In recent weeks, the United States has become the subject of particularly anxious discussion in Saudi Arabia, Australia and Israel—not because of the abstract notion of “Western leadership,” but because of a very specific question: can Washington simultaneously be a security guarantor, a reliable economic partner and a predictable strategist? The answers differ markedly in the three countries, but they share one idea: American power remains indispensable, yet its current political style makes that power a source of risk for allies.
The main common theme has been the US approach to Iran and the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. In Saudi Arabia, the issue is viewed primarily through the lens of maritime trade security, energy revenues and the right of Gulf states not to be reduced to bystanders in Washington–Tehran negotiations. In a column for Arab News, Saudi commentator Hassan Al-Mustafa emphasizes that Riyadh supported the halt in hostilities and the negotiations, but links the meaning of any deal to restoring freedom of navigation to prewar levels. For the Saudi debate, this is not a technical detail. Hormuz is an artery through which energy exports and supplies for global markets pass; if the strait’s security becomes a bargaining chip, regional powers learn that even US military involvement does not guarantee a stable order. (arabnews.com)
Australia’s reaction is far more critical of the way the United States uses force. In an ABC analysis, correspondent Matthew Doran describes a logic that strongly reflects the local perspective: Washington, which began the campaign by promising a short war, underestimated Iran’s ability to turn Hormuz into a lever of pressure on the entire global economy. The issue here is not sympathy for Tehran—Australian commentators harbor no illusions about the Iranian regime—but the conclusion that a show of military force without a realistic plan for a political settlement creates a cascade of consequences that allies end up paying for. Australia has found itself in a particularly uncomfortable position: it is expected to show solidarity with the United States, while the conflict’s consequences are hitting prices, shipping routes and Australia’s own security. (abc.net.au)
In Israel, the reaction to US–Iran diplomacy is even more anxious, but for a different reason. The concern there is not that Washington is too belligerent, but that it may settle for a compromise allowing Iran to rebuild its resources without eliminating the key threats. A June poll by the Institute for National Security Studies found that 66% of Israelis consider the US–Iran memorandum harmful to Israel, while only 12% believe Donald Trump is highly committed to protecting Israeli interests. This is a notable shift: distrust in Israel is directed not at the American alliance as such, but at its inconsistency and contradictions. (inss.org.il)
INSS experts Eldad Shavit and Jesse Weinberg explain Israel’s dilemma particularly clearly in their analysis of the memorandum: for Trump, an interim agreement offers an opportunity to present the outcome as an end to the war, stabilization of energy markets and a diplomatic success; for Israel, however, it is dangerous if enriched uranium, missile infrastructure and Iran’s ability to rebuild its capabilities remain under its cover. In other words, Jerusalem assesses US strategy according to whether it eliminates the threat, whereas the White House, in the view of many Israeli observers, assesses it by the speed of exiting the crisis and its domestic political benefits. (inss.org.il)
Against this backdrop, the Saudi–US agreement on peaceful nuclear energy, signed on July 22, became the second major topic—and a rare example of how the American presence is viewed positively in Riyadh. Saudi media portray it not as a sudden geopolitical deal, but as the result of a years-long move toward a post-oil economy. In an article in Al Riyadh, Sarah Al-Muayzer describes the agreement as a shift from conventional energy cooperation to a long-term partnership in one of the most technologically complex industries. From this perspective, nuclear power is needed not because the kingdom lacks oil, but because oil is more profitable to export and use in petrochemicals than to burn for domestic electricity generation. (alriyadh.com)
But a more subtle calculation lies behind the optimism. Saudi authors do not describe the alliance with America as an ideological choice. In an analytical article by Bina Al-Mulhim, the agreement is interpreted as a way to obtain technology, strengthen the sovereignty of decision-making and preserve room for maneuver among the United States, China, Europe and Russia. The purpose of the deal for Riyadh is not to return to its old one-sided dependence on Washington, but to increase the value of the Saudi partnership for Washington. Saudi businessman and commentator Turki Al-Faisal Al-Rashid put it almost without diplomatic embellishment in Arab News: American cooperation helps ensure high standards of oversight, but the kingdom has other international options as well. (alriyadh.com)
Australians see another problem in the same American policy: Washington demands strategic loyalty, yet can simultaneously punish even a close ally with trade measures. At the end of July, the US administration imposed a 12.5% tariff on Australian exports, explaining the decision by citing insufficient enforcement of Australian rules against goods produced using forced labor. In an ABC report, Australian businesspeople warned that the measure would undermine competitiveness and slow investment. For Canberra, the contrast is especially irritating: Australia is a US defense ally, a buyer of American weapons and a participant in AUKUS, yet none of that shields it from tariff pressure. (abc.net.au)
That is why AUKUS is increasingly discussed in Australia not only as a shield against China, but also as a dependence on an unpredictable America. A Lowy Institute poll published on June 22 recorded Australians’ lowest-ever level of trust in the United States: 60% said they did not trust Trump at all on world affairs, while 51% believed that Australia should distance itself from the United States under his leadership. At the same time, 73% still considered the American alliance important to the country’s security. This is not an anti-American turn, but a far more complex position: the alliance is necessary, yet its political cost is becoming increasingly unacceptable. (lowyinstitute.org)
Retired Australian diplomat Lachlan Strahan expressed the local anxiety particularly vividly in a conversation with Guardian Australia: Canberra is trying to signal disagreement, or at least discomfort, with US actions without provoking a conflict with Trump that it would inevitably lose. Critics of AUKUS go further: deep integration of military structures, bases, intelligence and submarine programs could lead to a situation in which Australia becomes involved in an American war before Canberra has made a full political decision. (theguardian.com)
The most unexpected common conclusion from the Saudi, Australian and Israeli debates is that none of them is simply proposing to “turn away from America.” Saudi Arabia wants to turn its American partnership into an instrument of technological autonomy. Australia wants to preserve the alliance while regaining political control over the extent of its involvement in American conflicts. Israel wants tougher and verifiable American commitments regarding Iran, fearing that Washington’s diplomatic success could amount to a strategic postponement of the threat.
Thus, the international image of the United States is changing not from strength to weakness, but from strength to unpredictability. Riyadh is responding with diversification, Canberra with growing public skepticism, and Jerusalem with demands for guarantees and fear of an “incomplete victory.” American power still shapes the decisions of all three, but trust in how exactly Washington will use that power tomorrow is becoming the scarcest resource in US relations with its allies.
