Syrian authorities announced on Thursday the arrest of Ali Kayali, known by the nickname Miraj Ural, who is considered the principal suspect in the mass killings in Baniyas. His detention is the latest in a series of high-profile arrests of prominent members of Bashar al-Assad’s ousted regime suspected of crimes and abuses against the Syrian people. The move is being described as an important milestone for transitional justice: some of those involved have already gone on trial, while proceedings against others are continuing.
Ural was born in 1956 in Antakya, southwestern Turkey. In the 1980s, under Hafez al-Assad, he acquired Syrian citizenship and became known as Ali Kayali. His armed career began decades ago: he joined the left-wing communist organization Ajalcilar and later the militia known as the Iskenderun Brigade Liberation Front. In 1978, he was arrested for bombing the US consulate in Adana and robbing a bank. He passed through 12 Turkish prisons, but escaped in 1980 by bribing a guard after Kenan Evren’s coup. He found refuge in Syria and joined the Syrian army.
When the 2011 revolution began, Ural once again emerged as a leading figure, commanding the pro-government militia known as the Shabiha—“Syrian Resistance–People’s Front for the Liberation of the Iskenderun Brigade.” It was based in the countryside of Latakia and operated as an auxiliary force for the regime’s army. Human rights organizations accuse Ural and his group of war crimes and sectarian crimes against hundreds of civilians. It was during this period that he acquired the nickname “the Butcher of Baniyas.”
He is considered implicated in the massacre in the al-Bayda area of Baniyas on May 2, 2013, as well as in other mass killings, including the killings in Ras al-Nabaa near Baniyas. The Syrian Network for Human Rights says that more than 450 civilians were killed in these two incidents alone, including 92 children and 71 women, who were executed in large numbers and with extreme brutality. Ural has also been accused of playing a role in the Houla massacre in Homs province in May 2012, in which 111 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed.
Among the cases in the same category is that of Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, who was born in Aleppo in 1949. He was a preacher in the city’s mosques and became the republic’s mufti under Bashar al-Assad. Hassoun sided with the regime and called the revolution “a conspiracy by terrorists against Syria’s security”; his opponents nicknamed him the “mufti of barrel bombs.” In 2025, he was arrested while attempting to leave the country and charged with incitement to murder, war crimes and crimes against humanity. On August 24, 2026, the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus sentenced Hassoun to life imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his movable and immovable property for the benefit of the state treasury.
Wassim Assad, born in 1980, is a cousin of ousted President Bashar al-Assad and, according to investigators, the leader of a local armed network in Latakia. He is accused of extorting merchants, smuggling fuel and creating armed groups involved in crimes against civilians. On June 21, 2025, he was arrested in a carefully prepared ambush carried out by the General Intelligence Directorate and the Interior Ministry. On August 18, 2026, the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus sentenced him to death, finding him guilty of establishing groups that carried out mass killings and torture—acts classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Amjad Youssef, born in 1986 in the village of Nab al-Tayib in the al-Ghab area of northwestern Hama, was a junior military intelligence officer under the ousted regime and took part in special operations in southern Damascus. He is accused of detaining, torturing and killing opposition members and civilians, as well as bearing primary responsibility for the 2013 massacre in the Tadamun district. Youssef was arrested on April 24, 2026, during a months-long operation in the Hama countryside. Atef Najib, born in 1960 in Jableh, headed the Political Security branch in Daraa. He is accused of arresting and torturing children in Daraa in 2011 and of involvement in abuses against protesters, including the case of teenager Hamza al-Khatib.
Najib was arrested on January 31, 2025, in the Latakia countryside. The Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus found him guilty of storming the Omari Mosque in Daraa and directing operations against civilians in 2011, and on August 11, 2026, sentenced him to death. Muhammad al-Shaar, born in 1950 in the city of Haffeh in Latakia province, served as interior minister under Assad from 2011 to 2018. He is suspected of widespread abuses, including the suppression of protests and the torture of prisoners, and has also been linked to the Sednaya prison massacre in 2008 and events in Bab al-Tabbaneh in Lebanon in 1986. On February 4, 2025, he surrendered to the Syrian authorities.
Ibrahim Huwayjah is one of the most prominent security officials of the ousted regime. He rose to prominence after Hafez al-Assad’s 1970 coup and in 1987 became head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, replacing General Muhammad al-Khuli. He remained in the post until Bashar al-Assad dismissed him in 2002. His name is associated with Military Intelligence’s direct role in suppressing the 1982 uprising in Hama, as well as with planning the assassination of Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt in 1977. Huwayjah was arrested on March 6, 2025, in the Jableh area. On August 17, 2026, Radif Mustafa, head of the Accountability and Prosecution Department at the National Commission for Transitional Justice, urged relatives of victims to file lawsuits and testify against Huwayjah before specialized judicial bodies.
Wajih Ali al-Abdullah headed the Military Affairs Directorate under ousted President Bashar al-Assad and is considered directly responsible for coordinating 13 years of repression from the presidential palace, particularly between 2015 and 2018—years described as “the bloodiest.” The Interior Ministry said he was arrested on May 10, 2026, during a special operation. Colonel Ahmad Habib Ali, born in the village of Harf al-Masitara in the Qardaha area of Latakia, headed the Scientific Studies and Research Center and was responsible for sarin storage facilities and chemical production at Unit 417. He is accused of overseeing the manufacture of around 20 sarin bombs used in attacks on Syrian cities and towns in 2013 and 2017. He was arrested on July 15, 2026, during an Interior Ministry special operation in Latakia. Air Force Major General Ibrahim Mahla, born in 1963 in Ayn al-Arus in the Qardaha area, served as chief of staff of the Air Force’s 22nd Division and is suspected of involvement in airstrikes on civilian areas. He was arrested on May 15, 2026.
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What is the “Shabiha,” and what role did these pro-government militias play in the early years of the Syrian conflict? — The Shabiha (Arabic for “ghosts”) were informal pro-government militias that emerged in Syria before 2011, primarily from Alawite clan-based and family-linked criminal networks associated with the Assad family’s circle. During the first years of the conflict, from 2011 to 2013, they were used as a semi-legal force to disperse protests, conduct raids, carry out abductions, torture and kill opposition members and civilians, often operating alongside the army and security services. Many were later integrated into the National Defence Forces and other structures.
What is known about the 2013 Baniyas massacre, and why did it become one of the most prominent episodes in cases against the Shabiha? — In May 2013, regime forces and the Shabiha carried out mass killings in Baniyas and neighboring al-Bayda in Tartus province. According to the UN and human rights groups, at least 248 civilians were killed, including women and children. Many were killed in their homes, while some bodies were burned or thrown into the sea. The massacre became a symbol of sectarian cleansing targeting Sunnis along the coast. It became a major episode in cases against the Shabiha because of the scale of the killings, video evidence, survivor testimony and extensive documentation, as well as the way it demonstrated the impunity enjoyed by pro-government militias.
What is Sednaya prison, and why did it become one of the main symbols of the Assad regime’s repression? — Sednaya is a Military Security Directorate prison near Damascus, known as a “human slaughterhouse.” Thousands of detainees—including opposition members, activists and civilians—were held there. Systematic torture, starvation, mass executions and the concealment of bodies were practiced at the prison. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the prison was liberated, and the evidence uncovered there—cells, documents and mass graves—made it the central symbol of the regime’s repression.
What is the Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus, and which former-regime crimes does it hear? — The Fourth Criminal Court of Damascus is one of the courts in the Syrian capital being used in the post-Assad period to hear cases involving crimes committed by the former regime. Its docket may include cases involving enforced disappearances, torture, mass killings and crimes against humanity linked to the security services, the Shabiha, Sednaya prison, the Baniyas massacre and other incidents. The court has also reportedly issued warrants for senior members of the former regime.
What are the Scientific Studies and Research Center and Unit 417 within Syria’s security structure? — The Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) is a Syrian state research and development agency that formally worked on civilian and military projects but, according to the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, played a key role in chemical weapons, ballistic missile and other weapons programs. Unit 417 is a division of the SSRC—reportedly linked to Military Intelligence—that was responsible for developing and producing chemical weapons, including sarin. It is subject to international sanctions.
Why are Latakia, Jableh and Qardaha considered strongholds of the Alawite community and the former regime, and how does this affect trials of security officials from the area? — Latakia, Jableh and especially Qardaha are historic centers of the Alawite community; Qardaha is the ancestral village of the Assad family. Many military personnel, security officers and Shabiha members lived in these areas, which is why they are considered strongholds of the former regime. Trials of security officials from the region are complicated by local support for suspects, witnesses’ fear, the risk of sectarian revenge and collective punishment, distrust of the new justice system, and the possibility that some perpetrators may be hiding or benefiting from clan connections. This requires a careful balance between justice and preventing a new escalation.
Full version: The Last of Them Is Miraj Ural: Meet 10 of the Most Prominent Figures Involved in Crimes Against Syrians