The main American story currently drawing the strongest reaction in China, Israel and France is the new phase of the U.S. conflict with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. In local commentary, this no longer looks like another regional operation by Washington. For the French, it is a symptom of the White House’s strategic improvisation and a source of risk to the global economy; for the Israelis, an alarming test of whether America can turn pressure on Iran into a political result; and for Chinese observers, an example of how a superpower is narrowing its own room for maneuver by becoming trapped between military demonstrations and the need to negotiate.
Chinese official analysis has been particularly consistent in portraying the United States as a party caught in a “military-diplomatic dilemma.” In an analysis published on July 9, Xinhua emphasizes that Donald Trump’s administration is simultaneously seeking to avoid returning to a full-scale war and to avoid appearing conciliatory toward Tehran. In the Chinese presentation, the key issue is not so much the individual strikes as the contradiction at the heart of U.S. strategy: Washington has reinstated oil sanctions and launched a new series of strikes, but has still moved no closer either to a lasting agreement on Iran’s nuclear program or to unimpeded shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Xinhua quotes former U.S. negotiator Aaron David Miller as saying that Trump has “painted himself into a corner” and is unlikely to achieve much through either military or diplomatic means. The Chinese perspective here is not neutral: it turns America’s difficulties into an argument against coercive policy in general—particularly policies based on sanctions, maritime pressure and the threat of escalation. (www3.xinhuanet.com)
The French reaction is close to this assessment in its diagnosis, but differs in its motivation. The Paris press says less about the geopolitical decline of the United States as such and more about the failure to manage the crisis. An editorial in Le Monde describes the current situation as a war deadlock: the agreement reached after the April ceasefire proved too vague precisely on the issue of control over the Strait of Hormuz. For the French authors, it is particularly revealing that the original U.S. goal—constraining Iran and its nuclear capabilities—has been displaced by a dispute over shipping, tariffs and effective control of the strait. In other words, U.S. military superiority has not translated into political clarity. French criticism is harsher than Chinese criticism on one fundamental point: in the editorial board’s view, the problem lies not only in Iran’s resistance, but also in the “improvisation” of the Trump administration, whose contradictory signals allowed Tehran to exploit the weaknesses of a poorly formulated agreement. (lemonde.fr)
In Israel, the same story is viewed through a much narrower and more painful lens: will Washington lose sight of the main issue—Iran’s nuclear and missile programs? Sima Shine, former head of the Iran program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, notes in a commentary for N12 that the memorandum of understanding means, at best, a ceasefire rather than an end to the conflict. In her assessment, the proposed arrangement leaves unanswered the fate of the centrifuges, the parameters of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and many other critical questions. The most notable aspect of the Israeli analysis is its skepticism about the American protective role in the Persian Gulf: Gulf states, Shine writes, have concluded that the United States failed to protect their infrastructure and bases from being drawn into a war they did not want. This is significant: in the Israeli debate, the doubt is directed not at the alliance with America itself, but at the effectiveness of the American deterrence model.
This concern does not mean that Israel expects the war to expand immediately. On the contrary, there is a clear desire to remain outside the current exchange of strikes as long as it remains confined to Hormuz. Reserve Brig. Gen. Tzvika Haimovich, former commander of Israel’s air-defense system, describes the conflict in an article for Israel Hayom as the “first war for Hormuz”: the United States is striking primarily at facilities linked to the strait, Iran is responding against American targets in the region, but so far is avoiding an attack on Israel. Haimovich advises Israel to maintain a high state of readiness while following a “correct and passive” course. This reflects an important local feature: for part of the Israeli establishment, the American campaign becomes dangerous precisely when its logic expands from maritime security back to Iran’s nuclear sites or ballistic missiles. In that case, according to this assessment, Iran could once again bring Israel into a direct military scenario. (israelhayom.co.il)
The common theme in the Chinese, French and Israeli reactions is not a belief in an imminent American defeat on the battlefield, but doubt about the United States’ ability to define an achievable political objective. China sees the limits of hegemonic coercion; France sees the destructive consequences of diplomatic carelessness for trade, energy and allies; and Israel sees the risk that America will agree to a respite without eliminating the threat that prompted the campaign in the first place. Israeli commentator Yoni Ben-Menachem directly articulates a suspicion widespread in Jerusalem: Trump has shifted to a strategy of “negotiations under fire,” seeking to combine military and economic pressure with a future deal while avoiding another major war on the eve of the U.S. November midterm elections. In his commentary, he emphasizes that the pursuit of a deal may be no less important to Washington than the demonstration of force. (epoch.org.il)
The most unexpected conclusion emerging from a comparison of these three debates is that America is increasingly perceived not as an outside arbiter imposing order, but as one of the parties to the conflict, whose domestic political timelines and economic constraints determine the region’s fate. In France, this is described as the risk of a new “endless war,” already unpopular within American society itself; in China, as a narrowing of Washington’s range of choices; and in Israel, as grounds both to remain close to American military power and not to rely on its political resolve. In this view, Hormuz is not merely a strait through which oil passes. It has become the place where allies, rivals and observers are testing whether the United States can, after launching a strike, formulate a peace that will last longer than the next pause between attacks.
