Anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments in Egyptian society are not a spontaneous reaction to current events, but the result of decades of historical, cultural and political experience that has shaped a collective mindset. Hostility toward Israel goes back to collective memory, where it is seen as an “historical enemy,” and it is also linked to an acute sense of sovereignty and rejection of outside interference. To understand this mood, one must take into account the contexts that reproduce it with every crisis, rather than seeking narrow explanations in momentary events.
Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Egypt has viewed it as an existential threat — up to the 1973 war. In the era of Arab nationalism, especially under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the state tied security to rhetoric of “resistance,” while society saw in every confrontation an opportunity to restore historical rights and achieve full liberation. Even after the defeat in 1967, the spirit of resistance did not disappear; it transformed into a more complex strategy: managing a long-term conflict, rebuilding internal strength, intensifying diplomacy, and expanding alliances.
This “Nasser-era mindset” also extended to support for anti-Western movements: in 1962–1966, Egypt helped the opposition in Iran against the Shah. In this context, the article cites the memoirs of the late Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who wrote about Nasser’s death: “This news struck us like thunder… we cried bitterly… not only because we lost a man, but because of the hope he embodied in his struggle against arrogance and injustice.” The internal upheavals between 1967 and 1973 — such as the 1968 protests and the student movement at Cairo University — show how street pressure redefined the boundaries of political action within the country and across the region.
After 1973, political changes — particularly UN Security Council Resolution 338, the Camp David Accords (1978), and the peace treaty (1979) — split public opinion. The state shifted priorities toward protecting immediate borders and winding down pan-Arab projects, moving the conflict from the battlefield to the diplomatic halls. During Hosni Mubarak’s “Cold Peace” era, there was space for criticism of normalization amid popular solidarities, for example the intifadas of 1987 and 2000, but popular rejection of Israel remained.
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, especially during the events in Sheikh Jarrah and the 2023 war in Gaza, Egypt put national sovereignty at the forefront and sought a balance between public sentiment and state obligations. The country remained a mediator and played a diplomatic role, organizing a peace conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, the outcomes of which were later endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Egypt’s official relations with Iran remain “extremely cautious,” but public consciousness is an independent sphere that instinctively sympathizes with anyone who stands against Israel — although this does not mean approval of Iran’s project: Egyptians’ perceptions of Iran and Hezbollah were damaged by their interference in Syria.
These sentiments are fueled by civilizational, religious and cultural factors, turning the conflict with Israel into a “struggle for existence, not for borders.” At the core is the memory of blood and past defeats, as well as images of national heroes such as Saad Idris Halawa or Sulaiman Hater, who opened fire on Israeli tourists and was celebrated by the streets. Cinema, literature and art entrenched the idea of existential confrontation with Israel, creating in society a kind of “intellectual immune system” that cuts across sectarian divisions and emotionally focuses against Israel.
The latest war with Iran and the subsequent escalation by the United States and Israel once again revived the narrative of the “arrogant existential enemy.” This has strengthened Egyptians’ sympathy for Iran — as a way to express a sense of powerlessness and a desire to contain Israel. At the same time, the state continues to balance between pressure from the street, obligations to Gulf security, and its role as a mediator, preserving a fragile equilibrium.
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Why did the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser provoke such strong emotions in Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and what historical connections existed between Iran and Egypt at the time? — Ali Khamenei, as a young Islamist revolutionary, admired Nasser as a symbol of anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and the struggle against Israel. Despite ideological differences (Nasser was a secular Arab nationalist, while Khamenei is an Islamic cleric), what united them was hostility toward the West and support for the Palestinian cause. In the 1950s and 1960s, relations between monarchic Iran (the Shah) and Nasserist Egypt were tense because of different sides in the “Cold War” in the Middle East; but after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran tried to draw closer to Egypt, seeing it as a potential ally against Israel.
What role did Hezbollah play in the civil war in Syria, and why did that lead to a decline in its reputation among Egyptians despite a broadly anti-Israeli stance? — Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, helping to turn the course of the war. However, among Egyptians, especially the Sunni majority, support by the Shiite organization for a regime aligned with the Alawites against largely Sunni rebels was perceived as betraying Sunnis and as Iran’s interference in Arab affairs. In addition, Egypt traditionally leans toward Saudi Arabia, which supported the Syrian opposition, further intensifying the negative view of Hezbollah.
What is the status of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran today, and what key disagreements (for example, over Syria or Yemen) prevent their normalization? — Relations remain at the level of interests without full diplomatic missions: embassies have been closed since 1979. The main disagreements are: Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the Assad regime (Cairo sees this as a threat to its role in the Arab world); Iran’s interference in Yemen via the Houthis (Egypt is concerned for the security of the Red Sea); and Tehran’s ties with Palestinian groups that compete with Egypt’s mediating efforts in Gaza. Normalization is also hindered by Egypt’s strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia — Iran’s main rival.
What is meant by the “Iranian project” in the Middle East, and what strategic goals (for example, creating an “axis of resistance” or exporting the revolution) does Tehran pursue in the region? — The “Iranian project” is a strategy to expand influence through a network of non-state allies (“axis of resistance”): Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as Hamas and “Islamic Jihad” in Palestine. The goals include: 1) exporting the ideology of the Islamic Revolution (creating states governed by Islamic clerics); 2) creating a land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean through Iraq and Syria to supply Hezbollah; 3) countering U.S. and Israeli influence; 4) weakening Sunni Arab monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, by supporting their opposition.
Full version: لماذا تعاطف المصريون مع إيران ضد أمريكا وإسرائيل؟