As of late October 2026, the image of the United States in Brazil, South Africa and China is shaped not by a single headline-grabbing event, but by a shared sense that Washington is increasingly using access to its market, financial system and technology as tools of political pressure. Local debates differ in tone but converge on one point: U.S. policy is seen as more transactional, less predictable and far more dependent on Donald Trump’s domestic political calculations and the congressional midterm elections on November 3. In Brazil, this is compounded by a fraught debate over sovereignty and elections; in South Africa, by the risk of losing trade preferences and the consequences of cuts to HIV-related aid; and in China, by the concern that a brief trade détente will not end efforts to contain its technological development.
The main common theme is tariffs as a language of U.S. diplomacy. On July 27, the Brazilian government initiated consultations at the WTO, calling additional U.S. tariffs under Section 301 unjustified. Washington linked the trade penalties not only to digital services and ethanol, but also to issues of anti-corruption policy, intellectual property and the fight against illegal deforestation. In a statement by Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, this is effectively described as an attempt to make another country’s domestic regulations grounds for U.S. trade penalties. According to Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, the new measures affect 23.1% of the country’s exports to the United States, while 52.7% of shipments are exempt from additional sectoral or country-specific tariffs. (gov.br)
Brazil’s response, however, is not simply anti-American. In a column for Folha de S.Paulo, Adam Goldsmith, a former U.S. Treasury financial attaché for South America, observes that relatively limited economic interdependence helps shield Brazil from a macroeconomic shock, but also means missed opportunities for investment and technological cooperation. This is an important qualification in the Brazilian debate: from this perspective, the problem is not only U.S. pressure, but also the failure of Brazil and the United States to build a relationship of trust that could withstand changes of administration. Even the most pragmatic Brazilian assessments see Trump’s tariffs not as a carefully designed industrial policy, but as a signal that the rules can be revised at any time.
In South Africa, the same concern is expressed more sharply, because what is at stake is not merely tariffs but the future of AGOA, the U.S. program that gives African goods duty-free access to the American market. South African Ambassador to Washington Roelf Meyer called the relationship an effective “deadlock” in an interview with Semafor: Pretoria had offered trade compromises, he said, but had received no clear explanation from the administration of what concessions it wanted. This is particularly unsettling for businesses: a decision to exclude South Africa from AGOA could come as early as November. (Semafor)
South African analysts see what is happening not as a routine dispute over market access, but as an attempt to subject the country’s domestic and foreign policies to U.S. conditions. In its analysis, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) writes that the termination of funding for the U.S. PEPFAR HIV treatment and prevention program in South Africa in June 2026 demonstrated the dangers of dependence on foreign aid. For a country with one of the world’s most severe HIV epidemics, this is no abstract diplomatic signal: it is a blow to the healthcare system and to confidence in the partnership with the United States. (SAIIA) The local response is therefore twofold: many insist that the country should not yield to pressure over land reform, racial equality and Pretoria’s ties with BRICS, while also acknowledging that a break with the United States would mean losing jobs, investment and export markets. South Africa does not want to choose between dignity and market access—and, its commentators argue, that is precisely what makes the U.S. approach so damaging.
In China, the debate takes a different shape: there is little expectation of reconciliation, but an effort to distinguish temporary stabilization from strategic trust. Following agreements reached in Chinese-U.S. trade talks, Beijing hopes to extend the pause in mutual restrictions, which expires on November 10. At the same time, Chinese media and experts are closely discussing a U.S. proposal to expand restrictions on investment in China, including in biotechnology, supercomputing, artificial intelligence and hypersonic systems. An editorial in Global Times, published on the People’s Daily platform, presents this as an example of how the concept of national security is being broadened to restrict normal competition. (opinion.people.com.cn)
Significantly, Chinese commentators do not stop at the familiar formula of “containing China.” Dongsheng Di, dean of the School of Global and Regional Studies at Renmin University of China, argues in an interview with China Daily that Democratic and Republican administrations alike ultimately face the same reality: confrontation with China comes at a high cost to the United States itself. In China’s view, this is not evidence of U.S. goodwill, but a limit on American power: tariffs raise prices, investment bans narrow opportunities for U.S. companies, and attempts to break up supply chains accelerate the search for alternatives. (chinadaily.com.cn)
What is especially striking is how all three countries link U.S. foreign policy to domestic politics in the United States. In Brazil, the tariff conflict became part of the country’s own electoral contest: a July Datafolha poll found that the public was debating not only who was to blame for the tariffs, but also whether Brazil’s right had used its ties with Washington against Lula’s government. (Datafolha) In South Africa, the uncertainty surrounding AGOA is seen as a consequence of the Trump administration’s ideological approach to land reform and its claims about the situation of Afrikaners. In China, meanwhile, the midterm elections are viewed as a possible source of short-term concessions—for example, if tariffs begin to hurt American farmers, manufacturers and consumers—but not as a guarantee of a strategic U.S. policy shift.
The overall view from Brazil, South Africa and China is clear-eyed: the United States remains too large an economy and too powerful a technological force to ignore, but fewer and fewer countries are willing to regard it as a predictable arbiter of rules. Brazil is responding through the WTO and diversification; South Africa is trying to preserve dialogue without making sovereignty a bargaining chip; and China is combining negotiations with an accelerated push to strengthen its technological autonomy. Their shared conclusion is not that the United States has lost its influence. On the contrary, its influence remains enormous—but using it through tariffs, visa restrictions, aid cuts and investment bans is prompting partners to prepare for a world in which dependence on Washington is a political risk rather than an advantage.
