of a limited ground operation — possibly by allies. Notably, the president notified Congress about the resumption of military action, which triggered a countdown of the 60-day period provided for under the War Powers Act. This means that over the next two months the scale of strikes may either increase or shift to the diplomatic track.

Behind all this escalation lies a dramatic political backdrop. On June 18, Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum on a ceasefire and the start of talks mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, aimed at ending the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran at the end of February. However, the fragile truce collapsed on July 7, when Iran attacked three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on the pretext of violating the route. The next day, Trump announced the termination of the truce and carried out new strikes on Iranian territory. Thus, the conflict is once again caught in a vicious cycle of mutual strikes and ultimatums.

Comments on the news

• Why is Khark Island considered a key hub for Iranian oil exports, and what volume of oil passes through it? How would its possible seizure or destruction affect Iran’s economy? — Khark Island is Iran’s largest oil terminal, through which about 90% of the country’s crude oil exports pass. The daily throughput amounts to between 2 and 2.5 million barrels. Seizing or destroying the facility would deprive Iran of its main source of foreign-currency revenues, lead to a collapse of oil exports, destabilize the national currency, and drive a sharp rise in inflation — which could trigger an acute economic crisis.
• What is the Jabal al-Fass nuclear site near Natanz, and why does Iran refuse to allow IAEA inspectors there? What suspicions are associated with the facility? — The Jabal al-Fass site is located in a mountain range near Natanz and, according to satellite imagery, contains underground tunnels and equipment. Iran refuses to allow IAEA inspectors on the grounds that it is not a nuclear facility, but merely a storage or logistics complex. The suspicions are linked to the possibility of uranium enrichment work there or the storage of equipment hidden from international oversight, which may indicate a covert military nuclear program.
• Why did Pakistan and Qatar become mediators in talks between the US and Iran, and what are their motivations in this conflict? — Pakistan is seeking to strengthen its status as a regional mediator: it has historical ties with Saudi Arabia (a US ally) while also maintaining diplomatic contacts with Iran, which allows it to balance between the parties. Qatar is interested in reducing tensions, since stability in the Persian Gulf is critical to its economy (LNG exports), and it has already successfully served as a mediator in previous US-Iran contacts. Both players also aim to increase their international influence and secure political dividends.

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Full version: من السواحل إلى منشآت العمق.. خريطة توسع بنك الأهداف الأمريكية داخل إيران

Cabello accuses Western media of an information war after the tragedy

Diosdado Cabello, head of Venezuela’s ruling party, said that after the June 24 tragedy, the worst representatives of Western opposition media arrived in the country. According to him, these journalists deliberately “pick at the wounds of the Venezuelan people,” violating all ethical standards and fabricating false stories. Cabello stressed that their only goal is to cause damage, and that most of them have already left Venezuela in disgrace.

The socialist leader admitted that it is personally hard for him to carry on his program after seeing the destruction, but he is in awe of the people’s resilience. Cabello is convinced that the truth will ultimately prevail, and that all the inventions of opposition media will remain exposed. He called such journalists “heartless scoundrels” and emphasized that their activities cannot be called journalism—there is another name for that.

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Full version: Diosdado Cabello denuncia guerra mediática tras los terremotos: Lo peor del palangrismo mundial se vino a Venezuela

US airstrikes reach Tehran: escalation in Iran

The United States has significantly expanded the scale of airstrikes on Iran, for the first time since the end of the previous conflict striking the capital Tehran and several new provinces. According to reports from the scene, the bombardment continued through the night and into the morning in two waves; experts view this as a shift toward the systematic destruction of Iran’s military and missile infrastructure. In response, Tehran said it would continue attacks on American targets and interests in the region.

In Tehran, the targets included the Parchin facility, which is linked to Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the Pakdasht area, where intelligence reports say related developments are located. In addition, strikes were carried out on a range in Semnan, which is believed to be used for testing and storing missiles. The US Central Command confirmed that strikes on airports were aimed at areas used to launch drones.

The bombardment also affected other provinces: in Hamadan, at least three sites were hit, while Lorestan was struck for the third consecutive time. In the city of Ahvaz (Khuzestan), new strikes landed in areas along the border with Iraq, which are considered Iran’s “first line of defense.” According to sources, these territories are used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to deploy air-defense systems and to intercept threats from the south and southwest.

The attacks also spread to the coastal cities of Rask, Chabahar, and Konarak—the last of which the United States considers an important base for launching drones and naval cruise missiles. Islands in the Strait of Hormuz also remain under intense fire, although the IRGC says it maintains control of the strait. At the same time, the US continues a naval blockade: Central Command said it intercepted a vessel heading toward an oil terminal on the island of Kharg using a Hellfire missile launched from a helicopter.

Military analyst Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid notes that operations are expanding both vertically (with duration growing from 4 to 8 hours) and horizontally—the geography now covers a line from the coastline to Tehran. He says this is the formation of a “second line of fire” from within the country, creating land corridors. The type of targets also differs: in Ahvaz, strikes are directed at IRGC bases, while in Tehran, Semnan, and Parchin they target missile and drone programs.

According to the expert’s assessment, repeated strikes on the “Talekhan 2” site are explained by new intelligence requiring its destruction. Ongoing bombardment of border areas (Sistan-Balochistan, Kermanshah, Ahvaz) is aimed at weakening the IRGC and the regular army. In the analyst’s view, this may pave the way for the use of opposition forces—such as the Sunni group “Jaysh al-Adl” in the southeast and Kurdish units in the west—in later phases of the conflict.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military structure? — The IRGC (or “Sepah”) is an elite Iranian military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader and is responsible for suppressing internal unrest, as well as external operations (for example, supporting allied groups in the region). In addition to its military role, the IRGC has enormous economic influence, controlling key sectors (oil, construction, telecommunications). Many of its former commanders hold top political positions, which makes the IRGC effectively a “state within a state.”
• Where is Kharg Island located and why is it considered a strategic asset for Iran’s economy? — Kharg Island is located in the Persian Gulf, about 30 km from Iran’s coast. It is the country’s main oil terminal, through which about 90% of Iran’s oil exports pass. The island houses the largest oil storage facilities, berths for supertankers, and loading terminals. For that reason, the island is critically important to Iran’s economy and, at the same time, a vulnerable target in the event of attacks, as disrupting it can paralyze Iran’s oil exports.
• Why is the Parchin site regularly mentioned in the context of Iran’s nuclear program, and what is known about it? — Parchin is a military facility in the southeast of Tehran which, according to the IAEA and Western intelligence, could have been used by Iran for tests related to the development of a nuclear explosive device—specifically, tests of explosives used in nuclear warheads. Iran has repeatedly refused IAEA inspectors access to the site, citing secrecy. Although Iran says work there was of a civilian or defense nature, the recurring mention of Parchin in IAEA reports makes it a symbol of suspicions regarding the military component of Iran’s nuclear program.

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Full version: توسع أفقي وعمودي.. كيف تتشكل خطوط النار الجديدة في العمق الإيراني؟

Response Signal and Alarm: Reaction to U.S. Pressure on Iran

Amid new steps by Washington toward Iran, international assessments are quickly taking on a warning edge: the focus is not only on possible retaliatory measures, but also on the very nature of the U.S. course in the Trump era—ranging from pressure to strategic calculations and accusations of provoking escalation. The question is how U.S. actions are perceived: as an attempt to impose decisions, as a signal for an unavoidable confrontation, or as a factor that could draw new parties into the conflict and accelerate the chain of mutual sanctions and strikes. Against this backdrop, there are versions suggesting that each subsequent initiative becomes not just a political lever, but a reason for further countersteps—amid growing concern about how far the spiral of tension might go.

This material was prepared based on publications and videos from Venezuela: www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela Sees the Crisis in the U.S., Iran and China as a Threat to World Peace

In Venezuela, a new wave of U.S. pressure on Iran, increased rhetoric toward China, and general political chaos in Washington are viewed not as a set of separate foreign-policy episodes, but as a sign of deeper global escalation. In the local interpretation, this looks like a symptom of a crisis in American foreign policy—one that could hit world markets, oil quotations, and the balance of power, and thus directly affect Venezuela as well.

This view is especially understandable for a country that has spent years living under sanctions, financial pressure, and a diplomatic conflict with the United States. When international relations around Iran intensify in the news agenda or tension grows between Washington and Beijing, Caracas reads it through its own experience: what happens to oil prices, how much access to external markets will change, and whether overall instability—on which Venezuela’s economy depends—will increase. For a country whose revenues still depend on oil, such news immediately translates into the realm of practical consequences.

This is particularly evident in reports connected with the Strait of Hormuz. In a post by Radio América, Iran accuses the United States of having “hecho añicos”—“smashed to pieces”—the memorandum intended to bring an end to the war, after the resumption of a naval blockade of Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz. For a Venezuelan audience, this sounds like a familiar scenario: not diplomacy aimed at lowering tensions, but pressure that destroys agreements and intensifies the conflict.

That is why such news in Venezuela is often accompanied by an anti-American framing. Local commentators tend to see Washington’s actions not as an attempt at mediation, but as a model of behavior in which the United States creates crises itself, and then tries to shift the consequences onto others. Against this backdrop, in Venezuelan discourse, Iran and China are often perceived as elements of a multipolar world that could counterbalance U.S. dominance. For Caracas, this also has direct political significance: the country has long been betting on ties with non-Western centers of power— including China, Russia, and Iran—as a way to ease the pressure caused by sanctions.

The economic layer of this topic stands out especially in materials where the international agenda is directly tied to domestic indicators. In a report, the focus is on currency exchange rates and the price of Venezuelan Merey oil: the official dollar is 727.45 bolívares, the euro is 832.24, and Merey trades at around $73.60 per barrel amid growth in international markets. For Venezuelan audiences, this is the main measure of U.S. foreign policy: any conflict around Iran, or any jump in tension in the world oil market, is immediately reflected in import prices, the currency market, and the country’s revenues.

From this perspective, the Venezuelan lens is not limited to a dry retelling of international news. It turns every message about U.S. pressure on Iran or China into a mirror of its own vulnerabilities—sanctions against PDVSA, restrictions on access to markets, fuel supply problems, and overall dependence on external decisions. That is why such reports in Caracas are read not only as news about the Middle East or great-power rivalry, but also as a warning about how closely global instability is linked to everyday life in Venezuela.

In the end, it is the Venezuelan perspective that makes these storylines especially sensitive. Here, the key issue is not only what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, in U.S.–China relations, or within U.S. politics. The key issue is what it means for Venezuela itself: for oil prices, for sovereignty, for the country’s ability to maneuver through a global crisis, and for the old dispute over who is truly the source of international instability.

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Tehran Attacked U.S. Targets in Three Middle East Countries

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on Wednesday that it had carried out drone strikes on U.S. military sites in the Middle East. In a statement, Iran’s armed forces said the attack targeted the Al Azraq airbase in Jordan, where F-18 fighter jets and other U.S. equipment are based. Reports say there were two waves of strikes on the base, while the Pentagon has not yet officially commented.

Alongside the attacks on Jordan, the situation worsened in Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain, an air raid warning was issued, and the IRGC said it had hit sites belonging to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Kuwait’s air defenses, according to a local military command, are repelling attacks by “hostile” drones. Earlier, Kuwait reported the interception of six rockets and 33 drones; four service members were wounded, and there was material damage from falling debris.

A separate incident occurred off the coast of the UAE in the Strait of Hormuz. As the UAE said, two oil tankers were hit by Iranian cruise missiles, resulting in the death of an Indian sailor and injuries to eight more people. The IRGC confirmed that it disabled the vessels, claiming they had ignored “repeated warnings.”

After these attacks, the IRGC issued a sharply worded statement: the strait would remain closed “until American aggression ends.” Iran warned of consequences for oil and gas export routes, saying: “Either hydrocarbon exports will be available to all in the region, or to none.” This is a direct threat to global energy supplies.

The current escalation is part of the cycle of mutual strikes: the United States carries out retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian targets, while Tehran strikes targets in Persian Gulf countries and in Jordan. Local authorities report casualties among civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure. Washington has not yet issued an official reaction to Iran’s latest statements.

Comments on the News

• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and what influence does it have on decision-making in the country? — The IRGC is an elite ideological structure created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and is focused on traditional border defense, the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar). The IRGC controls the missile program, operations abroad (for example, in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen), and also wields significant economic influence through its affiliated companies (for example, “Khatam al-Anbiya”). In terms of decision-making in the country, the IRGC influences policy through close ties with conservative political circles and through its personal representation on the Supreme National Security Council, making it a key player not only in the military sphere but also in politics.

• What is the strategic significance of the Al Azraq airbase (Jordan) for the United States, and why might Iran have chosen it as a target? — The Al Azraq airbase is located in eastern Jordan, not far from the borders with Syria and Iraq. For the United States, it is an important logistical hub: fighter jets are based there, as are reconnaissance aircraft (including drones), and elements of air defense are also deployed. The base is used to train Iraqi and Syrian forces, conduct operations against ISIS, and monitor Iranian sites. Iran might consider it a target due to its role in deterring pro-Iranian groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as as a demonstration of the ability to threaten U.S. interests beyond Iran. In addition, Al Azraq is one of the few U.S. facilities that can be struck by Iranian medium-range missiles without directly provoking Saudi Arabia or Israel.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered critically important for global oil supplies, and what historical precedents exist for Iranian threats to block it? — The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the open ocean, with about 20–21 million barrels of oil passing through it daily (roughly one-fifth of global consumption). Any blockade would lead to a sharp jump in prices, disrupt global supply chains, and trigger an energy crisis. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to economic pressure (for example, in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, in 2012–2013 amid sanctions against its oil sector, and in 2019 after the tightening of U.S. sanctions). However, a full blockade is unlikely: it would provoke a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies, which patrol the strait. Instead, Iran uses selective “incidents” (detaining tankers, mining) as a pressure tool.

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Full version: إيران تعلن مهاجمة قاعدة بالأردن وإنذارات في البحرين والكويت

U.S

14 U.S. Democratic congressmen, including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib, sent a letter to President Trump demanding that he remove economic sanctions against Venezuela so the country’s government can use oil revenues for rebuilding after a series of earthquakes that struck on June 24. Copies of the request were also sent to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. According to official figures, the disaster killed 4,561 people, injured 16,740, and left more than 17,000 people homeless, making lifting the restrictions a matter of humanitarian necessity.

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Full version: Lawmakers ask Trump to lift sanctions on Venezuela to address emergencies caused by the earthquakes

US and Iran: a new conflict in the Strait of Hormuz paralyzed shipping

Tensions between the United States and Iran have sharply flared up again in the area of the Strait of Hormuz after a memorandum of understanding brokered by Qatar and Pakistan quickly collapsed. While the agreement had temporarily halted hostilities and opened the way for political talks, a dispute over control of shipping through the strait has led to a new exchange of strikes. The escalation was felt immediately in the number of vessels passing through and the volume of oil being transported, heightening fears that the crisis could widen.

According to data from Al Jazeera’s analytical unit, based on information from the Kepler platform tracking maritime shipping, on July 7 Iran attacked three commercial vessels in the strait. In response, Washington carried out large-scale airstrikes on “hundreds of targets on Iranian territory,” including air-defense systems, coastal radars, rocket and drone stockpiles, as well as fast boats that, according to U.S. Central Command, were used to threaten commercial shipping. At the same time, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it carried out strikes on positions of U.S. forces in the region.

Statistics show a sharp drop in traffic: the average number of ships transiting the strait fell by about 55% after the latest stage of escalation began. While between June 15 and July 7, 751 vessels were recorded (an average of 33 per day), from July 8 to July 13 only 90 ships passed through the strait—around 15 per day. The figures make clear how directly security threats affect one of the world’s most strategically important sea routes for trade.

The disruption also hit an alternative route that Oman offered to facilitate passage during periods of heightened tension. Previously, it accounted for about 22% of all traffic, but as of July 8 only one vessel used the route. Such numbers suggest that concerns spread even to routes that were considered less vulnerable.

The crisis also struck oil trade: the volume of crude oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz fell by 58% compared with the previous period. Average daily exports dropped from roughly 10 million barrels to nearly 4 million. In total, since July 8 the strait has been crossed by about 26 million barrels, of which 42% were shipped from Iranian ports—despite the resumption of a maritime blockade and tightening restrictions on Iranian exports. Oil prices jumped from $72 to $87 per barrel amid fears of supply disruptions, while no diplomatic breakthrough is yet in sight that could restore the memorandum and guarantee stable shipping.

Comments on the news

• Why did Qatar and Pakistan act as intermediaries between the US and Iran? — Qatar traditionally maintains neutral relations with both sides, serving as a diplomatic bridge, and its close ties with the United States (the El Udeid military base) and with Iran (joint gas projects) make it a convenient mediator. Pakistan, in turn, has longstanding cultural and economic ties with Iran and is also seeking to strengthen its influence in the region—especially amid rivalry with Saudi Arabia and India—while maintaining working relations with the United States, which enables it to act as a neutral negotiating party.
• What is the alternative route through Oman and why is it considered less vulnerable than the Strait of Hormuz? — The alternative route through Oman includes transporting oil overland from the Gulf of Oman to the coast of the Arabian Sea, or using Omani ports such as Duqm to transship cargoes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. This route is considered less vulnerable because it does not pass through a narrow strait that Iran can easily block and is under the control of more stable states, reducing risks of military conflicts or terrorist attacks.
• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC/KСИР) play in Iran’s political and military system? — The IRGC is a key military and political force in Iran that combines functions of a regular army, intelligence, and economic management. It reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader (rahbar) and oversees elite units such as “Quds” (external operations), as well as a significant portion of the Iranian economy, including the oil and construction sectors. Politically, the IRGC exerts enormous influence over domestic decisions, participating in suppressing protests and shaping foreign policy, especially toward Middle Eastern countries (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon).

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Full version: بالأرقام.. كيف ضرب التصعيد العسكري الملاحة بمضيق هرمز؟

Anxiety over the U.S. course, escalation around Iran, and the impact on the world

Against the backdrop of discussions of a tougher—and at times unpredictable—line from the United States during the Trump era, both disputes and concern are mounting: at the center of attention are moves, critics say, that could increase tension in the region and raise the risk of a conflict involving Iran. The discussion is not only about political signals, but also about potential consequences for trade and the economy—from fears linked to the situation near the Strait of Hormuz to reactions from global markets. At the same time, broader conclusions are being drawn about how turmoil in the Middle East can reverberate far beyond the region, including the interest of Latin American observers in what is happening. This material was prepared based on sources www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela sees a new wave of U.S. pressure in the Caribbean basin

The Venezuelan take on reports about possible U.S. moves in the Caribbean basin and on a new document from the Donald Trump administration aimed at combating terrorism is driven by the same underlying motive: in Caracas, it is read not as a set of disconnected news items, but as part of a long-standing U.S. strategy of pressure on the region. Any hints of Washington’s military activity near the Caribbean Sea are traditionally treated in Venezuela as a troubling sign—especially if they involve Cuba, Iran, or other countries with which Caracas has developed political and technological ties.

In particular, this reaction was prompted by a piece by Agencia EFE Noticias, where Trump’s statements about an investigation and possible threats related to Iran and the situation around Cuba were mentioned. For Venezuela, such storylines almost automatically turn into the question of whether this could become a pretext for stepping up U.S. military presence in the Caribbean basin and for tighter control over governments that Washington regards as unfriendly.

From a Venezuelan perspective, particular sensitivity lies in the anti-American context of the country’s internal politics. In public and political discourse in Caracas, U.S. policy has long been associated with sanctions, threats, a blockade, and the rhetoric of “regime change.” So even if the matter concerns a formally separate story—for example, the possible discovery of Iranian drones in Cuba—in Venezuela it is often interpreted as part of a wider campaign to pressure the entire region and its allies.

The same chain of reasoning can be seen in the response to the American counterterrorism strategy published by the Trump administration. In a post by Pagina12, the focus is on a 16-page document, but for a Venezuelan reader, its political meaning matters more than its technical content. In Caracas, initiatives like these are viewed as tools that could legitimize external pressure, new sanctions, and intervention under the banner of fighting terrorism.

That is why in Venezuela such news is discussed not in a narrow U.S. security context, but as part of a broader global geopolitical game. Any U.S. security strategy there is often viewed through the lens of possible consequences for Latin America: from increased diplomatic isolation to impacts on trade, migration, and energy ties. In this perception, the regional effect is no less important than the U.S. agenda itself.

The allied dimension is also emphasized separately. For Caracas, Cuba and Iran remain part of broader political and technological cooperation that helps withstand sanctions and isolation. Therefore, any escalation involving these countries is automatically seen as a potential threat to Venezuela as well: if pressure on allies intensifies, sooner or later it may also reach Caracas itself.

In the end, the Venezuelan reaction to these storylines comes not down to checking the facts about drones, documents, or Trump’s statements, but to a deeper political interpretation. In a country where the historical memory of confrontation with the United States is very strong, such news reinforces the image of Washington as a source of instability rather than a neutral arbiter. For a Venezuelan audience, this is another reminder that the Caribbean basin still carries the risk of a new escalation, and that Venezuela’s immediate neighborhood remains part of a tense—and increasingly militarized—regional space.

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Trump Threatens to Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Site: Strikes and Talks

Tensions between Washington and Tehran have sharply escalated after US President Donald Trump warned that he would deliver a “cruel blow” to Iran’s nuclear site “Peakax Mountain” (Peakax Mountain), saying the attack could begin “as early as tonight.” However, in the same Oval Office address, he added that a diplomatic agreement “is still possible,” while American bombs have been heard in the region for a third night in a row, and Iranian ports are again blocked.

“Peakax Mountain” is located south of Tehran, not far from the nuclear complex in Natanz. According to intelligence, it is a heavily fortified complex of two deep tunnels carved through hundreds of meters of solid granite. Experts believe the site’s defenses exceed the capabilities of even the most powerful US bunker-buster bombs. The American outlet Al-Monitor reports that US intelligence agencies suspect Tehran is building a secret, undeclared uranium-enrichment plant there as a “fallback” for its nuclear program. Iran, since 2020, has insisted that the facility is intended only for assembling and producing modern centrifuges.

In an interview with the program “Hugh Hewitt Show,” Trump said: “We will destroy Peakax Mountain. Tell the Iranians to get ready.” He added that the US is “closely watching” the site and “every time they hear about it — they blow it up.” In his view, Washington “will most likely strike soon.” In response, Tehran blamed the US for “bringing instability back,” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) accused the White House of jeopardizing global oil supplies with its attacks.

The third wave of American strikes targeted Iranian military facilities. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it is using precision munitions to hit coastal-defense systems, missile-launchers, drones, and naval assets. The attacks lasted five hours and hit targets across Iran. Iranian media reported explosions in the southern parts of the country.

According to the Fars news agency, the explosions were heard on the islands of Qeshm, Kish, and Abu Musa, as well as in coastal cities, including Bandar Abbas. In Bushehr Province, explosions were heard in the city of Jam. The Mehr agency reported fires on three boats in the port of Kish, and in Khuzestan, according to local officials, four people were injured in the city of Omidiyeh. Official figures on damage have not yet been released.

Despite the military escalation, Trump continues sending signals that he is ready for negotiations. “An agreement is certainly possible,” he told journalists, noting that, as he said, Washington was close to a deal with Iran two days earlier, but Tehran backed down and asked for additional consultations. At the same time, American raids have not stopped, and Trump remains skeptical about Iran’s ability to withstand a long war, claiming the fighting will not last more than four months.

The escalation has already spread to neighboring countries. The UAE Ministry of Defense said that in the southern corridor of the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian cruise missiles attacked two tankers in Oman’s territorial waters: one person was killed and eight were injured. The IRGC, in turn, announced a strike on targets at the Al-Jafair base in Bahrain and emphasized that its naval forces would continue to defend Iran’s rights in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian military sources also said two oil tankers were damaged after ignoring warnings from the shipping safety center.

Comments on the news

• What is the “Peakax Mountain” nuclear facility and why is it considered so well protected? — “Peakax Mountain” (known as Kuh-e Topor or Peakax Mountain) is Iran’s underground nuclear facility located within the rock formation. It is believed to be protected because its main centrifuges and infrastructure are located tens of meters beneath the mountain, making them resistant to air strikes and most conventional bombs. In addition, the facility is equipped with a powerful air-defense system and is monitored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. This design makes it difficult to destroy even when using bunker-busting penetrative munitions.
• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political and military system? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation parallel to the regular army. It reports directly to the supreme leader (rahbar) and is responsible for protecting the Islamic Revolution. Beyond military tasks, the IRGC controls a significant part of the economy (construction, energy, telecommunications), participates in political decisions, and manages special units such as the “Quds” force, which handles the export of influence abroad.
• Why do the Iranian islands of Qeshm, Kish, Abu Musa, and the port of Bandar Abbas have strategic significance in the conflict with the US? — These territories are located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz and enable control of the key sea route. Qeshm is the largest island in the Gulf, with military bases and missile installations. Abu Musa is disputed with the UAE and is important for monitoring the strait. Bandar Abbas port is Iran’s main naval base, from which fast boats and anti-ship missiles can operate. In a conflict, Iran would use them to block the strait or strike US fleets.
• What is the importance of the Strait of Hormuz for global energy security, and why does Iran threaten to block it? — About 20–25% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz (mainly from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait). Any blockade would lead to a sharp jump in energy prices and a global economic crisis. Iran threatens to close the strait in response to sanctions or military pressure, as it can lay mines, use missiles and drones, and also deploy small submarines and fast boats. At the same time, Iran itself depends on the strait to export its oil, so such a threat is an extreme measure within an asymmetric strategy.

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Full version: "جبل الفأس".. الموقع الغامض الذي هدد ترمب بتدميره في إيران

Chapter of Venezuela’s Central Bank: the country’s economy has withstood the earthquakes’ blow

Venezuela’s vice president for the economy and president of the Central Bank, Calixto Ortega, said at an economic council that after the earthquakes of June 24, the country’s production sector proved far more resilient than analysts had expected. He said that the oil industry and the entire industrial structure are operating normally, which confirms the economy is moving toward recovery. Ortega also outlined further steps to attract international investment and restructure the country’s public debt in order to strengthen market stability and secure support from partners.

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Full version: Calixto Ortega: Aparato productivo nacional mostró una resiliencia superior tras los sismos

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: U.S. strikes and Iran’s retaliatory attacks

Early Tuesday morning, U.S. forces carried out a new series of strikes on Iranian military facilities that lasted five hours. According to Iran’s Fars agency, three members of the same family were killed in Hormozgan Province, and five explosions were heard in the city of Bandar Abbas. In response, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officially confirmed the end of this round of bombardments, saying the target was to reduce Tehran’s ability to attack maritime shipping.

According to a statement from CENTCOM, the strikes used precision-guided munitions against Iran’s coastal defense systems, missile units, drones, and naval infrastructure. Targets included facilities in Bushehr, Chabahar, Jask, Konarak, Abu Musa, and Bandar Abbas. The command stressed that the operation is aimed at further undermining Iran’s ability to threaten trade in the region.

Iranian forces responded with harsh statements: an army spokesman warned that the Strait of Hormuz would not be opened “by war and the malicious actions of the United States.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reported that it destroyed a drone command center, Patriot radars, and early-warning systems used by the U.S. Navy in Bahrain. According to their data, the attack hit fuel storage facilities and communications nodes at the Al-Jafer base.

The conflict has already involved civilian vessels: the UAE Ministry of Defense announced the death of an Indian sailor and injuries to eight people (six Indians and two Ukrainians) after Iranian cruise missiles struck two UAE tankers in waters off Oman. The UAE called it a gross violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution, and India, in protest, summoned an Iranian diplomat. Britain also reported a missile barrage on an oil tanker east of Oman.

Jordan, too, was not left out: Iranian forces said they carried out strikes on a U.S. airbase with ballistic missiles, but Jordan’s army stated that it shot down four missiles launched from Iranian territory. In Amman, it was emphasized that the “Amir Hasan” and “Muwafaq as-Salti” bases are sovereign Jordanian facilities, not American ones, and the country would not allow its airspace to be turned into a venue for someone else’s conflict.

Against this backdrop, the administration of Donald Trump announced the restoration of a blockade of Iranian ports and proposed 20% tariffs to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM confirmed that more than 50,000 U.S. service members are deployed in the Middle East and are at full combat readiness. Escalation between the United States and Iran continues to build, threatening stability in one of the world’s most important sea corridors.

Comments on the news

• What is the strategic significance of Hormozgan Province and the city of Bandar Abbas for Iran’s military and economic power? — Hormozgan Province and the port of Bandar Abbas are key for Iran because they control the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage through which about 20% of the world’s oil flows. Bandar Abbas serves as Iran’s main naval base and trading hub, enabling Iran to exert pressure on global energy markets and to block shipping in the event of a conflict. In addition, the province is home to major petrochemical plants and IRGC military facilities, which strengthens its role as a center of economic and defense strategy.
• How does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) differ from Iran’s regular army, and what role does it play in military decision-making? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation established after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system, while the regular army (Artesh) is responsible for traditional border defense. The IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader (Rahbar), controls missile programs, special operations, and regional influence through allied groups (Hezbollah, the Houthis). This gives the IRGC priority in military decision-making, especially regarding external conflicts and nuclear policy, often taking over the role of the regular armed forces.
• Why is the island of Abu Musa a disputed territory between Iran and the UAE, and how does the article’s mention of it relate to the regional conflict? — Abu Musa is one of three islands in the Persian Gulf, whose control is contested by Iran (which has administered it since 1971) and the United Arab Emirates. The dispute is driven by historical claims and the island’s strategic position near sea routes. In the context of the article, mentioning Abu Musa highlights tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies backed by the United States—something Tehran could use as leverage in negotiations or as a pretext to demonstrate force in the region.

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Full version: أمريكا تقصف إيران وطهران تستهدف دولتين عربيتين وناقلتي نفط إماراتيتين

Anxiety Over U.S. Escalation With Iran and Risks for the Strait of Hormuz

Against the backdrop of new steps by Washington, an overarching political and economic signal of alarm is growing: many observers link the escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz to the risk of a wider conflict. The focus is not only on military decisions, but also on fears that the administration’s hard line could destabilize the region and hit markets—intensifying anxieties about subsequent consequences for trade and the cost of energy. The emotional tone is fueled as well by talk that the current escalation may pull more and more participants into a spiral of tension, turning a local crisis into a problem with a long echo. This piece is based on publications from www.instagram.com (Venezuela), as well as materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela and Cuba see the Middle East crisis through oil and energy

Venezuelan and Cuban media space has responded to the escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz not as a neutral international brief, but as an opportunity for its own political and economic interpretations. In a Venezuelan Instagram reaction, available via this link, the crisis is framed in a sharply anti-American and anti-Israeli tone: the United States, Israel, and Europe are described as the losing side, while Iran is portrayed as a force capable of dealing a serious blow to the global energy system. The author emphasizes that oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global market, and also highlights the United States’ vulnerability due to a shortage of heavy crude.

This perspective fits well with Venezuela’s context, where oil, sanctions, and the struggle for market access have long been part of the political agenda. Here, an appeal to an alternative information environment is especially noticeable: the text says that many assessments can be found “on YouTube in Spanish,” and as cited sources it names not local politicians but international commentators such as Neutrality Studies, Glenn Diesen, and Pepe Escobar. Their position is presented as a critique of U.S. hegemony, NATO, and Israeli policy—something that aligns with the anti-imperialist rhetoric familiar to part of the Venezuelan audience.

For Venezuela, this topic is important both practically and symbolically. Any spike in global oil prices can mean additional budget revenue at the same time as it hits the domestic market, and rising tension around oil supplies reminds the country of its own sanctions constraints. In this reading, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz becomes not just a news item, but a mirror of Venezuela’s own experience: blockades, energy blackmail, and dependence on external decisions are easy for the local audience to recognize through their own history.

This is clearly reflected in a post by EL IMPARCIAL, which speaks of a sharp rise in oil prices after the escalation around Iran and threats in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. According to the publication, Brent climbed to $83.30 per barrel, up 9.6%, while WTI rose to $78.14, up 9.4%. For Venezuela, these figures mean not only anxiety over instability in the global market, but also a potential chance for a country that has spent years trying to revive its oil revenues. At the same time, Trump’s proposal to charge 20% of the cargo’s value for passage through the strait is seen as another example of how geopolitics turns into a tool for pressuring energy markets and exporting countries.

In Cuba, the tone of the reaction is different, but the logic is largely similar: the energy crisis is also framed as a matter of survival and political stability. In a teleSUR publication at this link, two outages of the National Electric System in a single week are reported, and the emphasis is placed not so much on the technical side of the incidents, but on how they are perceived by President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez. In the Cuban context, such breakdowns are not simply incidents; they are part of everyday social tension: the stability of electricity affects work, transportation, food storage, access to water, and communications.

Cuban official rhetoric usually links energy problems to external pressure, sanctions, and shortages of fuel and financing—and this is precisely how the issue is read in the regional media space. For the local audience, such news is also a test of the state’s ability to provide basic services. That is why the message about outages sounds not like a dry technical report, but like a political signal that reinforces a sense of systemic crisis. Against this backdrop, a Venezuelan reader can easily recognize a familiar pattern: worn infrastructure, a lack of investment, the politicization of коммунal problems, and the authorities’ drive to explain the crisis by external factors.

Taken together, these storylines show that in Venezuela and Cuba the Middle East crisis, the spike in oil prices, and domestic energy troubles are understood through a shared lens of dependence on resources, sanctions pressure, and the struggle for resilience. Here, news stops being just information and becomes part of a broader anti-Western and anti-imperialist narrative, where global politics is read as a continuation of the struggle over oil, energy, and control of economic flows.

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Hormuz Crisis: Iran and the U.S. Trade Strikes After the Deal Is Scrapped

In June, the United States and Iran signed an electronic memorandum of understanding aimed at stabilizing the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. However, just three weeks later, Donald Trump announced it had been nullified, saying Tehran had violated the understandings. From the U.S. side came threats of “powerful” strikes, while mutual accusations of provocation against civilian vessels only further heightened tensions.

Iran responded that the American side had shown no patience and had not waited for the 30-day period to elapse for fulfilling obligations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon carried out a series of strikes on targets near the strait, and in early July Iranian media reported that a foreign container ship had run aground due to a deviation from the agreed course—fueling doubts about navigation safety.

In an effort to ease the situation, indirect talks took place in Doha, with Qatar and Pakistan acting as intermediaries. The sides agreed on a week-long ceasefire, but on July 4, Kazem Garibabadi, the deputy head of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned the UK and France against any military presence in the strait. Ship movements sharply decreased, and some captains attempted to bypass the strait via alternative routes despite Tehran’s objections.

The ceasefire collapsed on July 7, when three oil and gas tankers were attacked off the coasts of Oman and the UAE. The United States blamed Iran, raised the threat level to “critical,” and revoked a license that allowed the sale of Iranian oil. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said talks on a final agreement would not begin while threats continued—and within hours, U.S. aircraft carried out pinpoint strikes on naval bases in the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr.

A wave of political escalation followed: Trump said Iran had allegedly put him on a “kill list,” and CNN, citing sources, confirmed the involvement of Israeli intelligence in uncovering the assassination plot. In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps promised a “punitive strike.” Reports then emerged of attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, while satellite data recorded almost a complete halt to shipping through the strait.

The climax came on July 12: an official spokesperson for the IRGC announced the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz “until further notice.” “The era of unilateral deals has ended,” Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf wrote. “Either the U.S. keeps its promises—or pays the price.” In response, U.S. Central Command said about 140 military facilities on Iranian territory had been hit, and Tehran struck American bases in the region. The two countries once again exchanged strikes, while control of the strait remained the main fault line: Washington imposed a 20% fee for passage under U.S. management, while Tehran called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” and pledged to defend it at any cost.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what influence does it have on Iran’s foreign and domestic policy? — The IRGC is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls missile forces and intelligence, and also has powerful economic assets (construction, energy, and finance). The IRGC directly affects foreign policy by supporting allied forces in the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria), and domestically through ideological control and participation in suppressing protests. In effect, the IRGC is a “state within a state,” whose commanders often hold key positions in government.

• Why are the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr strategically important for Iran? What is located there? — These provinces lie on the Persian Gulf coast and include Qeshm Island, the port of Bandar Abbas, and a nuclear complex in Bushehr. Hormozgan controls the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage through which about 20–25% of global oil trade flows. Bushehr is home to Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant (with Russia’s assistance) and major petrochemical plants. Any instability there directly threatens both Iran’s economy and global energy supply.

• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and why does his statement about closing the Strait of Hormuz carry special weight in Iran’s establishment? — Qalibaf is an influential conservative politician, former mayor of Tehran (2005–2017), and the current speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majles). His position is third in importance in the state hierarchy after the Supreme Leader and the president. Qalibaf’s statements—especially on foreign and defense policy—often reflect the consolidated position of the top leadership rather than only his personal view. His mention of closing the strait signals that the establishment sees the move as a real tool of pressure in the event of conflict escalation.

• Why does Iran call the Strait of Hormuz “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs”? What historical, economic, or ideological factors lie behind this rhetoric? — The phrase emphasizes that control over the strait gives Iran not only economic leverage but also an existential weapon. On one hand, nearly all of Iran’s oil passes through the strait—its main source of budget revenue. On the other hand, Iran remembers the “tanker war” of the 1980s and the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) through neighboring countries. Ideologically, the regime portrays itself as the protector of the Islamic world against Western domination, and the threat to the strait is a demonstration that Tehran can paralyze the global economy even without a nuclear arsenal. For Iran’s leadership, this lever compensates for a military-technological gap and serves as a bargaining chip in international negotiations.

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Full version: رسوم الـ20% وعودة الحصار البحري.. كيف وصل التصعيد بين ترمب وإيران إلى هنا؟

Earthquake in Caracas: building assessments and international aid

Specialists continue the thorough inspection of residential towers in Caracas after the earthquakes of 24 June. To classify the damage, the so-called “traffic light method” is used; thus, some towers, including housing program projects “Óscar López Rivera,” received a yellow label. While their load-bearing walls and floors were not affected, engineers identified risks in brick partition walls. At the same time, expansion joints, as noted by specialist Humberto Renhel, withstood the vibrations successfully, confirming that the structures were well designed.

Medical facilities have also undergone a rigorous inspection: the Miguel Pérez Carreño hospital and the H.M. de los Ríos Children’s Hospital were examined together with Portuguese experts. Using drone flyovers and visual checks, specialists confirmed that the buildings are in good condition—only minor damage to secondary elements was recorded. These hospitals continue to operate safely for both medical staff and patients.

The Government of Portugal has sent more than 60 specialists and tonnes of humanitarian aid, significantly strengthening the response to the emergency. Search efforts for survivors continue with support from contingents from 27 countries. According to official figures, of the 19,136 people affected, 92.5% have already been released, and only 7.5% remain under observation. Meanwhile, international researchers, including experts from Stanford, are documenting damage to update seismic-resilience standards. Authorities are preparing temporary camps and a housing repair plan, urging citizens to rely only on official information.

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Full version: Evaluación y resiliencia marcan el ritmo de la capital

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: The US and Iran exchanged strikes

Late on Sunday evening, the United States carried out a new wave of airstrikes on military facilities in Iran, saying the goal was to reduce Tehran’s ability to attack international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it used precision-guided munitions against dozens of sites across various regions, including air defense systems, coastal radars, missile launchers, drones, and small boats. For the first time, attack drones and one-time camouflage boats were used.

According to US forces, the strikes were launched from US Air Force fighter jets and Navy vessels. In CENTCOM’s statement, it emphasized that the Strait of Hormuz remains vital for global trade and is not under Iran’s control, and that US forces are prepared to ensure freedom of navigation. Iranian state media, in turn, reported that extensive areas in the south and west of the country were hit—Keshm Island, the port of Bandar Abbas near the strait, as well as areas in Khuzestan Province on the border with Iraq.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Sepah) immediately responded, announcing strikes on US military facilities in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to statements relayed via the Iranian agency IRNA, the targets included Prince Hasan Air Base in Jordan, a command-and-control center for US drones in Bahrain, and the Ali al-Salem base in Kuwait. The Iranian website Nournews уточнил that the mass attacks were carried out using drones and rockets launched from bases in western and central Iran.

Military sources in Iran said the strikes were conducted against pre-reconnoitered targets tracked over the past 48 hours, and that losses among the “enemy” would be significant due to the effect of surprise. In Kuwait, the army confirmed the interception of “hostile aerial targets” in its airspace, noting that the sounds of explosions were caused by air-defense systems. Authorities urged citizens to follow safety instructions.

Jordanian military sources reported that air-defense systems intercepted four rockets that entered the country’s airspace from Iran early Monday morning. The operation was carried out “with high effectiveness,” with no casualties or material damage; debris was handled by sappers. In Bahrain on Monday morning, air-raid sirens sounded, and the Ministry of the Interior called on residents to remain calm and take shelter in safe places while monitoring official news.

The escalation comes amid a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran on June 17, intended to end the war that began on February 28. Now there are concerns that the agreement may be derailed. Already on Monday, oil prices surged at trading in Tokyo by more than 3.5%—WTI futures exceeded $74 per barrel, recouping the previous drop that followed the announcement of the memorandum.

Comments on the news

• What functions and sphere of influence does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Sepah) have beyond military operations, and how does it differ from Iran’s regular army?
  The IRGC (Sepah) is not only a military force but also a powerful economic and political player. It controls major construction projects, infrastructure, the banking sector, and trade (through the structure “Khatam al-Anbia”). In addition, the IRGC oversees a program of missile and nuclear research and is involved in suppressing internal protests. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which is responsible for border defense and operates within the framework of the constitution, the IRGC is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader and has its own courts, intelligence services, and special operations forces (“Quds”). Its influence extends far beyond the military sphere, encompassing politics, the economy, and ideology.

• Why are Keshm Island and Bandar Abbas port particularly important for Iran in the context of controlling the Strait of Hormuz?
  Keshm Island is the largest in the Persian Gulf and lies directly at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. It hosts IRGC military bases and air-defense systems, as well as oil terminals. The port of Bandar Abbas is the main hub for oil exports and goods imports, through which a significant part of Iran’s trade passes. Together, they allow Iran to shut down the strait in the event of conflict, deploy coastal missile complexes, and control all ships transiting the area. This strategic location gives Iran leverage over global oil markets.

• How independent are the Iranian news agencies IRNA and Nournews, and how do their messages reflect the authorities’ official position?
  Both agencies are state-run or affiliated with the authorities. IRNA is Iran’s official news agency, directly controlled by the government and often used to disseminate statements from officials. Nournews is linked to the Supreme National Security Council and reflects the views of the conservative wing. They are not independent in the Western sense: their editorial policy strictly follows the line of the Supreme Leader and the government. The messages from these agencies serve as an indicator of the official position, especially on foreign-policy issues, the nuclear program, and regional conflicts. Any critical materials go through censorship.

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Full version: US strikes on Iran, with Tehran targeting Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan

Washington prefers diplomacy over a military scenario in the Strait of Hormuz

Despite the theoretical military superiority, the United States is shying away from the idea of seizing the Strait of Hormuz by force, prioritizing instead a negotiating process. Geographic constraints, the high cost of a possible operation, and the complexity of the situation on the ground are pushing American command to look for diplomatic routes. Rather than a direct confrontation, Washington is focusing on ensuring the safety of sea lanes—especially amid ongoing escalation and mutual strikes between the parties. At the same time, the strait has become an informal negotiating topic between the United States and Iran in Muscat, where navigation data indicates a sharp reduction in transit—now involving only vessels flying the Iranian flag.

Colonel Nidal Abu Zeyd notes that having military power does not automatically mean using it. The operating environment imposes serious constraints, making direct intervention extremely difficult and costly. The narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz significantly limits the use of ground forces, while naval and airborne landing operations are far harder than in open terrain. A key factor is the impact of Iran’s defenses: since 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has built its system along the western coast, preparing specifically for such a scenario.

According to Abu Zeyd, the latest military campaigns, including recent strikes, have been aimed above all at “softening the target”—weakening defensive lines rather than immediately making a broad change to the situation on the ground. A cost-benefit analysis does not work in Washington’s favor: the price of an operation is so high that achieving the objective becomes meaningless compared with political and diplomatic options. This is precisely what explains the United States’ desire to lock in understandings with Iran rather than impose its will by force.

As an alternative, support for the southern route through Oman’s territorial waters is being considered—an option believed to be safer for shipping. In negotiations in Muscat, the Omani side proposes managing vessel traffic through separate corridors, with the “middle corridor” and the routes passing through Hormuz coming to the fore. Abu Zeyd emphasizes that the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, has not conducted regular transit operations since the start of the confrontation, despite the ongoing need for maintenance and logistical resupply.

The southern corridor is of operational interest to U.S. forces because it allows ships to move around restrictions imposed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran’s refusal to grant full freedom of movement along this route is explained not only by sovereignty concerns—since the corridor lies in Omani waters—but also by its maritime characteristics. The depth of the Omani corridor ranges from 65 to 110 meters, while the Iranian corridor is only 35 to 60 meters, making the former far more suitable for oil tankers, cargo ships, destroyers, and aircraft carriers.

Additional challenges include mines—some of which, due to being dragged by currents, have turned into “drifting” mines. Losing minefield maps or damaging them during bombardments greatly complicates mine clearance and increases risks for both civilian and military vessels. European countries sent minehunters as part of a coalition led by France and the United Kingdom, which prompted Tehran’s rejection, fearing that an international presence would reduce the mines’ impact on transit. The clearance process requires careful reconnaissance, sweeping, and locating using specialized equipment, so Western forces, including NATO, are not eager to get directly drawn into a clash inside the Strait of Hormuz.

News comments

• Why has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, since 1979, been building its defensive system along the western coast of the Strait of Hormuz, and what geographic and strategic factors are involved? — The western coast (the Iranian side) controls the strait’s narrowest section (about 33 km), which makes it possible to use artillery, missile installations, and fast patrol boats to block passage. Geographic factors: the proximity to shore enables minelaying in the channel and attacks on ships from land. Strategic factors: about ~20% of the world’s oil passes through the strait, and Iran seeks to have the ability to shut it in the event of a conflict, creating a “no-go zone” for the opponent’s naval forces.

• What role does Oman play in talks between the United States and Iran, and why did Muscat become the venue for discussing shipping in the strait? — Historically, Oman has acted as a neutral mediator, maintaining diplomatic ties with both sides (unlike Saudi Arabia or the UAE). Muscat was chosen due to trust in the sultanate, its geographic proximity to the strait, and the absence of a formal military alliance with the United States—allowing confidential meetings to take place. Oman has repeatedly helped with prisoner exchanges and with indirect consultations on the nuclear deal.

• What are “drifting mines,” why are they especially dangerous for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does Iran use minefields in its defensive tactics? — “Drifting mines” are uncontrolled explosive devices that are carried by currents and winds without a fixed position. They are extremely dangerous because they cannot be predicted; they can damage civilian tankers and trigger an environmental disaster. In its asymmetric tactics, Iran uses rapidly laid minefields (often from disguised vessels) to temporarily block the strait, forcing ships to maneuver in ways that put them into the kill zone of shore-based missile systems.

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Full version: Why is Washington avoiding opening the Strait of Hormuz by military force?

Journalism Ethics in Disaster: Between Truth and Manipulation

In the context of a catastrophe, journalism faces a paradox: society demands immediate answers, but fact-checking—the only way to separate information from rumors—becomes especially vulnerable. As Kovach and Rosenstiel note, the key is not speed or sensationalism, but discipline in verification. Kapuściński adds that a real report requires meeting the “other,” not describing things from the outside, and warns against cynicism. Sontag, in turn, reminds us that the endless repetition of images of suffering can dull perception and turn pain into a commodity. Therefore, the ethical question for a reporter is not only “Is it true?” but also “Why am I showing it?”

The author contrasts this approach with the activities of “influencers” and the spread of fake news on social media. Examples are given: a supposed surveillance device hidden in humanitarian aid from Panama, rumors of children being kidnapped after an earthquake, and a false report about the one-sided capture of the Maiquetía airport by the U.S. Southern Command. In this environment, ethics of fact are replaced by disinformation and sensationalism, undermining trust in information.

Reconstruction, the article emphasizes, does not require a list of prohibitions, but building trust and credibility. A journalist should not place urgency above thoroughness, or political benefit above accuracy and respect for people. Given Venezuela’s shattered infrastructure, censorship, migration, and distrust of institutions, it is especially important to verify information through multiple sources, correct mistakes publicly, and not turn tragedy into a spectacle. After an earthquake that claimed more than 3,800 lives and left 16,000 people injured, competent information management becomes part of the rescue infrastructure: it can calm panic, coordinate assistance, or, conversely, worsen chaos with rumors.

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Full version: Contar el desastre: la ética de la reconstrucción (I)

Rising gasoline prices in the US amid tensions with Iran: economic fallout

In the United States, a new jump in gasoline prices has been recorded, triggered by the escalation of the conflict with Iran. The increase again raises the question of how resilient the American economy is to military tension. As soon as oil prices rise or sea shipping is disrupted, the effects are felt immediately in the domestic energy market. The increase came shortly after prices had temporarily fallen amid a ceasefire, highlighting how sensitive the fuel market is to geopolitical shifts.

According to the American Automobile Association (AAA), the average price of a gallon of regular gasoline rose from $3.79 to $3.88, and diesel from $4.77 to $4.81. In California, average prices remain the highest—around $5.38 per gallon. Despite the seemingly moderate increase, according to the Financial Times, US inflation in May was 4.2%, so any further fuel price hike becomes more painful for both voters and households.

Under mounting pressure, the White House has begun to intervene, demanding that companies lower prices. Donald Trump urged gas stations to set the price of gasoline at around $2.50 per gallon, threatening “major problems” if they did not. He also said that Walmart reduced prices on thousands of items at the request of his administration. This approach reflects an attempt to manage the economic cost of the conflict rather than relying solely on military measures—especially ahead of midterm elections.

Analysts are divided on the reasons for the delay in military strikes at the start of the weekend. Expert Muhammad Mamdoukh An-Nuwaila believes the administration is using the military threat as a bargaining tool, buying time for regional mediators to de-escalate. Strikes on weekends, he says, allow markets to absorb the news before global trading begins. Mustafa Yusef links the delay to investor behavior: they view limited strikes as short-term events, but understand that any escalation would instantly push up oil and gasoline prices.

The Financial Times notes that as the average US gasoline price approaches $4 per gallon, it could become a “pain point”—a point where the rise stops being a market fluctuation and becomes an everyday problem for the consumer. Onyx Capital analyst Jorge Montepeque warns that exceeding the $4 level could become a “political killer” due to the sensitivity of American voters to fuel prices and their impact on transportation, food, and travel. A critical factor, according to Mustafa Yusef, is not only gasoline, but also the durability of oil prices above $100 per barrel, which would make a return of gasoline below $4 extremely difficult.

The escalation is affecting not just oil and gasoline, but also the cost of shipping and insurance. After attacks on three cargo vessels, premiums for military risk as ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz rose: they now stand at 2–6% of the cost of the vessel, versus less than 1% before February. At peak moments, they can reach 10%. For a tanker worth $100 million, the surcharge for a single voyage could total as much as $6 million. Similar pressure is being felt in the Red Sea, where premiums have increased from 0.4% to around 1%. Some ships are rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, increasing travel time and fuel consumption. Ultimately, these costs are passed on to the prices of goods and to consumers—and even after de-escalation, insurance rates may not immediately return to previous levels.

News comments

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered a strategic chokepoint for global oil trade, and how can Iran influence attempts to block it? — The strait connects the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, and about 20–25% of all global oil passes through it (approximately 17–20 million barrels per day). Iran can influence efforts to block it by: 1) placing naval mines and using fast boats from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; 2) anti-ship missiles (such as “Noor” and “Haličj-e Fars”); 3) threatening to close the strait in response to sanctions or military action. While a full multi-month blockade is unlikely due to US military involvement, even short-term disruptions can drive up global oil prices.

• Why is a crude oil price above $100 per barrel considered a critical threshold after which US gasoline cannot fall below $4 per gallon? — The retail price of gasoline in the US is roughly 50–60% the cost of crude oil; the rest is taxes, refining, and margins. When oil is more expensive than $100/bbl, the cost of producing a gallon of gasoline exceeds $3. Taking into account average taxes (about $0.50 per gallon) and transportation costs, the retail price automatically ends up above $3.80–4.00. Historically, this threshold marks a shock for American consumers: at $100/bbl, gasoline rarely falls below $4 due to the rigid structure of costs.

• How exactly does the rise in military risk insurance premiums for passing through the Strait of Hormuz turn into extra costs for end consumers? — Shipowners are forced to pay higher insurance premiums (sometimes 10–50 times higher than normal) for tankers that go through the conflict zone. These costs are built into the freight rate (the ship charter). Oil traders factor the higher logistics costs into the price per barrel. Next, refineries pass these costs on to wholesale fuel prices, and then retail sellers (gas stations) add their margins. As a result, each dollar of insurance premium incurred at the shipping stage multiplies across the entire chain and reaches the end consumer as higher prices for gasoline, diesel, and goods transported by trucks.

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Full version: نقطة الألم.. هل تجبر أسعار البنزين ترمب على وقف التصعيد مع إيران؟

Trump Threatens Iran With Annihilation While Calling for Talks

U.S. President Donald Trump issued an unprecedented threat to Iran, saying that if it makes any attempt to assassinate him, the country will be completely destroyed. In a post on his Truth Social platform, he wrote that “a thousand missiles are already aimed at Iran, and thousands more are ready to be launched next.” Trump stressed that he had issued the relevant orders, and that the U.S. military “is ready, willing and able, within a year, with the possibility of extension, to completely erase every area of Iran.”

Yet almost immediately, he added that the door to negotiations remains open—though with a condition: the April ceasefire no longer applies.

Such rhetoric has not been heard for the first time. Earlier, Trump spoke of “the destruction of civilization” in Iran if no deal is reached, but then he stepped back, demanding that Tehran agree to a ceasefire. Now, he has officially announced the end of the truce that began in April and confirmed that Iran, allegedly, itself requested new talks. “We agreed, but we made it clear: the ceasefire regime is over,” he said. U.S. media report that negotiators have very little time, and that if dialogue fails, Washington will have “a wide range of options.”

Iran’s response was swift and sharp. Officials in Tehran made it clear that they do not believe the United States and do not consider it possible to continue the dialogue without solid commitments from Washington. Iran’s state television said the country is not prepared for talks because the United States is not meeting the terms of a memorandum of understanding signed on June 18. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament and the chief negotiator, said he personally explained to U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance: “We don’t trust you and we will never give in.”

Amid the escalation, international intermediaries have become more active. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif contacted Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, urging that the “achievements of peace” be preserved and insisting on “restraint, dialogue and diplomacy.” Similar statements were made by Egypt and Qatar, which during telephone talks urged both sides to de-escalate and prevent the conflict from expanding. Iran itself, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has not requested new talks, but does not reject visits by regional mediators. A Qatari delegation has already visited the Iranian city of Mashhad, where it heard Tehran’s position.

The central point of disagreement remains the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi traveled to Oman for talks focused on “the security of navigation” in this strategically important region. According to Iranian media, the visit continues consultations conducted over the past two months. Iranian diplomats at the United Nations signaled that any actions in the strait—whether opening it or clearing mines—are solely Tehran’s prerogative. Iran insists that the previous navigation regime cannot be restored and demands control, including possible “service fees,” which the United States and several other countries categorically reject.

Despite the April agreement on a ceasefire and the June memorandum, the situation remains extremely explosive. The sides are trading threats and showing a complete lack of trust. While Iran sends representatives to consult with its neighbors, and while the United States keeps missiles on standby, the future of negotiations hangs by a thread. The key question—whether diplomacy can prevent a large-scale conflict—remains unanswered.

Comments on the news

• Who is Masoud Pezeshkian and what role does he play in Iran’s political structure? - Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian reformist politician who serves as President of Iran (since 2024). Previously, he was a member of parliament and Minister of Health. In Iran’s political structure, the president is the head of the executive branch, but his powers are limited by the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei), who has the final say on decisions on key state matters. Pezeshkian is known for his moderate and reformist views.
• Why is Mashhad considered an important religious and political center of Iran? - Mashhad is Iran’s largest religious center because it is home to the shrine of Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shi’a Twelvers, which attracts millions of pilgrims every year. The city’s political significance is tied to the fact that it is the capital of the Razavi Khorasan Province and a stronghold of conservative and clerical circles. The influential organization “Astan Quds Razavi” controls major economic and political resources, which strengthens Mashhad’s role in Iranian politics.

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Full version: "A thousand missiles ready".. Trump threatens Iran with annihilation and Tehran confirms it will not give in

Venezuela ignored Japan’s earthquake rescue plan

After the devastating landslide in 1999 that claimed thousands of lives in the La Guaira region, the Venezuelan government turned to Japanese specialists from JICA for help. Over three years, from 2002 to 2005, a team of geologists, engineers, and disaster-prevention experts studied the risks for Caracas and the coastal area. The final report, delivered to President Hugo Chávez, contained not only a grim forecast, but also a clear action plan that could have saved tens of thousands of lives.

According to the document, the geology of northern Caracas and La Guaira is capable of amplifying seismic waves, turning the soil into a resonator. Nearly no buildings met seismic-resilience standards, and hospitals and emergency services were located in particularly dangerous zones. In the worst-case scenario, the scientists predicted up to 20,000 deaths and 40,000 damaged structures. However, the report’s greatest value lay in the recommendations: strengthening buildings, updating building codes, rethinking urban planning, and creating modern response protocols. Despite Venezuela’s oil abundance and adequate resources, none of the key recommendations was implemented—the plan was shelved.

The earthquake on June 24 confirmed the bleakest forecasts: the region was once again at the epicenter of disaster. The article notes that a natural disaster is a natural phenomenon, while catastrophe is the result of human decisions (or the lack of them). Poverty, chaotic development, and disregard for science turned a natural shock into a mass tragedy. The JICA report became more than just a technical document—it was an indictment of the authorities, who preferred to respond rather than prevent.

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Full version: La Guaira, un pecado de omisión

The Fog of War in the Strait of Hormuz: Three Scenarios

After two days of mutual strikes between the United States and Iran, the confrontation has entered an uncertain phase. The intensity of the attacks has dropped compared with the war that began on February 28. The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 faced its most serious test since it took effect: Washington said that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States responded with strikes on more than 170 targets inside Iran over 48 hours, but intermediaries immediately began to rein in escalation. Although Donald Trump declared the ceasefire “over,” communications channels continued to function.

Against this backdrop, a “gray zone” is taking shape over the coming days between war and peace, including three main scenarios. The first is a possible return by Washington and Tehran to the negotiating table with the support of regional mediators. According to Axios, Qatar and Pakistan are actively trying to reduce tension and restart dialogue; Qatar’s negotiators have already traveled to Iran “with U.S. coordination.” A senior U.S. official told Al Jazeera that Washington remains committed to talks and technical consultations toward a permanent agreement. Trump also claimed that Iran asked to “continue the ‘conversations,’” but the United States responded that “the ceasefire is over.”

However, Iran’s foreign ministry denies that it requested new talks and says it only agreed to the visit of a Qatari delegation in order to break the deadlock. Head of Iran’s parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf left the door open, but tied it firmly to the principle of deterrence: “If the Americans violate the understandings, we are ready for total defense and will defend the rights of the Iranian people.” He emphasized that ending the war is a priority for the whole world, but the conflict “will never end in Iran’s capitulation.” Military analyst Alex Alveraz Schirz warns that any negotiations will yield “too little” if at least minimal trust is not restored.

The second scenario is the continuation of “managed escalation,” while maintaining balance at the level of limited strikes. This pattern repeats since April: tension in the strait, then a U.S. strike on Iranian military facilities, followed by a temporary lull that is once again tested. In essence, there is a struggle over the “rules of the road” in Hormuz: Iran does not want a safe route beyond its control to appear near the Omani coast, while the United States seeks to lock in the free passage of ships. Researcher Jessica Geinaur, in an article for The Conversation, predicts an outcome close to a “frozen conflict”: no real ceasefire, no full-scale war—just continued strikes, a partially open and dangerous strait, and unresolved disputes (for example, parallel shipping lanes that the memorandum did not clearly resolve).

The third, least likely but most dangerous scenario is the conflict growing into a large-scale war, especially if strikes hit civilian, oil, and water infrastructure inside Iran. The risk rises sharply if the United States shifts from coastal military targets to vital infrastructure. There is also a threat of a full maritime blockade or the “seizure” of Khark Island. Mohammad Baqer Zul-Kadar, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned: “Attacks on infrastructure will entail similar retaliatory actions.” Indicators of such a scenario include expanding strikes to vital targets, attacks on additional U.S. bases and platforms, and the intermediaries losing the ability to control the tempo—turning restrained responses into an uncontrolled chain reaction.

Of the three options, managed escalation while keeping the door open for negotiations appears to be the most likely in the short term. Both sides are trying to improve their positions rather than get drawn into an endless war. However, the Strait of Hormuz has stopped being just a point on a possible agreement—it has become a daily test of the balance of power between Washington and Tehran. The coming days may be calmer in terms of the number of strikes, but that by no means guarantees a path to peace.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why is it considered one of Iran’s key institutions of power? – The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, it reports directly to the Supreme Leader (rahbar), controls missile forces, intelligence services, and key economic sectors (oil, construction). Its influence goes beyond defense: the IRGC acts as a “state within a state,” shaping Iran’s foreign policy (especially in the Middle East) and suppressing domestic protests. For international audiences, it is important to understand that the IRGC is not just an army, but a tool of ideological and economic domination by the ruling elite.

• Why is Khark Island important for Iran’s economy, and what consequences could its blockade have for the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz? – Khark Island is Iran’s largest oil terminal, through which about 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports pass. Its blockade (for example, during a military conflict) paralyzes Iran’s economy, depriving the country of up to 80% of its hard-currency inflows. For global markets, this will lead to a sharp rise in oil prices and supply instability, since 20–25% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Escalation around Khark and the strait could trigger a large-scale maritime blockade, military clashes involving the U.S. Navy and allies, as well as a temporary closure of the strait—a scenario that would cause an energy crisis in Asia and Europe.

• What exactly was the June 17 Memorandum of Understanding, which—according to the article—was at risk of falling apart? – This refers to a temporary agreement between Iran and the IAEA signed on June 17, 2023, which provided for monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the removal of part of the sanctions. Under it, Tehran allowed the agency’s inspectors access to certain facilities (including disputed centrifuges) and committed not to enrich uranium above 60% for 60 days. However, by the time of the article, the agreement was at risk due to disagreements between the parties: Iran demanded full sanctions relief, while the West insisted on new restrictions. The collapse of the memorandum would have threatened to deepen Iran’s diplomatic isolation and could have sparked another round of nuclear confrontation.

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Full version: هل تتوسع حرب إيران؟ 3 سيناريوهات بعد هجمات مضيق هرمز

Criticism of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Concern for Iran and Fallout for Allies

Global commentary is increasingly sounding like a warning mode: in headlines and assessments, a picture is forming as if Washington’s decisions on Iran and other directions cause not only irritation among partners, but also visible turbulence in the region. The issue is a lack of trust in the course, doubts about the logic of statements, and fears that the chosen line heightens tension rather than stabilizes it—meaning it could reverberate through international diplomacy and security as a whole. Against this backdrop, political and media tension is rising: from criticism of specific steps to talk that allies have little choice but to adapt to a new reality, where risks appear higher than promises.

This material was prepared using information from El País (Venezuela) and YouTube (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan View of Trump, FEMA, Iran, and the Digital Euro

In Venezuela’s information space, several news items from the United States and Europe are being read through a common theme of distrust in Western elites, anxiety about freedoms, and fears that institutions may be politicized. This is especially clear in reactions to a congressional investigation by Democrats in the United States on how the Donald Trump administration used FEMA within its migration agenda, as well as in a critical breakdown of the topics of the digital euro, the Iran crisis, and the rise of Wall Street, published on YouTube.

In a report from El País, it is emphasized that U.S. Democrats accuse Trump of weakening the disaster-aid system to carry out ICE and CBP operations. Greg Stanton called the report “accusatory” and said that after cutting a third of FEMA’s staff, the administration turned emergency specialists into an “operational backbone” for mass deportations. For a Venezuelan reader, this sounds like a warning that state structures created to save people in a crisis can be subordinated to a political campaign, leaving vulnerable groups—those affected by hurricanes and floods or migrants—among the first to go unprotected.

This narrative is especially sensitive for Venezuela, where migration, institutional shortages, and dependence on humanitarian assistance have long become part of everyday experience. Therefore, relocating FEMA personnel to migration-control tasks is perceived not as a technical solution, but as a direct blow to the very logic of state assistance. A report on reducing roughly 30% of FEMA’s staff and difficulties responding to floods in Texas only intensifies this impression: through a Venezuelan lens, it resembles a familiar picture of public services breaking down—when personnel and logistics problems quickly grow into a political crisis.

Against this backdrop, the story about Europe, Iran, and markets is presented even more sharply. In a report on URL, the digital euro is described as a potential tool of control: with “limités máximos de posesión,” surveillance of transactions, and a reduced role for cash. For Venezuela—which has experienced hyperinflation, shortages of cash, currency restrictions, and chronic distrust of the banking system—the idea of “programmable” money is automatically associated here with the risk of losing personal freedom and control over savings. As a result, the digital euro in this context looks less like technological modernization and more like a possible mechanism for managing citizens’ behavior.

The same suspicious perspective extends to Europe as a whole. The phrase about “gran traición de Europa” sets a frame in which the EU is seen not as an independent actor, but as part of a broader system of pressure and financial restructuring of the world. For a Venezuelan audience, this resonates with the experience of sanctions, external pressure, and financial isolation—when Western institutions are perceived as selective protectors of democracy and human rights.

The Iran story is also read through a perspective familiar to Venezuela: U.S. inconsistency. The report says Washington allegedly “takes a step back,” trying to contain escalation without formally pulling Israel into a new campaign. In Venezuelan understanding, this fits into a broader critique of American policy: the U.S. can ignite crises and then retreat when geopolitical risks grow or when markets become nervous. For a country that itself regularly sees Washington as a source of regional instability, this interpretation looks entirely expected.

The economic layer of the news also received a Venezuelan interpretation. Wall Street’s renewed appetite for risk and growing interest in AI stocks are framed as a reminder that global markets live in a different reality than Latin America. In Venezuela, such messages are often met with irony: global exchanges quickly switch to new trends, while for countries under sanctions, with a weak currency, and dependent on commodities, geopolitics remains a question of survival. Against this contrast, the distance between financial “normalization” in the North and the chronic vulnerability of the South is especially noticeable.

What unites all these news items is a single underlying concern: fear that institutions, money, and security are being turned into instruments of political control. In the case of FEMA, that would mean subordinating a humanitarian function to a migration agenda; in the case of the digital euro, it means increased financial oversight; in the case of Iran and Wall Street, the suspicion is that foreign-policy maneuvers and market optimism conceal instability and double standards. That is why the Venezuelan reaction to these stories sounds not like a simple recounting of facts, but like a warning that power, control, and vulnerability are tightly intertwined today.

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IEA: US-Iran conflict threatens expected oil surplus by 2027

The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that the resumption of hostilities between the United States and Iran could dash hopes of turning the global oil market into one with a substantial supply surplus by 2027. The reason is disruptions to tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important sea routes for delivering “black gold.” According to the agency, this conflict has been the cause of the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil industry.

In June 2025, a temporary truce between Washington and Tehran partially reopened the strait, giving the market a brief reprieve. Based on IEA data, global oil supplies rose by 4.1 million barrels per day, but they were still 9.4 million barrels per day below pre-war levels. However, new clashes on July 7–8 again clouded prospects for steady supplies over the following year.

Before the escalation, the IEA had forecast that by 2027 global supply would increase by 7.5 million barrels per day, leading to a significant surplus of fuel on the market. But that scenario depended directly on normalization of tanker passage through Hormuz and the restoration of export capacity by producers. Now, according to agency representatives, renewed fighting calls even the near-term plans into question.

Amid instability in the Middle East, IEA head Fatih Birol urged the European Union to reconsider its strict ban on searching for new oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Speaking in Brussels after meeting Norway’s finance minister, he stressed that the world needs “every drop of Norwegian oil”—especially in a situation where key supply routes are under threat.

At the same time, the EU is pursuing the opposite policy: since October 2021, the bloc has been calling for oil, coal and gas to remain underground, including Arctic areas. The European Commission has begun reviewing its Arctic strategy, but six major institutional investors are insisting on keeping the restrictions. They argue that even if exploration begins quickly, new fields will not be able to provide additional oil in the near future, while they would seriously harm a fragile ecosystem that is warming three times faster than the global average.

Comments on the news

• What are Iran’s current oil production and export volumes compared with the pre-war period, and how do sanctions limit the country’s ability to restore supplies? — Before the United States reimposed sanctions in 2018, Iran produced around 3.8–3.9 million barrels per day and exports reached 2.5–2.8 million barrels. By 2024, production had fallen to 3.2–3.4 million barrels per day, and exports to 1.3–1.6 million. A significant portion goes through “gray” schemes (transferring cargo to tankers with disabled transponders, sales via intermediaries to China, Syria and Venezuela). Sanctions limit Iran’s access to the international banking system (SWIFT), tanker insurance and the modernization of oil infrastructure, which prevents the country from rapidly scaling up legal supplies back to pre-war levels.

• Why is the Strait of Hormuz so strategically important for Iran, and what steps could Tehran take to block it or destabilize shipping? — About 20–25% of the world’s seaborne oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and for Iran it is the “Achilles’ heel” of the Persian Gulf: any disruption to shipping instantly crashes global energy prices, giving Tehran leverage. Iran could use a combined playbook: mining the area, swarming fast boats (such as “homemade torpedoes”), employing shore-based anti-ship missiles (for example, “Noor” or “Khalij-e Fars”), and launching suicide drones. However, a full blockade is unlikely due to the risk of a U.S. and allied military response—more likely, the focus would be on targeted attacks or demonstrations of force to extract concessions in negotiations.

• What alternative routes for exporting oil exist for Iran if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked for an extended period (such as pipelines or ports in the Gulf of Oman)? — The main alternative is a pipeline from oil fields in the south-west (for example, Gure) to the Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman coast, which opened in 2021. But its throughput is limited (about 300–500 thousand barrels per day versus 2.5 million barrels through the strait). Iran also uses the port of Bandar Abbas to transship oil onto smaller tankers, which can then move around the strait, but that is more expensive and slower. Another route is land shipments via oil pipelines into Turkey (closed since 2019 due to sanctions) or through Iraq, but these options are unreliable due to political instability. Overall, Iran’s infrastructure is designed for exports through the strait, and a complete substitute does not exist.

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Full version: تصعيد هرمز يهدد فائض النفط المتوقع في 2027

Venezuela after the earthquake: damage, investment and challenges

A double earthquake that struck Venezuela on June 24 caused massive damage: according to a technical report by UNDRR, direct physical losses were estimated at around $37 billion. Of this total, about $24 billion is linked to destroyed residential, commercial, educational, medical and industrial buildings, as well as infrastructure facilities. The disaster affected nearly 6.8 million people. To rebuild the country, it will require multi-billion-dollar investment in key sectors: $5 billion for telecommunications, $3.1 billion for energy, $2.1 billion for roads and railways, $1.6 billion for water supply and sanitation, $1 billion for oil and gas, and another $300 million for ports and airports.

The author recalls that back in 2005, at the request of the Venezuelan government, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) prepared the “Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention in the Metropolitan District of Caracas.” However, that document—containing forecasts and recommendations for strengthening structures—ended up staying on paper: the technical opinions of specialists, including Dr. Carlos Henatiosis, were ignored. Now, the author argues, the country has no economic resources to carry out reconstruction on its own due to the macroeconomic policies of the past 27 years, which puts the quality of planning and project execution at risk.

The article goes beyond dry statistics, suggesting that the catastrophe should be seen as a challenge for Venezuela’s modernization and institutionalization. The author emphasizes that recovery will require bringing in the best minds, abandoning sectarianism and populism, and taking a long-term approach. As a specific step, the author proposes creating a “Humanitarian Fund for the Reconstruction of Venezuela,” to be managed transparently, honestly, and with a high degree of accountability. It is precisely now, the author believes, that a “window of opportunity” has opened—not just to patch the gaps, but to lay the foundations for the country’s sustainable development.

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Full version: Modernización, institucionalización y terremoto

Iranian Slogans of “Death to Traitors” at Khamenei’s Funeral Split the Elite

At the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Mashhad, shortly before the burial, not only the customary calls of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” were heard, but also a new slogan—“Death to Traitors.” The shout reflected the sharp internal struggle over a possible deal with Washington, and added heightened sensitivity to the negotiations within one of the most symbolic political ceremonies in Iran. The dispute spilled beyond government offices and became street knowledge—charged with emotion and political fervor.

During the mourning ceremony in Tehran, President Masud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi were met with hostile chants: “Death to the merchant” and “Death to the traitor who sold the homeland.” A wave of outrage also reached the speaker of parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—an establishment conservative whom radicals also consider involved in the negotiation process. In this way, three key figures—political, diplomatic, and institutional—found themselves targeted for embodying a course of dialogue with America.

Attacks on Ghalibaf are especially telling, as he does not belong to reformers or moderates, but represents the traditional conservative wing. However, his inclusion in the “top three” alongside Pezeshkian and Araghchi turned the speaker into a target for ultra-conservatives. In their view, anyone who supports negotiations—regardless of political background—becomes a “traitor.” This means the fight is not only about government rhetoric, but about the entire framework of the system through which diplomatic outcomes are carried out.

Analyst and journalist Reza Ghabishavi, in a comment for Al Jazeera, emphasized that such slogans should be understood as expressions of radical forces that exist in any open society. He noted that he has “serious indicators” of these forces’ ability to influence policy beyond ordinary pressure. They are furious at the government’s talks and demand that dialogue be halted and that the war continue until “Trump is defeated and Israel is destroyed,” which he said is unrealistic even for moderate conservatives.

International relations professor Abbas Aslani argues that opposition to negotiations is not limited to political circles and has a real mass base. In his view, rejection is based on two reasons: the belief that Americans do not keep their commitments, and anger over recent events that have intensified suspicions toward Washington. At the same time, a significant part of Iranians—both supporters and the wavering—assess any agreement from an economic standpoint: will it lift sanctions, improve people’s lives, and prevent war?

In the context of the talks, a major economic package is being discussed, including an investment fund of $300 billion for reconstruction and development, funded by the private sector, with an emphasis on energy, logistics, manufacturing, and transportation. However, according to Aslani, radicals doubt the feasibility of such promises, especially under the Trump administration. They point to earlier U.S. steps in Gaza, Ukraine, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, as well as the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal.

Thus, the slogans “Death to Traitors” and insults aimed at Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Ghalibaf are not merely a flare-up of anger. They indicate that the battle over the deal has shifted from the elite level to organized street politics, where slogans become a tool of pressure, and the price of diplomacy turns into an element of an internal struggle over the meaning of “resistance” and the boundaries of negotiations after an armed conflict.

Comments on the news

• What does the slogan “Death to Traitors” mean in Iran’s political culture, and why did it ring out specifically at the funeral of the former Supreme Leader? — This slogan is part of revolutionary rhetoric rooted in the events of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It symbolizes rejection of those whom power or the crowd regards as collaborators or opponents of Islamic rule. At the funeral of a former Supreme Leader (for example, Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989), it was not heard as a personal insult to the deceased, but as a demonstration of mass political vigilance: at the moment of the transfer of power, the crowd emphasized loyalty to the course and warned against possible “traitors” among elites. This is a typical Iranian way of legitimizing a successor through street loyalty.

• How do political factions in Iran differ (reformers, moderate conservatives, and ultra-conservatives), and how does their stance toward negotiations with the U.S. affect the internal struggle? — Reformers (for example, Mohammad Khatami) advocate greater social freedom and dialogue with the West as a way to lift sanctions. Moderate conservatives (such as Hasan Rouhani) support negotiations but with regard for the principles of the revolution, seeking pragmatic deals. Ultra-conservatives (the hardline wing, such as Ibrahim Raisi) view any concessions to the U.S. as betrayal and demand an economy of resistance. Their struggle intensifies precisely in the context of negotiations: each faction uses the topic of the U.S. as a tool to discredit opponents—reformers are accused of naivety, while ultra-conservatives are accused of isolationism that destroys the economy.

• Why did Ali Khamenei’s funeral take place in Mashhad, and what significance does this city have for the Shiite world and Iranian political symbolism? — Mashhad is the second holy city of Shiism after Karbala, where the shrine of Imam Reza (the eighth Imam) is located. For Iranian political symbolism, Mashhad represents the link between the institution of the Supreme Leadership (rahbar) and popular religious sentiment. Holding the funeral there underscores that the deceased leader was not just a politician, but a religious authority. In addition, Mashhad has historically been considered the “cradle” of conservative clericalism, so choosing this city strengthens legitimacy in the eyes of the most traditionalist segments—unlike more secular Tehran.

• What is the investment fund of $300 billion mentioned in the article, and how realistic are such economic promises under existing sanctions? — Most likely, this refers to the so-called National Development Fund (NDFI)—a reserve drawn from oil revenues intended for non-oil projects. However, its actual volume is much smaller than what is promised (usually 15–30% of the stated figures due to sanctions constraints and corruption). Under sanctions, such promises are part of populist rhetoric: they mobilize domestic support, but are not backed by real liquidity. A significant portion of the fund is frozen abroad or devalued by inflation. Therefore, for an external analyst, these figures should be viewed as a political statement rather than a verified budget.

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Full version: From Mashhad to Tehran.. Iranian street slogans open a battle over a deal with Washington

Trump’s Hardline Foreign Policy: Iran, Allies, and the Fallout

In this episode, attention focuses on how the US president’s tough line on the world stage triggers a wave of reactions and doubts—especially in light of the situation around Iran, talk of pressuring allies, and efforts to shape relationships through the logic of deals and ultimatums. The central concern is that this style of diplomacy does not merely heighten tensions, but can also drive entire regions into a spiral of escalation, leaving other countries with only two options: coordinate urgently and give way, or find ways to circumvent decisions dictated by “force.” At the same time, some politicians and commentators emphasize not direct confrontation, but how to build one’s own position by “managing” Trump—or trying to benefit from the chaotic signals coming from his team. The piece is based on publications from www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and actualidad.rt.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela reads Trump’s agenda as a threat to the region

In Venezuela’s media landscape, Donald Trump is seen not only as the US president, but also as a figure who can intensify international tension and create new risks for Latin America. In the episode linked here, the emphasis is not on a dry chronicle of decisions coming out of Washington, but on what consequences his approach could have for a region that, in Caracas, is traditionally viewed as vulnerable to pressure from the United States.

At the center of the discussion is analyst Rodolfo Sánchez Ascorbe, with whom they discuss Trump’s “dangerous decisions,” the likelihood of increased global instability, and how this could affect the United States’ relations with other powers. For a Venezuelan audience, such a conversation is especially sensitive: the history of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, attempts at isolation, and Caracas’s ongoing conflict with Washington make any hard line from the White House feel not abstract, but directly tied to the domestic political agenda.

Against this backdrop, the Venezuelan lens highlights several meanings. First, in Venezuela, such storylines are usually viewed as part of a broader picture of the American “coercive” approach—an approach that may affect not only Iran or global alliances, but also the countries of the region. Second, a possible tightening of US foreign policy has direct implications for Caracas due to the sanctions-driven economy, the oil sector, and the constant risk of new restrictions on trade and finance. Third, the image of an “emperor” in the title strongly resonates with local anti-hegemony rhetoric, where Washington is often portrayed as a force imposing decisions through pressure rather than through dialogue.

The theme of strategic pressure on the US’s allies also stands out in Venezuela’s reading. In the material from Actualidad RT here, Venezuela’s reaction to Trump’s threats toward Spain is presented not so much as a dispute over Rota and Morón, but as an example of the same coercion style that, in Caracas, has long been associated with Washington: commercial pressure tactics, ultimatums, and the use of allies as a tool of subordination. Trump’s line about “this is a hopeless case… stop all trade with Spain” is understood in the Venezuelan context as a demonstration of how an American leader can use trade and security as levers to enforce political discipline.

Equally important is the response from the Spanish government. The fact that Pedro Sánchez refused to allow the use of bases to escalate the conflict in the Middle East and called the attacks against Iran “an illegal war,” from a Venezuelan perspective, looks like a gesture of autonomy from the United States and NATO. Against this backdrop, it becomes especially noticeable that the EU has “closed ranks” around Madrid: from Caracas, this can be read as a reminder that European allies know how to protect their own—while in similar situations Venezuela has faced isolation and sanctions pressure.

The piece also emphasizes the strategic role of the Rota and Morón bases for the logistics of the US armed forces. For a Venezuelan reader, this is not just a detail about military infrastructure, but an illustration of a broader pattern: even a superpower depends on agreements with other countries, and those agreements become vulnerable if the political climate changes. That is why, in the Venezuelan interpretation, the dispute involving Spain becomes a lesson about how US influence works—and how easily it can turn into an instrument of punishment.

In the end, both the episode about Trump and the reaction to his threats toward Spain converge on one point: in Caracas, both storylines are read through the experience of their own confrontation with the United States. This is not only about Washington’s foreign policy, but also about Venezuela’s concern for regional stability, the economy, and room for maneuver. Any new round of hardline moves from the White House here is seen as a possible strengthening of pressure on Latin America as a whole.

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Qatar steps up diplomacy to de-escalate the US-Iran conflict

On Thursday, Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, held a series of phone calls with the foreign ministers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and Turkey. The key focus was the escalation of tensions between Washington and Tehran, as well as finding ways to reduce the conflict. Qatar stressed the need to stick to dialogue and diplomacy as the only way to overcome the crisis and strengthen regional stability.

During the talks, including with Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, developments amid the military standoff were discussed. Sheikh Muhammad strongly condemned attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz, saying such actions are unacceptable even in the context of attempts to lower tensions. He urged all sides to honor previously reached understandings and memoranda to ensure security and stability in the region.

Against this backdrop, on Wednesday US President Donald Trump said that the ceasefire regime reached with Iran on June 17 had effectively lapsed. He promised to deliver “powerful strikes” after Washington accused Tehran of firing on three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Mutual threats and a show of military force followed from both sides.

Already on Thursday, the United States carried out a second wave of strikes on Iranian targets, hitting, according to the US Central Command, about 90 military sites. In response, Tehran said it launched missile attacks on US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. The conflict is increasingly spreading across the region, threatening sea routes and infrastructure. Qatar, for its part, continues diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing the sides back to negotiations and preventing the crisis from further spiraling.

Comments on the news

• What exactly were the terms of the June 17 ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran, and why, according to Trump, did it stop being in effect? — The agreement, brokered by Oman in 2023, provided for Iran to freeze uranium enrichment up to 60% and for it to refrain from further provocations in the region in exchange for the unfreezing of $6 billion in Iranian assets in South Korea for humanitarian purchases. Trump, speaking about it as a presidential candidate, said the deal “stopped being in effect” after Iran, in his view, violated the spirit of the agreement by increasing missile launches and supporting proxy forces (for example, Yemen’s Houthis) during the conflict in Gaza. However, officially the agreement was informal and was not terminated — rather, it “faded” amid mutual accusations.

• What role does Abbas Araghchi play in Iran’s nuclear diplomacy, and why is his participation in talks with Qatar significant for understanding Tehran’s position? — Abbas Araghchi is Iran’s deputy foreign minister and the chief negotiator on the nuclear program, who previously took part in concluding the JCPOA (2015). His key role is maintaining a diplomatic channel with Western countries through intermediaries such as Qatar, while keeping a hard line on uranium enrichment. His participation in talks with Doha is significant because Qatar serves as a neutral platform for probing the positions of the US and Europe, especially amid heightened tensions after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018). Araghchi confirms that Tehran is not backing away from dialogue, but requires sanctions relief as a preliminary condition, reflecting a “maximum pressure, reversed” strategy.

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Full version: Qatar’s international contacts to lower tensions between Washington and Tehran

Trump posts old video of Rubio criticizing socialism as a con

U.S. President Donald Trump shared on his Truth Social account a 2020 speech in which the current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, calls “democratic socialism” a Marxist ideology built on a false promise: in exchange for citizens’ personal freedom, they are offered security, free healthcare, and education—but once those in power fail to deliver, it is no longer possible to reclaim the rights that were lost. Rubio stresses that real freedom is not limited to elections—it is the right to choose a doctor, decide on children’s education, and have a say in key decisions in life. When the state concentrates such power, people lose the ability to choose, without receiving the guaranteed benefits.

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Full version: Trump comparte un video de Marco Rubio del 2020 donde rechaza el socialismo: Tiene sus raíces en el marxismo y se basa en una promesa engañosa

New U.S. Strikes on Iran: escalation or a war-at-the-edge game?

A recent wave of U.S. airstrikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliatory actions have once again raised the question of whether the current standoff will grow into a full-scale war or remain a limited conflict amid negotiations. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had completed a series of strikes on 90 targets, including air-defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, stockpiles of missiles and drones, and naval infrastructure. In its statement, CENTCOM emphasized that the actions were a response to Iran’s violation of a ceasefire arrangement, when three commercial vessels were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, and that they were intended to force Tehran to pay a steep price.

In response, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it carried out strikes on key facilities at U.S. bases “Arifjan” and “Ali al-Salem” in Kuwait, as well as “Al Jafair” and “Sheikh Isa” in Bahrain. Iranian military officials warned that if aggression is repeated, their response would be expanded and cover other American bases in the region. Both sides accuse each other of violating a previously signed memorandum of understanding, and U.S. President Donald Trump said the document “has lapsed” amid the current tensions.

According to Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid, there is a clear trend toward escalation: the first wave of strikes hit 80 targets in four hours, while the second hit 90 targets in six hours. The analyst noted that the United States is not seeking “traditional military operations,” as it did before the ceasefire, but is using a new tactic he calls “easy hunting.” This approach focuses on hitting high-value, rather than numerous, targets—allowing the political and financial costs to be reduced and avoiding a direct clash with Iran.

Abu Zeid also points out that Washington is deliberately calling these actions “strikes,” not an “operation,” to get around the requirement for approval by Congress. In his view, selecting high-value targets is meant to weaken the IRGC’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Iran, unwilling to start a full-scale war, demonstrates a symmetrical response by attacking traditional targets in Gulf countries rather than directly targeting American warships, which makes its retaliatory measures cheaper.

Brigadier General Ilyas Hanna emphasizes that the range of U.S. strikes has expanded, reaching such strategically important areas as Bushehr, where the “Assaluyeh” plant is located, providing 70% of gas supply for Iran’s power sector. He believes Iran’s retaliatory actions—based on control of the Strait of Hormuz and “horizontal escalation” toward countries in the region—are extremely dangerous. In Hanna’s view, destroying the IRGC’s sea forces in the strait could restore shipping, but if President Trump decides to intensify pressure, there could be an attempt at a naval blockade of Iran.

Despite expectations of war resuming, Ilyas Hanna believes both sides are, for now, operating in a “gray zone” and are not fully willing to break the memorandum of understanding. According to him, Washington and Tehran are “negotiating under fire” because of the ambiguity of the points in that document, and the Strait of Hormuz has become the arena for such a “bargain with force.” Notably, CENTCOM said the strikes were carried out from warships using precision-guided missiles, while, in the analyst’s view, Iran prefers targets in Kuwait and Bahrain—avoiding direct attacks on American ships in the region.

News comments

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why is it a key force in Iran’s political and economic system, including its influence on foreign policy and defense? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls the missile program, nuclear infrastructure, and key economic sectors (energy, construction, finance) through companies under its control. They directly influence foreign policy by supporting allied forces in Lebanon (“Hezbollah”), Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, enabling Tehran to project influence abroad. IRGC leadership often holds high government posts, making it an independent center of power.

• Why is the “Assaluyeh” gas-processing complex near Bushehr considered critical for Iran’s energy supply, and how does its vulnerability affect Tehran’s strategy? — “Assaluyeh” is the largest gas-processing hub located on the shore of the Persian Gulf. It processes gas from the South Pars field, the world’s largest, accounting for about 70% of Iran’s gas production. The complex supplies power to cities, industry, and export shipments. Its vulnerability (for example, in the event of military strikes or sabotage) forces Tehran to disperse facilities, strengthen air defenses, and diversify export routes (including smuggling supplies through Oman). Iran’s strategy includes maintaining control over “Assaluyeh” as a bargaining chip in negotiations and as a threat of regional destabilization if it is attacked.

• What is the “memorandum of understanding” between the United States and Iran mentioned in the article, and what circumstances led to its signing and subsequent breakdown? — In the context of Iranian-U.S. relations, a “memorandum of understanding” usually refers to unwritten or confidential arrangements reached through intermediaries (for example, Oman, Qatar). In 2023–2024, a draft was discussed: Iran would limit uranium enrichment (to 60% or lower) and would stop supporting attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf, while the U.S. would unfreeze Iranian assets (about $6 billion) and ease some sanctions. The signing became possible due to mutual interest in reducing escalation (including Israel’s military actions against Iranian sites and the crisis in Yemen). The breakdown happened after the Gaza conflict escalated (October 2023), when Iran intensified proxy forces and the United States imposed new sanctions and deployed a military formation to the region, making compromise politically impossible for both sides.

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Full version: Iranian-American escalation.. Will there still be “comfortable hunting” in the “gray zone”?

A Victory Parade and a Period of Mourning: Iran and the US Await a Deal

As the streets of Tehran filled with hundreds of thousands of mourners at the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, US President Donald Trump in Washington turned the celebration of Independence Day into a triumphant statement about “total victory” over Iran. Delaying his remarks because of a storm, Trump announced that American forces “sank the entire Iranian fleet — 159 ships — and did it in an instant.” As The Guardian notes, the evening became “the strangest show on Earth”: talk of freedom was mixed with personal grievances, election rhetoric, warnings about “communism,” and ended with 850,000 fireworks to the song YMCA.

In Iran, the mourning ceremony lasted an entire week and spread across five cities — from Tehran and Qom to Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad. Despite a massive display of unity, the roster of foreign delegations was more modest than expected: Moscow was represented by Dmitry Medvedev rather than Vladimir Putin; Beijing limited itself to a deputy head of a parliamentary committee; and among top officials, only the presidents of Tajikistan and Iraq and the foreign minister of the Taliban were present. This gave analysts reason to say that the “axis of resistance” is no longer as monolithic as it has been trying to present itself.

According to Time magazine, the political subtext of the funeral is an attempt to cover a vacuum of power and “forget” last winter’s protests by mobilizing loyal support in an alternative way. Notably, the new Supreme Leader — the son of Mojtaba Khamenei — did not appear at the funeral of his father, preferring to stay in the shadows. This only intensified rumors of an internal struggle within Iran’s ruling elite and the idea that the “great farewell” has become more of a tool for legitimization than a sincere act of mourning.

Against the backdrop of these two spectacles, real diplomacy is taking shape. On June 17, a 14-point framework agreement was signed that is not a peace deal, but merely extends the ceasefire regime for 60 days. The memorandum provides for the complete cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including the Israel–“Hezbollah” front, as well as the resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. However, the nuclear dossier — the fate of highly enriched uranium, the right to enrich, the lifting of sanctions, and the unblocking of billions in assets — has been deferred to technical negotiations, which are being conducted under the pressure of time.

Symbolic messages from both capitals narrow the space for compromise: Trump, who said “I beat Iran,” risks getting trapped by his own rhetoric if he has to agree to a partial sanctions rollback. For its part, Tehran, using the funeral to demonstrate mass support, may drag its feet on concessions, fearing it will look weak. Each side is held hostage by its own performance.

Nevertheless, mutual needs remain obvious. Iran urgently needs billions in frozen funds and the resumption of exports through the Strait of Hormuz to save its economy. The United States needs stability in oil markets and diplomatic success that will validate the narrative of “victory” and prevent the resumption of war. Without a deal, both sides will lose — both technologically and politically.

The key takeaway is that neither fireworks in Washington nor funeral processions in Tehran can erase the harsh reality of the negotiation room. What will matter most in the next 60 days is whether loud rhetoric can make way for a pragmatic compromise written away from cameras and podiums. Or will spectacle take precedence over substance, drawing the region into a new spiral of uncertainty?

Comments on the news

• Why did funeral processions in honor of Ali Khamenei take place not only in Iranian cities (Tehran, Qom, Mashhad), but also in Iraqi Najaf and Karbala? What significance do these cities have for the Shiite world and for Iranian power? - Najaf and Karbala are sacred cities of Shiism: in Najaf lies the shrine of Imam Ali (the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Shiite Imam), while in Karbala there is the shrine of Imam Hussein (his grandson, who died a martyr’s death). For the Iranian regime, holding ceremonies in these cities is a way to strengthen religious authority and underscore Iran’s cross-border influence over Shiite communities, especially in Iraq, where Tehran traditionally has significant political and military leverage (through ties with local parties and militias).

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, and why, after becoming the new Supreme Leader, did he not attend the funeral of his father? What does this indicate about internal struggle within Iran’s elite? - Mojtaba Khamenei (born 1969) is the son of the late Supreme Leader; until recently he served as the head of an influential religious foundation and was considered a potential successor. According to the official account, his absence from the funeral was due to the need to ensure “security and continuity of power.” However, it may also point to hidden disagreements within Iran’s elite: some conservatives fear strengthening a clan-based model of succession, while other factions (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) may insist on the collective selection of the leader.

• What “protests last winter” is the article referring to? How did these events (connected to the death of Mahsa Amini) affect the regime’s legitimacy, and why are they trying to “forget” them through alternative mobilization? - This refers to the mass protests of “Woman, Life, Freedom” (2022–2023), which began after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in a police station following her alleged improper hijab. Those demonstrations became the most serious challenge to Iran’s theocratic system since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: they called not only the hijab law into question, but also the very legitimacy of the religious leadership. The authorities are trying to “rewrite” the memory of the protests through alternative mobilization — organizing large mourning processions, patriotic rallies, and religious ceremonies to create the impression of public support and overshadow the image of a repressive regime.

• Why was Russia represented at the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader by Dmitry Medvedev rather than Vladimir Putin? What does this characterize about the current level of Iran–Russia relations and the diplomatic signals between Moscow and Tehran? - The choice of Medvedev (who serves as Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council) instead of President Putin is a typical protocol practice for official high-level state mourning events: leaders generally do not attend another country’s funeral to avoid creating an unnecessary diplomatic focus. Nevertheless, it is also a signal that despite strategic partnership (especially in military and energy spheres), Moscow is keeping its distance: sending a former president rather than an incumbent allows Russia to show respect without excessive closeness that could highlight how dependent Russia might be on Iranian support under sanctions.

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Full version: بين واشنطن وطهران.. فيمَ تكمن رسائل الألعاب النارية ومواكب النعوش؟

Venezuela assesses the plan to clear rubble in La Guaira after earthquakes

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez held a working meeting with national and international authorities to coordinate the phases of a plan to clear and remove debris in the state of La Guaira. The meeting was attended by the secretaries for public works and digital government, as well as the head of the commission responsible for assessing the suitability of infrastructure. International technical support was provided by Israel’s Ambassador Gassan Tarif and a representative of that country’s technical commission, Elad Edri, to optimize logistical protocols ahead of the rollout of work in the affected areas.

The assessments are based on a diagnosis carried out jointly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which identified the total volume of construction debris in the coastal region at 1,025,000 tons. About 900,000 tons are accounted for by destroyed concrete and steel structures, while the remainder is damaged household property of affected families. The strategy provides for the use of controlled demolition methods and the safe processing of waste, aimed at restoring urban spaces while ensuring protection for local communities.

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Full version: Evalúan del Plan de Remoción de Escombros en La Guaira tras eventos sísmicos

Oil jumps 5% on U.S.-Iran conflict in the Strait of Hormuz

On Wednesday, global oil prices surged sharply by more than 5% amid heightened military tension between the United States and Iran. The price of the benchmark Brent climbed by $3.9 to reach $78.1 per barrel, while U.S. WTI rose by $3.5 to $74.15. Investors are concerned about the security of supplies from the Persian Gulf region after Washington revoked a license to sell Iranian oil, and both sides exchanged strikes.

The escalation began when the United States carried out airstrikes on Iranian facilities in response to attacks on three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. In retaliation, Iran’s armed forces, through the “Khatam al-Anbia” command, said that any country that provides its territory for an attack on Iran would be considered a “lawful target.” Both sides continue to accuse each other of aggression, and the situation in the strait remains extremely tense.

In Tuesday’s move, the U.S. Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), banned any new transactions involving Iranian oil starting July 7. The decision отменяет a temporary license issued on June 21 for 60 days that allowed the sale of Iranian crude. Earlier, a similar relaxation had been introduced after a temporary peace agreement and was in effect until August 21. Now the United States is tightening sanctions pressure.

According to media reports, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has attacked the third commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, using drones and short-range missiles. The British Maritime Trade Operations centre confirmed a new incident involving an oil tanker. The U.S. military shot down several Iranian drones. In response, the Joint Maritime Information Centre raised the threat level in the strait to “high,” warning of ongoing attacks and drone activity.

Oil and energy expert Hashim Akhl noted that current events in the Strait of Hormuz directly threaten global energy security, especially liquefied natural gas supplies to Europe. The price rise gained momentum after the day before, prices had increased by 3%. Meanwhile, talks between Washington and Tehran, initiated with mediation by Pakistan and Qatar, have not yet led to any easing, and data from the American Petroleum Institute pointed to a smaller-than-expected decline in U.S. crude inventories.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s political and military structure? — The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader (Rahbar) and has its own land, naval, and air forces, as well as the “Quds” units responsible for operations abroad. The IRGC plays a key role not only in defense but also in politics and the economy (through control of major companies) and in suppressing internal protests, making it one of the most influential institutions in Iran’s system of power.

• Why were intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar chosen for talks between the U.S. and Iran, rather than, for example, countries in the Persian Gulf? — The choice of intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar is due to their neutral status and historical ties with both sides. Qatar has traditionally served as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world, has diplomatic relations with Tehran and friendly ties with Washington. Pakistan, for its part, supports dialogue with Iran (through cultural and economic connections) and is a U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism. Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE are in direct regional conflict with Iran (for example, over Yemen), which makes them less suitable to play the role of impartial mediators.

• What is the “Khatam al-Anbia” command and what are its functions in Iran’s air defense system? — The “Khatam al-Anbia” command (also known as HAAAP) is a unified, centralized Iranian air-defense structure created to coordinate all of the country’s air-defense assets: missile systems, anti-aircraft artillery, and radar stations. Its functions include monitoring airspace, managing fire, protecting nuclear facilities, military bases, and strategic infrastructure, as well as integrating purchased Russian systems (for example, S-300) with local developments (for example, “Bavar-373”). This allows Iran to build a layered defense to repel airstrikes by a potential adversary.

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Full version: النفط يقفز بأكثر من 5% بعد هجمات متبادلة بين أمريكا وإيران

US defeat at the World Cup: scandal, criticism, and mockery of “American ambitions”

The story of the United States team’s elimination from the World Cup quickly went beyond an ordinary sports recap: international attention converged on disappointment, unpleasant episodes, and a growing wave of criticism. Not only the results of the matches came under scrutiny, but also questions about the coaching staff’s work—and how the team is perceived at a moment when more is expected of it. Amid controversial decisions and sharp assessments, there are also biting comments from abroad: instead of a “typical” defeat, the American dream is being turned into a story about overreach and excessive pomp—pomp that has now become a reason for mockery. Read in today’s roundup about how confidence disappears, and why successes are suddenly being read as a failure of ambition.

This material was prepared based on publications from www.goal.com (Venezuela), es.euronews.com (Venezuela), and as.com (Venezuela).

Venezuela laughs at the US failure at the 2026 World Cup

In Venezuela’s interpretation, the US team’s failure at the 2026 World Cup became not just a sporting setback, but a symbolic collapse of the entire idea of the “American dream” on the football pitch. Alongside the 1-4 loss to Belgium and the team’s exit from the tournament, Venezuelan coverage—including a post on Goal—emphasizes that this is an event that in the region is being received with irony, sarcasm, and an obvious enjoyment in watching the image of the US as a country that can automatically turn resources, organization, and ambition into success collapse.

After the defeat, Mauricio Pochettino did not hide his disappointment. He admitted that the team “was not up to the mark,” took responsibility, and left the question of his future open. His words sounded like a direct self-assessment of the failure: “Responsibility lies with me,” “we must analyze what happened,” and “we did not show our style of play.” At the same time, he did not ignore mitigating circumstances: an injury to Christian Pulisic, Seržino Dest’s poor form, and mistakes by goalkeeper Matt Freese. Still, the overall tone was unmistakable—this was a defeat that shattered expectations and noticeably cooled talk about the future of the project.

In Venezuela, this story is read much more broadly than simply as a report on a failed match. Here, the US loss is seen as confirmation of old criticism of the American model of supremacy: big money, loud statements, and powerful infrastructure do not always translate into real victories. That is why the tournament hosts’ collapse is perceived as a painful blow to the image of a country that is accustomed to claiming leadership in everything—including sports.

The same motif also appears in reactions to other pieces about the 2026 World Cup. In a Euronews publication retold in the Venezuelan context and tied to the story of Belgium mocking Trump and FIFA, the US defeat is presented as grounds for satire not only against the football team, but also against politics, corruption, and the influence of strong players on international institutions. The Belgian players’ dance and the slogan “Overturn this” are seen in the regional interpretation not as just a joke, but as a public gesture of contempt for authority—and for attempts to impose convenient rules.

For the Venezuelan audience, it is especially important that sports and politics are intertwined in this story. The image of FIFA, allegedly bending under pressure, fits easily with already existing distrust of international structures, while the figure of Donald Trump reinforces the sense that football has long stopped being a fully autonomous arena. As a result, Belgium’s victory is seen as a moral resolution—a moment when “justice prevailed,” and when the public humiliation of those in power turned out to matter more than the actual score.

Another Venezuelan piece, dedicated to the 2026 World Cup bracket and quarterfinal scenarios, continues the same line: the US exit is treated as a symbolic failure of American football ambition. Even though the tournament was held on US soil and the country was positioning itself as the new football center, reality again reduced it to its familiar place—under the shadow of European and South American leaders. In this context, it is particularly noticeable that the CONCACAF zone lost all its representatives, and the regional hierarchy at the world championship has returned to what it was: Europe dominates, South America holds its brand, and the US failed to capitalize on either its home status or expectations.

For Venezuelan authors and readers, this is also an opportunity for broader cultural and political irony. Here, a football defeat can easily become a metaphor for a more general fall from the pedestal: a country accustomed to talking up its own superiority is again turned into a victim of its own expectations. Against the backdrop of local experience with crises, broken promises, and constant attempts to start over, such a storyline provokes a special reaction—from sarcastic enjoyment to a sense of symbolic justice.

That is why Venezuela’s take on the US failure at the 2026 World Cup is not a dry sports commentary, but a unified reaction to a whole set of themes: the team’s weakness, uncertainty around Pochettino’s future, FIFA’s vulnerability to political influence, mockery of Trump, and the general collapse of the image of American infallibility. In this story, football is only the surface; underneath it is a conflict between power and reality, ambition and results, claims to leadership and a practical inability to deliver.

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New Attacks on Tankers in the Strait of Hormuz: Two Vessels Damaged

Two attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a new wave of concern about the safety of shipping through this key maritime corridor. The incidents occurred amid a fragile truce between the United States and Iran, as ship traffic gradually began to resume. According to British sources, one of the tankers caught fire after being hit by a projectile, but no crew members were injured. Analysts warn that the intensity of the attacks could return to the level seen before the temporary lull.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) authority said it received a distress signal from 8 nautical miles east of the Lima area in Oman. The southbound tanker was hit by a projectile on its port side, after which a fire broke out on board. The agency did not name the vessel and did not indicate who was behind the attack, limiting itself to describing the projectile as “unidentified.” At the same time, a U.S. official confirmed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fired at least two rockets at commercial vessels, causing serious damage to two of them.

According to news agencies, one of the ships affected was the Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker “Al Rekayyat,” flying the flag of the Marshall Islands. Its cargo capacity is about 216,000 cubic meters, and tracking data show that it has been widely operating in the Arabian Sea off the coasts of India and Pakistan. There is a gap in the records: its last recorded position near India was about 18 days ago, which could make it difficult to reconstruct its full route at the time the attack occurred near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Another version of the incident points to a second vessel that was damaged overnight—a Saudi oil tanker, which is currently under investigation. This information aligns with Reuters data that after an attack on a gas carrier near Oman, a Saudi crude tanker was also reported to have been affected. The incidents highlight the vulnerability of transit routes and raise the question of whether current security measures are sufficient to prevent a repeat of similar attacks.

As for shipping, Reuters reported that on Monday six supertankers carrying about 12 million barrels of oil transited the Strait of Hormuz, as well as two chemical tankers, a car carrier, and a container ship—all associated with Japan. However, other sources noted that over the weekend several vessels turned back, and two changed course, moving away from the Omani route toward a path closer to Iran. A representative of the Pakistani government called the attacks “unexpected” after the peace agreement, saying that the gas carrier “Al Arish” returned due to threats and that Pakistan is now negotiating security assurances.

On the political front, Axios, citing a U.S. official, said the IRGC fired at least two rockets that caused significant damage but no casualties. According to him, the United States will, “with a high probability,” carry out retaliatory strikes against Iranian targets. President Donald Trump said on Monday that the U.S. would either reach an agreement with Iran or “finish the mission.” Tensions are rising: since March 1, restrictions were reintroduced following the framework agreement of June 17, and now companies are worried about returning ships to Omani routes—shifting the balance of control at sea away from the most protected routes.

Comments on the news

• What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role does it play in Iran’s military and economic life? — The IRGC is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the regime. It controls missile programs, nuclear infrastructure, and participates in regional conflicts (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon). In the economy, the IRGC manages major enterprises in construction, energy, telecommunications, and the banking sector, giving it enormous influence.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered one of the most strategic locations for global oil supplies, and which countries depend on its security? — About 20–30% of the world’s seaborne oil passes through the strait (approximately 17 million barrels per day). Its stability is critical for Asian countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea) and for Gulf exporters (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq). Any disruption in the strait leads to a sharp spike in oil prices and a global energy crisis.

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Full version: ناقلات في مرمى النيران.. هل عاد استهداف السفن في مضيق هرمز؟

Luis Eduardo Martínez calls for consensus to save Venezuela

The rector of the Central University of Technology of Venezuela, Luis Eduardo Martínez, said that only a nationwide consensus will make it possible to quickly restore the economy and save thousands of families affected by the crisis. He emphasized that, despite the deep pain caused by the tragedy of June 24 (in which hundreds of people died), the best tribute to the victims is to build an entirely different, united nation. Martínez recalled that in 1811 it was national unity that helped Venezuelans throw off Spanish rule, and today, as never before, it is necessary to leave behind disagreements and conflicts for the sake of a shared process of reviving the country.

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Full version: Luis Eduardo Martínez: El consenso es la única fórmula que nos permitirá recuperar a Venezuela

Iran Warns the US: Respect the Memorandum, or There Will Be No Talks

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on Tuesday that Washington must abide by the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries and stop issuing threats. He stressed that talks on a final agreement would not begin as long as the American side continues to use the language of ultimatums. In a post on the social media platform X, the diplomat noted that millions of Iranians had rallied together and that no threats would intimidate them.

Citing paragraph 13 of the document signed a month ago, Araqchi made clear that a condition for launching the negotiation process is to abandon bellicose rhetoric. “Honor your signature,” he told the White House. The statement came after US President Donald Trump threatened to “wrap up the mission” if an agreement was not reached, and even said he could destroy Iranian infrastructure within an hour.

In response, Tehran took a hard line. Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohammad Baqer Zolghader, called Trump’s threats “illusory,” adding that Iranians do not understand the language of intimidation. “Address our people with respect; otherwise we will respond in another language,” he warned—signaling willingness for a symmetrical escalation in words.

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry criticized statements by the head of Germany’s Foreign Ministry regarding the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The ministry’s official spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, called them “shameful and distorting reality,” adding that Berlin bears responsibility for complicity in military aggression. The issue concerns mine clearance in the strait—Germany believes Iran should pay for the operation, although such sanctions have not been imposed yet.

The latest round of indirect consultations between the United States and Iran last week showed no visible progress. Nevertheless, the current 60-day ceasefire remains in effect, giving diplomacy another chance. While the sides continue trading sharp statements, the future of negotiations and the ceasefire regime remains uncertain—everything depends on who decides first to change the tone.

Notes

• Who is Abbas Araqchi and what is his role in Iranian diplomacy, especially in nuclear talks? — Abbas Araqchi is one of Iran’s most experienced diplomats, having served as deputy foreign minister. He was the chief negotiator for the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and played a key role in shaping its terms. After the US withdrew from the deal, he continued to take part in talks aimed at lifting sanctions. His style is described as pragmatic yet firm in defending national interests. For foreign audiences, Araqchi is a symbol of continuity in Iranian diplomacy—able to engage with the West without yielding on key principles.

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Full version: Araqchi: Final agreement talks will not begin if US threats continue

Emergency meeting between Netanyahu and Trump: Israel seeks to rebuild trust

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to hold a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump this week, immediately after Trump returns from a NATO summit taking place in Turkey. The move is driven by the desire of Israel’s leadership to once again coordinate positions with Washington on a range of regional issues. According to Israeli media, Netanyahu is pressing for contact as quickly as possible—before even the resumption of U.S.-Iran talks.

Netanyahu’s main goal is to restore trust that has been shaken by the recent escalation between Israel and Iran. In addition, the prime minister plans to brief Trump with the latest Israeli intelligence in order to influence the U.S. position in the upcoming negotiations with Tehran. The agenda also includes discussion of normalization of relations with other countries in the region, and the rapid visit itself could give Netanyahu political momentum ahead of the coming Israeli elections.

In recent months, notable differences have emerged between the leaders, particularly over Washington’s deal with Iran and the situation in Lebanon. Netanyahu, however, denies that there is a rift in the relationship: in an interview with Fox News, he said, “I don’t see any discord,” adding that each of them acts in the interests of their own country. Trump, for his part, confirmed that he received a request for the meeting and described their relationship as “very good.”

Against the backdrop of preparations for a possible meeting between the two top officials, several senior Israeli officials are preparing to visit Washington in the coming weeks. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar plans to meet with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Defense Minister Israel Katz also intends to travel to the United States. However, according to sources, these trips could be canceled if the date of the Netanyahu-Trump meeting is agreed upon in the near future.

Israeli political circles do not hide the fact that the “military option” remains on the table. The movement of ministers and the very request for an urgent meeting indicate an attempt by Israel to recalibrate its relationship with a key ally amid rising tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and regional conflicts. In this way, Tel Aviv is seeking to secure maximum influence over U.S. policy before fateful decisions are made.

Comments on the news

• What powers does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have in Iran’s political and economic system, and how does this organization affect the country’s nuclear program? – The IRGC is a key military-political institution directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. It controls a significant part of the economy (through foundations and companies, for example “Khatam al-Anbia”), and it also has representatives in parliament and the government. In the nuclear program, the IRGC is responsible for the security of facilities, the development of missile systems, and can block or accelerate negotiations depending on its own strategic interests.

• How is Iran trying to strengthen its regional influence and create a military deterrent factor against Israel through its support for Lebanon’s “Hezbollah”? – Iran provides Hezbollah with financial assistance, modern weapons (including high-precision missiles), and military advisors. This allows the Lebanese group to threaten Israeli territory, creating a “multi-front” danger for Israel. In doing so, Tehran increases its influence in the Levant and raises the costs of any potential aggression by Israel against Iranian assets.

• What role does Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei play in setting the red lines in negotiations with the United States over the nuclear deal, and what key demands does Tehran make? – Khamenei has the final veto authority over any negotiation decisions. He sets “red lines”: a prohibition on inspections of military sites or meetings with U.S. officials, as well as a requirement for guaranteed removal of all sanctions before any reduction in uranium enrichment. Tehran’s main demands: complete removal of sanctions, recognition of the right to peaceful enrichment, and the exclusion of doseimetric measures that violate sovereignty.

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Full version: Netanyahu is racing the clock to meet Trump to repair trust and influence the Iran file

Why Venezuelan institutions are letting the country down

In Venezuela, there has long been a habit of blaming the state for all the country’s troubles. But the problem runs deeper: many private institutions—professional associations, trade chambers, unions, opposition parties, and even non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—copy the same flaws as the authorities. Their leaders remain in place without change, elections are held only in form, staff and ideas are hardly ever renewed, and the organizations often serve merely as tools to obtain privileges and personal connections with the very politicians they criticize. This situation is not unique to Venezuela, but here it has become systemic.

The roots of this problem go back long before Hugo Chávez came to power. Even in the era of the two traditional parties—Acción Democrática and COPEI—universities, professional guilds, and trade unions operated on the principle of loyalty rather than merit. New ideas and fresh voices were suppressed, and institutions turned into “tribes,” where personal devotion mattered more than democratic values. Chavismo deepened this culture, making it nearly irreversible. That is why, before criticizing the government, it is worth looking inside one’s own organizations.

Today Venezuela has a real window of opportunity: the country has strategic resources, attracts the interest of investors, benefits from support from the Trump administration, and has qualified personnel. To seize this chance, it is not enough to demand reforms from the state—you also need to change yourselves. Opposition groups and every private institution should create formal channels to receive proposals from citizens and respond to them, and the government should open similar windows in every ministry. Only then can opposition turn from a voice of criticism into real infrastructure for supporting society.

The example of the United States shows how healthy institutions work: there, universities, guilds, and civic organizations respect, fund, and promote the best ideas regardless of their source. Social mobility becomes possible thanks to rules that most people follow. If Venezuela wants to attract investment and rebuild the world’s trust, it will have to give up caudillismo and clannishness within its own structures. Respect begins at home—with open, merit-based, value-driven institutions.

Comments on the news

• What do the traditional parties Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI represent, and what role did they play in shaping Venezuela’s institutional culture before Chávez? – AD (a left-leaning centrist party) and COPEI (a right-leaning centrist party) were the two dominant parties under the so-called “Puntofijo” system (1958–1998). After the fall of the dictatorship, they entered into the Punto Fijo Pact, which entrenched a two-party monopoly and excluded other forces. This led to the formation of an institutional culture based on clientelism, corruption, and the use of state resources to strengthen party power. The parties controlled trade unions, business associations, and the courts, creating a patronage system that crushed independent institutions and undermined trust in democracy. By the time Hugo Chávez arrived in 1998, these parties had discredited themselves through their inability to solve social problems and their deep corruption.

• What does the term “caudillismo” mean in the Venezuelan context, and how does it show up in private institutions—professional associations, trade chambers, and unions? – Caudillismo is a form of personalized leadership in which authority rests on the charisma of a specific “caudillo” (leader), rather than on formal procedures or laws. In Venezuela, this tradition dates back to the 19th century and survived even after the transition to democracy. In private institutions (bar associations, engineering associations, trade chambers, and unions), caudillismo manifests as leadership concentrating power in its own hands, using organizations for personal enrichment or political influence, and elections turning into a formality where the incumbent leader’s appointees win. This undermines internal democracy, leads to stagnation and corruption, because institutions become tools of a narrow group rather than serving the interests of their members.

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Full version: El Estado no es el único fallido

Oman route through the Strait of Hormuz: a test of resilience

In recent days, the Oman route in the Strait of Hormuz has moved into the stage of practical trials: dozens of vessels began using it despite Tehran’s open dissatisfaction, which insists on coordinating all transits through the strait. Against the backdrop of fears that, without agreement with Iran, vessel safety cannot be guaranteed, many ships have started reconsidering their routes between the Iranian and Omani zones. According to data collected by Al Jazeera’s analytical division via the MarineTraffic platform, between 24 June and 3 July, 313 transits were recorded: 124 (about 40%) used the Oman route, while 189 (60%) went on the Iranian route passing south of Qeshm Island.

Traffic varied by day. In the first two days (24–25 June), 92 ships transited—an average of 46 per day—which became the peak for the entire analysis period. Then the flow declined: on 26 June there were 27 transits, on 28 June there were 31, on 29 June there were 24, before rising again to 35 (30 June), 33 (1 July), 34 (2 July), and 36 (3 July). Such fluctuations show that shipping did not stop, but operated under pressure from the changing political and military situation, forcing captains to choose one route or another depending on the day’s news about rising tension.

Statistics on the types of vessels that used both routes are as follows: tankers for crude oil lead (52), followed by bulk carriers (34), container ships (26), general cargo ships (25), and tankers for oil products and chemicals (19). The data also notes 16 transits by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tankers and 6 by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. On the Oman route, the leading categories were the same oil tankers (36), followed by bulk carriers (19), while LNG tankers, container ships, and dry bulk carriers each recorded 10 transits in their respective categories.

The Oman route tests coincided with direct threats to its safety. According to U.S. military command, on 25 June an Iranian suicide drone attacked the container ship Ever Lovely, which was travelling along the Omani coast from the strait. Iran did not claim responsibility. The 27 June attack on the oil tanker Kiku was even more serious: carrying more than two million barrels of oil, it was also struck by a suicide drone. After these incidents, satellite data—according to the report—show that the Oman route temporarily emptied: from noon (dohiem time) until the morning of the next day, ships preferred to go by the Iranian route south of Qeshm Island.

The diplomatic situation also affected developments. In Muscat, the first meeting took place of the joint Iran–Oman committee on managing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi said Tehran informed Oman that it needs to change routes and that “the situation in the strait will not return to the pre-war state.” Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf stressed that control over shipping in Hormuz is Iran’s right, which it will not give up, and that sovereignty over the strait belongs to Iran and Oman, with which Tehran intends to discuss further steps.

Iran also warned the United Kingdom and France against any military maneuvers in the strait. Garibabadi noted that Hormuz is “not a place to display military force,” and that the safety of the strait is the responsibility of coastal states, while those who create crises must be ready for the consequences of “adventures.” Thus, the data indicate that the Oman route received real but fragile recognition right at the outset, and then faced a strict test—both militarily and politically. Its future now depends directly on Tehran’s and Muscat’s ability to develop a mutually acceptable formula for governing this strategic passage.

Comments on the news

• What is the strategic significance of Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz, and why does the Iranian route run south of it? - Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategic significance is that it allows Iran to control a key oil transit hub (about 20% of the world’s supplies). The route south of Qeshm appears to be used by Iran to demonstrate a military presence or as part of exercises, to underscore the ability to block or regulate shipping in the strait in the event of a conflict.
• What is meant by “the pre-war state” in Deputy Minister Garibabadi’s statement? What period or conflict is it referring to? - The term “pre-war state” likely refers to the period before the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) or the era before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015. In this context, the deputy minister may be referring to a return to a more tense military or nuclear confrontation characteristic of those periods.
• Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and what role does he play in Iran’s political system? - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is a conservative politician and the current Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) since 2020. Previously, he served as Mayor of Tehran (2005–2017) and was the commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Qalibaf is an influential figure in a system closely linked to the Supreme Leader and is considered one of the potential candidates for the presidency in the future.
• On what historical or legal grounds does Iran claim control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz? - Iran justifies its claims to control the Strait of Hormuz based on international maritime law (in particular, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it signed but did not ratify), as well as historical rights as a coastal state. Tehran argues that the strait is within its territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles) and that it can regulate ship passage for its national security, citing “innocent passage” and “transit passage” in international norms.

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Full version: في أسبوعين.. كم سفينة عبرت هرمز من المسار العماني؟

Trump’s Patriotic Spectacle Against the Backdrop of America’s 250th Anniversary

The anniversary of the United States on a 250-year scale is turning into a stage for a battle over meanings: some see what is happening as a demonstration of strength and national unity, while others view it as the harsh politicization of a holiday and an opportunity for criticism. The focus is on how Trump turns the celebration into a theatrical proof of the “greatness of America,” framing his message with symbols, rhetoric, and an atmosphere of confrontation, where tough language about the “communist threat” and a commitment to hardline nationalism sound like part of a single message. Against this background, international reactions also reveal troubling notes: some describe the event as excessively military—almost “march-like”—while others mention everyday mishaps such as weather-related disruptions, which create a contrast with the festive narrative.

This material was prepared based on publications from sources www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.rtve.es (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan View of Trump: Protectionism, Isolation, and a Risk for the Region

The Venezuelan perspective on Donald Trump’s return to the agenda for Latin America is built not so much around individual trade disputes as around a broader concern: the United States again appears to be an unpredictable partner, capable at any moment of revisiting the rules of the game. For a region where many economies depend on exporting raw materials, agricultural products, and industrial goods to the northern market, this sounds like a serious warning. Even existing agreements, this logic suggests, do not guarantee stability.

In one of the materials published here, the point is stated outright: “todas nuestras agroexportaciones a USA corren el peligro de Trump.” For Venezuelan—and more broadly Latin American—political culture, such a phrase is easily read as confirmation of an old suspicion: U.S. foreign policy is often driven not by agreements, but by the logic of power and by its own economic interests. For Venezuela, which has experienced sanctions pressure and direct U.S. intervention in the economic sphere, this feels especially familiar—on this reading, the American market and American rules become not a guarantee of development, but an instrument of pressure.

The text also emphasizes the contrast between countries in the region. It notes that “Brasil” allegedly can “enfrentarse a Trump,” while weaker economies find themselves in a vulnerable position. For a Venezuelan audience, this resonates with their own experience of asymmetry: small and medium-sized economies in Latin America have to defend themselves not through the strength of negotiations, but through regional solidarity, diversifying markets, and carefully balancing between external centers of influence.

At the same time, the note cites the position of Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, who rejects the thesis of “bad negotiations” and assures that “hay certidumbre para la inversión.” Venezuela’s interest in this episode is that it shows efforts by Latin American leaders to maintain business confidence amid U.S. pressure. For Caracas, this is telling: economic resilience in the region depends not only on internal reforms, but also on how sovereign a country is in shaping its trade policy toward its northern neighbor.

This theme also echoes a broader view of Donald Trump’s first year in the White House, which in another article RTVE is presented as a period of isolationism, a national turn, and political polarization. It is noted that Trump’s main achievements were the tax reform and the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, while his key failures included the repeal of Obamacare and immigration reform. It also highlights the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the TPP, and other multilateral mechanisms. For a Venezuelan reader, this matters not only as a characterization of U.S. policy, but as a sign that Washington is moving away from the role of leader of the global liberal order.

The Venezuelan interpretation here is twofold. On the one hand, the United States’ retreat from global commitments may be seen as a weakening of external pressure and a symbol of crisis in the American model. On the other hand, it increases the unpredictability of Washington’s policy toward Latin America. That is why, in the regional perception, Trump often functions not just as a domestic U.S. leader, but as a factor influencing prices, trade, international legitimacy, and the political balance within Latin America itself.

In the end, both storylines—fear surrounding Peruvian exports and an analysis of Trump’s isolationism—converge on one point in the Venezuelan reading: the United States under Trump is again perceived as a force that can act through protectionism, pressure, and abrupt course changes. For Latin America, this is not an abstract foreign-policy debate, but a reminder of how fragile economic dependence is—and of how important it is to find one’s own mechanisms of protection in the face of the northern neighbor.

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Funerals for Khamenei and the Hormuz crisis: Iran in the spotlight

Large-scale funerals for Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei are continuing, taking place amid serious political tension both inside the country and beyond its borders. Tens of thousands of Iranians are streaming into Tehran’s spacious prayer hall to bid farewell to the late leader. The ceremonies, which began on Friday, will run until 9 July. Mourners carry portraits of Khamenei, his son, and his alleged successor Mojtaba Khamenei; many are dressed in black and wrapped in Iranian flags. In this context, US President Donald Trump said that Washington had given Tehran a week to return to talks “out of respect for the supreme leader’s funeral,” adding: “We did it out of our kindness,” and emphasizing that there had been no shootings between the sides during the mourning period.

At the same time, disputes are intensifying over the future of the Strait of Hormuz and shipping through it—this strategic corridor handles the transit of about 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied gas supplies. The United States, Gulf countries and the international community reject any attempts to charge ships for passage, but Tehran is proposing an alternative in the form of the so-called “service fee.” Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, said his country will “definitely introduce” a service fee as a state whose portion of territorial waters lies in the strait, уточнив that these will not be “transit fees” in the strict sense, and that friendly countries will receive “special” terms.

Iran has also warned against any military action in Hormuz after the UK and France announced their readiness to deploy a multinational military mission to ensure freedom of navigation. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi said Hormuz “is not a stage for military theatrics by forces outside the region,” adding that “coastal states bordering the strait are responsible for its security.” He added: “As a responsible power and guarantor of the security of the Strait of Hormuz, we warn against any military action in it,” noting that this is a “serious warning,” and that whoever creates crises “will face the consequences of their adventures.”

Possible mechanisms for governing the strait after the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States are also being discussed. The document guarantees the safe passage of commercial ships “without payment for 60 days,” but further steps remain unclear. Tensions in Tehran were reflected in a joint statement by France and Britain saying that Oman agreed to work with them to ensure shipping security in its territorial waters. French President Emmanuel Macron said the country had sent specialized demining equipment to the region, as well as two frigates and a maritime patrol aircraft, and that, in cooperation with partners, it is ready for the full restoration of shipping and to ensure safe passage through Hormuz.

Reports have also emerged of a proposal put forward by Iran and Oman to the United States, which envisages joint management of the strait between Tehran and Muscat, as well as the idea of charging administrative fees. However, according to sources, Oman has not yet submitted a complete official proposal, although consultations continue. As reported, US negotiators have “reservations” about the proposal, but intend to discuss it with the Omani side, believing they can settle the contentious issues. Meanwhile, the White House press secretary said Trump confirmed that Iran cannot charge for passage through Hormuz because it is an international waterway, and Axios reported that Trump’s envoys are trying to convey the idea that Tehran’s fee demands could “derail” the chances of reaching an agreement.

Military and diplomatic developments are accompanied by real navigational challenges: ship-traffic data show that shipping is still facing problems despite the resumption of transit. It is reported that at least eight ships suddenly turned near the coast of Oman before entering the strait, and some vessels changed course between Friday and Saturday as they attempted to leave the Persian Gulf. According to Bloomberg, later the routes of four ships were adjusted, and they are crossing the strait via Iran’s navigational channel, while the reason for the course change remains unknown. Iran has repeatedly stressed that passage through the strait must be carried out via a navigation route that it has designated and authorized for use.

In a statement that drew widespread attention, Russia’s Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev noted that the Strait of Hormuz has become for Iran “a weapon no less powerful than nuclear weapons,” adding that there is a “backup weapon” in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. In this way, the funerals for the supreme leader have become intertwined with an acute geopolitical crisis around a key maritime artery, where the interests of regional and global powers collide—and the future of shipping remains in question.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei and why is he called the alleged successor to Iran’s supreme leader? - Mojtaba Khamenei is the son of the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and an influential member of the clergy. He is described as a possible successor due to the lack of a formal succession procedure in the “velayat-e faqih” system: in practice, power can pass to a trusted person close to the leadership, although the final decision is made by the Assembly of Experts.
• What is the Iranian concept of a “service fee” for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and how does it differ from ordinary transit charges? - Iran often frames the passage of ships through its territorial waters in the strait as a service that requires compensation for ensuring security and environmental oversight. Unlike standard fees (for example, for pilotage or port services), this concept is not recognized under international maritime law and is political in nature, because Iran uses it to pressure shipping.
• What role does Oman play in negotiations over the status of the Strait of Hormuz, and what are its relations with Iran and Western countries? - Oman acts as a neutral mediator thanks to traditionally friendly relations with Iran and, at the same time, cooperation with the West (including military arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom). It offers a platform for negotiations and often eases tensions by pushing for compromise on the strait’s status, such as initiatives for demilitarization or joint shipping management.
• What is the “Iranian navigational channel” in the Strait of Hormuz, and why are ships required to follow it? - The “Iranian navigational channel” is a route that Iran has designated as part of its territorial waters and on which, according to its claims, special safety rules apply. Tehran argues that ships must follow it to prevent collisions and pollution, but in practice this requirement is unilateral: international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) recognizes ships’ right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation without any obligation to follow a national channel.

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Full version: Funeral ceremonies for Khamenei continue and debate escalates over the future of Hormuz

Venezuela's government denies false information about organ seizure from an Indian sailor

Venezuelan authorities officially denied the false information spread by journalist Maibort Pety about alleged organ seizure from an Indian citizen in Caracas. In a statement published on social media, it is stressed that the sailor Rakesh Chauhan did not die during the seismic event on June 24, and that his body was not handled by state agencies—fully absolving the government of responsibility for rumors about illegal medical procedures.

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Full version: Gobierno nacional desmiente información falsa sobre supuesta extracción de órganos a ciudadano indio en Caracas

Iran bids farewell to Khamenei: $30 million for the funeral and signals to the world

Tehran is preparing for an unprecedented, on a massive scale, send-off ceremony for the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. The mourning events are expected to draw between 20 and 30 million people. The authorities are seeking not only to organize a mass procession, but also to turn it into a powerful demonstration of political and military unity. According to Al Jazeera’s correspondent, these funerals have temporarily frozen international negotiations, but the political subtext remains a key element of the event.

Within the country, the main goal is to show Iranian unity in the face of Israel and the United States, and to confirm popular support for the official course. In his address, President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed that the funerals are not just mourning, but the start of a new phase: the deceased leader has become a symbol of resistance and resilience. He urged citizens to take part, saying that Iran is opening a new chapter in its history. Calls to join the ceremonies were voiced by the heads of all three branches of power and by the senior military leadership.

The international dimension also plays an important role. Iran intends to demonstrate that it has emerged stronger from its conflict with the United States and Israel and is ready for new challenges. Organizing such a large-scale event with official delegations from more than 100 countries is viewed as part of that message. Former Iranian diplomat Hadi Afghahi said that the people have rallied around the leadership, and that an oath of loyalty has shifted to the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, warning enemies: any adventure against the Islamic Republic will require a multiple reassessment of the balance of forces.

From the American side, the reaction is more restrained. Patrick Marr, the former head of the Republican Party committee in Washington, said that for the United States, symbols are not what matters, but Iran’s behavior. He noted that Washington is focused on the Strait of Hormuz issue, IAEA inspections, and ending support for proxy forces in sovereign states—especially in Lebanon. At the same time, he mentioned “American optimism” and positive signals from President Trump regarding a rapid comprehensive agreement—technical channels through intermediaries remain open.

An Al Jazeera correspondent in Washington reported that Trump had been closely following the ceremony despite the celebrations of Independence Day. In an interview with Axios, he called Iranian tears “possibly fake” and made a sarcastic comment on the mourning. Trump also mentioned a deal that provides a one-week postponement to complete the funerals and made a provocative statement: “the current Iranian leadership can be removed with one shot, but then there would be no one to negotiate with.” He reaffirmed that his approach is negotiations from a position of strength, and announced a meeting with Netanyahu at the White House after the NATO summit, despite remaining disagreements over Iran and Lebanon.

Thus, the grand funeral in Tehran became not only an act of remembrance, but also a stage for demonstrating domestic unity, international ambitions, and a fragile balance of power. While millions bid farewell to their leader for the last time, behind the scenes a tense game is underway: Washington is assessing vulnerabilities, Tehran is sending signals of resolve, and the future dialogue remains on hold until all rituals are completed.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mojtaba Khamenei and why is he specifically mentioned as the new Supreme Leader of Iran? - Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He is considered a likely successor because of Iran’s informal power-transfer system, where ties within the clerical establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps play a key role. Although the official mechanism for transferring power is carried out through the Assembly of Experts, analysis of domestic politics suggests that Mojtaba’s name is increasingly appearing among the candidates for the post, reflecting a trend toward concentrating power within a single family.

• Why is control of the Strait of Hormuz a key issue for the United States in negotiations with Iran? - The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic corridor through which about 20% of the world’s oil trade passes. For the United States, control of it means the ability to influence global energy prices and ensure the security of its allies in the Persian Gulf. Iran periodically threatens to close the strait in response to sanctions, which could trigger a military conflict and disrupt supply chains—so any agreement with Tehran must include guarantees for freedom of navigation.

• What are Iran’s proxy forces in Lebanon and what role do they play in regional politics? - In Lebanon, proxy forces primarily refers to Hezbollah—a Shiite military-political organization created and supported by Iran. It is simultaneously part of the Lebanese government, has its own army, and a network of social services. In regional politics, Hezbollah acts as an instrument of Iranian influence: it takes part in conflicts in Syria, confronts Israel, and helps spread Tehran’s ideological and military influence across the Middle East. Its role is especially important for Iran as a deterrence factor and as leverage in negotiations with the West.

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Full version: With 30 million mourners involved... How Tehran and Washington read the huge funeral for Khamenei?

US-Iran Memorandum: Early Progress and Unresolved Contradictions

Several weeks have passed since the announcement of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding on June 17, and its implementation is moving forward, albeit with extreme caution. Early results are already visible on the ground: the ceasefire regime is being observed, there have been no reports of large-scale military clashes, the Strait of Hormuz has been reopened to navigation, and the “risk premium” on oil markets has fallen. In addition, the sides have established a permanent negotiation mechanism—technical meetings are being held in Doha to maintain communication channels and prevent new incidents.

Qatar and Pakistan’s intermediary role has become noticeably stronger: having helped draft the memorandum itself, they have moved to directly monitoring its implementation. Diplomats coordinate contacts, track compliance with the points in question, and step in when disputes arise. Meetings have taken place both in Switzerland’s Bürgenstock and in Doha, and a communications line has been set up for reporting possible violations. The mediators prepare joint progress reports and hold separate consultations with US and Iranian delegations.

Despite positive signals, serious disagreements over the interpretation of key provisions have already emerged. The sharpest is the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran insists that the memorandum gives it the primary role in regulating shipping through the strait in coordination with Oman. Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said that the “fifth clause” provides for exactly such an arrangement, and that Iran will not allow the United States to interfere. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Garab-Abadi, stressed that the strait is not a place for the display of military force from outside.

The United States, by contrast, views the Strait of Hormuz as an international waterway and rejects any attempts by Iran to collect fees or impose restrictions. This position was supported by a joint document from the Gulf Arab states, and the International Maritime Organization warned that introducing passage fees would set a dangerous precedent for global navigation. The dispute is not limited to the strait: in the Lebanese question, Iran links implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, while Washington, at this stage, sees only de-escalation—and ties any withdrawal to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the transfer of control to the Lebanese army.

The nuclear file remains outside the discussion for now: technical consultations have not touched on uranium stockpile levels or enrichment rates—those decisions have been postponed to later rounds of talks. Disagreements also persist over sanctions relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets. The United States is proposing step-by-step, conditional lifting of restrictions with monitoring of how the money is spent, while Iran demands full control over its assets without external conditions. As a result, the memorandum is currently succeeding in reducing tensions and stabilizing energy markets, but low trust, differing interpretations of the provisions, and mutual linkages are turning it more into a crisis-management mechanism than a solid, comprehensive agreement.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and why do his statements about the memorandum’s “fifth clause” matter for understanding the position of Iran’s conservative circles? — Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majlis) and a prominent conservative, and he previously served as mayor of Tehran. His reference to the “fifth clause” (likely relating to some Iran-Russia or bilateral agreement) signals that conservative elites are insisting on strict implementation of commitments without concessions—especially on issues affecting national sovereignty and regional security. This matters because it shows that conservatives in Iran are demanding a hard line from the authorities and are unwilling to accept compromises in negotiations with external players.

• On what legal basis does Iran insist on its leading role in regulating shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does this relate to international maritime law? — Iran cites the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as its national legislation, which establishes sovereignty over territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and the right to regulate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which partly falls within Iran’s zone. Tehran argues that it can restrict the passage of ships for security and environmental reasons—something that is formally permitted under Article 25 of UNCLOS. However, the international community typically interprets these rights more narrowly, insisting on “transit passage”—and Iran’s position is disputed by the United States and other countries, but it remains a key tool of pressure.

• Why does Iran link implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, and how does this linkage reflect its regional priorities? — For Iran, supporting Lebanon’s Hezbollah and resisting Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon is part of the “axis of resistance” strategy, which is a central element of its regional policy. By tying implementation of the memorandum to Israel’s withdrawal, Tehran signals that it places the fight against Israel’s influence above any other agreements. This highlights the priorities of Iranian policy: strengthening proxy forces and creating buffer zones along the borders with Israel, as well as countering normalization of Arab-Israeli relations.

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Full version: هل ينجح الوسطاء في منع انهيار التفاهم الأمريكي الإيراني؟

Venezuela opposition strategy: Criticism of Trump and an appeal to Latin American voters

Spanish journalist Javier Negre said that the team of Venezuela’s opposition leader María Corina Machado has instructed its supporters and social media influencers to intensify criticism of Donald Trump’s administration. According to him, the goal of this campaign is to warn the White House: if Washington does not provide decisive support for Machado’s return to active political life, it could prove costly for Republicans in the upcoming midterm elections in November.

In his address to Latin American voters in the United States, Negre urged them to “pass the bill” to those who put oil interests ahead of human lives, implying that the community’s anger could be reflected in voting. In this way, Machado’s circle is trying to use the electoral influence of Latin Americans—especially in southern states—as leverage to pressure Trump into working more actively toward removing political restrictions on the opposition leader.

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Full version: "Pásenle factura en noviembre": Revelan presunta estrategia de la oposición venezolana contra la Casa Blanca

250 Years of the U.S.: the Nuclear Challenge and the Path to Survival

The United States is preparing to mark the 250th anniversary of independence— the longest-lasting attempt at republican rule in modern history. Yet behind the celebratory narrative lies a deep historical contradiction: the rhetoric of freedom and equality sharply contrasts with the genocide of Indigenous peoples carried out before the country was founded and with repressive practices afterward. The text recalls that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” coexisted with an economy built on slavery and the forced labor of Africans, the exploitation of day laborers, and the stripping of women of basic rights up to the 20th century. Once again, the central question emerges: what will allow humanity—and especially the United States—to endure for another quarter of a millennium?

According to the author, the only and most important answer is the abolition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which pose an existential threat not only to America but to the entire world. The article traces the history of the nuclear age as a chain of fateful decisions: from the 1941 Manhattan Project, the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the removal of Bikini Atoll residents for testing, to more than a thousand atomic and hydrogen explosions on the Marshall Islands, in Kiribati, at Johnston Atoll, in Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, Mississippi, Alaska, and elsewhere. In the end, an arsenal was created capable of “destroying much of the planet’s higher forms of life.”

Notably, opposition to the project emerged already in its early stages, proving that concern was not belated. Physicist Lise Meitner said: “I will have nothing to do with the bomb.” Nobel laureate Isidor Isaac Rabi refused to join the effort: “I don’t want the crown of three centuries of physics to become a weapon of mass destruction.” And Joseph Rotblat left Los Alamos as early as 1944 after hearing from General Groves that “the true purpose of making the bomb was to subjugate the Soviets.” Later, Rotblat devoted his life to disarmament: he helped draft the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), founded the Pugwash Conferences (1957), and received the Nobel Peace Prize (1995).

The threat was perceived not only as a scientific problem, but as a question of civilization’s survival. As early as 1947, U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace spoke at Madison Square Garden: “I don’t hear marching armies—I hear a world crying out for peace.” He warned that the success or failure of foreign policy could mean the difference between life and death, and sometimes between humanity’s continued existence and its disappearance. Today, the author notes, such critical voices have almost vanished from public discourse—many believe that nuclear weapons “ensure our security,” without grasping the full extent of the horror that these arsenals carry.

Against the backdrop of weakening warnings, the article cites fresh signals of escalation. According to the author, on June 10, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence in the United States, Tulsi Gabbard, said that the world is “closer to nuclear annihilation than ever.” And in January 2026, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock 85 seconds closer to midnight, repeating the warnings of nuclear strategists who seriously discuss the possibility of “winning a nuclear war.” The article also mentions Donald Trump and his circle, who have repeatedly hinted at the possibility of violating the nuclear taboo.

In the end, the article returns to the main question: what is needed for humanity to last another 250 years? And it repeats the answer: cancel and eliminate nuclear weapons as the core condition. The author believes that if the American public understands the threat and begins demanding disarmament, it will create pressure capable of bringing about real change. Then one day it may be possible to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Independence Day. Any delay in confronting the nuclear risk, the text emphasizes, exposes everyone to the likelihood of an unimaginable catastrophe.

Comments on the news

• What are the Pugwash Conferences and what are they known for in the context of nuclear disarmament? — The Pugwash Conferences are international meetings of scientists, launched in 1957 at the initiative of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell. They are known for creating, in the midst of the Cold War, an informal channel of dialogue between Soviet and American experts on nuclear security. The conferences contributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for efforts to prevent a nuclear threat.

• What role did Henry Wallace play in U.S. history, and why did his position on foreign policy contrast with the dominant line? — Henry Wallace was U.S. vice president under Franklin Roosevelt and the Secretary of Commerce. After World War II, he advocated cooperation with the USSR, opposed the arms race, and supported disarmament—sharply contrasting with the dominant “containment of communism” line in the Truman administration. Wallace criticized the Marshall Plan and NATO as provocative, and was removed from decision-making; his views were considered “pro-Russian” and marginal during the McCarthy era.

• Which organizations and experts determine the Doomsday Clock’s setting, and how widely are their assessments recognized in the international community? — The setting of the Doomsday Clock is determined by the Science and Security Board of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), which includes leading physicists, ecologists, and experts in nuclear policy. Their assessments are recognized as a symbol of global vulnerability, but they have no binding force; they are widely cited in the media and academia, although some critics note subjectivity and an excessive alarmist tendency.

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Full version: 85 seconds tell you not to celebrate, Mr. Trump

Tucker Carlson announces the creation of a third party in the US due to a break with...

Conservative TV host Tucker Carlson said he intends to found a new political party, finally breaking with the Republican Party. According to The New York Times, the deciding factor was the war with Iran, which Carlson called a betrayal of the “America First” principles. He accused Donald Trump and Republican leadership of backing away from promises to protect the interests of ordinary Americans, and now believes the country needs a third path—outside the traditional rivalry between Republicans and Democrats.

Carlson emphasized that, in his view, the two major parties have no fundamental differences on key issues: war, funding, and foreign policy. He called the current system “a one-party state under the cover of democracy” and urged the dismantling of this duopoly. At the same time, as The Guardian reports, he ruled out his own bid for the presidency, saying he does not see himself as Trump’s competitor, but intends to support alternative candidates in Congressional elections in November.

Carlson’s announcement comes amid deep internal divisions within both parties. Democrats are under pressure from the left wing over their position on Israel and the war in Gaza, while Republicans are split between neoconservatives who support military intervention and isolationists who demand a focus on domestic problems. Carlson is clearly aligning himself with the second camp, proposing a full ban on immigration and a reworking of economic policy in light of the growth of artificial intelligence.

Alongside Carlson, a similar initiative is being promoted by former Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene. According to The Independent, she is conducting “serious and intensive talks” with a number of political figures about creating a party oriented toward “pure” American interests, free from the “traps and frameworks” of the major parties. Greene called the current Republican bloc an expression of the agenda “America last,” and believes that a new force could attract both right-wing and left-wing voters who are disappointed with the establishment.

These moves reflect a broader ideological split within the conservative movement. As The Telegraph notes, on the one hand there are neoconservatives such as John Bolton, who demand the resumption of military operations to protect Israel; on the other are supporters of “America First,” who call the war with Iran “a betrayal” of the Trump base, provoked by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In experts’ view, this conflict is not simply about Trump’s personality—it touches the very identity of the conservative movement: whether it will be interventionist or isolationist, placing the economy, social issues, and immigration at the top of the agenda.

Thus, Carlson’s and Greene’s statements signal the possible emergence of a serious alternative to the two-party system. While for now it is only an idea and not an organizational structure, the very fact that a split in the conservative camp is being discussed publicly—and that a third force is being considered—points to growing dissatisfaction among a significant segment of American voters. Ahead of the next elections, this trend could significantly affect the balance of power, especially if the new movements manage to unite disaffected right-wing voters and part of the left electorate that opposes military adventurism and advocates for social justice.

Comments on the news

• What specific real events or conflicts between the US and Iran in recent years prompted calling the situation a “war with Iran”? — Among the sharpest incidents are the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 on President Trump’s orders, after which Iran launched a missile strike on a U.S. base in Iraq, and a series of attacks on oil tankers and facilities in the Persian Gulf (2019). Cyberattacks should also be taken into account (for example, an attack on Iran’s nuclear program using Stuxnet, though it was classified) and intensive sanctions campaigns which, taken together, created the backdrop for “hybrid war.”
• Why in discussions among American conservatives is the war with Iran directly linked to Israel’s interests and to Prime Minister Netanyahu? — This is explained by the long-standing alliance between neoconservative circles in the US and Israeli leadership. Netanyahu has consistently portrayed Iran as an existential threat to Israel, and many American conservatives (especially in think tanks such as AEI and WINEP) view confrontation with Iran as part of protecting Israel’s security. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy and withdrawal from the JCPOA matched what Netanyahu expected, which cemented the association “war with Iran = war for Israel” in the rhetoric of the right.
• How did the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) affect the split between neoconservatives and “America First” supporters within the Republican Party? — The JCPOA became a catalyst for the split. Neoconservatives (for example, John Bolton and Lindsey Graham) sharply criticized the deal as a “capitulation,” insisting on the use of force to contain Iran. “America First” supporters (including Trump himself and Tucker Carlson) opposed the JCPOA for different reasons: they believed the deal benefited European and Chinese allies more than the US, and they interpreted any foreign commitments as undermining national interests. In the end, both wings came together in rejecting the JCPOA, but from different ideological positions, which deepened the internal split in the party on foreign-policy issues.

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Full version: يمين ترمب يتصدع.. هل تصنع حرب إيران حزبا أمريكيا ثالثا؟

Venezuelan authorities accuse “media labs” of stoking chaos after the earthquake

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez said that after the powerful double earthquake that struck on June 24, the government faced not only a natural disaster, but also a deliberate information attack. According to her, so-called “media labs” were involved—both inside the country and abroad—to sow panic and hinder rescue efforts. Rodríguez acknowledged that the scale of the earthquake exceeded all forecasts, but stressed that alongside the tragedy there was a planned destabilization campaign.

As a specific example, the head of state cited a false call to “everyone go down to La Guaira,” which was widely circulated on social media. This disinformation, according to an investigation, was intended to create traffic jams and chaos on the roads, obstructing evacuation and the search for survivors. At the same time, Rodríguez separately emphasized that she understands those citizens who genuinely went to that area to look for relatives—their actions were driven by compassion, unlike the commissioned campaign. The authorities said they have already identified the technical and geographic sources of these attacks, but for now are not disclosing any specific names or countries from which they were carried out.

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Full version: Gobierno nacional denuncia activación de “laboratorios mediáticos” para generar caos tras el doblete sísmico

The US fears Israel could target Iranian negotiators

The US administration has expressed serious concern over a possible Israeli plan to eliminate two key Iranian negotiators — the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. According to The New York Times, American officials believe that such a move could derail delicate negotiations over a temporary peace agreement, which Washington is conducting with Tehran.

Washington believes that removing Qalibaf or Araqchi could completely derail the negotiating track launched back in April. Previously, Israeli authorities had considered both politicians to be “legitimate targets” as part of a campaign to topple Iran’s government. The US side fears that any attempt at an assassination after real talks have begun would lead to the resumption of hostilities.

Qalibaf, according to Iranian sources, has already twice survived an apparent attempt on his life. The first time was during the so-called “12-day war” in June 2025, and the second time during a recent conflict when Israel struck a secret hideout of top officials under a mountain. In both cases, the politician was pulled out from under the rubble.

Before Qalibaf’s planned visit to Islamabad to meet with US Vice President James David Vance, Iran’s security service requested assurances of safety. Through intermediaries — Pakistani and Qatari diplomats — Tehran was convinced that Israel would not carry out covert operations against the delegation.

The precautions were unprecedented: Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian aircraft carrying more than 70 officials for the entire journey to Islamabad and back up to the border. However, on the return route to Tehran, reports arrived about a possible Israeli attack — two fighter jets allegedly entered Iranian airspace from the west. The plane made an emergency landing in Mashhad, after which the delegation reached the capital by ground transport, taking about eight hours.

In response to the publication, Israeli officials said that “when Israel wants to eliminate someone, it does so.” Against the backdrop of these troubling signals, the US continues to fear that an attempt on Iranian negotiators would not only derail the current dialogue but also prevent the use of part of frozen Iranian funds to purchase essential goods — a step that could pave the way for a broader settlement.

Comments on the news

• Who is Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, and how does his past in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and as mayor of Tehran affect his role as a negotiator? — Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf is an Iranian politician and a former aviation commander in the IRGC, who served as mayor of Tehran from 2005 to 2017. His military background gives him authority among conservative circles and enables him to understand the security dimension. His experience managing a megacity brings skills in bureaucratic compromise. As a negotiator, he combines toughness (his ties to the IRGC) with pragmatism (successful infrastructure projects), allowing him to work with both conservatives and reformists. However, he also faces distrust from Western partners due to his connections to the IRGC, which the United States has designated a terrorist organization.
• What is the “12-day war” in June 2025 mentioned in the article, and why did it become a turning point for the security of Iranian officials? — This question cannot be addressed, as the available reliable sources contain no information about a “12-day war” in June 2025. It may be a reference to a hypothetical or unverified scenario, so it is impossible to provide a substantiated answer.
• What specific Iranian funds are frozen abroad, and how could unlocking them help ease a humanitarian crisis and negotiations? — The discussion concerns Iranian assets totaling about $6–7 billion, blocked in banks in South Korea, Iraq, and several European countries due to US sanctions. The funds are frozen as part of restrictions on oil exports and currency transactions. Unlocking them would allow Iran to import medicines, food, and medical equipment, easing the humanitarian situation for the population. In negotiations, this could become a “goodwill gesture” from the US to build trust for discussing a nuclear deal, but the US fears that the funds could be redirected to military programs.

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Full version: نيويورك تايمز: واشنطن تخشى خطط إسرائيل لاغتيال المفاوضين الإيرانيين

Concerns over US Trade and Migration Signals

In the Spanish-language agenda, reactions to actions and rhetoric from the United States in the spirit of the “Trump era” have become noticeably troubling. Attention is focused on how Washington might increase pressure on both trade and migration policy, and what consequences this could have for relations with Venezuela—and more broadly, for the entire Latin American agenda. Uncertainty about the future of the trade regime in North America, questions about stronger controls over labor and border enforcement practices, and a sense of tougher geopolitical maneuvering form the backdrop in which American moves are read as potential signals of instability and as tools of influence. This piece helps unpack why, for foreign audiences—especially in Latin America—events in the United States are perceived not as local developments, but as part of a larger line of tension and pressure. The article is based on materials from www.facebook.com (Venezuela) and www.dw.com (Venezuela).

Trump, NATO, and Venezuela: how the US crisis is read in Caracas

Venezuelan reactions to Donald Trump’s statements about NATO spending show not only a dispute over the military budget, but broader skepticism regarding the resilience of American foreign policy. In Caracas, these words are seen as further confirmation that the United States increasingly builds relationships with allies and neighbors through pressure, bargaining, and demands for loyalty. In a published La Jornada report, Trump described the situation regarding the distribution of spending within the alliance as “ridiculous,” criticizing the allies for the claim that the United States spends more than the rest and supposedly receives “beneficios a cambio” in return.

For a Venezuelan reader, it is easy to draw the parallel with how Washington shapes relations with Latin America: through conditions, requirements, and an expectation of submission. That is why criticism of NATO in Venezuela is read not as a technical dispute within the Western bloc, but as a symptom of a deeper crisis in American leadership. The idea takes root here that the United States does not act out of principles of alliance, but out of calculation—and that its foreign policy depends increasingly on internal contradictions.

This lens is especially visible against the backdrop of a broader Venezuelan view of relations with Washington. Even the main military alliance of the West, according to local interpretations, appears to be entangled in the same style of behavior that Venezuela has long been seeing toward itself: pressure, sanctions, and the expectation of political concessions. Therefore, Trump’s remarks in Caracas—that the United States carries a disproportionately large burden—are perceived as part of the broader narrative that American diplomacy is in crisis and can offer partners less and less beyond conditions.

This conclusion is reinforced by another storyline—how Venezuela reads changes in its relationship with the United States following the earthquakes of June 24, 2026. In a DW report, it is noted that the catastrophe has effectively changed the agenda and exposed the country’s dependence on decisions made in Washington, the weakness of its institutions, and the fragility of any externally imposed roadmap for transition. For the Venezuelan side, this is primarily a question of the survival of the population—not abstract diplomacy.

Experts quoted by DW say directly that the previous U.S. plan—“estabilización, recuperación y transición” (stabilization, recovery, and transition)—has been pushed into the background. Carolina Jiménez Sandoval of WOLA believes the earthquakes derailed the trajectory that Washington was trying to set and made “mucho más difícil una transición política organizada y gradual” (“much more difficult an organized, gradual political transition”). Phil Gunson of the International Crisis Group goes even further, emphasizing that now “all of the energies of the Government and civil society” must be directed toward recovery, which will take years. This approach closely matches the Venezuelan way of understanding crises: when a country lives for years under a complex “emergencia humanitaria compleja” (complex humanitarian emergency), political formulas fall into the background.

DW’s material also shows how, in Venezuela, the role of the United States is perceived—as a force that both helps, controls, and decides who can even be a subject of negotiations. Gunson says plainly that it is Washington that determines “qué hacer, cuándo negociar y quién se sienta a negociar” (“what to do, when to negotiate, and who sits down to negotiate”). Against that backdrop, mention of the hypothetical “state 51” is seen not as a joke, but as a reflection of longstanding fears about excessive U.S. influence. Even help in the amount of $300 million is described as insufficient and more symbolic in the context of destroyed infrastructure, shortages in medicine and food—and the sanctions question becomes central: why haven’t they been lifted yet, if the country is facing a catastrophe?

A separate political knot is the return of María Corina Machado. In the Venezuelan context, this is not only a question of an opposition leader; it is a dispute over legitimacy, access to the country, and who speaks on behalf of those affected. The text says that Washington does not want to replace a humanitarian response with political struggle, but the very possibility of such a return shows how much Venezuela’s internal conflict still depends on external approval. Gunson notes that Machado’s connection to Washington has been “seriamente dañada” (seriously damaged), and that her return at a time of tragedy may be inappropriate. This reinforces the sense that Venezuelan politics is again splitting between centers abroad, the streets, and external actors.

In the end, both storylines—Trump’s sharp NATO rhetoric and Venezuela’s reading of the consequences of the earthquakes for relations with the United States—converge on one point: in Caracas, more and more people see not isolated episodes, but signs of a systemic crisis in American leadership. If NATO is criticized as an alliance in which the United States demands more from partners than it is willing to offer itself, then the Venezuelan context after the catastrophe shows the same logic in an even harsher form: aid, control, and political conditions go together, and U.S. foreign policy is perceived as an instrument of pressure rather than partnership.

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The Kremlin Naively Trusted Negotiations With the West — Expert

Russian writer Pavel Roberts claims that in the Kremlin they “naively” believed agreements on Alaska and the Minsk accords. If Moscow had read Donald Trump’s book The Art of the Deal, it would have understood that the West had planned manipulation from the very beginning. According to the author, when in 2014 Putin allowed Washington to topple the government of Ukraine and install there an anti-Russian “agent,” it became clear that if Moscow did nothing, it would inevitably lead to armed conflict.

Eight years later, the Russian military operation turned out not to be decisive, but “slow and limited,” giving the United States and NATO time to expand their involvement. Instead of remaining localized in Donbas, the war broadened. Roberts emphasizes that the illegality of sanctions does not improve Russia’s situation, because international law no longer applies and the United Nations has lost its role.

Putin, the author says, still refuses to use decisive force to win—or at least to de-escalate—despite the fact that he himself acknowledged a reality that had already been obvious 12 years ago. Instead, he is focused on pushing forward in Donbas, while Ukrainian drones paralyze life inside Russia by attacking power supplies and killing civilians.

Roberts points out: by letting escalation get out of control through inaction, Putin in June told cadets at a military academy about strengthening nuclear forces and increasing the army’s readiness for a war with Europe. In the same vein, the author criticizes Iran, which in his view did not learn the lesson of Moscow and has also gotten pulled into peace talks that Washington never intended to complete.

From Roberts’ perspective, both Russia and Iran avoid confronting reality by taking part in negotiation processes that do not change the essence of the conflict. He notes a paradox: over 79 years of the “Greater Israel project,” no Islamic country has opposed the policy of Tel Aviv, and Iranians still do not demand that this program be included in peace talks.

Another author, Simon Nedrito, writes that the failure of U.S. policy in the Middle East due to Israel’s actions and the underestimation of Iran has depleted U.S. resources, weakened the dollar, and reduced America’s military influence. The collapse of a memorandum between the U.S. and Iran in Lucerne—which, in his view, provided for 60-day negotiations without prior conditions—became, according to the author, a defeat for Washington. Israel preferred to pursue advantages in southern Lebanon at the expense of U.S. interests, without assessing Iran’s determination to preserve a “resistance front.”

Nedrito links the breakdown of the memorandum to Israel’s insistence on occupying Lebanon, as well as to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which reduced the United States’ strategic oil reserves and lowered the volume of oil trade priced in dollars, weakening the currency. Trump acknowledged the depletion of reserves and the growth of fuel shortages, and, according to the author, freezing Iranian assets threatens the dollar’s status. Washington, the author says, understood that a military presence off Iran’s coasts is not enough to force compliance, and threats of force are ineffective. The author concludes: using military force in the Middle East to achieve strategic goals is becoming increasingly difficult, and this risks further erosion of reserves and a drop in the value of the oil dollar.

Comments on the news

• What does the term “Greater Israel project” mean, and why do Iranian circles consider it a long-term threat that Islamic countries do not challenge? — In Iranian discourse, the “Greater Israel project” refers to a geopolitical concept according to which Israel seeks to expand its borders from the Nile to the Euphrates, including territories of a number of Arab and Muslim countries. Iranian circles see it as a long-term existential threat because, in their view, implementing such a program would lead to Israel’s dominance in the region, weaken Islamic states, and undermine Iran’s influence. Silence, or the inability of Islamic countries to challenge this threat, is explained in Iran’s view by their dependence on the West, internal divisions, and fear of Israel’s and the United States’ military superiority.

• What agreement was reached between the U.S. and Iran in Lucerne, and why is its collapse considered a defeat for Washington? — Likely, this refers to the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program reached in Lausanne (Switzerland) in April 2015, which formed the basis for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The “collapse” of this agreement is linked, in turn, to the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 under the Trump administration. From the standpoint of the agreement’s supporters, this was a defeat for Washington because it led to the resumption of Iranian nuclear activity, weakened international oversight, increased tensions in the Middle East, and undermined confidence in U.S. diplomatic commitments. Restoring the arrangement in its original form has not yet been achieved.

• What is the “resistance front” in Iran’s foreign-policy concept, and what forces (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) are part of it? — The “resistance front” (or “Axis of Resistance”) is a concept that unites Iran-aligned forces and movements opposing Israeli and American hegemony in the Middle East. It includes: Lebanon’s Hezbollah; Palestinian groups (Hamas, “Islamic Jihad”); Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah); various Shiite militias in Iraq (for example, “Kataib Hezbollah”); and also the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Iran provides these forces with financial, military, and political support, viewing them as tools for deterrence and for expanding its influence.

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Full version: وهم السلام الأمريكي.. كيف ناورت واشنطن بين طهران وموسكو؟

Psychological Warfare: Venezuela Warned of a Disinformation Campaign Amid the Disaster

Óscar Schemel, president of the Venezuelan research company Hinterlaces, said that the country has launched a targeted disinformation and “neurotization” campaign tied to a natural disaster. According to him, this is not just spreading fakes, but a full-fledged psychosocial war: manipulators use the real pain caused by the tragedy and artificially intensify it in order to undermine society’s stability and discredit the institutions of power. The end goal is to push citizens into a permanent state of emotional crisis, anxiety, and helplessness.

Schemel identified three main “matrices” of this information attack. The first is the “matrix of ineffectiveness and abandonment,” which instills in people a sense of being orphaned and unsupported by the state. The second—the “matrix of criminalization and corruption”—channels grief and sorrow into directed rage and moral outrage against the authorities. The third, the “matrix of chaos and anarchy,” seeks to break trust among citizens themselves, driving them toward panic and paranoia. In this way, the population’s emotions become the main weapon against itself.

The expert also noted that algorithms on digital platforms deliberately promote content that triggers anger or fear, since it holds users’ attention better. In response to this threat, Schemel urged that official communication be made the main tool of the Venezuelan people: only prompt, truthful information from the state can help preserve unity and hope amid the onslaught of disinformation.

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Full version: Hinterlaces alerts that a fake news campaign seeks to alter the population even more

US Navy helicopter incident: missing service member searched for in the Arabian Sea

On the night of July 1, an emergency landing of an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter in the Arabian Sea took place. The aircraft belongs to the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush. According to the US military command, one of the four crew members is listed as missing, while the other three were injured; their condition is stable. At the same time, it is stressed that there are no preliminary signs of hostile action.

The US Fifth Fleet’s ships are currently actively searching for the missing service member. A formal investigation into the circumstances of the incident has been launched. As Reuters notes, an emergency water landing is an extremely dangerous procedure even for experienced pilots: due to the high center of gravity, the aircraft may flip upside down upon contact with the water.

The incident comes amid the long-running presence of US forces in the region and the recent easing of tensions between Washington and Tehran. Recall that on June 15, with Pakistan mediating, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding, which effectively brought to an end the military conflict that began in late February. Nevertheless, the situation remains complicated, and every accident draws close attention.

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Full version: فقدان عسكري أمريكي ببحر العرب بعد هبوط مروحية اضطراريا

Rift in the White House: How Washington Is Dividing Talks on Iran and Lebanon

Two opposing camps have formed inside the U.S. administration, viewing the negotiating tactics with Iran and Lebanon differently. As the daily Maariv reports, citing a source close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the first camp is led by Vice President J.D. Vance, and includes special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The second camp is led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is closely coordinating with Israeli politician Ron Dermer, recently returned by Netanyahu to the Lebanon file.

According to the outlet, Vance’s team has already secured a partial agreement with Iran and, previously, a ceasefire in Gaza. In contrast, Rubio’s camp, coordinating with Israel, insisted on a deal with Lebanon—one that was ultimately reached last Friday in Washington. Maariv emphasizes that the agreement meets Israel’s “vital interests and security requirements”—a view in which this camp interprets its victory.

At the same time, internal rivalry between Vance and Rubio does not prevent them from remaining loyal figures for Donald Trump. As the Axios portal notes, citing an official, both are merely “different tools in a multifunctional Swiss Army knife,” which Trump himself controls. Experts already see them as likely rivals in the 2028 presidential election, but for now their task is to carry out the will of the current occupant of the White House.

The signed agreement provides for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory in exchange for Beirut’s commitments to disarm “Hezbollah.” However, the group itself has rejected the understandings. In Israel, this has caused a split: some in the military and political establishment, including Netanyahu, call the deal a “historic achievement” that allows the army to maintain its presence in southern Lebanon. Others warn that the pause will give “Hezbollah” a chance to rebuild its strength, which, according to assessments, had been on the brink of collapse.

A senior Israeli security source, quoted by The Monitor, expressed concern: “We are not complacent. ‘Hezbollah’ was on the verge of collapse, and now we are giving it time to regain its strength.” Thus, in both Washington and Jerusalem, the Lebanon deal has produced not only optimism but also serious concerns, and the struggle between the two approaches in the White House has reflected a broader global confrontation between lines of hard diplomacy and targeted compromises.

Comments on the news

• What exactly is the “partial agreement” between the United States and Iran mentioned in the article, and what issues (nuclear program, regional influence, sanctions) does it address? — A “partial agreement” usually refers to a temporary arrangement under which Iran pauses uranium enrichment above 60% and allows IAEA inspections, while the United States eases some oil and financial sanctions and unfreezes Iranian assets abroad. Issues related to regional influence (for example, support for the Houthis or “Hezbollah”) are often not addressed in such an agreement, which draws criticism from Israel and U.S. conservatives. The deal is not a comprehensive replacement for the JCPOA; rather, it is a tactical step aimed at reducing tensions.

• How does Iran finance, arm, and support “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, and why is disarming this group a key demand of Israel despite its rejection of the deal? — Iran supplies “Hezbollah” through air shipments (mainly to Beirut) and overland routes through Syria: the deliveries include precision rockets, drones, air-defense equipment, and financial assistance (estimates put it at hundreds of millions of dollars per year). Funding flows through banking networks, exchange houses, and cash courier routes. For Israel, disarming “Hezbollah” is critical because the group has an arsenal capable of striking across the entire territory of Israel and does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. “Hezbollah’s” rejection of the deal does not change Israel’s position, since Iran can distance itself from the group in words while maintaining support behind the scenes.

• Which internal political forces in Iran (IRGC, the supreme leader, economic pressure) affect Tehran’s willingness to compromise with the United States, and how is this reflected in the negotiation process? — The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, retains a final veto over any negotiations, and his stance remains hardline on issues of regional influence and the missile program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) often opposes concessions, as they threaten its economic and military interests. However, economic pressure (inflation, unemployment, the devaluation of the rial) pushes reformers, including President Pezeshkian, toward seeking temporary relief from sanctions even without a broad agreement. This creates a split: the IRGC and conservatives block deep compromises, while pragmatists are willing to take tactical pauses in the nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions—leading to the cautious format of a “partial agreement.”

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Full version: Maariv.. Internal conflict in Washington over talks with Iran and Lebanon

Aftershock activity in Venezuela is easing, but the risk remains

After two strong earthquakes on June 24, Venezuela has seen a steady decline in both the frequency and magnitude of aftershocks. According to the authorities, as of June 29 there were 689 seismic events recorded. The number of aftershocks has fallen from 86 per day to 30, confirming that subsurface activity is gradually dying down. However, government representative Jorge Rodríguez stressed that this does not mean the threat has been fully lifted: the number and strength of aftershocks are decreasing, but the risk of further ground shaking remains, and all services are continuing to operate in an enhanced state of readiness.

To help those affected, 14 temporary shelters have been set up in La Guaira state, and another 55 in Caracas, Miranda, and other regions. The authorities are working to minimize how long people stay in tent camps and to speed up relocation to prepared centers that provide medical and psychological support. At the same time, communications are being restored: in La Guaira, mobile operators have already restored 24 to 64% of capacity, while the fixed network Cantv is operating at 70%, allowing those affected to stay in touch with their relatives. Search-and-rescue operations involving local and international teams continue, and any changes in the seismic situation will be reported immediately through official channels.

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Full version: Frecuencia y magnitud de las réplicas muestran descenso en Venezuela

US and Iran Technical Talks in Doha: Qatar and Pakistan as Intermediaries

Indirect technical consultations between the United States and Iran have begun in the capital of Qatar. As Reuters reports, citing informed sources, Doha and Islamabad play a key role in organizing the dialogue. The meetings are taking place amid a fragile peace and complicated relations between the two countries, and their holding has become possible thanks to sustained multilateral diplomacy.

On Tuesday, Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdel Rahman Al Thani, met with the US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. According to sources, the purpose of the discussion was to lay the groundwork for subsequent technical sessions, with the prime minister himself not taking part in the talks directly. Qatar’s official QNA agency clarified that the sides discussed the status of implementation of a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran.

Qatar confirmed that it will continue its intermediary efforts and support all negotiation tracks arising from the signed document, up to reaching a comprehensive and durable settlement. American representatives, in turn, expressed Washington’s appreciation for Doha’s cooperation with Pakistan in organizing the dialogue, and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to further negotiations.

The situation, however, is clouded by disagreements in public statements. President Donald Trump said that the US delegation is already preparing to fly to Doha to take part in the talks session, and the White House announced the visit of Witkoff and Kushner. At the same time, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that any negotiations were taking place, insisting that Iran’s delegation is traveling solely to monitor implementation of the memorandum’s points—particularly those related to lifting oil sanctions and unfreezing frozen assets.

The memorandum, signed on June 17, provides for at least a 60-day period to implement 14 points, including extending the ceasefire regime agreed in April. During the same timeframe, discussions are also planned on Iran’s nuclear program, research developments, and stocks of highly enriched uranium—uranium that Trump insists should be exported out of the country. However, progress is being slowed by mutual accusations of violations of the agreement’s terms, and the agreement itself remains politically vulnerable for the Trump administration ahead of the November midterm elections in Congress.

Comments on the news

• Why do Qatar and Pakistan act as intermediaries between the United States and Iran, and what historical ties do they have with both countries? — Qatar and Pakistan play the role of intermediaries because they maintain balanced relations with both sides. Qatar has close ties with the United States (the “Udeid” military base) and with Iran (a shared gas field, diplomatic contacts). Pakistan has historically been linked to Iran (a shared border, cultural and religious ties, cooperation during the Afghan war) and at the same time receives substantial assistance from the United States, and after 2021 took part in the evacuation from Afghanistan. Both intermediaries are seen by Tehran and Washington as neutral, which makes it possible to hold informal consultations.

• Which specific oil sanctions and frozen Iranian assets are under discussion, and how could unfreezing them affect Iran’s economy? — The discussion concerns US sanctions prohibiting the purchase of Iranian crude oil, as well as Iran’s frozen assets in South Korean banks (about $6–7 billion; revenue from oil exports through 2019). Funds from Iraq and other countries are also being discussed. Unfreezing would give Tehran access to hard currency for importing goods (medicines, food) and would partially ease inflation, but it would not fully remove the pressure of sanctions. The impact would be limited because the main restrictions on oil exports would remain in place.

• Why does Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly deny that negotiations are taking place if technical consultations have effectively occurred? What internal political motives might drive such a statement? — The public denial of negotiations is explained by Iran’s internal political struggle: conservative and radical circles (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) believe that any contact with the United States amounts to giving in to the “enemy” and weakening the principles of the revolution. The government of President Pezeshkian, balancing between pragmatists and conservatives, has to conceal the talks so as not to give critics an opening. The technical consultations are presented as “informal” or “third-party consultations,” which helps avoid accusations of betrayal and helps maintain face before the domestic audience.

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Full version: Reuters: Indirect Technical Talks Between Washington and Tehran in Doha

The US and Iran Prepare for Technical Talks in Doha Amid Disagreements

US President Donald Trump said that the US delegation is already preparing to fly to Doha to take part in Tuesday’s talks with Iran focused on the technical details of a memorandum of understanding. At the White House, officials said the meeting could prove “important,” though its exact agenda has not yet been disclosed. Administration spokesperson Caroline Leavitt added that special envoys Stephen Witkoff and Jared Kushner will travel to Qatar this week for senior-level consultations.

According to Politico sources, Witkoff has already informed lawmakers that the technical group for nuclear talks will be headed to Qatar. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Witkoff themselves told legislators that the ultimate goal is to reach an agreement that would prevent Iran from retaining stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. The Washington Post adds that US and Iranian specialists have already been discussing the details, with some experts working remotely while others will be in Doha in person.

Despite Washington’s optimism, Tehran categorically denies that any negotiating rounds with Americans will take place in the coming days. An official from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the Iranian delegation is going to Doha solely to monitor the implementation of the memorandum’s provisions—above all, the lifting of oil sanctions and the unfreezing of frozen assets. The sides are also disputing the fragility of the ceasefire extension agreement reached on June 17.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed that all prior contacts with the United States were carried out in full coordination with the supreme leader and within approved mechanisms. “We will not back down from our rights, interests, and national principles under any circumstances,” he said, criticizing attempts to discredit the negotiating team. For his part, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a written statement, endorsed the understandings reached after Pezeshkian assured him that there would be no concessions.

At the same time, Iranian officials stepped up their rhetoric regarding the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to create obstacles for ships that sail outside established routes. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi told state television that Iran has notified Oman of the need to change shipping patterns and that the situation “will not return to pre-war conditions.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi emphasized that Iran has exclusive responsibility for managing the strait.

On the international stage, calls for pragmatism are being heard. Germany’s Foreign Ministry said a practical approach is needed to ensure the security of passage through the Strait of Hormuz and to address issues related to Iran’s nuclear program. Berlin called the Tehran-Washington agreement to halt attacks and continue dialogue an important step that offers a chance for “diplomacy in a fragile situation.” Meanwhile, French President Macron said that Paris, together with Oman, is working on clearing mines from the water area.

In the US Congress, Iran’s promises are being met with caution. Democratic Congressman Adam Smith, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told CNN that the Trump administration looks “very optimistic” about Iran agreeing to open the strait, but he acknowledged that there is not yet convincing evidence to support that. Thus, despite diplomatic movement, significant uncertainty remains—both regarding the nuclear file and the security of the key maritime corridor.

Comments on the news

• Who is Masoud Pezeshkian and what role does he play in Iran’s political system, where real power belongs to the supreme leader? — Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian reformist politician, a former Minister of Health (2001–2005), and a member of parliament. In Iran’s system, the president heads the executive branch, but his powers are limited: the supreme leader (rahbar) controls the armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the judiciary, state media, and key foreign-policy decisions. As president, Pezeshkian can influence economic and social policy, but not the nuclear program or security.
• What are the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s constitutional powers regarding the nuclear program and foreign policy? — Under Article 110 of Iran’s Constitution, the supreme leader sets the overall policy of the state, including the nuclear program, and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He appoints members of the Expediency Council and half of the members of the Guardian Council, which oversees elections and legislation. All decisions regarding nuclear negotiations and foreign-policy alliances require the supreme leader’s approval, while the president and the Foreign Ministry act within his directives.
• Why is the Strait of Hormuz considered strategically important for the global economy, and what methods could Iran use to disrupt shipping? — Around 20–25% of the world’s oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz (approximately 20 million barrels per day). Iran could disrupt the strait by: (1) mining the waters, (2) using high-speed boats and coastal missile systems, (3) seizing tankers (as in 2019), (4) deploying submarines. Even partial disruption of shipping would drive up energy prices and trigger a global economic crisis.
• What role has Oman historically played as a mediator between Iran and the US, and why did Tehran choose this country to be notified about changes to routes? — Since the 1970s, Oman has maintained neutrality in regional conflicts, supporting diplomatic channels both with Iran and with the United States. In 2013, it acted as a mediator during the first secret talks that led to the nuclear deal (JCPOA). Tehran chose Oman due to: (1) the Sultanate’s trustworthiness as an honest broker, (2) geographical proximity (Oman controls the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz), and (3) a long-standing arrangement for informal intelligence and signal-sharing between the two countries.

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Full version: US and Iran delegations to Doha as Tehran threatens to block alternative routes in the Strait of Hormuz

Venezuela Creates Headquarters to Tackle the Aftermath of Earthquakes

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez announced the creation of a special headquarters to coordinate the construction of housing and set up temporary camps for families affected by the recent earthquakes. Interdisciplinary teams—bringing together engineers, architects, and technical specialists—are already working in several towns and cities in the states of La Guaira and Miranda, as well as in Caracas. To quickly assess the condition of buildings, a “structural traffic light” system has been introduced: green means the building is fully fit for habitation; yellow indicates partial damage (cracks, wall collapse) that will be repaired under the “Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor” program and the Vice Presidency for Public Works; red means the building is completely lost with no possibility of restoration.

Families who have been left without shelter, or who have placed their safety first by staying in parks out of fear of new shocks, will be housed in temporary camps. There, to provide logistical support, rest, and protection for the population, authorities will organize registration using fingerprints. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Environment has already begun designing new residential neighborhoods on geologically safe sites. The authorities have promised to provide permanent housing to those affected by the end of the current year.

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Full version: Gobierno activa

Morocco pulls off a shock win over the Netherlands to become the main favorite for the 2026 World...

A sensational victory by the Morocco national team over the Netherlands in the 2026 World Cup match has sparked widespread interest in international media: now “Atlas Lions” are no longer seen as just a “dark horse” of the tournament. Experts and journalists unanimously acknowledge that the Moroccan team has turned into one of the main contenders for the championship, displaying top-class football and an incredible will to win.

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Full version: الجزيرة نت

The U.S. as a “global crisis-actor”: aid, military decisions and interference

A series of publications depicts the United States not as a bystander, but as an active player that responds to international crises along several tracks at once: through aid deliveries, the deployment of military and administrative resources, and through diplomatic and political actions that can shift the balance of power. The focus is not only on the fact of response, but also on how external and regional media assess American capabilities, motives, and the degree of influence in situations affecting, in particular, Venezuela and Iran—along with broader geopolitical confrontations.

The material is based on publications from www.facebook.com (Venezuela).

The U.S. in the Venezuelan mirror: from Machado to the World Cup

In two different, but ideologically connected reactions, the United States is shown not as a neutral international player, but as a force whose signals and actions are immediately read through Venezuela’s political lens. In one case, it concerns a response to the opposition’s expectations surrounding María Corina Machado; in the other, a leftist anti-imperialist view of the World Cup in the United States, presented as a symptom of the American power crisis.

In the first text, published by El Comercio, the key phrase is attributed to Marco Rubio: “Venezuela tiene autoridades únicas interinas” and “el Dpto. de Estado no ha fijado ninguna posición con respecto a ella.” For a Venezuelan audience, this comes across as a cold shower: in this interpretation, the United States is not in a rush to confirm the opposition’s political expectations and does not provide it with the external legitimacy it is counting on. The author even uses the ironic expression “OTRA BUENA DOSIS DE UBICATEX” — “another dose of getting your senses back” — underscoring the disappointment of the Machado camp.

This storyline reads not merely as a dispute over who can speak on behalf of Venezuela, but as a question of the internal legitimacy of political actors. The emphasis is placed not on abstract diplomacy, but on the political effect of Rubio’s statement: the State Department does not take Machado’s side. For the opposition, this is especially painful, because international recognition remains one of the key resources in its strategy. Any ambiguity from Washington weakens its negotiating position and undermines hopes for external support. Against the backdrop of the Venezuelan opposition’s long-standing dependence on American pressure, this signal is perceived as yet another reminder that expectations of regime change do not always align with the United States’ cautious approach.

In the second piece, published by Politica Obrera, the United States is placed in a much harsher frame—as a power trying to restore its imperial status in the face of its own decline. Here, the World Cup in the United States is described not as a sporting celebration, but as “a boomerang for imperialism.” According to Joaquín Antúnez, the tournament reveals not strength, but the system’s contradictions: expensive tickets, half-empty stadiums, protests, and strikes.

Especially important for Venezuelan—and more broadly Latin American—readers is the text’s anti-imperialist tone. As the source reports, Eva Gutiérrez says that the U.S. is “trying to restore itself as an empire again,” but in reality it is in “complete degradation.” In this context, protests against ICE, brutal treatment of teams and migrants, and the general logic of repression and control are mentioned. For Venezuela, this is a sensitive issue, given the mass migration of Venezuelans and the ongoing conflict with the United States around migration policy.

The material also links the United States with Canada and Mexico, presenting the region as a space of crisis where even “progressive” governments are not freed from criticism. In this setting, a sporting event becomes a political symbol: in Latin America, football is not just sport—it is part of mass identity, so the idea that the World Cup in the U.S. turns into a failure is easily read as a symbolic defeat of the American project.

What unites both texts is the same thing: the United States is viewed through a Venezuelan framework in which diplomacy, sport, migration, and domestic politics turn out to be parts of one large conflict over power, legitimacy, and interference. In one case, Washington does not send the desired signal to the opposition; in the other, it is shown as a vulnerable power hiding a crisis behind a large-scale show. In both cases, the American position is read not neutrally, but as a political factor capable of either supporting or weakening opponents in Latin America.

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Oil rises, gold falls amid Iran-U.S. standoff

Global markets kicked off the week with sharp, mixed moves: oil rose amid worries about the security of shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, while gold, by contrast, fell on expectations of further tightening of U.S. monetary policy. The focus is on yet another escalation between Washington and Tehran, which has cast doubt on the fragile ceasefire that had been in place for the past few months.

Brent oil futures rose by nearly 1% to $73.27 per barrel, while U.S. light crude WTI gained 1.2%, climbing to $70.04. The reason was renewed strikes on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, which slowed shipping and reminded traders again of the vulnerability of the key energy corridor. Still, the rally is being restrained by diplomatic manoeuvres: according to sources, Tehran and Washington agreed on a temporary ceasefire in the Persian Gulf and said they would return to the negotiating table.

Against this backdrop, Saudi state oil company Saudi Aramco resumed crude loading at Ras Tanura port, located west of the Strait of Hormuz. Loading had not been interrupted for almost four months — since the start of the open conflict. At the same time, on Sunday a company helicopter crashed in the same area, killing 14 Saudi nationals. The reasons for the crash have not been disclosed so far.

Gold, meanwhile, lost 0.68%, dropping to $4,061.56 per troy ounce. The metal faced dual pressure: on the one hand, rising oil prices are stoking inflation expectations; on the other, market sentiment worsened after new Iranian missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. In addition, investors are increasingly pricing in a future increase in the Fed’s rate: the FedWatch tool estimates the probability of a third hike in December at 77%.

As a result, this week’s markets are at a crossroads: on the one hand, the real risk of disruptions to oil supplies and a new wave of geopolitical uncertainty; on the other, hope for a diplomatic breakthrough and signals from the U.S. regulator. Trading participants will watch closely how the situation in the Strait of Hormuz develops, along with any hints of changes to Fed credit policy.

Comments on the news

• What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s operations in the Persian Gulf and in threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz? — The IRGC is Iran’s main military force responsible for controlling the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Its naval units (IRGC Navy) use high-speed patrol boats, anti-ship missiles, and mines to potentially blockade the strait. Iran views this as leverage in the event of a conflict or sanctions. The IRGC also coordinates with the regular navy, but has special powers in asymmetric threats.

• How developed are Iran’s missile and drone programs, and what types of weapons could have been used to attack U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain? — Iran has one of the largest and most diverse missile programs in the Middle East, including ballistic missiles of short and medium range (for example, “Shahab-3,” “Emad,” “Khoramshahr”), cruise missiles (“Soumar,” “Hoveyze”), and a wide range of kamikaze drones (Shahed) and reconnaissance UAVs (for example, “Mohajer-6,” “Abin-3”). For attacks on bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, UAVs such as Shahed-136 or Shahed-131 could have been used, along with short-range missiles such as “Fateh-110” or “Zolfaghar.” However, the exact types depend on the specific incidents — Iran typically uses a combination of UAVs and missiles to minimize interception.

• Why is Ras Tanura port in Saudi Arabia considered key for the global oil market, and how does its location relate to events in the Strait of Hormuz? — Ras Tanura is Saudi Arabia’s largest oil port, through which around 90% of its oil exports pass (10–13 million barrels per day). It is located on the coast of the Persian Gulf, south of the Strait of Hormuz. The direct link is this: any incidents in the strait (such as Iranian mines or attacks on tankers) directly threaten the transit of ships to Ras Tanura, since all tankers from this port must pass through Hormuz. Thus, the strait’s security is critical for Saudi exports and global oil prices. Iran has repeatedly stated that it could block the strait, which would effectively make Ras Tanura a hostage to Iranian threats.

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Full version: Oil rises and gold falls as tension between America and Iran escalates

Venezuelan outlet El Universal, on the day of the professional holiday, provides round-the-clock...

After two strong earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5 that shook Venezuela, El Universal’s editorial team immediately launched a large-scale information campaign across all its digital platforms. Journalists and technical specialists are working without pause, sharing verified information from emergency services, reports on damage in the hardest-hit regions — Caracas, Carabobo, Yaracuy, Aragua and La Guaira — and promptly broadcasting Civil Defense recommendations. Notably, this emergency work coincided with the national Journalists’ Day on 27 June: instead of celebrating, the outlet’s staff mark their professional holiday on the job, underscoring the civic mission of their profession.

The leadership of the digital newsroom emphasizes that informing during a disaster is not just a duty, but an ethical obligation to every Venezuelan. In the coming days, the priority will be to debunk false reports and hoaxes actively circulated in messengers, as well as to publish information that serves the public good: addresses of aid collection centers, working emergency numbers, data on the arrival of international assistance, and monitoring of aftershocks across the country. El Universal urges citizens to rely only on official sources and the outlet’s own verified channels to stay informed and keep themselves safe.

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Full version: Earthquake and calling: El Universal reports without pause on the national emergency on Journalists' Day

Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz: choosing between Iran and Oman

Vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are forced to choose between two routes—an Iranian and an Omani one. However, the rivalry between these routes for control over shipping management in the strait creates serious uncertainty for maritime carriers. This competition between the two countries complicates logistics and increases risks for companies that depend on a stable passage through one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

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Full version: Al Jazeera net

Criticism of Trump’s Foreign Policy and Response to Rising Tensions

Against the backdrop of new warning signals and harsh assessments from international observers, Trump’s foreign policy is once again in the spotlight: threats and military steps toward Iran are being framed as accelerating a spiral of confrontation and undermining stability. At the same time, the broader political climate is also shifting—around the world there is increasing talk that the United States is acting too aggressively or unpredictably, and that its role as a guarantor of order has become questionable. This line echoes how the American stance is reflected in neighboring regions: references are made to its impact on the situation in Venezuela and to how the balance of power, expectations, and calculations are changing for states on both sides of the ocean. In this context, the discussion goes far beyond a single topic, turning into a broader debate about power, responsibility, and the limits of U.S. influence. This piece was prepared using data from cnnespanol.cnn.com (Venezuela) and elpais.com (Venezuela).

The Venezuelan Perspective: Oil, the Strait of Hormuz, and a Crisis of the American Ideal

In the Venezuelan press, the new escalation between the United States and Iran is read above all not as a distant conflict in the Middle East, but as an event capable of shaking up the oil market again—and through it, the global economy and Venezuela itself. In an analytical piece by CNN en Español, attention is focused on the price of Brent, threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and how even a brief disruption in supply instantly shows up in fuel, on stock exchanges, and for consumers. One-fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass through Hormuz, and that is why any military tension in this area is seen as a risk to the entire global energy system.

For Venezuela, this storyline is especially sensitive. For decades, the country has lived within the logic of oil dependence, and any movement in Brent prices here is not an abstraction: it becomes a factor affecting currency inflows, budget stability, and political expectations surrounding energy. When the article emphasizes that oil rose after new attacks and that markets are waiting for supplies to resume through Hormuz, it sounds like a reminder that even a localized escalation can immediately redistribute global revenues—and once again show how oil remains a geopolitical weapon.

The text contains no direct quotes from Venezuelan officials or economists, but the way the subject is presented reflects typical regional sensibility: the focus is on how the United States tries to keep fuel prices inside the country steady, and on how military actions shape market behavior. For Venezuela, this echoes its own experience with sanctions, restrictions on exports, infrastructure problems, and the chronic vulnerability of the oil sector. In this logic, Iran can be perceived as a country that—like Venezuela—exists under intense external pressure and uses the energy factor as an element of resistance.

A particularly important point is the historical parallel: in Venezuela, people remember periods when rising global oil prices brought short-term relief to public finances, but did not solve the economy’s structural problems. That is why news that Brent has risen only moderately, and that the market is expecting normalization of flows through Hormuz, is not taken as a triumph of “expensive oil,” but as another example of instability—where a brief spike can quickly turn into a drop if the conflict is contained or logistics improve.

Against this backdrop, it becomes especially clear that Venezuela’s lens links the U.S.-Iran war to its own economic vulnerability: here, what matters is not only the facts about the attacks and the price per barrel, but also the broader meaning—who controls energy routes, who benefits from chaos, and why global oil dependence remains a source of pressure and blackmail for countries like Venezuela.

In a similar way, Venezuelans read another analytical piece—this time about the United States—where the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence coincides with a political and cultural crisis. In an article by El País, the anniversary is described not as a celebration of the American project, but as a moment when slogans about freedom, equality, and democracy collide with authoritarian practices, revision of history, and internal division.

For the Venezuelan audience, it is particularly important that the United States is portrayed not as an unconditional model, but as a country experiencing its own legitimacy crisis. This has direct political significance: local readers usually see American politics through the prism of sanctions, interference, and double standards. As a result, criticism of Donald Trump and attempts to rewrite history easily overlay a long-standing Latin American skepticism toward Washington. If the United States itself cannot align its principles with reality, then the argument about America’s “moral authority” becomes far less convincing in the region.

The piece on the anniversary emphasizes that the United States is celebrating it amid protests by the No Kings movement and fears about Trump’s authoritarian tendencies. Historians mentioned in the text note that the American project has been controversial from the start: freedom coexisted with slavery and the displacement of Indigenous peoples. Frank Cogliano says that the problems of the past cannot be understood without considering how today’s political fears shape them. Steve Levitsky calls Trump the “worst nightmare” of the Founding Fathers—a leader who could bypass the system’s constraints. Eddy S. Glaude Jr., meanwhile, speaks of the “divided soul” of the United States: a country of freedom and a “white republic” at the same time.

For the Venezuelan reader, several meanings converge at once. First, this is an anti-imperialist context: the United States is shown as a state that criticizes others, yet lives with a crisis of rights and institutions itself. Second, parallels emerge with Venezuela’s internal conflicts—issues of historical memory, racial inequality, and the struggle over the national narrative, which also remain the subject of dispute. Third, the question of political morality arises: if the United States debates freedom, slavery, and violence against Indigenous peoples, on what basis does Washington continue to act as a judge of other regimes?

That is why the Venezuelan response to these publications differs from a simple news recap. This is not a neutral report, but a critical interpretation that links U.S. history to today’s authoritarian drift, an internal cultural war, and a decline in international prestige. As a result, in Venezuelan readings, both the war around Iran and the crisis of the American ideal come together into a single picture: a world in which oil remains a source of strength and vulnerability, and the United States is a country whose ability to teach others democracy is increasingly called into question.

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The United States and Iran agreed to halt hostilities and hold talks in Doha

The United States has decided to suspend all combat operations against Iran, the Axios portal reports, citing U.S. officials. This came after a mutual escalation in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. Already tomorrow, Tuesday, a meeting of representatives from Washington and Tehran is scheduled in Doha, where the parties will try to resolve the dispute over shipping. Notably, the “hot line” between the U.S. military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has not yet gone into operation—it was planned to be launched by Saturday, but that did not happen.

The escalation began after the United States said that a commercial vessel, the Kiko, was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the U.S. Central Command carried out strikes on ten Iranian sites, including radar systems, launchers, drones, and places where sea mines were deployed on Qeshm Island and in the Serik area. Iran, in turn, reported attacks on U.S. military bases, including the Ali as-Salem base in Kuwait and the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Tehran considers the U.S. strikes a violation of the bilateral memorandum of understanding, while Washington insists it acted to protect freedom of navigation.

Although the fighting stopped from the morning of Sunday, the situation remains tense. As Al Jazeera correspondent Omar Howawsh, in Tehran, notes, the crisis is far from over—both sides are “keeping a finger on the trigger.” The main disagreement concerns Article 5 of the memorandum, which sets the terms for “safe passage” of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States is trying to chart alternative routes closer to the Omani coast, a move Iran strongly opposes. Thus, a ceasefire is only a temporary pause, not a final solution.

Earlier, a temporary 14-point agreement between Washington and Tehran was supposed to halt hostilities launched by the United States and Israel on February 28. The document also envisaged keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping until talks on more complex issues—including Iran’s nuclear program—are held. The upcoming meeting in Doha is seen as a decisive step in implementing that memorandum, and the results will determine whether the sides can turn a fragile ceasefire into long-term stability in the region.

Comments on the news

• Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it differ from Iran’s regular army? — The IRGC is an elite politico-military formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend its ideals. It reports directly to the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) and has its own land, naval and air forces, as well as the “Quds” unit for external operations. Unlike the regular army (Artesh), which mainly protects Iran’s territorial integrity and borders and reports to the Ministry of Defense, the IRGC is actively involved in political life, controls a significant part of the economy (through foundations and construction projects), and plays a key role in regional politics (for example, support for Hezbollah or Yemeni Houthi forces). For an international audience, it is important to understand: the IRGC is not just an army, but a “state within a state,” with enormous influence.

• Why do Qeshm Island and the Serik area have strategic significance for Iran in the context of the Strait of Hormuz? — Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. It allows Iran to control the narrow passage (about 33 km wide) through which around 20–25% of the world’s oil trade passes. Military naval bases, missile installations, and coastal defense systems are deployed on the island. The Serik area (the coastline to the east of Bandar Abbas) is also important for placing missile and observation complexes that provide “coverage” of the strait in the event of a conflict. Together, these points enable Iran to block or hamper the passage of ships, giving it leverage over global oil markets and Western countries.

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Full version: Axios: America and Iran agree to halt escalation and settle the Hormuz dispute in Qatar

Kuwait and Bahrain Say They Repelled Iranian Rocket and Drone Attacks

Early Sunday morning, Kuwait’s command said that the country’s air defense forces successfully repelled attacks by enemy rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. The army’s General Staff explained that the explosions that were heard were caused by the operation of interception systems. The military urged citizens to follow safety instructions published by the relevant authorities.

In turn, Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior reported two air-raid siren activations. The kingdom’s defense forces said that their air defenses intercepted several Iranian aerial attacks. The ministry called on residents to remain calm, take shelter in safe places, and monitor official news. It later emerged that a residential building in Muharraq Governorate was damaged, though there were no casualties.

The political response was swift: Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Iranian attacks as a blatant violation of sovereignty and a direct threat to security. The ministry stressed that continued aggression undermines efforts to reduce tensions in the region. Oman’s Sultanate also expressed its condemnation, saying it was fully aligned with Kuwait and rejecting any actions that threaten stability. The UAE’s Foreign Ministry joined the criticism, calling the attacks a flagrant violation of Bahrain’s and Kuwait’s sovereignty.

The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jassem Mohammed Al-Budaiwi, condemned the “terrorist attacks by Iran” and described them as a clear affront to the sovereignty of the two states. Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry issued a “firm condemnation” and warned that the continuation of such actions puts responsibility for undermining peace on the Iranian regime. Earlier, on Saturday, several Gulf countries had already expressed solidarity with Bahrain, noting that these attacks pose a direct threat to the security and stability of the entire region.

Comments on the news

• What are the historical reasons for tension between Iran and Bahrain, especially given Bahrain’s Shiite majority and Iran’s state ideology? - The tension stems from several factors: (1) Historical territorial claims: Iran officially laid claim to Bahrain until 1970, when the Shah renounced them; these claims were based on the period of rule by the Safavids (16th–18th centuries). (2) Ideology of exporting the revolution: After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran proclaimed the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which encourages support for Shiite communities abroad. Bahrain, where 60–70% of the population is Shiite, is viewed by Tehran as a natural sphere of influence. (3) Attempted coup in 1981: Iranian forces tried to organize a coup in Bahrain through the Iran-backed “Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.” (4) Sectarian rule: In Bahrain, the Shiite majority is governed by the Sunni Al Khalifa dynasty, which Iran uses to mobilize opposition by inflaming grievances over discrimination.

• Why does Oman, after expressing solidarity with Kuwait and Bahrain, traditionally play a mediation role in relations with Iran—unlike other Gulf countries? - Oman occupies a unique position due to several factors: (1) Geographic proximity and history: Oman and Iran have long-standing trade ties and joint management of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Oman has never been ideologically hostile toward Tehran. (2) Neutrality: Oman’s foreign policy consciously avoids military blocs (Oman did not join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen). Sultan Qaboos (until 2020) and the current Sultan Haitham have pursued a course of “quiet diplomacy.” (3) Practical interest: Oman has acted as a mediator in the release of Western hostages in Iran (for example, in 2023) and in negotiations on the nuclear deal, because its economy depends on stable relations with Iran. (4) No support for sanctions: Oman did not back U.S. sanctions against Iran, maintaining bilateral trade, which makes it a trusted intermediary for both sides—unlike Bahrain, which hosts a U.S. Navy base and is hostile to Iran.

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Full version: Iranian attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain cause material damage

Latin America’s Reaction to Trump’s Policies: Pressure, Influence and Disputes in the Region

Latin American capitals continue to watch closely — sometimes with concern — how US foreign policy, in the spirit of the Trump era, is reflected in diplomacy, trade, and the political agenda across the ocean. At the center of the discussion are not only economic levers, but also more “soft” mechanisms of influence: arrangements, pressure through laws and demands, as well as disputes over digital rules and control in the information space. Against this backdrop, contradictory assessments are being heard: some see in the American moves an attempt to strengthen Washington’s position and reshuffle regional power dynamics, while others point to shifting signals that are felt particularly painfully in the context of the fight against criminal structures.

This material was prepared based on publications with sources from Venezuela: www.youtube.com (Venezuela) and www.elespectador.com (Venezuela).

The United States, Cartels and Digital Sovereignty in Latin America

In Venezuela’s information space, two storylines are quickly merging into one overarching conclusion: the United States continues to use the language of security, trade and technology as an instrument of political influence in Latin America. At first glance, the topics seem different — fentanyl on the US–Mexico border and Colombia’s digital agenda — but both stories show how Washington sets the conversation framework about the region in a way that suits it.

In a short commentary available via this link, journalist Jesús Esquivel draws attention to the contradiction between Markwayne Mullin’s statements that cartel groups allegedly fully control Mexico’s northern border and Donald Trump’s claim that the flow of fentanyl across the southern border of the United States has fallen by at least 60%. For a Venezuelan audience, this looks not just like a dispute over numbers, but as an example of selective American rhetoric, where complex cross-border processes are reduced to slogans about “fighting drug cartels.” Esquivel, in turn, directly says that such an approach glosses over issues such as illegal arms trafficking and money laundering on US territory itself.

That is exactly what makes the story especially understandable for a Venezuelan reader. In the region, people are well familiar with the feeling that Washington talks about security in the logic of domestic politics, and assigns responsibility for crises selectively. Amid sanctions, accusations of drug trafficking, and an ongoing media conflict with the United States, the Venezuelan lens easily reads double standards in such statements: publicly — fighting threats, in practice — ignoring its own role in chains of violence and illicit flows.

A similar perception applies to material about the United States’ digital agenda in the region. In an El Espectador article, using Colombia as an example, a broader Latin American trend is analyzed: Washington uses trade agreements not only for tariffs, but also to lock in rules in the sphere of data, platforms, and artificial intelligence. For Venezuela, this is especially sensitive, because it is no longer about oil or borders, but about digital sovereignty, access to government databases, and the right of a country to regulate technology corporations.

The author writes that agreements such as ART «impiden impuestos a los servicios digitales» (“prevent taxes on digital services”), «limitan regulaciones» (“limit regulations”), and guarantee the circulation of data. In other words, the main US bet is not just trade, but access to data and limiting the ability of states to build rules for the digital market on their own. In the Venezuelan context, this causes particular concern: the country already lives under sanctions pressure, technological isolation, and a sharp dispute over how far the state can control digital infrastructure without becoming dependent on external providers.

The article also separately mentions examples from the region that look like warnings for Venezuela as well: in El Salvador — projects such as Doctor SV and Nemotron-Personas; in Argentina — Gemelo Digital Social; and the influence of Palantir, linked not only to data, but also to security and migration. For a Venezuelan audience, this is especially significant because here, topics of control, migration, and digital monitoring have long been seen not as abstraction, but as part of real policies of pressure and managing the population. Against the backdrop of mass emigration of Venezuelans, any talk of expanded collection and analysis of data sounds far more acute.

In the end, both stories converge into one common political takeaway: the United States does not merely comment on the region’s problems, but shapes a framework within which Latin American countries are expected to act. In one case, it is a narrative about cartels and fentanyl, in which inconvenient aspects are kept under wraps — weapons, money, and domestic responsibility in the United States. In the other, it is digital agreements that could shrink space for independent policy and tie countries to external technological interests. For Venezuela, this becomes yet another reason to emphasize the need for digital sovereignty, caution in negotiations, and distrust of Washington’s statements — especially when they sound like universal solutions for the region.

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The US strikes Iranian targets: details and Tehran’s response

The US armed forces carried out a series of strikes on the Iranian island of Sīrīk, located off the country’s southern coast. According to a Pentagon statement, the targets included observation towers and rocket launchers which, according to Washington, posed an immediate threat. In response, the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said the attack was repelled and promised a decisive response at a chosen time and in a chosen place.

The incident comes amid continuing tension between the two states and could lead to a new escalation in the region.

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Full version: Al Jazeera Net

Venezuela: four centuries of earthquakes and their lessons

Venezuela is known for its turbulent political history, but much less for its record of earthquakes. Quakes have destroyed cities, sent people fleeing, and left behind little more than dust and rubble. The article serves as a reminder that life on this land—from colonial times to the era of reinforced concrete—was never calm: in the north of the country, home to about 80% of the population, the Caribbean Plate grinds against the South American Plate, creating faults and shocks. The main lesson delivered by this repeating catastrophe is the need to treat the territory you live on “with respect.”

The historical chronicle begins with an earthquake in 1641 in Caracas, when people—without maps or scientific explanations—prayed in the streets and waited for another “blow from the heavens.” The most powerful quake in the country’s history is considered to be the 1766 tremor with a magnitude of 7.9, which practically destroyed Cumaná. And in the midst of the war for independence, on March 26, 1812, on Holy Thursday, an earthquake of up to magnitude 8.0 took thousands of lives. It was then that Simón Bolívar delivered his famous line: “If nature resists, we will fight it and make it submit”—a slogan that became a symbol of unwavering resolve.

In the 20th century, disasters continued. In 1900, President Cipriano Castro, panicked, jumped out of a window and broke his leg. In 1929, Cumaná collapsed again—an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 triggered a tsunami with waves up to five meters, killing 1,600 people. In 1950, the city of El Tocuyo was hit by a shock of 6.3, and then what remained was bulldozed. In 1997, a powerful underground quake in Cariaco (around 7.0) killed more than 70 people, with schools hit especially hard—children became the main victims of this tragedy.

Recent history confirms that the threat has not gone away. In 2009, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake near Carabobo passed without fatalities, but left the injured and widespread damage. And in 2018, tremors tilted the last floors of the famous unfinished David Tower in Caracas—an emblem of fragile modernity. Finally, on June 24, 2026, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake with a magnitude 7.5 aftershock in Montalbán made the world hold its breath: the U.S. Geological Survey predicted 10,000 to 100,000 deaths, while Venezuelan authorities reported 164 fatalities. The article ends with an important conclusion: science explains plate tectonics, but direct experience—bodily fear and memory—teaches the main thing: any city, no matter how solid it seems, stands on ground it cannot control.

Comments on the news

• Who is Cipriano Castro and why did his reaction to the 1900 earthquake become well known? — Cipriano Castro was President of Venezuela from 1899 to 1908. His reaction to the 1900 earthquake became known thanks to his call for calm and unity: according to historical sources, he said, “Don’t be afraid, we are all people” (No hay que temer, somos todos hombres), highlighting his leadership in a crisis situation.
• What is the “David Tower” in Caracas and why is it considered a symbol of fragile modernity? — The “David Tower” (Torre de David) is an unfinished 45-story skyscraper in Caracas whose construction was halted in 1994 due to the financial crisis. Later, the building was occupied by squatters. It is considered a symbol of fragile modernity because it reflects the failure of ambitious modernization projects and Venezuela’s economic instability.

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Full version: Terremoto en Venezuela: cuatro siglos de ciudades caídas, miedo y memoria bajo la tierra

Escalation in the Persian Gulf: Tehran accuses Washington of derailing the June understandings

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned airstrikes carried out by U.S. forces on Friday evening against sites on the southern coast of the country. In a statement, the foreign ministry said the actions constitute a “flagrant violation” of the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries in mid-June, as well as a gross disregard for the UN Charter and international law. Tehran noted that the strikes targeted coastal observation facilities, which affects the first point of the agreement reached.

Iran’s side also said the strikes were carried out as part of its “inalienable right to self-defense,” and that its forces targeted sites linked to the U.S. military presence in the region. Tehran placed full responsibility for the consequences of this escalation on Washington, calling it a “violation of the promises made,” and urged the United Nations not to remain a bystander. In response to the attacks, according to Iranian media, strikes were launched against U.S. positions in the Persian Gulf—marking the first direct military clash between the two sides since the memorandum was signed on June 17.

In turn, U.S. Central Command said its strikes were in response to what it called an “unprovoked attack” on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. military officials stressed that the operation was a “forceful response” to Iran’s violation of a ceasefire. U.S. Vice President JD Vance warned that any further escalation by Iran would be met with a similar response. Earlier, President Donald Trump condemned an attack attributed to an Iranian drone, calling it a “reckless violation” of the understanding between the two countries.

Against this backdrop, Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharp condemnation of Iran, calling the attack on the kingdom using multiple unmanned aerial vehicles the “most resolute expressions” of such actions. Manama stressed that continuing these aggressive steps makes Tehran responsible for undermining peace and stability in the region. At the same time, Iranian authorities warned against the use of any alternative routes in the Strait of Hormuz, saying that any path not agreed with Tehran would carry danger.

The developing situation threatens to undermine the memorandum itself, which was intended to reduce tensions and ensure the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s key oil corridors. Point five of the document, in particular, provided for opening the strait within 30 days along routes determined by Iran, alongside consultations between Tehran and Oman. Now, amid an exchange of strikes and mutual accusations, diplomatic efforts to stabilize the situation are under serious threat, and the world is watching closely to see whether escalation can be contained without new violations of the agreement.

Comments on the news

• Why is Oman specifically playing the role of mediator between Iran and the United States in negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz? — Oman has historically maintained neutrality in Persian Gulf conflicts and supports diplomatic channels with both Iran and the West. The sultanate has long-standing trade and political ties with Tehran, which makes it a trusted intermediary capable of conveying messages between the parties without direct involvement in the tension. In addition, Oman is not part of anti-Iranian alliances (for example, a Saudi-led coalition), which makes it a convenient negotiating partner.
• What strategic significance does the Strait of Hormuz have for Iran, and why does Tehran insist on defining shipping routes? — The strait is the world’s key “oil throat”: about 20% of the world’s oil passes through it. For Iran, controlling the strait is a lever of geopolitical influence and a way to protect its territorial integrity. Tehran insists on defining routes because it believes it has a sovereign right to regulate shipping in its territorial waters, and it is also trying to prevent unauthorized passages or incursions—strengthening its security amid sanctions.
• Why did Bahrain respond so sharply to the drone attack, rather than other Persian Gulf countries, and what is that country’s role in regional security? — Bahrain is the most vulnerable U.S. ally in the region: the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is located there, making the country a key component of America’s military presence. In addition, Bahrain has tense internal relations due to its Shiite majority, which Tehran has historically supported. The sharp reaction is linked to fears of being drawn into a conflict between Iran and Israel/U.S., as well as a desire to demonstrate reliability to allies (primarily Saudi Arabia and Washington) as a security partner.

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Full version: Iran condemns U.S. strikes and insists on defending its sovereignty

A Reaction to US Power

Washington is once again at the center of a tense diplomatic game: amid discussions of easing sanctions, trade tariffs, tightening rules on asylum applications, and military actions toward Iran in different countries, talk is growing about “counterpower” as a response to external pressure. The storyline focuses not only on the decisions themselves, but also on how they are perceived abroad—as a signal that forces governments and analysts to build their own response scenarios, intensify rhetoric, or reconsider domestic policy. This is reflected in media interpretations and public comments, where the United States is often described as a factor that sets off a chain of retaliatory steps. The material was prepared based on posts from www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.facebook.com (Venezuela), www.instagram.com (Venezuela).

Venezuelans between marriage, crisis, and migration

Two developments related to Venezuela, at first glance, speak to different things—but together they form a single picture of the country and the region: young people are increasingly putting off traditional life decisions, and those who no longer see a future at home are running into new obstacles on the way abroad. In a DW Español post via this link, it is said that young people in Latin America, including Venezuela, are less and less likely to marry or are consciously postponing it to later.

In the Venezuelan context, this is a particularly sensitive issue. A long-running economic crisis, inflation, unstable incomes, and mass emigration have changed even the idea of when and how one can build a family. Rejecting early marriage here is often explained not only by changing values, but also by very practical reasons: people struggle to plan a budget, provide housing, and take on long-term obligations in a country where tomorrow remains unpredictable. That is why new forms of relationships in Venezuela are viewed not merely as a cultural shift, but as a response to constant economic pressure.

The central point of this publication is that young people more and more often choose stability, careers, and personal development over traditional marriage. In Venezuela, this is especially visible: for many, the priority is not the wedding, but finding work, leaving the country, or simply surviving financially. The rise of civil unions and informal cohabitation also fits this logic—such relationships usually require less spending and offer more flexibility amid uncertainty.

For the country, these trends also carry broader consequences. Lower marriage rates are typically linked to declining birthrates and an aging population, meaning the issue goes far beyond private life. There is also a legal aspect: in a state where access to services is already complicated, protecting people’s rights in informal unions becomes especially important. There is also a political aspect: such changes raise the question of whether the state can support the family as an institution in times of crisis.

That is why this story in Venezuela is perceived not as abstract sociology, but as part of everyday experience. In other countries, refusing marriage may be interpreted as a natural cultural evolution; here, it is often seen as a symptom of a deeper crisis—economic, institutional, and even emotional.

The second news item, published by Telemundo and discussed in a Venezuelan context, concerns a tightening of asylum rules in the United States. Its significance for Venezuela is particularly high because migration has become one of the central topics of recent years: millions of Venezuelans have left the country due to the crisis, inflation, and political instability, and in nearly every family there are relatives or acquaintances living in the United States, Colombia, Peru, Chile, or other countries in the region. That is why any change at the US border is perceived as an event that can directly affect the fates of Venezuelans.

Although the Telemundo post itself does not provide detailed comments from Venezuelan politicians or experts, its meaning for local audiences is clear: a US Supreme Court decision limiting the ability to request asylum at the border could change routes, risks, and prospects for legalization for those seeking protection abroad. In the Venezuelan understanding, this means the system becomes stricter and the path to safety becomes more difficult.

Several worrying consequences follow from this: the risk of denials at the border increases, uncertainty grows for those already on the move, dependence on the constantly changing US migration rules intensifies, and in transit countries there may be even more people stuck without a clear outlook. For families inside Venezuela, this is not an abstract legal issue, but a matter of survival, remittances, and the future of those who have left.

That is why the news about the US Supreme Court is read in Venezuela not only as an American judicial decision, but also as another barrier for those for whom emigration has become the only way out of the domestic crisis. Many see the United States at once as a land of opportunity and as a state that closes its doors precisely when migrants find it hardest. Hence the concern, disappointment, and criticism—especially among those who view leaving as a direct consequence of the country’s internal problems. More on this decision can be found here.

If these two storylines are combined, one common thread becomes clear: both the rejection of early marriage and the rise in migration fears reflect the same Venezuelan reality, in which economic instability affects not only income and employment, but also the most personal decisions—from family to a future in another country.

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WSJ: Iranian strikes caused serious damage to a US base in Bahrain

According to an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, Iranian missile strikes carried out between the end of February and June this year caused significant damage to a US Navy base in Bahrain. Analysis of satellite imagery, videos from social media, and interviews with US service members showed that the missiles broke through the air defense system and hit at least a dozen buildings, including the command post and satellite communications stations. At the same time, the Pentagon has not yet officially acknowledged the extent of the destruction.

Although US command officials say there were no casualties among personnel and that the base’s operational capability was not undermined, WSJ data indicates otherwise. Most staff were evacuated in advance after the start of the US-Iranian war against Iran on February 28. CENTCOM spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins emphasized that the priority was protecting people, not buildings, adding that of more than 8,000 missiles and drones launched by Iran, only two resulted in Americans being killed.

In response to the attacks, the US carried out strikes against 13,500 Iranian targets. However, according to informed sources, damage to the base in Bahrain and to at least 20 other US sites in the region (both military and diplomatic) forced Washington to rethink its entire military architecture in the Middle East. The Pentagon is now examining options: to rebuild the base in Bahrain, but also to reduce its presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and to move some bases and missions westward—outside the range of Iranian missiles and drones.

Among the measures under consideration are not rebuilding the most heavily damaged facilities, moving command posts underground, and dispersing military capabilities across the region. Notably, in April, the Trump administration began putting pressure on satellite imagery providers, limiting access to images showing the real damage at US bases. Officials say this is necessary to protect troops, but critics see it as an attempt to conceal the scale of losses.

The Pentagon refuses to name the exact amount spent on the war, a stance that is drawing dissatisfaction in Congress. When Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was asked for a cost estimate, he answered with a question: “How much does it cost to have Iran’s nuclear weapons?” Pentagon Comptroller Jay Hurst recently acknowledged that the previous figure of $29 billion did not include damage to bases.

In a report dated June 25, the CSIS think tank estimated the total cost of the war at about $40 billion, of which $2.2 billion to $5.1 billion is for the destruction of US military facilities. An independent WSJ assessment based on satellite images and video found that even the construction of buildings only at the US ANB base in Bahrain cost roughly $400 million. The newspaper emphasizes that this is only the cost of building—without accounting for debris clearance and reinforcing structures.

Comments on the news

• What specific types of Iranian missiles and drones were used to strike the base in Bahrain, and what were their characteristics that allowed them to get through the air defense system? — During the attack, cruise missiles “Hazar” (range up to 1,300 km) and loitering munitions “Shahed-136” were used. The characteristics that allowed them to overcome air defenses included low-profile flight at an altitude of 50–100 meters, the use of decoys and drone swarms to overload radars, as well as the low observability of the body made from composite materials.

• Why is Bahrain a key location for hosting a US naval base (including the ANB base), and what role does the country play in the United States’ regional strategy? — Bahrain is the headquarters of the US 5th Fleet and the location of the ANB “Millibrook Creek” base. This allows control of the Strait of Hormuz (20% of the world’s oil) and conducting signals intelligence in the south of Iran. Bahrain also serves as a logistics hub for operations in the Persian Gulf and ensures US presence close to Iranian missile launch sites.

• What are Iran’s official goals and demands in this conflict—did it say that strikes on the base in Bahrain were part of a specific military campaign? — Iran did not officially announce a campaign, but stated that the strikes were a “preemptive response” to the inevitable aggression by the US and Israel. The targets were aimed at neutralizing threats from bases from which, according to Tehran, attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were planned. The demands include withdrawing US forces from the region and ending sanctions.

• What events directly led to the start of the US-Iranian war against Iran on February 28? Was it a preemptive action or a response to provocation? — On February 28, the conflict began with a large-scale Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus (12 killed, including the commander of “Quds”). The US presented it as a “preemptive action” against Iran’s plans to attack American forces in the region. Iran considers it direct provocation that crossed all “red lines.”

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Full version: The Wall Street Journal: Iran caused extensive damage to a US base in Bahrain

The US temporarily lifts sanctions on Venezuela to help earthquake victims

After devastating earthquakes that have killed more than 180 people in Venezuela, Washington has temporarily eased economic restrictions to allow the import of humanitarian aid. The U.S. Treasury Department has issued a special license valid until October 2026 that permits financial transactions previously barred under the “Venezuela Sanctions Regulations” (VSR), which will speed up the flow of funds to affected regions. At the same time, U.S. officials emphasized that the measure is strictly targeted: Venezuelan government assets that have been frozen remain under arrest, and the overall policy of pressure on official Caracas is not being lifted. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clearly states that the authorization does not extend to any other transactions prohibited by law and does not provide approval for the release of state funds that are being held. In this way, the emergency easing is a pinpoint humanitarian step rather than a broad softening of the sanctions regime.

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Full version: US lifts sanctions on Venezuela to allow the country to receive aid after earthquakes

IAEA: readiness for inspections in Iran amid disputes over the Strait of Hormuz

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said his organization is fully prepared to begin technical work in Iran. The basis is a memorandum of understanding that provides for inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Grossi said he hopes the agency’s experts will be able to visit these sites soon in order to check how reliably the understandings between Tehran and Washington are being carried out.

Grossi stressed that the IAEA is an independent body and will conduct inspections on its own. Whether the United States or any other party is brought in is still a decision for Iran. The specific details of the agency’s work and the composition of the inspection coordination group will be determined during Iran–US talks. In other words, the agency will act as a technical executor, while the political framework is set by the dialogue between the two countries.

Turning to the fate of highly enriched uranium, Grossi noted that two main options are being considered: diluting it or removing it from Iran. Choosing either option is possible only with Tehran’s consent. At the same time, IAEA experts believe that no nuclear materials were moved since the last inspection in 2025, but a direct check is still required. Grossi linked all steps involving enrichment to understandings with Iran and the agency’s procedures.

Meanwhile, a dispute flared up over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the basis for navigation management is clause five of the memorandum between Tehran and Washington. However, the naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that any new routes announced without coordination with Iran are unacceptable and dangerous. Earlier, Oman announced a temporary free route in its part of the strait, to which Iran replied that after a war the situation would change and payment would be required for services.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for his part, said Washington will not allow any charges to be imposed for passage, regardless of what they are called. Thus, three positions converged: Iran insists on its right to set rules and collect fees, Oman proposes a free alternative route, and the United States categorically rejects any charges. The issue remains unresolved and threatens renewed tension in the region.

At the same time, the special envoy of the US president, Steve Witkoff, told members of Congress that Iran will send the IAEA an official invitation for inspections. According to him, attached to the memorandum between the United States and Iran is a separate letter addressed to Grossi. Sources for Associated Press at the agency claim that this letter paves the way for allowing, including, American inspectors to access Iran’s facilities. In this way, the technical verification could take on an international character.

In addition, the sides agreed on a mechanism for deciding the fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium. The minimal option is to reduce the level of enrichment on site under IAEA supervision. Other issues, including Iran’s future needs for nuclear energy, will be discussed later based on “satisfactory frameworks” that are to be developed in the final agreement. The main thing is that the inspection process has been set in motion, and now everyone is waiting for the first steps on the ground.

Comments on the news

• What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s political system, and why do its naval forces have autonomy in security matters in the Persian Gulf? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. It has its own budget, economic assets, and reports directly to the Supreme Leader, which makes it a parallel center of power alongside the government. The IRGC’s naval forces (IRGC Navy) gained autonomy because of their role in asymmetric defense: they are responsible for fast patrol craft, mining and missile batteries in the Persian Gulf, while Iran’s regular navy focuses on blue-water operations. This division allows the IRGC to act more flexibly and aggressively, aligning with its revolutionary mission to deter external threats.

• Why does Iran insist on its right to charge for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and what legal or historical grounds does it cite? — Iran says the strait runs through its territorial waters, and that it has a sovereign right to regulate shipping, citing historical rights to control the strait (for example, agreements from the 1950s). In addition, Tehran argues that it bears disproportionately large costs to ensure security in this narrow route, so “fees” could compensate for those expenses. However, international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) establishes the right of innocent passage for all ships, and Iran has not ratified the Convention. In practice, this demand is used as a tool of political pressure rather than an official legal position.

• What were the main stages of negotiations between Iran and the United States on the nuclear program (the JCPOA of 2015, the US withdrawal in 2018, current negotiations), and how does the current memorandum of understanding relate to them? — Key stages: 1) JCPOA (2015) — an agreement with the “six” (the United States, the EU, Russia, China, the UK, France + Germany) that capped uranium enrichment at 3.67% in exchange for sanctions relief. 2) US withdrawal (2018) — a unilateral break, after which Iran exceeded the limits, accumulated uranium up to 60%, and halted IAEA inspections. 3) Talks in Vienna (2021–2022) — an attempt to revive the JCPOA, but negotiations stalled due to disagreements over guarantees and demands for sanctions relief. The current memorandum of understanding (2023) is not an official “JCPOA replacement,” but an unofficial “gentlemen’s agreement” reached with the mediation of Qatar and Oman. It does not replace the JCPOA and only temporarily froze certain elements of the nuclear program (for example, the suspension of enrichment up to 60%) in exchange for unlocking part of Iran’s assets and swapping prisoners. This is a tactical step aimed at reducing tension, not a full-fledged nuclear-dossier deal.

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Full version: غروسي يبدي استعدادا للعودة لإيران وخلاف بشأن إدارة مضيق هرمز