Just days before the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026, Germany, Russia, and Turkey are discussing America not as a distant domestic drama, but as a source of immediate foreign-policy consequences. Three issues are converging in the local debate: Donald Trump’s weakening at home, his readiness to revisit sanctions and energy taboos to bring prices down, and the possibility of a new escalation in the war with Iran. But each country sees these issues differently: Berlin sees a threat to rules and predictability among allies, Moscow sees an opportunity for a deal of convenience, and Ankara sees a test of how far presidential friendship can overcome American institutions.
In Germany, the dominant feeling surrounding the US election is not hope for a change of course, but concern that a weakened Trump may become even more impulsive. Bavarian broadcaster BR put the question bluntly: “Trump under pressure—will the US become even more unpredictable?” German debate has focused especially on the link between rising prices for gasoline and food in the US, the president’s falling approval ratings, and the absence of the quick resolutions he promised in Iran and Ukraine. The fact that a televised election discussion features Armin Laschet, chair of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Green Party representative Jamila Schäfer, US party activists, and a former ARD correspondent in Washington shows that, for Germany, this is already a matter of its own security—not just American party arithmetic. As BR notes, a possible Republican loss of the House of Representatives would reduce Trump’s influence, while also raising the question of how he will respond to limits on his power. (br.de)
In Russia, the same pre-election crisis in Washington is read differently: as an incentive for the White House to seek a quick, high-profile foreign-policy result. In an analysis published by the Russian International Affairs Council, Americanist Alexandra Voitolovskaya compares the Russia track in Trump’s calculations to “a table in a casino”: the White House could either score a breakthrough that muffles domestic criticism or push the issue out of the public spotlight. Her conclusion is particularly significant: pressure on Moscow and offers of compromise in the coming weeks will not rule each other out; they will go hand in hand. In other words, Russia’s expert community does not see negotiations as evidence of a lasting normalization. They are a bargaining tool ahead of the election, contingent on Trump’s personal political needs. The RIAC article emphasizes that three tracks are operating in parallel: technological restrictions on Russia, the threat of secondary tariffs on buyers of Russian energy, and a direct presidential channel with Moscow. (russiancouncil.ru)
Turkey’s perspective is even more practical. In Ankara, the US election is measured not only by approval ratings, but also by the fate of the F-35, F110 engines for the KAAN fighter, and CAATSA sanctions [“Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”]. The Turkish outlet T24 highlights a key paradox: despite Trump’s friendly statements, both defense issues remain unresolved because Congress has the decisive say. A possible Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives is seen as a risk of increased congressional oversight and renewed objections to arms sales. This reflects a characteristic Turkish pragmatism: Ankara is willing to leverage Erdoğan and Trump’s personal relationship, but increasingly recognizes that the US system can block presidential promises. (t24.com.tr)
The most striking shared story is Russian diesel for the US market. Trump’s decision, following a conversation with Vladimir Putin, to allow Russian fuel into the American market has become a symbol for Berlin, Moscow, and Ankara of how US domestic politics can override foreign-policy principles. Germany’s response has been the sharpest. The government stresses that Germany will not return to Russian oil and remains committed to sanctions. Green Party leader Franziska Brantner called Trump’s approach particularly unprincipled: first, launch a war against Iran without a clear plan and drive up global energy prices, then strike a deal with Putin to soften the consequences before the election. In her view, both Ukrainians and consumers will pay the price, and Europe’s response should be energy independence and a move away from fossil fuels. This position is set out in a Tagesschau report. (tagesschau.de)
The Russian debate is noticeably less euphoric than one might expect. RBC links the deal to a nearly 70% increase in diesel prices since the start of the US-Israeli operation against Iran, and explicitly describes it as an attempt by Trump to bring prices down before the vote. At the same time, the outlet highlights the president’s vulnerability: on October 19, his approval rating stood at 31%, according to Reuters/Ipsos, and some Republican candidates had begun distancing themselves from him. For Russian audiences, this turns the fuel deal not into a US geopolitical U-turn, but into a tactical concession by Washington, driven by gas pumps and the ballot box. RBC examines the issue in detail. (rbc.ru)
Turkish analysts add an important caveat: the concession to Russia may not deliver the promised benefits to American consumers. Göktuğ Çalışkan, an expert at the Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, notes in his analysis that the terms of trade for Moscow will improve, while the benefits to US consumers may be limited. If diesel is simply redirected from one market to another, global supply does not increase; only the cargo’s route changes. This is a surprisingly substantive Turkish reading: the deal reveals not only the hypocrisy of sanctions policy, but also its economic ineffectiveness when the country imposing sanctions faces shortages and high prices itself. (ankasam.org)
Finally, the war with Iran brings all three national perspectives together. In Germany, it is seen above all as an assault on international rules and an energy shock for Europe; in Russia, as a result of Trump’s pre-election need to project strength without losing the opportunity to negotiate; and in Turkey, as a direct threat to the region. Bilgehan Alagöz, a researcher at Marmara University, believes that the likelihood of US operations against Iran resuming after the election is high, although a new escalation could come sooner. He notes that 65% of Americans disapprove of the way Trump is conducting the military campaign, and that Congress has repeatedly voted to limit US involvement. In an Anadolu Ajansı analysis, the war is described as a conflict in which the timing and scale of operations are determined not only by military calculations, but also by US domestic politics, energy prices, and the struggle between Congress and the president over their respective powers. (aa.com.tr)
This is where all three responses to America converge. Berlin fears that Washington is turning alliances and sanctions into variables. Moscow hopes to exploit that volatility, but does not consider it a reliable basis for a long-term deal. Ankara draws an even more pragmatic lesson: the US president’s personal goodwill is useful, but it cannot replace decisions by Congress, stable contracts, or an independent defense capability. So outside the US, the upcoming American election is not seen as the end of the Trump era, but as a turning point after which his policy could become either more constrained—or, paradoxically, more dangerous.
