A new memorandum between Damascus and Moscow on the Hmeimim and Tartus bases opens a new stage in bilateral relations. The negotiations lasted about a year and a half and concluded after Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s two visits to Moscow—in October 2025 and January 2026. Analysts believe the agreement is intended to replace Syria’s previous dependence with a pragmatic partnership based on the country’s full sovereignty, while also settling political, military and economic issues.
Under the agreement, civilian facilities—including Hmeimim Airport and Tartus port’s fourth commercial berth—will be transferred to the management of the Syrian state and gradually integrated into civilian infrastructure. The military status of other facilities will be transformed into a format of joint training and education centers; the process is expected to be completed within three months at the latest. Syrian researchers believe this will enable Damascus to regain control over its territory and airspace.
Military cooperation, however, will not end. The bases are expected to be used to train and equip the Syrian army using Russian technologies, rather than for Moscow’s independent strategic objectives. Russian analyst Yevgeny Sidorov compared the new format with Soviet–Syrian cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, but emphasized its pragmatic and non-ideological character. Cooperation could include weapons maintenance, training, as well as joint security operations and humanitarian tasks such as combating piracy.
The memorandum allows Damascus to retain important benefits from cooperation with Moscow: maintenance of military equipment, access to Russian oil technologies, and Russia’s diplomatic support in the UN Security Council and on difficult regional issues. At the same time, the agreement limits the use of Tartus as an exclusive base for expanding Russia’s logistical presence in Africa. For Syria, it is also a way to legally revise its relations with Moscow without turning Russia into an adversary.
The most contentious issues remain transitional justice and the extradition of wanted individuals, particularly former President Bashar al-Assad. Moscow is unlikely to agree to hand him over, citing the political asylum granted to him and humanitarian considerations. However, the sides may reach confidential agreements aimed at preventing a rupture in relations. Damascus, meanwhile, expects that Russia’s previous protection will no longer extend to representatives of the former regime, including Maher al-Assad and members of the security forces. Despite their differences, al-Sharaa and Vladimir Putin are demonstrating a conciliatory attitude, while Iran remains the main exception to Damascus’s more flexible foreign policy.
Comments on the News
How could the transfer of Hmeimim Airport and part of Tartus port to Syrian management affect the operation of these facilities and the local economies of Latakia and Tartus? — The transfer of management could strengthen Syrian control, increase the involvement of local authorities and generate additional revenue from port, logistics and aviation services. However, without Russian investment, technical support and security guarantees, disruptions, reduced cargo traffic and job losses are possible. The outcome will depend on the terms of the agreement, the level of funding and the ability of Syrian institutions to manage the facilities effectively.
What does the transition of the Russian bases to a joint training-center format mean for the Syrian army, and how much does it change the role of Russian servicemen in the country? — This could represent a formal shift from a permanent military presence to a more limited role for instructors and advisers. Russian servicemen will likely focus more on training, coordination and technical support for the Syrian army rather than on independent combat operations. For Damascus, this preserves access to Russian expertise, but it also requires the Syrian army to become more self-reliant.
Why could the issue of handing over Bashar al-Assad and other representatives of the former Syrian regime complicate the agreement between Damascus and Moscow despite their publicly conciliatory stance? — For Moscow, handing over Assad would pose a serious political and reputational risk: it could be seen as abandoning a former ally and undermining Russian guarantees. For Syria’s new authorities, by contrast, the demand for his extradition may be linked to questions of justice and domestic legitimacy. As a result, public statements about cooperation may coexist with tough, confidential negotiations over guarantees, the status of former officials and possible legal proceedings.
Full version: After the Hmeimim and Tartus Agreement: What Did the Russians Lose and What Did Damascus Gain?