After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, southern Syria has evolved from the periphery of the Syrian conflict into one of the Middle East’s most sensitive flashpoints. This is no longer simply a border issue between Damascus and Israel, but a genuine test of Washington’s ability to reshape the region according to a formula based on security and stability rather than a fragile “balance of fear.”
Israel has strengthened its positions near the Golan Heights and continued incursions and strikes, while Damascus, with U.S. support and in a renewed diplomatic context, is seeking security arrangements to limit escalation. The U.S. presence in this situation is not accidental: Washington has shifted from open confrontation with Damascus to a more complex approach—gradually lifting sanctions, supporting domestic stability, encouraging Syrian-Israeli dialogue, and retaining leverage. The meeting between U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, along with discussions of bilateral relations and regional security, reflects this shift.
Southern Syria—especially Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida—lies at the intersection of several equations at once: a geopolitical nexus, overland corridors, supply chains and energy pipelines, as well as water resources for Damascus and Jordan. This makes it a point of contact involving Israel, Syria’s internal and national security, Turkish influence, the interests of Arab states, and the fight against the Islamic State. As a result, any disruption there does not remain local: it reverberates simultaneously in Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, around 280 incidents of Israeli military incursions into Syrian territory were recorded in September alone.
Washington understands that security cannot be created through military force, buffer zones, or unilateral demands alone. Southern Syria cannot be stabilized without addressing the causes of its fragility: weak state institutions, growing local conflicts, the absence of transitional justice, stalled reconstruction, and the presence of armed enclaves or communities that feel cut off from the central decision-making process. Reports indicate that Sweida province remained outside the authorities’ effective control in Damascus amid tensions with the Druze community. This makes governing the south a test of the new state’s ability to build unified legitimacy.
The U.S. strategy in Syria cannot be understood separately from the rivalry between Israel and Turkey. Israel links its security to preventing any hostile military presence near its borders and is demanding the annexation of large areas in southern Syria, including the strategic peak of Jabal al-Sheikh. Turkey, meanwhile, seeks to consolidate its influence and establish security coordination with Damascus, particularly following the process of dismantling the Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur base and Israeli concerns about the spread of Turkish capabilities in Syria show that the Israeli-Turkish rivalry over Syria’s “strategic depth” has become an integral part of the equation of stability or chaos. This is where the American role becomes apparent—as an inconvenient but necessary mediator.
The apparent U.S. objective is to establish a manageable security mechanism: an Israeli withdrawal or restrictions on Israeli incursions; a Syrian commitment not to pose a direct threat; international guarantees; and a political process preserving Syria’s sovereignty over its territory. Yet the path is filled with serious obstacles: continuing Israeli strikes and incursions, delays in withdrawing troops from occupied areas, Damascus’s limited ability to assert its sovereignty, and the complications surrounding Sweida. Any U.S. agreement will not endure if it is built at the expense of Syrian sovereignty or ignores the aspirations of southern Syria’s residents.
Washington’s success will be measured not by the number of meetings or statements, but by its ability to turn the region’s fragility into lasting security. If U.S. diplomacy does not evolve from crisis management toward building a genuine political solution, southern Syria will remain merely another front in a broader regional conflict. But if it can reconcile Israeli security guarantees, Syrian sovereignty, and the role of Arab and Turkish actors, it may open the door to a “balance of peace” instead of a “balance of fear.”
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Where is Sweida located, and why has the region’s Druze community historically held a special position in Syrian politics, at times distancing itself from Damascus? — Sweida is a city and province in southern Syria, near the border with Jordan, in the Jabal al-Arab (“Druze Mountain”) region. The Druze are a closed religious community concentrated there. Historically, they enjoyed autonomy under the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate and maintained their own religious and tribal structures. Because of their peripheral location, concerns about their identity, and distrust of central authorities, the Druze have often kept their distance from Damascus. During the civil war, Sweida became one of the few relatively autonomous areas where local councils and militias played a greater role than the regime.
What is Jabal al-Sheikh, and why does Israel seek control over this peak, linking it to security on its border with Syria? — Jabal al-Sheikh, or Mount Hermon, is a mountain massif in the Anti-Lebanon range at the junction of Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. It is a strategic elevation from which large areas of Syria, Lebanon, and northern Israel can be observed. Israel wants to control the Syrian part of the peak in order to obtain early warning, prevent Iranian forces, Hezbollah, or hostile groups from deploying near its border, and retain control over water resources—the runoff from Mount Hermon feeds the Jordan River.
What is the Abu al-Duhur base, and why do the interests of Israel, Turkey, and Syrian armed groups intersect there? — Abu al-Duhur is a former military air base in eastern Idlib and an important hub on routes connecting Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. During the civil war, it changed hands several times. Conflicting interests converge around it: Israel seeks to prevent Iran or Hezbollah from using the base; Turkey supports Syrian groups loyal to it and wants to weaken Kurdish forces; and various Syrian armed formations are competing for control of the strategic territory and communications routes.
What are the Syrian Democratic Forces, and why did their dismantling become a bargaining issue between Turkey, Damascus, and Washington? — The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are a politico-military alliance in northeastern Syria whose core consists of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). They received U.S. support in the fight against ISIS. Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and demands its dissolution. Damascus wants to restore central authority over the northeast. Washington uses the SDF to fight ISIS and preserve its influence, so the group’s future has become a bargaining issue: Turkey demands its dismantling, Damascus seeks its integration under central control, and the United States wants to maintain a manageable presence and prevent chaos.
Full version: Southern Syria… Washington Faces a Test of Security